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INTRODUCTION 
Previous  Commission  communications  on  the  implementation  of  the  EU  framework  for 
electronic communications (formerly telecommunications) have given extensive analysis in 
the form of a report backed by annexes containing more detailed regulatory and market data. 
The Commission’s latest communication, ‘European Electronic Communications Regulation 
and Markets 2004’, departs from that format in that it provides a very concise overview of 
major market developments over the past year and of the main horizontal regulatory issues 
arising. The more detailed analysis of the implementation of the framework in the individual 
Member States and market data is set out in this Commission Services’ Working Document. 
The document describes the transposition of the new regulatory framework in the Member 
States; the implementation in practice of nationally transposed measures; and developments in 
the  broadband,  mobile  services,  fixed  voice,  leased  lines  and  interconnection  market 
segments.  It  also  contains  an  annex  on  the  status  of  Article  7  proceedings,  based  on  the 
experience of the team put in place in the two Directorates General, Information Society and 
Competition, to assess jointly draft measures notified by national regulatory authorities; an 
annex covering implementation in the Member States (country chapters), for the first time 
including all twenty  five; and an annex containing detailed market data underpinning the 
Communication and Working Document. 
The Working Document was prepared on the basis of missions carried out between June and 
September 2004 by desk officers from the Directorates General for the Information Society 
and for Competition, and analysis of the notifications and drafts received from Member States 
of  national  transposition  measures.  The  market  data  were  assembled  by  DG  Information 
Society on the basis of information received from national regulatory authorities and of tariff 
data  supplied  by  Teligen HI  Europe.  All  data  were  validated  between  the  Commission 
services and experts from national regulatory authorities, directly and at a meeting held on 
11 October 2004. 
Unless otherwise stated, the regulatory situation described here is that at 1 October, and the 
market data cover the period up to and including 1 August 2004.  
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STATE OF TRANSPOSITION AND INFRINGEMENT PROCEEDINGS 
At the end of October 2004, twenty Member States had completed the adoption of primary 
legislation to transpose the five Directives establishing the new regulatory framework
1. Those 
that had not were Belgium, the Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece and Luxembourg. However, 
substantive secondary legislation is still to be adopted in a number of Member States.  In 
addition,  twenty  Member  States  have  supplied  complete  information  with  regard  to  the 
Competition Directive. 
  Framework 
 
2002/21/EC 
Access 
 
2002/19/EC 
Authori-
sation 
2002/20/EC 
Universal 
Service 
2002/22/EC 
ePrivacy 
 
2002/58/EC 
Competi-
tion 
2002/77/EC 
Belgium  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Czech Rep.  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Denmark  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Germany  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Estonia  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Greece  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Spain  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
France  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Ireland  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Italy  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Cyprus  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Latvia  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Lithuania  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Luxembourg  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Hungary  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Malta  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Netherlands  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Austria  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Poland  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Portugal  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Slovenia  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Slovakia  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Finland  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
Sweden  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
United Kingdom  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿  ￿ 
 
￿ = full transposition notified/complete information supplied  ￿  =  partial  transposition  notified/partial 
information supplied  ￿ = no transposition notified/no substantial information supplied 
                                                 
1  Framework,  Access,  Authorisation,  Universal  Service  and  ePrivacy  Directive;  see  Recital  5  of  the 
Framework Directive.  
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The above table indicates the state of transposition according to the notifications received 
from the Member States as of end November 2004 and, as regards the Competition Directive, 
whether information was supplied on primary legislation allowing the Commission to assess 
compliance with the Directive. 
The Commission has already opened the final stage of infringement proceedings against those 
EU 15 Member States that have failed to notify measures for the new regulatory framework
2 
and  to  supply  complete  information  with  regard  to  the  Competition  Directive,  and 
proceedings  have  been  pending  before  the  Court  of  Justice  against  Belgium,  Greece  and 
Luxembourg since June 2004
3. Infringement proceedings will be considered against those 
new Member States that have not notified transposition measures before the end of the year. 
The Commission services are currently examining the conformity of national implementation 
measures with the EU Directives, and the first substantive infringement proceedings have 
been launched
4. These concern the key issue of the role of the national regulatory authorities 
when carrying out market analysis, and in particular the remedies which should be available 
to them. Other issues are related to consumer interests. 
The Commission will continue to monitor closely the full and effective implementation of the 
new regulatory framework and the Competition Directive as a priority, in order to contribute 
to the overall Lisbon goals
5. 
Any statement in this document in relation to the regulatory situation in a specific Member 
State is therefore without prejudice to the position taken by the Commission in the exercise of 
its powers under the Treaty. 
                                                 
2  See  most  recently  IP/04/510;  all  press  releases  on  infringement  proceedings  related  to  the  new 
regulatory framework are available at   
http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/all_about/implementation_enforcement/index_e
n.htm  
3  Cases C 240/04 and C 376/04 (Belgium); C 236/04, C 349/04 and C 375/04 (Luxembourg), C 250/04, 
C 252/04 to C 254/04, C 299/04 and C 475/04 (Greece). 
4  Publicly  available  information  on  infringement  proceedings  can  be  found  at  the  following  website 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/secretariat_general/sgb/droit_com/index_fr.htm#infractions.  
5  Cf. 20
th Annual Report on monitoring the application of Community law (2002), COM(2003) 669 of 
21.11.2003.  
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REGULATORY FRAMEWORK 
NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTHORITIES 
The national regulatory authority has a fundamental role in ensuring a coherent application of 
the new regulatory framework as it is transposed in the national legal systems in the Member 
States. While monitoring the markets, the NRAs will be called upon to ensure a level playing 
field for all market players and stimulate investment, innovation and sustainable competitive 
development.  
For this to work, decision making procedures, either in the form of regulations or dispute 
resolutions, need to ensure regulatory predictability and effectiveness. They also need to be 
timely to reflect the dynamics of the electronic communications markets, while sanctions need 
to be proportionate to the objective to be achieved. As regards remedies, NRAs are expected 
to find the right balance between applying ex ante regulation and encouraging operators to 
invest  in  the  sector  and  in  particular  in  emerging  technologies.  In  the  context  of  the 
transposition and notification process, the Commission services are looking to the NRAs to be 
able  to  carry  out  fully  the  extended  tasks  they  are  required  to  undertake  under  the  new 
framework.  
However, certain issues have already arisen. There have been significant delays in conducting 
the market analysis and revising existing obligations. It also remains to be seen whether the 
requirement to provide for the independence of the NRA vis-a-vis operators is sufficiently 
ensured in all Member States. Further, the allocation of tasks has not always been clear in all 
Member States where powers are assigned to more than one organisation. In certain cases, 
national measures transposing the Directives provide for obligations to be imposed on ‘SMP’ 
operators  (operators  with  significant  market  power)  without  taking  into  account  the 
competitive and particular circumstances of a specific market, while in others the power of the 
NRA  to  impose  obligations  on  the  SMP  operators  is  relatively  limited.  The  Commission 
services are verifying the conformity of such arrangements with the new framework. 
Independence and impartiality 
The  legal,  functional  and  structural  independence  of  NRAs  from  organisations  providing 
electronic communications networks and services, especially where the state holds a stake in 
those organisations, continues to play a central role under the new regulatory framework.  
Concerns expressed by market players in the past in this connection in Belgium appear now to 
have been overcome following the adoption of relevant legislative measures. In France, while 
structural separation has not been modified, the situation appears to have improved to the 
extent that the Ministry no longer controls retail tariffs. It remains to be seen whether further 
major concerns subsist in the EU 15 as regards the issue of independence.  
It is also being examined whether further measures to improve the independence of the NRA 
and address concerns reported by the market players  could be taken in some of the new 
Member States. In particular, in Cyprus, despite progress achieved, there may still be some 
room for improvement as on one hand the incumbent is not incorporated and has the status of 
a ‘semi governmental body’ and on the other, the Ministry which co ordinates the ownership  
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functions  is  also  responsible  for  carrying  out  the  tasks  of  frequency  allocation  and 
management. In Latvia, the Ministry responsible for policy and drafting of legislation still has 
ownership interests in an operator in the electronic communications sector.  
As regards Slovenia, the Commission services are examining concerns from market players 
over  a  perceived  conflict  of  interest  and  lack  of  independence  resulting  from  the 
representation in the general shareholder’s meeting of the State’s holding in the incumbent 
fixed operator by the Ministry responsible for the supervision of the independent regulator, 
while  in  Slovakia  it  remains  to  be  seen  whether  structural  separation  of  regulatory  and 
ownership functions has been achieved. 
Allocation of tasks 
In  the  interests  of  transparency  and  effective  implementation,  the  Framework  Directive 
stresses the need to ensure that where tasks are assigned to more than one authority the tasks 
are published in an easily accessible form and that consultation and co operation takes place 
between the different bodies. 
In the United Kingdom Ofcom, the successor of OFTEL, now exercises all of the regulatory 
functions  previously  assigned  to  five  different  bodies,  including  those  relating  to 
broadcasting. Positive developments are also reported in Italy, where a long standing issue 
relating  to  the  distribution  of  tasks  between  the  independent  regulator  and  the  relevant 
Ministry  has  been  clarified  with  the  adoption  of  an  agreement  already  notified  to  the 
Commission. In Spain, the responsibility for different elements of the regulatory framework is 
spread between five different bodies (including the government). In France, it is still unclear 
how the ART and the CSA (the regulator for the audiovisual sector) will co ordinate their 
activities. In Lithuania it is reported by market players that there is some blurring of the 
responsibilities  between  the  NRA  and  the  Ministry  where  acts  of  the  NRA  require  the 
Ministry’s approval, while the ability of the Minister, even in theory, to annul NRA decisions 
could be problematic if applied in practice. In Poland, where regulatory functions are spread 
among three bodies (including the Ministry of Infrastructure responsible for defining relevant 
markets), some ambiguity has been noticed in the allocation of tasks regarding broadcasting 
between URTiP (the telecommunications NRA) and the National Broadcasting Council, while 
in Slovakia and the Czech Republic the division of tasks between the NRA and the national 
competition authority is somewhat unclear. 
In Malta, the exact division of tasks between the NRA and the Competition Authority is not 
clear,  as  the  NRA  is  also  responsible  for  ensuring  fair  competition  in  the  electronic 
communications sector. 
The Commission services are examining each of the instances described above to determine 
their conformity with the regulatory framework. 
In  certain  cases,  the  transposition  measures  introduce  new  provisions  addressing  long 
standing  concerns  on  the  part  of  the  market.  This  is  for  example  the case  for  Spain  and 
France,  where  the  powers  of  the  independent  regulator  have  been  extended  to  cover  the 
possible regulation of retail tariffs in the context of the market analysis. The exercise by the 
same body of both wholesale and retail regulation, where appropriate, would allow it to tackle 
more efficiently certain issues such as price squeeze.  
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Powers of the NRA 
The regulatory framework as a whole lists the powers that an NRA should have at its disposal 
in order to carry out its tasks. At the same time, in most cases it confers on the NRA the role 
of assessing the state of competition in a given market and determining, in the light of the 
conditions in that market at the time in question, what are the appropriate remedies to impose.  
However, in a number of Member States the legislation transposing the framework may well 
limit this discretion conferred on the NRA, by pre determining the outcome of the NRA’s 
deliberations, by excluding some options which would otherwise have been available to the 
NRA or by placing additional conditions on the exercise of the NRA’s powers which are not 
reflected in the EU framework.  
In the Netherlands, the overall powers of OPTA have been both increased and better defined 
by the new Law, as a result of which appeals for lack of a legal basis or the power to intervene 
are expected to be avoided. However, concerns are reported by market players in that country 
and  in  Ireland  concerning  the  actual  freedom  of  the  NRA  to  exercise  its  powers  with 
discretion, as the Ministers in both Member States can issue policy directions to the NRA. 
Also, in a case where the Malta Communications Authority did not follow Ministerial policy 
directions it would be possible for its functions to be transferred to the Minister; so far, no 
such policy directions have been adopted and it is to be hoped that the issue is of a theoretical 
nature. In Portugal the new law appears to pre define the remedies to be imposed on a finding 
of SMP in the leased lines markets, while in Finland the law appears not to allow for the 
imposition of all of the remedies available under the EU framework in the event of a finding 
of SMP. The Commission services are examining each of the instances described above to 
determine their conformity with the regulatory framework. 
In  Germany,  the  new  Telecommunications  Act  appears  to  limit  the  NRA’s  discretion  by 
predetermining  certain  types  of  remedies  for  access  issues  and  by  introducing  criteria 
additional to the new framework such as historic market power and double dominance. 
In Hungary the law seems to give to two ministries the power to issue decrees regulating 
broadcasting prices and the relations between fixed telephone networks and ISPs, without in 
either case the need for market analysis or a finding of SMP. In Poland, certain market players 
have expressed concerns that, in exercising its regulatory tasks, the NRA is less active than 
they would expect, while in Slovenia there is a concern on the part of new entrant market 
players, which the Commission services are examining, that there might be a lack of political 
will to regulate the market.  
Length of decision-making proceedings 
Delays have been reported by market players in certain Member States in the decision making 
process  of  the  NRA.  This  has  been  the  case,  for  example,  for  Portugal  and  Poland.  In 
Denmark and Germany, some delays have been reported in particular when the NRA acts on 
its own initiative. The  Commission services are examining whether these reported delays 
represent a systemic problem.  
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Enforcement of decisions 
Even if national law places at the disposal of the NRA all the powers envisaged by the EU 
framework, the exercise of those powers will have little effect on market conditions if there is 
not rigorous follow up and enforcement of regulatory decisions after they have been made. 
Limited  exercise  of  enforcement  powers  by  NRAs,  which  in  certain  cases  refers  to  the 
enforcement of the decisions that the NRA itself has adopted, is considered as one of the 
major obstacles to the promotion of effective competition across the EU, and the Commission 
services are examining a number of reported instances. In particular, in Belgium, for example, 
it is reported that the powers to impose fines are not exercised in practice, while in Greece it is 
reported that the NRA does not always use its powers to enforce its own decisions and to 
impose heavier financial penalties. In Italy the level of the financial penalties envisaged by 
law for non compliance is reported to be low, while delays in enforcement have also been 
experienced.  In  the  Netherlands  the  Commission  services  are  paying  close  attention  to  a 
reported lack of effective enforcement by the NRA of its own decisions in specific cases.  
Resources 
The need for NRAs to undertake the initial market reviews in addition to their ongoing work 
on supervision, dispute settlement and enforcement has clearly placed a severe burden on all 
regulators during this crucial period. The question of resources, in terms of expertise or staff 
numbers, is clearly an important element, and the Commission services are not yet convinced 
that  they  are  fully  available  in  particular  in  the  case  of  Cyprus,  Latvia,  Lithuania, 
Luxembourg,  Slovakia,  Poland  and  Sweden.  In  Italy,  an  increase  in  human and  financial 
resources would be welcome, following the reduction of the contribution by the State to the 
NRA’s funds and the recent increase of its competences. 
Consultation and transparency 
Public  consultation  and  transparency  in  the  regulatory  process  is  vital  for  the  smooth 
functioning of the market. The Framework Directive accordingly places special emphasis on 
the need for information on the application of the framework to be made easily accessible to 
the public and requires NRAs to give interested parties the opportunity to comment on draft 
measures within a reasonable time. 
The Commission services are scrutinising whether the consultation procedures in Articles 6 
and  7  of  the  Framework  Directive  have  been  fully  transposed  in  Latvia,  and  whether  in 
Slovakia some consultations exclude certain interested parties such as consumers from the 
process, and whether the requirements of Article 7 are fully transposed in the case of draft 
measures under the Universal Service Directive. The Commission services are looking into 
concerns in Lithuania that the period allowed for consultation is too short to give interested 
parties a reasonable opportunity to comment. In Spain, concerns are reported for the first time 
regarding lack of transparency on the part of the CMT, in particular concerning the market 
reviews, and whether the new telecommunications law includes specific provisions governing 
the national consultation procedures. In Germany not all of the NRA’s decisions are made 
publicly available on its website. In Greece, national legal requirements regarding publication 
of NRA decisions appear not to be fully applied in practice. In the Netherlands there was a 
reported lack of transparency as a result of the limited consultation of alternative operators 
following the negotiation of wholesale tariffs between the NRA and the fixed incumbent.  
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In  certain  Member  States,  the  issue  of  confidentiality  has  been  raised.  In  particular,  in 
Belgium, although the NRA has been pro active in taking measures to ensure a level playing 
field  especially  regarding  cost  accounting  methodologies,  it  is  reported  that  certain 
information that the new entrants consider essential to the proceedings has been withheld 
from the market on the grounds of confidentiality. Similar problems may well exist in Spain, 
where  it  is  reported  that  information  which  some  operators  consider  essential  for  the 
transparency of the decision making process is unavailable on grounds of confidentiality.  
In Austria, the Administrative Court in a recent judgment partly relaxed the applicable rules 
on  business  secrecy.  In  accordance  with  the  judgment,  business  data  forming  part  of  the 
reports used as evidence in NRA proceedings should not be deleted. This judgment could 
have an impact on the decision of market players to initiate proceedings before the NRA, as 
they might be concerned about their business data being revealed.  
The  Commission  services  are  examining  all  of  these  concerns  to  determine  whether  the 
regulatory framework has been complied with. 
Data gathering 
The Framework Directive requires undertakings providing networks and services to make 
available all information necessary for NRAs to ensure conformity with the provisions of, or 
decisions made in accordance with, the directive and the specific directives. 
Operators in a number of countries, in particular Belgium, Germany, Spain, France, Austria 
and the United Kingdom, have expressed concern at the volume of data they are required to 
submit in this context, and the frequency with which they are asked to submit it. Much of the 
information is for purposes other than market analysis, and appears to cover a wide range of 
subjects including business forecasts, detail of revenues, traffic volumes and patterns as well 
as information on the infrastructure used for each of the services concerned. The sheer detail 
required can represent a significant burden on operators. 
In this regard it is important that NRAs take particular care to ensure that the information 
requested is proportionate to the performance of the task in hand, and that an undue burden 
should not be imposed on undertakings. 
APPEALS AND DISPUTE RESOLUTION 
Appeal mechanisms 
In addition to its requirements for the Member States to ensure the existence of effective 
appeal  mechanisms,  the  new  framework  also  requires  that  the  appeal  bodies  have  the 
appropriate expertise available to them in order to carry out their functions. In the majority of 
the Member States, appeals against the NRA decisions are brought for before a court of either 
general  or  administrative  jurisdiction.  In  a  few  Member  States,  different  structures  are  in 
place. In particular, in the United Kingdom, appeals against Ofcom decisions are made to the 
Competition Appeal Tribunal, a specialist judicial body with jurisdiction over competition 
and regulatory cases, which assumed its responsibilities in April 2003.  
In  Denmark,  appeals  against  NRA  decisions  are  brought  before  the  Telecommunications 
Complaints Board. The Board convenes only on request and only a few times per year. The  
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Commission services are examining the extent to which a rapid response to appeals may be 
ensured.  
New structures have also been put in place in Belgium and Ireland. In Belgium, during 2003, 
the Act on Legal Remedies and Disputes Settlement introduced the right to appeal against the 
NRA’s decisions before the Court of Appeals in Brussels, which can deliver a judgment on 
the merits of the case.  
In Ireland, under the new electronic communications law, an Appeal Panel is set up only 
when an appeal against an NRA decision is received. The Commission services are examining 
whether the fact that the appeals panel is only established on an ad hoc basis could have 
implications  for  its  future  effectiveness,  for  example,  in  terms  of  ensuring  continuity  of 
expertise and experience.  
In Malta, under the new legislation the old Telecommunications Appeal Board should be 
replaced by the Communications Appeal Board which will consist of three members having 
relevant  experience.  The  new  Board  will  function  as  an  ad  hoc  body  being  convened 
occasionally when an appeal is filed. 
In Hungary, it would appear that any exercise of the powers of the Minister to adopt decrees 
imposing  remedies  independently  of  market  analysis  and  SMP  findings  could  only  be 
appealed  on  constitutional  grounds.  The  Commission  services  are  examining  this  issue 
carefully.  
In Poland, a large proportion of the decisions of the NRA has been overturned following an 
appeal against them, as a result of administrative and substantive deficiencies in the decisions. 
In Sweden, the Commission services are examining concerns regarding the right of appeal, 
since it appears that unless the decision is directly addressed to a certain party, the latter 
cannot appeal against it even if it is affected by it. In Hungary, it remains to be seen whether 
the  practice  of  limiting  the  right  of  appeal  to  those  who  were  parties  to  the  particular 
procedure  concerned  would  raise  concerns  in  view  of  the  wider  rights  of  appeal  for  all 
affected parties provided for by the new regulatory framework.  
Length of appeal procedures 
It has to be considered whether in some Member States (Germany, France, Poland, Denmark, 
Sweden and Italy) the length of appeal procedures has undermined the effective application of 
the regulatory framework. Nevertheless, in Germany, a substantial improvement in the time 
required for delivery of a court judgment is expected following relevant provisions in the new 
Law which eliminate one instance of judicial review. Likewise, in the Netherlands, as of the 
adoption of the new Law, judicial review can be sought directly without the need to submit an 
appeal first with OPTA. Delays can also be caused by the practice of operators systematically 
appealing against decisions by the regulator (as has been seen in  Belgium, Germany, the 
Netherlands, Portugal, Sweden and Greece), thereby reducing legal certainty until the final 
judgment is delivered.  
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Status of NRA decisions pending appeal 
Implementation  of  measures  needed  to  remedy  lack  of  effective  competition  can  also  be 
seriously delayed by the systematic suspension of NRA decisions pending the outcome of an 
appeal.  The  new  framework  has  sought  to  address  this  problem  by  providing  that  NRA 
decisions should stand pending appeal unless the appeal body decides otherwise. 
The Commission services are examining whether this principle is transposed in Poland and 
Finland. A frequent suspension of decisions until the final judgment is delivered has been 
reported by market players in Lithuania. In Austria, appeals against decisions of the NRAs 
responsible for the regulation of the broadcasting infrastructure and rights of way appear to 
have the effect of suspending them. In France, appeals from decisions of the NRA and the 
national competition authority are heard by different courts (administrative and commercial 
respectively). 
Dispute resolution 
The ability of an NRA to resolve disputes brought to its attention by market players in a 
timely  manner,  to  ensure  the  enforcement  of  the  decisions  it  has  reached  and  to  impose 
appropriate sanctions are the main criteria for assessing the effectiveness of the NRA as the 
dispute resolution authority in the sector. The Framework Directive requires NRAs to resolve 
disputes  in  the  shortest  possible  time  frame  and in  any  event within  4  months  except  in 
exceptional circumstances.  
The length of time taken for resolving a dispute in Lithuania, Sweden, Slovenia and Poland, 
and the limited effectiveness of the NRA in resolving disputes in Italy and Slovenia, have 
been points of criticism by market players, while in the Netherlands improvements have been 
made  to  the  law  regarding  the  time  limits  for  disputes  to  be  handled.  The  Commission 
services are examining the extent to which in Germany the right to invoke a dispute resolution 
procedure with the NRA is limited to areas in which the NRA does not have to deal with the 
matter on an ex officio basis. 
In Denmark market players appear to favour informal mediation on the part of the NRA to 
resolve  contentious  issues,  rather  than  launching  a  formal  complaint.  In  Belgium,  the 
efficiency of the Competition Council, which since 2003 has become responsible for settling 
disputes between operators on a number of issues, has been questioned as regards dispute 
resolution. 
NRAs are also empowered by the framework to intervene on their own initiative to ensure 
that the objectives of the new framework are met. However, in a number of Member States 
(including Luxembourg, Poland, Portugal and Slovenia) new entrants complain that the NRA 
is reluctant to intervene on its own initiative to address issues of horizontal importance to the 
market. 
The  Commission  services  are  looking  into  the  above mentioned  concerns  on  the  part  of 
market players. 
Finally, an interesting initiative has been taken in the United Kingdom by the NRA, Ofcom, 
with  the  establishment  of  the  post  of  “Telecoms  Adjudicator”  to  help  resolve  problems 
relating to local loop unbundling.  
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MARKET REVIEW PROCESS 
Timing of reviews 
It is a pre requisite for the effective implementation of the new regulatory framework that the 
initial process of market analysis and review of ex ante obligations be completed in a timely 
manner across the EU. For this reason the Framework Directive required NRAs to carry out 
their  market  analysis  as  soon  as  possible  after  the  adoption  of  the  Commission’s 
Recommendation on relevant markets.  
Partly as a result of delays in transposing the new framework and partly for other reasons, the 
market review process is still patchy across the EU, with draft measures having been notified 
to the Commission by only a minority of Member States. Furthermore, of those Member 
States only Austria, Portugal, Finland and the United Kingdom have notified the majority of 
the  market  analyses  which  will  ultimately  be  required.  A  further  description  of  the 
Commission’s experience to date in handling notifications under Article 7 of the Framework 
Directive is provided in annex. 
In  some  Member  States,  such  as  Italy,  Hungary,  Slovenia,  Slovakia  and  Sweden,  legal 
deadlines for completion of market analysis and choice of remedies have been included in 
national laws. However, this does not guarantee that the deadlines will be met, as evidenced 
by the situation in four of those countries, where the national deadline has already passed 
without completion of all market reviews (in Slovenia the deadline has not yet passed). In 
Sweden the status of existing prior obligations on the passing of the deadline is also an issue, 
because of the wording of the transitional provisions. In Slovenia the Commission services 
are examining the relevant provisions of national law to determine whether existing SMP 
obligations will remain in force only up to their stated date of expiry or until the completion 
of the market reviews, if later. In Estonia no deadline for starting or completing the market 
review procedures appears to be envisaged in the draft law, but it is proposed to include a date 
for the expiry of existing SMP designations and the obligations under the current law which 
flow from them.  
In  France,  although  the  main  transposition  laws  have  now  been  adopted,  further  decrees 
establishing the legal conditions allowing for the market review process to be completed are 
still awaited.  
Transposition issues relating to market reviews 
Although the EU regulatory framework does not prescribe which particular authority within a 
Member  State  should  carry  out  a  particular  task,  in  some  cases  the  division  of  legal 
responsibility for different elements of the market analysis process at national level may call 
into question the achievement of the objectives of the framework. Where this occurs, careful 
monitoring  by  the  Commission’s  services  will  be  required.  For  example,  in  Poland  and 
Austria national law appears to require that relevant markets be defined by ordinance and that 
the market analysis will then be conducted by another body. In Estonia, on the other hand, it 
is proposed that the relevant markets will be defined in the new law transposing the regulatory 
framework.  However,  the  fact  that  different  regulatory  bodies  or  legal  instances  are 
responsible for market definition and for market analysis could give rise to limitations on the 
ability of the body responsible for market analysis to carry out its task as it deems appropriate. 
It also raises the question to what extent interested parties will have the right to appeal against  
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the definitions chosen, since the legal acts concerned are subject to more limited rights of 
appeal than normal decisions of the communications regulator.  
The  fact  that  regulatory  responsibility  for  the  broadcasting  sector,  including  transmission 
services, is in the hands of the regional authorities in Belgium may have implications for the 
conduct  of  market  analysis  under  the  new  framework,  particularly  as  technological 
convergence breaks down the traditional distinctions between transmission platforms. 
In Germany the timing and nature of certain obligations to be imposed on a finding of SMP 
appear to be prescribed by law rather than left to the discretion of the NRA. 
The Commission services are monitoring developments in all of the above cases to determine 
their compliance with the regulatory framework. 
Consultation with national competition authorities 
Since the market analysis process is grounded firmly in the application of competition law 
principles, the Framework Directive  requires Member States to ensure  that the process is 
carried out, where appropriate, in consultation with national competition authorities.  
In Germany the agreement of the national competition authority is required before the NRA 
can act, but the opinion of the competition authority is not always made public. In Estonia 
there appears to be no legal basis for the exchange of information between the NRA and the 
national  competition  authority,  while  in  Lithuania  and  Poland  there  are  apparently  legal 
limitations on the ability of the national competition authority to share information with the 
regulator,  on  grounds  of  confidentiality.  In  Austria  there  seems  to  be  no  legal  basis  to 
guarantee co operation between the two authorities, although it is likely to occur in practice. 
In the United Kingdom the regulator has parallel powers to apply competition law in the 
electronic communications field. In Hungary there is a duty of co operation, but thus far little 
time  appears  to  have  been  given  to  the  NCA  to  provide  its  opinion,  given  the  timing 
constraints imposed under the law on the completion of market analyses. 
Careful monitoring will be required by the Commission services in the above instances. 
NUMBERING RESOURCES 
The availability of adequate supplies of numbers to meet demand is a key precondition for a 
competitive  and  growing  electronic  communications  market.  The  Framework  Directive 
therefore requires that the assignment of numbers and management of the national numbering 
plans  be  controlled  by  the  NRAs,  who  must  establish  objective,  transparent  and  non 
discriminatory assigning procedures. The Directive also requires Member States to ensure that 
adequate numbers are provided for all publicly available electronic communications services. 
In general the availability or management of numbering resources has not been identified as a 
major  concern  in  the  Member  States  in  the  reference  period,  although  the  Commission 
services  are  looking  more  closely  at  the  situation  in  Latvia,  where  an  insufficiency  of 
numbering resources might be an issue. 
One  area  which  is  likely  to  see  significant  growth  in  the  future,  and  which  will  require 
numbering resources if it is to reach its full potential, is the provision of voice telephony over 
IP networks (“VoIP”). It is reported that the NRA in Luxembourg is freeing up numbering  
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blocks for use in IP telephony, and the regulators in Germany, Malta, Austria and the United 
Kingdom  have  undertaken  public  consultations  on  the  rules  that  should  apply  to  VoIP 
services.  In  Germany  and  the  United  Kingdom  the  NRA  has  also  identified  specific 
numbering ranges for VoIP services.  
FREQUENCY MANAGEMENT 
As  with  numbers,  radio  frequencies  constitute  an  essential  resource  for  the  provision  of 
electronic communications services, whether fixed or mobile, in a flexible and cost effective 
manner.  For  this  reason  the  Framework  Directive  contains  specific  provisions  requiring 
Member  States  to  ensure  the  effective  management  of  radio  frequencies  for  electronic 
communications services in accordance with the objectives of the framework. They must also 
ensure that the allocation and assignment of frequencies by NRAs are based on objective, 
transparent, non discriminatory and proportionate criteria. 
In  Spain  a  new  body  with  NRA  status  was  created  by  the  new  law  transposing  the  EU 
regulatory  framework,  with  specific  responsibilities  for  the  management  of  spectrum  and 
charges  for  its  use.  In  the  United  Kingdom  the  new,  unified  regulator  for  the  electronic 
communications sector, Ofcom, has assumed the responsibilities for spectrum management 
which  were  previously  in  the  hands  of  the  Radiocommunications  Agency.  In  Malta  the 
regulator has also recently assumed responsibility for spectrum management. 
A horizontal issue which has existed in a number of Member States over the last year (e.g. 
France, Czech Republic) has been how to deal with requests from holders of existing rights of 
use of spectrum for their rights to be adapted to enable them to use the frequencies concerned 
for the provision of different services or the same services with different technology. 
This is an area which falls within the scope of the work currently being undertaken in the 
Radio Spectrum Policy Group (RSPG) in the context of its discussions on “Wireless Access 
Platforms for Electronic Communications Services”. Part of this work will be to assess how 
best to handle in the future the transition from the existing legacy of frequency rights towards 
a more flexible and technologically neutral approach to spectrum management which takes 
account of technological convergence and the need for legal certainty. 
The  issues  involved  are  particularly  acute  in  cases  where  the  original  rights  of  use  were 
granted before the accession of the Member State concerned to the European Union, when the 
safeguards  governing  the  assignment  of  frequencies  contained  in  the  EU  regulatory 
framework did not apply. 
The Framework Directive also allows for Member States to make provision in their national 
laws for the tradability of spectrum rights between undertakings, provided that this is done 
under the supervision and control of the NRAs. The Analysys report to the Commission on 
spectrum trading in May 2004
6 identified Austria, France, Germany, Italy, the Netherlands, 
Portugal, Spain, Sweden and the United Kingdom as having made provision for spectrum 
trading in their new legislation. Enabling provisions relating to transfer of rights of use are 
also present in the laws of Denmark, Malta, Poland and Slovenia as well as in the draft law of 
                                                 
6  Study on conditions and options in introducing secondary trading of radio spectrum in the European 
Community, May 2004 (available at http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/radio_spectrum/ 
useful_info/studies/secondtrad_study/index_en.htm)  
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the Czech Republic. However the precise scope of  any  ensuing trading rights may differ 
between Member States. 
Further details of specific issues relating to the management of frequencies and the grant of 
rights of use are provided in the section on Authorisations below. 
RIGHTS OF WAY, CO-LOCATION AND FACILITY SHARING 
Where  electronic  communications  providers  need  the  permission  of  public  authorities  at 
national or local level to enable them to install their infrastructure on public or private land, it 
is important that their dealings with those authorities be conducted in a timely and even 
handed way. The Framework Directive specifically requires Member States to ensure that 
competent authorities, when dealing with such requests, act on the basis of transparent and 
publicly  available  procedures,  applied  without  discrimination  and  without  delay.  The 
Directive also requires NRAs to encourage the sharing of facilities and provides that they may 
make such sharing mandatory in specific types of cases. 
Network operators have reported persistent problems across the EU as regards the granting of 
rights to install mobile masts and antennas, often due to health and environmental concerns. 
This might in a number of cases have delayed the roll out of 3G mobile infrastructure, such as 
in  Luxembourg,  Sweden  and  Austria.  In  Belgium,  Greece,  Spain,  Cyprus  and  Portugal 
variations  in  the  approaches  taken  by  different  local  authorities  have  been  identified  by 
operators as an additional burden. To help to overcome problems such as these within its 
territory, the NRA in Denmark has set up a publicly available database of all current and 
future locations of masts in the interests of transparency and to facilitate sharing. 
In Ireland a potential issue arises from the fact that in some cases local authorities that have 
ownership interests in regional broadband networks are also responsible for the grant of rights 
of way. 
In Poland the national law imposes obligations on all operators with regard to facility sharing 
and co location, and the Commission services are examining whether this goes beyond the 
requirements in the Framework Directive.  
In  Belgium  the  compatibility  with  EC  law  of  the  system  of  taxes  imposed  by  regional 
authorities on mobile pylons located on public land has been referred to the European Court 
of Justice. In Portugal the continued existence of a tax on the use of the public domain is a 
concern  for  operators.  In  the  Netherlands  proposals  to  impose  charges  on  unused  fixed 
infrastructure such as ducts have been criticised by the industry, while it has been alleged that 
in the United Kingdom local rates (taxes) on entrants could be proportionately higher than on 
the incumbent, as a consequence of different valuation methods applied.  
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AUTHORISATIONS  
The purpose of the Authorisation Directive is to ensure the freedom to provide electronic 
communications networks and services subject only to the limited (and clearly identified) 
conditions laid down in the Directive. Its effective implementation in the Member States will 
reduce  regulatory  burdens  on  market  entry  and  ensure  a  more  consistent  treatment  of 
undertakings both as between Member States and as between converging technologies.  
The Directive has not yet been fully transposed in Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece 
and Luxembourg. In Ireland there is a specific situation, as the Authorisation Directive is 
apparently  transposed,  inter  alia,  by  means  of  the  Wireless  Telegraphy  Act  of  1926  (as 
amended), dealing with apparatus authorisation rather than individual rights of use of radio 
frequencies. This approach appears to give rise to some inflexibility and its compliance with 
Community law remains to be examined. In the United Kingdom the situation is similar, as 
the United Kingdom legislation seems also to be based on authorisation of radio apparatus 
rather than the grant of rights of use of spectrum per se.  
COMPETITION DIRECTIVE 
The  Competition  Directive  also  includes  similar  provisions  referring  to  the  freedom  to 
provide electronic communications networks and services. Belgium, Czech Republic, Estonia, 
Greece  and  Luxembourg  have  not  provided  the  Commission  with  sufficient  information 
allowing it to assess the compliance of their legislation with the provisions of the Directive. 
One of the main principles of that Directive is the prohibition on imposing or maintaining in 
force any exclusive or special rights for the establishment and/or the provision of electronic 
communications  networks,  or  for  the  provision  of  publicly  available  electronic 
communications services. Member States must also not grant exclusive or special rights of 
use  of  radio  frequencies  for  the  provision  of  electronic  communications  services.  In  this 
regard,  there  are  some  concerns  regarding  the  delays  in  allowing  certain  available  PMR/ 
PAMR frequencies to be used for wideband PAMR services. 
FREEDOM TO PROVIDE NETWORKS AND SERVICES 
Any  restriction  of  freedom  to  provide  electronic  communications  networks  and  services 
(whether legal or administrative) that unduly inhibits this freedom should be seen as calling 
into question the application of this principle. In Sweden conditions attached to broadcasting 
content licences seem to oblige broadcasters to buy transmission capacity from a national 
terrestrial  network  operator,  creating  a  de  facto  exclusive  right  for  this  operator  in  the 
provision  of  transmission  services.  In  Cyprus  conditions  attached  to  the  mobile  licences 
appear to  give  rise to a duopoly situation and  prevent other undertakings from providing 
mobile services. The Commission services are looking into these issues.  
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GENERAL AUTHORISATIONS AND THE CONDITIONS ATTACHED 
The  Authorisation  Directive  requires  that  the  provision  of  electronic  communications 
networks and/or services may only be subject to general authorisation
7, and Member States 
were therefore required to bring existing authorisations into line with the provisions of the 
Directive by the date of its application. For the broadcasting sector this implies particular 
attention on the part of Member State authorities where an individual licence (e.g. for cable 
operations  or  for  terrestrial  transmission/content  providers)  currently  includes  both  an 
authorisation  to  provide  an  electronic  communications  network  or  service  and  an 
authorisation to provide broadcast content to the public. 
General authorisations can be subject only to the conditions exhaustively enumerated in the 
annex  to  the  Directive.  The  Italian  legislation  in  place  seems  to  lay  down  an  additional 
condition  under  general  authorisation  concerning  the  duration  of  the  right  to  provide 
electronic communications services and/or networks. In France, cable operators seem still to 
be covered by additional conditions imposed on them by local authorities (in contracts, drawn 
up prior to the entry into force of the new framework, enabling them to provide networks 
and/or  services),  and  which  have  to  be  removed  by  negotiation.  In  Latvia,  the  primary 
legislation seems to include among conditions that may be attached to general authorisations 
also specific requirements for SMP undertakings. The Commission services are examining the 
conformity  of  such  national  provisions  with  the Authorisation  Directive,  in  particular  the 
requirement  that  such  specific  obligations  be  legally  separate  from  rights  and  obligations 
under the general authorisation. 
INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS OF USE FOR RADIO FREQUENCIES 
Member States need to ensure that where possible, and in particular where the risk of harmful 
interference is negligible, they do not make the use of radio frequencies subject to the grant of 
individual rights of use but include the conditions for usage of such frequencies in the general 
authorisation.  The  Commission  services  are  examining  the  correct  transposition  and/or 
application of this requirement in some Member States, including Ireland, Latvia and Poland. 
In  those  Member  States the  usage  of  any  radio frequency  for the  provision  of  electronic 
communications services would in principle require the grant of an individual right of use
8. 
This raises questions of the objective justification and proportionality of such an approach.  
Procedure 
Where it is necessary to grant individual rights of use, such rights should be granted through 
open,  transparent  and  non discriminatory  procedures.  It  appears  that  this  requirement  is 
formally enshrined in the legislation of the Member States that have transposed. However, it 
is  the  actual  application  of  these  principles  that  may  prove  to  be  crucial  for  the  future 
development  of  electronic  communications  markets  in  the  European  Union.  The  Latvian 
Ministry  considers  that  no  valid  National  Frequency  Allocation  Table  currently  exists  in 
Latvia since the coming into force of the new law on 1 May 2004, and is currently applying 
the "ITU First Region Frequency Plan". Some doubts have been expressed by operators as to 
                                                 
7  This  is  without  prejudice  to  the  possible  requirement  for  individual  rights  of  use  for  underlying 
resources (i.e. frequencies, numbers and rights of way). 
8  In the case of Ireland – a licence for apparatus using the frequency in question. In case of Latvia this 
conclusion is based on the law notified to the Commission as of 1 October 2004.  
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the transparency and objectivity of the frequency assignment procedures in Poland, at least 
with regard to recent assignment of frequency in the 800 MHz band, and Malta with regard to 
DTTV.  
The non discriminatory nature and proportionality of the frequency allocation and assignment 
procedures  have  been  questioned  by  operators  in  some  Member  States.  In  Cyprus  the 
conditions  attached  to  the  individual  spectrum  rights  of  use  of  the  only two  operators  of 
mobile infrastructure (the second licence issued only in October 2003) seem to include a 
clause according to which no further individual right of use for the provision of 2G and/or 3G 
services will be granted for at least a 5  year period. In Malta the legal restriction on the 
number of mobile operators (two) was lifted only in September 2004. Moreover, Malta is 
planning  to  launch  tendering  procedures  for  the  grant  of  individual  rights  of  use  for 
frequencies  in  the  3G  band,  where  priority  may  possibly  be  given  to  current  2G  licence 
holders. They are also considering to offer individual rights of use in the 3.5 GHz band (for 
FWA), but despite the technical possibilities only two licences are to be granted.. With regard 
to DTTV, it is being  examined whether in at least two Member States (Italy  and Malta) 
preference is given to current (analogue) broadcasters in the process of granting frequencies 
for the provision of digital broadcasting and what policy objectives are at play here. The 
Commission services are looking into this issue. 
Efficient use of spectrum  
It is also to be noted that Member States should not limit the number of rights of use to be 
granted except where it is necessary to ensure efficient use of radio frequencies. Measures 
and/or practices adopted by some Member States that result in non use of certain frequencies 
(in general a highly valuable and scarce resource) and artificial scarcity thereof need to be 
verified against that principle, taking into account the overall objectives of the new regulatory 
framework.  
Conditions attached 
Individual  rights  of  use  of  radio  frequencies  may  be  subject  only  to  the  conditions 
exhaustively listed in the annex to the Directive. Such conditions must be objectively justified 
in  relation  to  the  network  or  service  concerned,  non discriminatory,  proportionate  and 
transparent.  
A difficult issue arising from the spectrum assignment exercise in some Member States is the 
extent  to  which  obligations  equivalent  to  those  which  may  be  imposed  on  a  finding  of 
significant  market  power  may  be  imposed  as  conditions  attached  to  a  right  of  use  of 
frequencies, if they derive from commitments entered into by an applicant in a competitive 
tender. This will need to be judged on a case by case basis by reference to the principle of 
proportionality and against the overall objectives and structure of the regulatory framework.  
In  Lithuania,  a  condition  attached  to  a  spectrum  right  of  use  assigned  to  an  undertaking 
precludes it from charging higher retail prices than the ones proposed during the tendering 
procedure. The Commission services are examining whether such a condition is objectively 
justified and proportionate.   
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ADMINISTRATIVE CHARGES AND FEES 
Administrative  charges  imposed  on  undertakings  should  in  total  cover  only  the  actual 
administrative  costs  of  the  national  regulatory  authorities  incurred  in  managing  the 
authorisation  system  and  the  granting  of  rights  of  use.  The  charges  imposed  need  to  be 
objectively justified, transparent and proportionate. For reasons of transparency, NRAs have 
to  publish  a  yearly  overview  of  their  administrative  costs  and  the  charges  collected  and 
appropriate adjustments should be made, if necessary. In Sweden, it is not clear that any 
adjustments can be made to the system for administrative charges following the publication of 
such an overview.  
In practical terms some Member States seem to maintain relatively high charges and their 
compliance with the principles mentioned above will need to be verified. Likewise there will 
need to be verification of the system of charges in France and Malta which are applied to all 
undertakings and take no (or little) account of their respective size and/or relative market 
power. 
Fees for rights of use of numbers and frequencies and for rights to install facilities have to 
reflect the need to ensure optimal use of these resources. They must be objectively justified, 
transparent, non discriminatory and proportionate in relation to the intended purpose and have 
to take into account the objectives of the new framework. It remains to be seen whether these 
requirements  have  been  clearly  transposed  in  Poland.  The  Commission  services  are  also 
examining  the  level  of  annual  fees  imposed  mainly  on  mobile  operators  for  the  use  of 
frequencies and/or rights to install facilities in some Member States, which may raise some 
doubts as to whether these requirements are correctly applied.  
It should be noted that it is not allowed to impose on electronic communications network 
operators  and/or  service  providers,  solely  because  they  are  such  operators  and/or  service 
providers, financial charges other than and in addition to those allowed by the Directive. This 
principle can be derived from the ECJ’s ruling in the Albacom and Infostrada cases
9. 
                                                 
9  Judgement of 18 September 2003 in joined cases C 292/01 (Albacom SpA) and C 293/01 (Infostrada 
SpA) ECR [2003], I 9449. This ruling refers to the Licensing Directive 97/13/EC and although this 
Directive  was  repealed  on  25  July  2003,  it  provides  important  guidelines  for  the  interpretation  of 
national measures similar to the contested charges, since the Authorisation Directive contains similar 
provisions in this respect.  
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ACCESS AND INTERCONNECTION  
The Access and Interconnection Directive contains the principal body of rules that apply to 
the relations between providers of electronic communications networks and services at the 
wholesale level. The Directive provides both for the rules that are to apply to all market 
operators, irrespective of their size, and also for the rules which are to apply only to operators 
having  significant  market  power.  In  both  cases  the  provisions  are underpinned  by  a  core 
principle:  regulation  has  to  be  limited  to  the  minimum  level  necessary  to  achieve  its 
objectives. 
GENERAL PROVISIONS 
As an example of the application of the above principle, the Directive provides that there 
should  be  no  restrictions  that  prevent  undertakings  from  negotiating  access  and 
interconnection with each other and that undertakings requesting access and interconnection 
do not need to be authorised to operate in the Member State concerned, if they do not provide 
services  or  operate  a  network  in  that  country.  It  would  need  to  be  seen  how  far  these 
requirements are met in the primary legislation in Latvia. 
Article 4 (1) of the Directive provides for a general right and obligation for operators of 
public communications networks to negotiate interconnection for the purposes of providing 
publicly available electronic communications services. The legislation in Poland appears to 
extend  the  right  and  obligation  to  negotiate  to  access  as  well  as  interconnection.  The 
Netherlands law seems to extend the right and obligation to negotiate also to providers of 
publicly  available  electronic  communications  services.  The  Commission  services  are 
examining the conformity of such transposition arrangements. 
In order to ensure fair competition, particularly in the retail market, the Directive requires that 
undertakings which acquire information from another undertaking in the context of access or 
interconnection  negotiations  use  that  information  solely  for  the  purpose  for  which  it  was 
supplied  and  maintain  its  confidentiality.  In  some  Member  Sates  the  implementation  and 
enforcement of these rules limiting information flow within undertakings will need thorough 
monitoring. In Hungary the NRA seems to have no information about the general fulfilment 
of this requirement and in Greece the level of win back activity on the market raises questions 
as to the practical application of these rules. Win back and “save” activity has also been an 
issue addressed by the NRA in France and the United Kingdom, and both by the NRA and the 
NCA in Italy. 
NRA POWERS TO IMPOSE OBLIGATIONS ON NON-SMP OPERATORS 
The Directive (Article 5) requires that NRAs should have the power to take action where 
necessary to ensure adequate access and interconnection and interoperability of services, by 
imposing appropriate and proportionate obligations on undertakings even when they do not 
have SMP.  
Further scrutiny will be needed as to whether the transposition measures adopted in Slovakia 
and Latvia ensure that the NRA has the complete set of powers and duties required under 
Article 5.   
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It  needs  to  be  highlighted  that  the  power  to  impose  access  and  interconnection  related 
obligations on non SMP operators has to be used with great care, as there is always a risk that 
excessive or unjustified use of the powers under Article 5 could undermine a key principle of 
the new framework – that competition related remedies should be based on the findings of a 
market analysis. The Commission is therefore following closely the development of NRA 
practice in the application of Article 5 of the Directive as part of the notification process 
under Article 7 of the Framework Directive. 
IMPOSING REMEDIES ON UNDERTAKINGS HAVING SMP 
The power of the NRAs to impose competition related remedies is connected to the findings 
of the market analysis exercise. The addressee of these remedies can only be an operator 
having  SMP.  The  Directive  requires  Member  States  to  ensure  that  the  NRAs  are  free  to 
impose the appropriate regulatory obligations based on the findings of the market analysis. 
The obligations must be proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down in 
the Framework  Directive. As a  consequence of these requirements NRAs have to have a 
degree  of  discretion  when  deciding  what  remedies  are  most  suited  to  address  the  market 
failures identified in the analysis. They must also have the power to adapt the remedies listed 
in the Directive to the particular situation on the market. As far as the implementation of these 
principles is concerned, it is not enough that the NRA is provided with these powers; it also 
has to apply them in practice. 
There are certain Member States which seem to limit the power of the NRA by restricting the 
necessary discretion by means of the application of criteria and conditions that are not present 
in  the  regulatory  framework.  This  is  the  case  in  particular  in  Germany  where  the  law 
introduced additional criteria – relating to the need for dominance on both the wholesale and 
the retail markets, and a historical market power position – as a condition for the imposition 
of  ex  ante  wholesale  price  regulation  for  access  services.  This  seems  to  go  beyond  the 
requirements set out in the Directive. 
There are a number of Member States in which the discretionary power of the NRA appears 
to be limited by the application of legislative rules which prejudge the outcome of the market 
analysis. In some Member States the possibility for the NRA to impose certain remedies in 
particular markets is ruled out. This is the case in Finland as regards interconnection price 
regulation for fixed to mobile calls, where the Commission services are examining a proposed 
amendment of the relevant law which partially addresses the issue. In Germany the law rules 
out the possibility of mandating unbundled resale of access services until 1 July 2008, which 
needs to be further looked into. 
In other Member States a remedy is determined by means of a legislative measure without the 
need  for  a  market  analysis  to  be  conducted  first.  Hungary  appears  to  have  introduced 
empowerment provisions in its law as regards price regulation in the field of broadcasting, 
and revenue sharing obligations between fixed public communications network operators and 
internet service providers (ISP), both of which are not subject to the test of market analysis. 
So far only one of those decrees has been issued, which regulates the wholesale provision of 
terrestrial  broadcasting  transmission.  In  Slovakia  the  law  itself  appears  to  impose  non 
discrimination  and  transparency  obligations  in  relation  to  interconnection  on  all  operators 
providing public networks, irrespective of whether they have SMP or of the conclusions of a 
market analysis. The application of the requirements presented in this paragraph may also 
affect  the  rights  of  affected  parties  to  appeal  against  the  outcome  of  a  market  analysis  
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procedure, and the conformity of such transposition with the requirements of the Directive 
will need to be further scrutinised. 
The Directive requires that NRAs have the powers to impose the remedies identified in it. In 
Finland  the  NRA  seems  to  lack  the  power  to  ensure  publication  of  the  reference 
interconnection  offer  (RIO)  and  the  reference  unbundling  offer  (RUO).  Furthermore  it 
apparently has no power to impose changes to the RIO and to make internal transfer prices 
transparent.  In  Austria,  due  to  the  lack  of  notification  of  an  older  ordinance  on 
interconnection, further examination will be needed whether it is ensured that the minimum 
necessary elements required by the Directive will be included in the RUO. The same applies 
to the issue whether the primary legislation in Latvia ensures that the NRA has the power to 
impose  the  obligation  of  transparency  pursuant  to  the  Directive.  In  Spain  the  new 
telecommunications law seems not to provide for all of the specific powers conferred on 
NRAs by the Directive to enable them to adopt appropriate wholesale remedies; these powers 
will however be provided for in implementing regulations not yet adopted. In Cyprus, where 
the incumbent lacks incorporation as a company, it remains to be seen whether the NRA will 
be able to implement remedies such as accounting separation and cost accounting effectively. 
The Directive lays down that NRAs may impose access and interconnection related remedies 
on SMP operators which are additional to those listed in the Directive, provided this is done in 
accordance with the special procedural requirements set out. The legislation in Finland, Latvia 
and Slovakia appears not to provide for such exceptional remedies. 
RECIPROCITY AND PRICE REGULATION 
The principle of reciprocity is being applied by a number of NRAs in different Member States 
(e.g.  Austria,  Germany,  Spain,  France,  United  Kingdom)  as  a  basis  for  determining 
interconnection prices of operators by reference to the regulated prices of the incumbent. This 
approach emerged under the old regulatory  framework. While reciprocity may be  a valid 
regulatory approach under the new regulatory framework, an NRA has to ensure that any 
price  regulation  on  the  wholesale  market  is  based  on  the  findings  of  the  relevant  market 
analysis  and  applied  only  to  operators  with  SMP.  Furthermore,  when  imposing  a  pricing 
remedy using the reciprocity principle the NRA has to take into account the investments made 
by the operator and allow it a reasonable rate of return on capital employed. This principle 
implies that the operator has to be given an opportunity to demonstrate that reciprocal prices 
do not reflect its costs, allowing for a reasonable rate of return. For example, in Belgium the 
NRA considers that an alternative operator having invested heavily in network competition 
with the incumbent is entitled to charge higher termination rates reflecting its higher cost. In 
Spain the NRA has applied the reciprocity principle in the context of interconnection disputes 
between the fixed incumbent and alternative operators and implemented in parallel a capacity 
based  interconnection  model.  The  NRA  has  recognised  the  downsides  of  applying  the 
reciprocity  principle  and  is  currently  revising  its  approach.  Despite  the  generally  applied 
reciprocity  rule  in  Germany,  the  NRA  lately  accepted  the  non  reciprocal  interconnection 
charges of some regional operators. It follows that compliance with the principles of non 
discrimination and proportionality of any price regulation applying reciprocity needs to be 
looked into on a case by case basis.  
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UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
SCOPE OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
The set of services that constitute universal service obligations must be made available at the 
quality specified to all end users in the whole territory of the Member States at an affordable 
price. The correct delineation of the scope of universal service is of utmost importance, since 
only the net cost to designated undertakings arising from the provision of these obligations 
may be recovered through a sharing mechanism or from public funds.  
The 9
th Implementation report pointed to some of the key issues relating to the scope of 
universal service arising from the national transposition measures. For example, in Germany 
there is an ongoing issue concerning the legislation, which appears not to require explicitly 
that the connection to the public telephone network should permit functional internet access. 
In  Ireland,  the  terminology  used  in  the  national  transposition  measure  has  given  rise  to 
discussions between the NRA and the fixed incumbent regarding the definition of functional 
internet access. 
The Directive provides that as an element of universal service, at least one comprehensive 
directory and directory enquiry service (i.e. comprising both fixed and mobile subscribers) 
should be available to end users. The Commission services are examining concerns that have 
arisen in a number of Member States (e.g. Greece, Spain, France, Malta, Poland, Portugal, 
Slovenia)  with  the  production  of  a  universal  directory.  They  appear  to  have  stemmed  in 
particular  from  the  fact  that  alternative  operators  have  either  refused  to  provide  their 
subscriber  data  to  the  designated  undertaking  or  that  the  latter  has  not  presented  its 
competitors’ data in a non discriminatory manner in the directory. The presentation in the 
universal service directory of competing operators’ directory enquiry numbers has also been 
an issue in the United Kingdom. In Italy, the issue relates rather to delays in putting in place 
the necessary regulations. 
As the Commission prepares to launch a consultation on the review of the scope of universal 
service, as provided for in Article 15 of the Directive, Ofcom in the United Kingdom also 
intends to launch such a review at national level in late 2004. 
DESIGNATION OF OPERATORS WITH UNIVERSAL SERVICE OBLIGATIONS 
The Directive requires Member States to implement universal service in a way that is cost 
effective and minimises market distortion. No undertaking should a priori be excluded from 
being designated, and the designation mechanism may be used as a means of determining the 
net  cost  of  universal  service.  Member  States  may  avail  themselves  of  the  possibility  to 
designate undertakings with universal service obligations through a tendering process.  
New decisions on the designation of operators with universal service obligations will soon 
have to be taken in a number of Member States. In Austria, for example, the fixed incumbent 
has been designated with universal service obligations until the end of 2004, and the NRA 
will consider transferring some obligations to alternative operators. In Spain, the question will  
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become topical in 2005, and the new government has expressed its willingness to examine the 
possibility  of  co financing  any  unfair  burden  associated  with  the  provision  of  universal 
service. In Denmark, the fixed line incumbent has been designated as the universal service 
provider until 2007 and there is a discussion regarding the existing price cap regulation for 
call set up charges (per minute charges are not regulated). 
In  contrast,  in  Portugal  the  fixed  incumbent  has  been  designated  as  the  universal  service 
provider until as long as 2025, apparently without any public consultation having been carried 
out.  The  Commission  services  are  examining  this  and  the  instances  outlined  below  to 
determine their conformity with the Universal Service Directive. 
In Sweden there is currently no designated universal service provider as a result of the expiry 
of the legal provisions that designated the fixed incumbent as the universal service provider. 
An issue of legislative technique which may also have tangible repercussions on the market 
arises in Finland, where universal service obligations appear to be imposed in the law on 
operators having significant market power.  
In France, the law appears to exclude in practice most operators from the possibility of being 
designated.  It  creates  the  possibility  for  designating  an  operator  for  each  service,  but  the 
operator  must  be  able  to  supply  that  service  on  the  whole  of  the  national  territory.  The 
question arises whether this excludes all operators but one from eligibility to provide access at 
a fixed location and public pay telephones. 
Meeting universal service obligations, and in particular the requirement to meet all reasonable 
requests  for  access  to  the  public  telephone  network  and  to  publicly  available  telephone 
services at a fixed location, proves more onerous in some of the new Member States than the 
EU15, due to the lower fixed telephone penetration rate in these countries. 
Even though it is questionable whether mobile operators can be considered as being able to 
provide  affordable  functional  internet  access  at  this  time,  the  Directive  provides  that  no 
undertaking  should  a  priori  be  excluded  from  being  designated.  Therefore  any  a  priori 
limitation as to the contribution of mobile operators to universal service may well be contrary 
to the Directive and to the principle of technological neutrality in general. The Commission 
services are monitoring the situation in particular in Hungary, where the law defines universal 
service  as  one  service  comprising  four  different  components,  and  thereby  may  make  it 
impractical for some operators to participate in the designation procedure.  
In  that  same  country,  according  to  the  law  the  obligations  placed  on  the  designated 
undertakings appear to be determined in “universal service contracts” negotiated bilaterally 
between the operators concerned and the authorities. Up to 30 September 2004 only one had 
been concluded, and no contract had been published. 
In Italy, no operator has been designated to provide directory enquiry services as referred to in 
Article 5 of the Directive, on the grounds that the market already provides for these services. 
However,  the  affordability  of  the  services  available  on  the  market  has  been  called  into 
question by consumer organisations, in particular because the prices levied by the operator on 
which the obligation was previously placed have increased significantly.  
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CALCULATING AND FUNDING THE NET COST OF UNIVERSAL SERVICE 
The net cost of universal service may be funded though a sharing mechanism (fund) or via 
public funds, where the costs arising from its provision constitute an unfair burden for the 
designated undertaking(s).  
In the current Belgian law, there appear to be no references to the net cost giving rise to an 
unfair burden on the designated undertaking(s). Alternative operators consider that due to this 
omission an essential requirement for the activation of the universal service fund is omitted 
and expect that a relevant provision will be included in the new electronic communications 
law, which is still in draft form.  
The Commissions services are examining the extent to which the new Slovenian law fails to 
refer to the existence of an unfair burden for the designated operator as the basic consideration 
for the authorities’ decision as to whether a compensation mechanism should be set up.  
Some Member States (e.g. Spain, France, the Netherlands) have availed themselves in their 
transposition measures of the possibility provided in the Directive to determine the net cost of 
universal  service  through  the  designation  (tendering)  procedure  of  the  universal  service 
provider. The draft Czech law also provides for this novel approach. 
A universal service fund is operational in France and in Italy. In Italy, AGCOM estimated that 
the net cost of providing universal service incurred by the designated undertaking was € 37 
million in 2002. This figure is disputed by market players, which overwhelmingly call for 
more transparency as to the criteria used by AGCOM in its cost calculations. 
In the Czech Republic, the currently applicable law also appears to provide for an approach to 
the recovery of the losses arising from the provision of universal service that is based on 
contributions  from  operators  in  proportion  to  the  level  of  their  revenues.  Not  all  of  the 
operators have been willing to pay the contributions and a lawsuit has been launched by the 
fixed incumbent against the NRA for alleged failure to collect these contributions. 
Following  the  ruling  of  the  Court  of  Justice  in  December  2001  against  the  system  of 
calculation of the net cost of the universal service in France, the French authorities revised 
this system comprehensively, and reduced the actual cost funded in previous years as well as 
the forecasts for following years. In this way, the definitive figure for 2001 fell from € 416 
million to € 142 million. The estimated cost for 2002, which was considerably delayed by the 
need to bring secondary legislation into conformity with the Court ruling, is now set at € 297 
million.  
In Spain, the CMT set the net cost incurred by the designated undertaking at € 110 million for 
2002 and, as in previous years, did not activate any funding mechanism on the grounds that 
the undertaking had not suffered any competitive disadvantage. 
The designated operator in Portugal has also submitted its net cost estimates to the NRA, 
which appears nevertheless not to have validated them or to have  come up with its own 
estimates.  
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In Belgium, the NRA’s estimates of the net cost of universal service borne by the designated 
undertaking have been criticised by alternative operators and are currently being re examined. 
While Belgium is a densely populated country, the net cost appears to be inflated by the high 
number of people benefiting from social tariffs. New entrants request further transparency in 
relation to the net costs and net benefits of the different components of universal service. 
Provisions in the draft law placing an obligation on all operators to offer social tariffs have 
created considerable concern among market players. 
RETAIL PRICE REGULATION 
The new framework builds on the 1998 liberalisation and open network provision directives 
that required Member States to remove all obstacles to tariff rebalancing before 1 January 
1998 or to provide a detailed timetable for implementation of this requirement.  
The relevant provision was not explicitly carried over into the new regulatory framework, 
because the latter was built on the premise that tariffs had been rebalanced by the above date 
or would be by the date of accession, in the case of the new Member States. 
However, incumbent operators claim that the tariff rebalancing process has not been fully 
completed at least in Portugal and several new Member States (e.g. Cyprus, Latvia, Malta, 
Czech Republic, Slovenia, Slovakia). 
The aim of the provision providing for the removal of obstacles to tariff rebalancing was to 
put an end to cross subsidisation by the fixed incumbent, which has the potential to distort 
competition  on  the  market  in  various  ways  and  thereby  to  prevent  market led  and 
competition based reductions in end user prices.  
In the new framework obligations at the retail level should only be imposed on undertakings 
with SMP where the market analysis shows that the relevant retail market is not effectively 
competitive  and  obligations  imposed  at  the  wholesale  level  or  the  imposition  of  carrier 
selection  and  pre selection  do  not  result  in  the  achievement  of  the  objective  of  ensuring 
effective competition and the public interest. 
It is for the market analysis to identify the main competition problems in Member States and 
to guide the NRA in the choice of the appropriate remedies. Without prejudice to the result of 
these analyses, in those new Member States where there is no effective competition in the 
fixed markets, where wholesale remedies (in particular local loop unbundling) are considered 
to be insufficient and where rebalancing has not yet been completed, rebalancing (by means 
of the cost orientation requirement) may be a necessary remedy for meeting the objectives of 
the regulatory framework. 
Retail prices of the undertaking(s) designated as having universal service obligations should 
be set at an affordable level; however, such prices should not be predatory or otherwise distort 
competition, and the universal service provider should not derive a competitive advantage 
from  its  provision  of  universal  service.  Any  losses  incurred  in  the provision  of  universal 
service  should  be  calculated  and  financed  in  accordance  with  Articles  12  and  13  of  the 
Directive.   
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To the extent that prices of operators designated as having SMP in relevant retail markets are 
so low as to impede competition, NRAs in the Member States must be fully equipped to deal 
with the situations contemplated in Article 17 of the Directive (excessive and/or predatory 
prices, unreasonable bundling of services, undue preference to specific end users).  
As competition on the market has increased, many national markets have seen fierce price 
competition among operators. In some countries, in particular in Spain and the Netherlands, 
there has been such a proliferation of discounts, promotions and price plans by the fixed 
incumbent that alternative operators have repeatedly drawn the NRA’s attention to alleged 
price squeezing. 
In Italy, in November 2004 the national competition authority sanctioned the fixed incumbent 
for  abuse  of  a  dominant  position,  arising  from  a  series  of  offers  targeting  public 
administrations  and  private  business  users,  and  imposed  fines  totalling  € 152  million. 
According  to  the  authority’s  Decision
10,  the  strategy  of  the  incumbent  was  to  explicitly 
exclude its competitors from the business end users market for telecommunications services 
and thereby to maintain its historically dominant position both on the end users market and 
the market for intermediate services for its competitors. It was based on offers of financial and 
technical  conditions  to  customers  that  competitors  could  not  replicate,  and  the  use  of 
contractual terms and conditions, such as exclusive clauses. 
As fixed incumbent operators have come under increased competitive pressure from mobile 
operators, new entrant players report that the incumbents have responded by bundling services 
and  products  with  a  view  to  keeping  existing  customers  and  attracting  new  ones.  Such 
practices are complained about by new entrants, for example in the Czech Republic, Germany 
and Slovenia. In Austria, the competition authority took decisive action on the bundling of 
products by the fixed incumbent. In Germany, on the contrary, the NRA appears to have 
approved a number of bundled tariffs of the incumbent.  
In the United Kingdom, the incumbent fixed network operator appears to have responded to 
competition  with  key  changes  in  its  retail  tariff  structure,  involving  the  migration  of 
customers from its standard tariff to a tariff package which allows flat rate calls at off peak 
times for an increased line rental fee. Alternative operators complained to Ofcom about the 
alleged anti competitive effect of these changes; however; Ofcom concluded that the tariff 
package did not breach competition rules.  
Among the various price plans offered by many fixed incumbents are schemes targeting users 
with a low level of consumption of telephone services. In some cases, such schemes are part 
of the universal service obligation imposed on a designated undertaking. In such cases it must, 
however, be ensured that the scheme is applied in a manner compatible with the Directive 
and,  in  particular,  that  market  distortions  are  kept  to  a  minimum  and  that  the  scheme  is 
applied in a transparent, objective, non discriminatory and proportionate way. 
Some Member States, such as Denmark and the United Kingdom, have voluntary commercial 
low usage schemes in operation. Where such a scheme is operated by an undertaking which 
                                                 
10  AGCM “Provvedimento” n° 13752 – Case A351 – “Comportamenti Abusivi di Telecom Italia”  
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has been designated as having SMP for the purposes of Article 19 of the Directive (carrier 
selection and carrier pre selection), the Commission service will examine them to ensure there 
are no anti competitive commercial or technical restrictions which would impede access to 
those facilities.  
Carrier  selection  (CS)  and  carrier  pre selection  (CPS)  have  indeed  been  key  drivers  of 
competition  in  the  telecommunications  market  under  the  1998  regulatory  framework.  On 
average, in 2004, around 80% of all subscribers who have chosen an alternative operator use 
CS or CPS for conveying calls. CS/CPS penetration can be estimated at about 25% of all 
subscribers in the European Union for long distance and international calls, and 13% for local 
calls. 
Member States where CS/CPS has experienced most success are Sweden (38% of customers), 
Germany (36% of customers for long distance and international calls) and Austria (30% of 
customers). 
CS and CPS are now effectively implemented for all types of calls in the EU 15 and in a 
number of the new Member States. However, the Commission services are examining some 
of the problems still reported by new entrants. In Latvia, CS appears only to be available in 
some  areas  for  international  calls,  whereas  CPS  appears  not  to  be  available  at  all.  Full 
compliance with the requirements of the directive is not envisaged by the national authorities 
before 2006. In Poland, CS and CPS appear to be available only for those subscribers who are 
connected to digital exchanges and, in any case, not for local calls. In Slovakia, neither CS 
nor  CPS  appears  to  be  available  at  present,  but  could  be  put  in  place  following  market 
analyses by the NRA. 
COMPETITIVE PROVISION OF DIRECTORY SERVICES 
With  a  view  to  enabling  competition  in  the  provision  of  directory  and  directory  enquiry 
services, the Directive requires all service providers that assign telephone numbers to their 
subscribers  to  make  relevant  information  available  in  a  fair,  cost oriented  and  non 
discriminatory manner
11. In some Member States, the Commission services are examining 
problems that are alleged to have arisen in this connection, in particular the requirement to 
provide relevant information on a cost oriented basis. 
In Italy, market entrants claim that there have been some delays with the allocation of the 
‘12xy’ numbers reserved for the competitive provision of directory enquiry services, which 
has reportedly created some market distortions. 
In the United Kingdom, where competition in these services is probably most advanced, the 
introduction of new directory enquiry numbers for all providers in August 2003 has had a 
mixed reception, due to some quality of service concerns on the part of consumers. 
                                                 
11  With regard to these requirements under the Voice Telephony Directive 98/10/EC, which was repealed 
on 25
 July 2003, see ECJ’s ruling in the KPN case C 109/03 of 25 November 2004.  
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CONSUMERS’ AND USERS’ ISSUES 
Accessing the single European emergency number free of charge is possible in 23 Member 
States. Cyprus has not provided data for the Commission’s questionnaire on the issue, but, 
according  to  information  available  to  the  Commission,  this  possibility  exists.  In  Poland, 
access to ‘112’ appears to be possible only through mobile networks. 
Number  portability  is  a  facility  that  contributes  significantly  to  consumer  choice  and 
competition. It should have been available for all numbers, fixed or mobile, since the entry 
into  force  of  the  Universal  Service  Directive.  However,  the  Commission  services  are 
investigating the lack of availability of number portability in Latvia, Poland and Slovakia. In 
the Czech Republic, Estonia, Luxembourg and Slovenia, fixed number portability is offered 
but mobile number portability appears not to be. In Malta, fixed number portability is not 
available in practice as there is only one fixed operator with allocated numbers. In Poland, 
pre paid customers appear to be excluded in the law from mobile number portability. 
Fixed number portability is very successful in some Member States: Denmark, Belgium, the 
Netherlands (where it represents about 12% of the total number of lines) and Spain (which 
has, in absolute terms, the most ported numbers in the EU). In all these countries, the price of 
number portability is below the European  average,  currently standing  at €19.  In  countries 
where the portability fee is significantly higher than the EU average, such as Ireland and 
Austria, the use of this facility appears to have slowed down. 
Mobile  number  portability  is  particularly  developed  in  Finland  (20%  of  all  subscribers), 
Denmark, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy, while in Germany, where the fee is above 
€20 (compared to an EU average of €11), there has been limited take up of this facility. 
Information available from consumer organisations indicates that consumers mostly complain 
about a lack of transparency and legibility of operators’ offers (in particular in the context of 
mobile number portability), bills and contract terms, as well as the prices of SMS, fixed to 
mobile calls, international roaming and internet access.  
Operators in some countries (e.g. Denmark and Spain) consider that too heavy public service 
obligations are placed on them and/or that there is excessive protection of end users. 
CONSUMER SATISFACTION SURVEYS 
Two studies on consumers’ satisfaction regarding services of general interest were conducted 
in 2003, the results of which were published in 2004
12.  
In a qualitative study of December 2003
13, fixed and mobile telecommunications services 
were generally well rated. Access to telephone services is perceived as easy, and the quality of 
                                                 
12  The main results of these studies were integrated into the “Evaluation of the performance of network 
industries  providing  services  of  general  interest  –  2004  report”,  available  at 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/en/update/economicreform/docs/sec 2004 866_en.pdf 
13  Qualitative  study  by  OPTEM–  European  consumers  and  services  of  general  interest  in  the  EU 25 
(December 2003)  
EN  33    EN 
service and of the information received is generally considered to be good. Contract terms and 
conditions are also generally considered as “fair” (equitable).  
In only three Member States (Austria, Malta, United Kingdom) do consumers perceive the 
price of fixed telephony to be “fair”. In ten out of the EU15, the first stage of opening up of 
the fixed market to competition is considered by consumers as having contributed to lower 
prices without deterioration in quality. However the amount and even the very principle of the 
line rental charge is questioned by a majority of consumers. Consumers would also appreciate 
“real” competition in the local access market. In the new Member States, the impression that 
the prices of fixed telephone services have dropped is almost absent, except to a limited extent 
in Hungary and Poland. 
As  regards  the  mobile  market,  the  benefits  of  competition  to  consumers  are  widely 
recognised, and any reservations expressed by consumers do not relate to the principle of 
competition, but to the limits and imperfections in the way it operates to bring about price 
reductions, including a lack of transparency and the difficulty in comparing prices. 
These findings are also reflected in the results of the Eurobarometer surveys
14, which however 
point to a single, but systematic difference between the EU15 and the new Member States as 
regards opinions of the quality of services of general interest. This is that consumers in the 
latter are less satisfied with the contract conditions, prices and in relative terms, with the 
service quality of their fixed and mobile telephone providers, than their counterparts in the 
EU15. Overall dissatisfaction with fixed telephone services is quite significant in the new 
Member States, in particular as regards prices and contracts. Mobile telephone services were 
rated better.  
MUST CARRY 
As mentioned in the 9
th Implementation Report, most national measures transposing the new 
regulatory framework do not introduce must carry rules; they are most often embedded in 
other pieces of national legislation, such as the audio visual laws. As a result of this, the 
Commission  services  gathered  information  from  the  Member  States  on  the  practical 
implementation  of  must  carry  through  a  questionnaire  submitted  in  the  Communications 
Committee.  
This was done in a context where the compliance of existing and new national must carry 
rules with the Directive has been called into question by market players in some Member 
States  (e.g.  Finland,  Germany,  the  Netherlands,  France),  in  particular  in  terms  of  their 
proportionality.  
According to the Directive, must carry obligations should be imposed only where they are 
necessary to meet clearly defined general interest objectives. The general interest objectives 
invoked by the Member States are quite similar (pluralism, cultural diversity, freedom of 
                                                 
14  Eurobarometer   Consumers’ opinions on services of general interest – Public opinion in the acceding 
and candidate countries (Fieldwork June –July 2003). The qualitative study and the Eurobarometer 
reports  were  commissioned  by  Directorate  General  for  Health  and  Consumer  Protection.  They  are 
available at: http://europa.eu.int/comm/consumers/cons_int/serv_gen/cons_satisf/index_en.htm  
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expression).  The  Commission  services  are  examining  the  link  between  the  must carry 
obligations  and  the  objectives,  and  the  extent  to  which  the  discretionary  powers  of  the 
authorities  to  grant  must  carry  status  are  circumscribed  in  a  manner  that  ensures  that  no 
arbitrary decisions are taken, in particular where the general interest objectives have been 
defined in broad terms.  
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PRIVACY AND ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS 
The 9th Implementation report identified some of the key issues arising from the Directive, 
such as traffic data (retention), location data, unsolicited communications and ‘cookies’. Due 
to the fact that during the preparatory process for this report only limited information has been 
shared with the Commission services on the implementation of this Directive, this section will 
focus mainly on three areas covered by the Directive, namely unsolicited communications, the 
retention of traffic data and cookies. These are also the topics which are most debated in the 
market and by national authorities, and which may have a significant impact on the consumer.  
UNSOLICITED COMMUNICATIONS 
Article 13(1) of the Directive requires Member States to prohibit the sending of unsolicited 
commercial communications by fax or e mail or other electronic messaging systems such as 
SMS and MMS unless the prior consent of the subscriber has been obtained (opt in system). 
The only exception to this rule is in cases where contact details for sending e mail or SMS 
messages (but not faxes) have been obtained in the context of a sale. Within this existing 
customer relationship the company who obtained the data may use them for the marketing of 
similar products or services as those it has already sold to the customer. Nevertheless, even 
then the company has to make clear from the first time of collecting the data that they may be 
used for direct marketing and should offer the right to object. Moreover, each subsequent 
marketing message should include an easy way for the customer to stop further messages. 
The opt in system is mandatory for any e mail, SMS or fax addressed to natural persons for 
direct  marketing.  With  regard  to  legal  persons,  Member  States  have  to  ensure  that  their 
legitimate interests are sufficiently protected.  
For  all  categories  of  addressees,  legal  and  natural  persons,  Article  13(4)  of  the  Directive 
prohibits direct marketing messages by e mail or SMS which conceal or disguise the identity 
of the sender and which do not include a valid address to which recipients can send a request 
to  stop  such  messages.  For  voice  telephony  marketing  calls,  other  than  by  automated 
machines, Member States may also choose between an opt in or an opt out approach. 
The Czech Republic, Estonia, Greece and Luxembourg have not yet notified transposition 
measures for Article 13. In Latvia transposition of Article 13 is left to secondary legislation 
which had not been notified by 1 October 2004. The question of full or correct transposition 
needs to be further examined in some Member States including Austria, Slovakia and Poland, 
in particular with regard to Article 13, paragraph 2. 
Regarding  the  protection  of  the  interests  of  legal  (as  opposed  to  natural)  persons,  Spain, 
Denmark,  Italy,  Belgium,  the  Netherlands,  Germany,  Hungary,  Poland,  Czech  Republic, 
Slovakia  and  Slovenia  have  chosen  an  opt in  system,  while  Portugal,  France,  United 
Kingdom, Austria, Ireland, Sweden and Finland, have chosen an opt out model. In Cyprus 
this is left to secondary legislation which was not yet adopted on 1 October. The Commission 
services  are  examining  whether  in  the  Maltese  and  Lithuanian  laws  legal  persons  are 
sufficiently protected. As in Latvia transposition of Article 13 is left to secondary legislation 
which has not yet been notified, it remains open how legal persons are to be protected against  
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spam.  The  divergence  in  transposition  of  this  provision  is  apparent  and  even  though  the 
Directive leaves it to the Member States to choose how to protect legal persons, practical 
problems for operators confronted with both natural and legal persons can arise. In addition 
the distinction between legal person and natural persons is not the same everywhere. In some 
cases small businesses, such as micro businesses, do not qualify as legal persons but as a 
natural persons. The Commission services will look into these divergences.  
In  January  2004  the  Commission  published  a  Communication  on  unsolicited  commercial 
communications
15.  The  Communication  identified  several  actions  to  complement  the 
legislative ‘ban on spam’, focusing on effective enforcement by Member States and public 
authorities,  technical  and  self regulatory  solutions  by  industry,  consumer  awareness,  and 
international cooperation. Examples include providing competent authorities with the required 
investigation and enforcement powers to trace and prosecute 'spammers', adapting marketing 
practices to the opt in regime, and explaining to users how to avoid spam and what filtering 
and security can do for them. The Commission has indicated in this Communication that it 
would assess by the end of the year whether additional or corrective action was needed to 
combat  spam.  To  help  with  this  exercice,  a  consultation  has  been  organised,  including  a 
public workshop on 15 November 2004.  
The Working Party on the protection of individuals with regard to the processing of personal 
data (The “Article 29 Working Party”, set up by Directive 95/46/EC) provided an Opinion 
(5/2004
16) on the issue of unsolicited communications for direct marketing purposes. This 
document provides useful indications on the interpretation by data protection authorities of 
various concepts used in Article 13(2) of the Directive. 
On the issue of application of the provisions on spam, reference should also me made to 
national self regulation initiatives ongoing in some Member States that build on the provisions 
against spam. This is a welcome development.  
For example, in the Netherlands there is since June 2004 a self regulatory code on direct 
marketing, on the basis of which the companies make it clear they will not be involved in 
distributing  spam.  Direct  marketing  associations  and  the  employers’  association  were 
involved in setting up this code, which also has the endorsement of the consumer association. 
In Germany the ‘anti spam task force’ has issued in September 2004 a White Paper that 
includes a “white listing” project called "certified senders alliance" which is promoting a joint 
venture  between  German  internet  service  providers  and  the  German  direct  marketing 
association.  
TRAFFIC AND LOCATION DATA  
Article  5(1)  of  the  Directive  requires  that  confidentiality  be  guaranteed  not  only  for  the 
content of communications but also for the related traffic data. Moreover, to actively pursue 
this, Article 6 of the Directive requires that service and network providers erase traffic data 
when they are no longer needed for the transmission of a communication. They may only 
process traffic data beyond this point if this is necessary for billing purposes. 
                                                 
15  http://europa.eu.int/information_society/topics/ecomm/doc/useful_information/library/communic_ 
reports/spam/spam_com_2004_28_en.pdf 
16  http://europa.eu.int/comm/internal_market/privacy/docs/wpdocs/2004/wp90_en.pdf  
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Traffic data may also be of interest for marketing or they may be the basis for value added 
services  (traffic  information,  weather  forecasts  etc.)  but  usage  for  these  purposes  always 
requires the prior consent of the subscriber or user of the initial communications service. 
Article 9 concerns location data other than traffic data. Location data can be used for the 
provision of services such as route guidance or tourist information. Precise location data can 
also be useful for emergency services. While mobile location based services can be of great 
use to the public, it is  also necessary  to ensure there are appropriate data protection and 
privacy safeguards. Therefore, Article 9 requires that such location data may only be used 
with the consent of the subscriber. Moreover, it should remain possible for subscribers and 
users to temporarily block the tracing facility. 
The  Czech  Republic,  Estonia,  Greece,  Luxembourg  and  Belgium  have  not  yet  notified 
transposition measures. It is being examined whether in  Latvia the rules for dealing with 
traffic data require further transposition. In Finland the law provides that with regard to the 
storage of traffic data there is an obligation to store for two years the information on the time 
of the processing, the duration of the processing and the person who processed the data. This 
is  comparable  to  similar  provisions  in  some  Member  States  with  regard  to  traffic  data 
retention for law enforcement purposes, outlined below. 
In January 2003, the Article 29 Working Party adopted an Opinion in which it says that it 
considers that it is reasonable that there is a “routine storage period for billing of maximum 3 
6 months, with the exception of particular cases of disputes where the data may be processed 
for a longer period”. It also says that “only traffic data that are adequate, relevant and non 
excessive for billing and interconnection purposes may be processed.” 
DATA RETENTION FOR LAW ENFORCEMENT PURPOSES  
Finally, there is a considerable increase of the interest in the use (and retention) of traffic data 
by law enforcement authorities. Article 15 of Directive 2002/58/EC provides that Member 
States  can  adopt  legislative  measures  (restricting  the  scope  of  Articles  5,  6  and  9  of  the 
Directive)  for  the  retention  of  traffic  data  for  a  limited  period  when  it  is  a  necessary, 
appropriate  and  proportionate  measure  within  a  democratic  society  to  safeguard  national 
security, defence, public security and the prevention, investigation, detection and prosecution 
of criminal offences or of unauthorised use. 
Following the Declaration on combating terrorism of 25 March 2004, four Member States 
(France, Ireland, Sweden and the United Kingdom) tabled a proposal in April 2004 for a 
Council Framework Decision on Data Retention under Title VI of the Treaty on the European 
Union, which is being discussed in Council, with a view to adoption by June 2005. The draft 
Framework  Decision  speaks  of  a  minimum  12  month  general  retention  period  with  a 
maximum of 36 months.  
On the basis of information received in the context of this implementation report it appears 
that  the  current  trend  in  the  EU  is  towards  longer  traffic  data  retention  periods  for  law 
enforcement purposes than the currently existing periods. A few examples support such a 
trend.  In  Denmark  for  instance  there  is  a  draft  for  a  new  order  on  anti  terrorism,  which 
appears to include traffic data that are not logged today in Denmark as they are not needed for 
billing purposes, such as incoming calls, incoming mail and cell information for GPRS. The 
data is to be kept for one year. In Poland, for reasons referred to in Article 15, traffic data has  
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to be retained for twelve months. In Italy the legal retention period is 24 months which can be 
extended for another 24 months in cases of crimes against electronic systems and for reasons 
related to organised crime or terrorism. 
Besides the need to maintain proportionality as between the length of retention periods, the 
intrusion on privacy and the actual need for the traffic data for law enforcement purposes, it is 
also necessary to keep in mind the costs to be borne by operators. The economic impact of 
traffic data retention periods increases as the retention period gets longer. In addition there has 
been an increase in the number of request from law enforcement authorities to retrieve certain 
data. In some Member States the respective costs borne by operators and service providers 
(such as investments in software, technologies and human resources) are not reimbursed; in 
others they are only partially reimbursed. These issues were debated in a consultation and at a 
public  workshop  on  data  retention  practices  for  law  enforcement  purposes  held  on  21 
September  2004,  both  organised  by  the  Commission  services  in  the  light  of  the  draft 
Framework Decision.  
COOKIES 
Article 5(3) governs the use of devices for storing or retrieving information, such as ‘cookies’. 
Users must be informed of the purposes of such devices and have the opportunity to refuse 
their use or installation on their terminal equipment. Even though this provision is supposed 
to have been applied since 31 October 2003, it has not been transposed yet in all the Member 
States (no transposition by Slovakia, Latvia, Greece, Belgium and Luxembourg). On top of 
that, normal use of the Internet does not appear to lead to any notifications of information on 
cookies or similar devices in accordance with the Directive. If so, this would indicate that the 
provision is generally not implemented in practice so that a thorough analysis of the situation 
in the Member States would be justified.  
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APPLICATION OF TRANSITIONAL MEASURES 
Article  26  of  the  Framework  Directive  repeals  the  ONP  legislation  from  the  date  of 
application of the new regulatory framework, i.e. 25 July 2003. Article 27 of the Framework 
Directive, however, requires Member States to maintain certain obligations under national law 
until  such  time  as  a  determination  is  made  in  respect  of  those  obligations  by  a  national 
regulatory  authority  in  accordance  with  the  market  analysis  procedure  established  under 
Article 16 of the Framework Directive.  
The rationale behind these provisions is that the legislator considered it necessary to provide 
for the continued application of certain specific obligations, in order to ensure legal certainty 
and to avoid a legal vacuum during the transitional period. Consequently, such obligations 
should  initially  be  carried  over  into  the  new  regulatory  framework,  but  are  subject  to 
immediate review in the light of prevailing market conditions. 
The obligations to be maintained are those for access and interconnection imposed under 
Articles  4  (Rights  and  obligations  for  interconnection),  6  (Non discrimination  and 
transparency),  7  (Principles  for  interconnection  charges  and  cost  accounting  systems),  8 
(Accounting  separation  and  financial  reports),  11  (Co location  and  facility  sharing),  12 
(Numbering),  and  14  (Publication  of  and  access  to  information)  of  the  Interconnection 
Directive, including obligations relating to carrier selection or pre selection; obligations on 
special  network  access  imposed  under  Article 16  of  the  Voice  Telephony  Directive  and 
obligations  relating  to  retail  tariffs  for  the  provision  of  access  to  and  use  of  the  public 
telephone  network  imposed  under  Article  17  of  the  same  directive;  and  obligations 
concerning the provision of leased line transmission capacity, namely imposed under Articles 
3 (Availability of information), 4 (Information on supply conditions), 6 (Access conditions, 
usage conditions and essential requirements), 7 (Provision of a minimum set of leased lines), 
8  (Control  by  the  national  regulatory  authority)  and  10  (Tariffing  principles  and  cost 
accounting)  of  the  Leased  Lines  Directive.  Finally,  obligations  under  the  Unbundling 
Regulation  continue  to  apply  until  the  relevant  market  analysis  procedure  under  the  new 
framework has been completed.  
Obligations  that  fall  outside  the  scope  of  Article 27  of  the  Framework  Directive  can  be 
imposed only through an SMP determination made in accordance with the market analysis 
procedure under the new regulatory framework, by a measure taken under Article 5 of the 
Access Directive, or, alternatively, in exceptional circumstances, by a measure taken under 
Article 7(6) of the Framework Directive.  
The starting conditions for the ten new Member States at the date of their accession (1 May 
2004) are dealt with separately below. Consequently, the following overview relates only to 
the transitional regime as applied by the EU 15. 
Continuity  during  the  transitional  period  has  proved  to  be  particularly  important  in  areas 
where  regulatory  intervention  was  needed  to  resolve  issues  which  were  indicated  as  still 
outstanding  under  the  1998  regulatory  framework  in  previous  reports.  Although  general 
concerns  as  to  legal  certainty  have  been  expressed  by  market  players,  transitional 
arrangements were put in place in most of the EU 15 Member States. In practice, most NRAs 
continued  to  apply  existing  tariff  regulation  and  cost  accounting  obligations, to  carry  out  
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interconnection dispute settlement procedures and to monitor and enforce the relevant SMP 
obligations imposed before the date of application of the new framework, e.g. on carrier pre 
selection and unbundling. The Commission services are examining the apparent reluctance of 
the NRA of one Member State (Luxembourg) to intervene on regulatory issues during the 
transitional  period  and  its  preference  instead  to  focus  on  tariff  controls.  Specific  issues 
concerning the application of the transitional measures have arisen in other Member States, 
which will need to be further looked into. 
The German NRA (RegTP) has stated that an obligation for an ex ante approval of retail 
services which had been imposed in accordance with the old law will remain valid in the 
transitional period. In a recent (provisional) decision the relevant Administrative Court has, 
however, called into question this approach, limiting the scope of the transitional regime for 
tariff  regulation  to  the  tariff  principles  laid  down  in  Article 17  of  the  Voice  Telephony 
Directive. 
OPTA,  the  Netherlands  NRA,  applies  its  own  guidelines  on  costing  models  for  the 
determination of cost oriented interconnection tariffs in a different way from that followed in 
previous  years  pending  the  completion  of  the  market  analysis.  In  Portugal,  ANACOM 
introduced a new “retail minus” pricing mechanism when approving the incumbent’s tariffs. 
In Italy, the NRA (AGCOM) has prevented the incumbent from differentiating retail tariffs on 
the basis of different interconnection charges requested by the operator which terminates the 
call. The decision is still pending before the Italian court. 
In  Spain,  the  existing  requirement  for  ex ante  approval  of  specific  retail  tariffs  was 
transformed into a requirement only to notify the NRA of tariffs, without a market review.  
In Ireland, the Minister issued a set of Policy Directions during the transitional period which 
concerned in particular national roaming obligations and single billing through wholesale line 
rental.  However,  in  their  final  form  these  appear  to  allow  the  NRA  to  comply  with  the 
procedural requirements of the new framework. 
In this context it is worth mentioning that the United Kingdom NRA (Oftel) communicated to 
the Commission pursuant to Article 7(6) of the Framework Directive provisional measures 
with  a  view  to  maintaining  obligations  that  fell  outside  the  scope  of  Article  27  of  the 
Framework  Directive  (i.e.  obligations  which  were  based  on  licence  conditions  and 
interconnection directions imposed under Article 9 of the Interconnection Directive). 
In any event, it should be stressed that Article 27 of the Framework Directive is a strictly 
transitional regime and is not to be used by NRAs to bypass their obligations under the new 
regulatory framework, namely to carry out the market analysis. It might also be questioned 
whether the regulatory resources invested in “updating” pre existing regulatory obligations do 
not in some way or another detract from the speedy implementation of the new framework. 
Review of the obligations maintained during the transitional period should therefore be given 
priority,  in  order  to  avoid  over regulation.  This  is  to  be  taken  into  particular  account  in 
Member States that only transposed late, or where transposition has not even taken place at all 
yet. The same applies with respect to obligations that had not been imposed under national 
law before the date of application of the new framework (e.g. with regard to bitstream access 
or price regulation for call termination in individual mobile networks).  
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In some Member States the national law sets a deadline for completion of the market analysis. 
In one of the EU 15 Member States (Sweden), the national law, however, also stipulates that 
obligations under the old regulatory framework cease to exist after that date. The question 
arises as to whether this limitation of the scope of the transitional regime ensures its effective 
application,  e.g.  in  the  event  of  failure  to  complete  determinations  within  the  national 
deadline.  
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NEW MEMBER STATES - STARTING CONDITIONS AND THE 
TRANSITION TO THE NEW FRAMEWORK 
The regulatory framework came into force in the New Member States on the date of their 
accession,  1  May  2004.  Thus  the  framework  applies  to  25  Member  States,  and  the 
Commission is examining the transposition and implementation in all Member States on an 
equal  footing.  However,  the  effective  implementation  of  the  new  framework  presents  a 
particular  challenge  to  the  New  Member  States,  where  the  legal,  regulatory  and  market 
developments are, in many cases, at a very different stage to that obtaining in the EU15 when 
they came to implement the framework a year previously. The fact of acceding to the EU 
when the new regulatory framework was already in place also required substantial efforts 
from the New Member States but most of them proved able to take up this challenge. 
The adoption of primary transposition measures had not been completed in two of the New 
Member States, the Czech Republic and Estonia, as of 1 October 2004. Malta and Poland 
were also quite late with transposition but, on the other hand, the other six New Member 
States transposed the framework before or very soon after the date of accession, which is a 
better rate of success than the EU15 in regard to their deadline in July 2003. The law in Latvia 
was originally adopted on a provisional basis, but the Commission is aware that a modified 
version was adopted definitively in late October 2004, which has not yet entered into force. 
Secondary legislation (quite significant, in some cases) will be required before transposition 
can  be  considered  to  be complete  in  the  Czech  Republic  and  Estonia  (where  there  is  no 
transposition,  as  yet),  and  the  Commission  is  examining  whether  this  is  also  the  case  in 
Cyprus, Latvia, Poland, Slovenia and Slovakia. As well as the problems of delay, a number of 
issues need to be examined in regard to the conformity of the transposition measures that have 
been adopted. 
As well as the effective transposition of the acquis, the success of the transition of the New 
Member  States  to  the  EU  regulatory  framework  was  predicated  on  their  implementing 
important aspects of the old framework some time prior to accession,  as they  committed 
themselves to do when enlargement negotiations were opened. This approach was designed to 
ensure that the basic “starting conditions” for liberalisation and harmonisation were in place 
as quickly as possible and, in particular, that the regulatory obligations on SMP operators 
from the old framework would be in force and could be maintained until the market analysis 
process  has  been  completed.  This  would  have  allowed  the  application  of  the  transitional 
measures under Art. 27 of the Framework Directive in the same way as for the EU 15. It was 
also aimed at ensuring the establishment of independent national regulatory bodies capable of 
ensuring the effective implementation of the framework upon accession. 
However, some of the New Member States seem to have failed to implement fully prior to 
accession  the  “starting  conditions”  under  the  old  framework,  particularly  those  under  the 
Access  and  Interconnection Directive  which stood as a basis for imposing obligations on 
undertakings  designated  as  having  SMP  in  accordance  with  the  criteria  under  the  old 
framework, and this failing has been compounded by the delays that took place in transposing 
the new framework. The Commission services are looking into the application of some of the 
key transitional obligations on operators with SMP (over the 25% threshold as defined in the 
old Directives), relating notably to the apparent absence of adequate cost accounting and/or  
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tariff  transparency  (Cyprus,  Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Slovenia)  and/or  of  an 
interconnection  reference  offer,  or  one  that  adequately  meets  market  needs  (Cyprus, 
Lithuania,  Poland,  Slovakia,  Slovenia)  to  ensure  that  interconnection  is  competitively 
available on non discriminatory conditions. 
The Commission services are also examining whether the cost accounting system applied in 
Malta ensures that the NRA is able to monitor compliance with the cost orientation obligation 
imposed  on  the  incumbent  in  the  market  for  fixed  public  telephony,  given  that  the 
interconnection charges applied are among the highest among EU Member States. Latvia and 
Slovakia also have very high interconnection tariffs. In Slovakia also, due to the failure to 
impose key obligations of the old framework and lengthy decision making, fixed to fixed 
interconnection  is  virtually  non existent  –  there  is  only  one  interconnection  agreement 
concluded by the incumbent, with an operator which does not compete on the retail market. 
As  well  as  examining  such  matters,  the  Commission  services  are  looking  at  whether 
regulatory obligations have been incorrectly applied to operators, either because they do not 
have SMP in the markets identified under the old framework (Czech Republic, Slovenia) or 
because different markets have been identified (Malta). In particular, in the Czech Republic 
the current law requires accounting separation to be imposed on all operators, whether or not 
they have SMP. 
The full implementation and enforcement of all these obligations is an essential pre requisite 
for ensuring that an NRA can impose appropriate remedies on the basis of a market analysis 
exercise and effectively monitor compliance therewith. 
Other important market opening rules were also not implemented prior to accession in some 
of the New Member States. Carrier selection and pre selection was a key tool in the EU15 for 
enabling competition to develop in the first place, and its apparent absence in some New 
Member  States  (Latvia  except  for  international  calls;  Slovakia)  seriously  undermines  the 
development of competition. In some cases, the scope of CS/CPS was limited, either in terms 
of the markets to which it applies (Poland; as well as in Hungary where the problem has now 
been resolved), or simply because it was not defined as an SMP obligation (Slovakia). The 
Commission is examining whether fixed number portability has been implemented in some 
New Member States (Latvia, Poland, Slovakia). 
Local  Loop  Unbundling  is  proving  to  be  increasingly  important  for  the  development  of 
competition and the roll out of broadband services in the EU. However, in a number of New 
Member States the Commission is examining whether LLU has been implemented because 
there does not appear to be a Reference Unbundling Offer (Malta, Poland, Slovakia), or, 
where  this  exists,  the  conditions  it  establishes  do  not  appear  adequate  to  allow  actual 
competition in local access through unbundling (Czech Republic, Lithuania, Slovenia). 
There  have  also  been  some  problems  given  the  lack  of  designation  of  operators  prior  to 
accession as having SMP on particular markets identified under the old framework, especially 
the  markets  for  interconnection.  This  means  that  some  large  mobile  operators  were  not 
subjected to cost orientation or price control on their mobile termination rates (Lithuania, 
Poland). 
In a number of cases, therefore, there has been a failure to take the regulatory measures that 
were  required  to  ensure  that  basic  market  opening  rules  were  in  place  upon  accession, 
including in markets where patently there are serious issues of market power. These cannot  
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now  be  addressed  until  the  necessary  legislative  and  administrative  measures  have  been 
completed, and then the market analysis carried out, which shows just how urgent it is for 
New Member States to ensure that NRAs have the resources and the legal mandate to carry 
out the market analyses as soon as possible. 
While not part of the “starting conditions”, the existence of an independent and properly 
resourced  national  regulatory  authority  is  in  fact  a  determining  factor  in  the  successful 
implementation of the framework. Accordingly, the Commission is monitoring closely the 
administrative capacity of the NRA in several New Member States (Latvia, Poland, Slovenia, 
Slovakia)  and/or  its  independence  (Cyprus).  In  some  countries,  the  Commission  is  also 
examining whether there are limitations or constraints on the powers of the NRA to carry out 
its tasks (Slovenia, Latvia), particularly in relation to market analysis (Poland, where relevant 
markets are defined by law) and the imposition and enforcement of remedies.  
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MAIN MARKET DEVELOPMENTS
17 
The estimated value of the electronic communications services sector for the year 2004 is 
€277 billion
18, which accounts for 43% of the overall ICT sector. The rate of growth for the 
sector appears to have stabilised and for 2004 is estimated at 4.6%
19. However, at this level, it 
will outpace both growth in GDP, which (for the Eurozone) is estimated at 2.1%
20, and in the 
ICT  sector,  which  is  estimated  to  grow  at  3%  for  2004.  The  key  drivers  are  mobile 
communications  services  and  fixed  data  services,  which  show  strong  growth  of  7%  and 
11.5% respectively
21. 
EU25 electronic communications market value (€ billion)
277
265
254
226
240
220
240
260
280
2000 2001 2002 2003 2004
Source: EITO 2004 and Commission services  
Source: EITO 2004 and Commission services 
Underlying these general growth trends, fundamental shifts are taking place in the relative 
importance  of  the  various  components  that  make  up  the  sector.  Traditional  fixed  line 
telephony has declined in terms of value, as increasing competition, from new entrants and 
mobile communication services, forces prices and margins down. Fixed telephony revenues 
remain the cornerstone of the traditional operators’ business, which have concentrated their 
efforts on reducing long term debt and operational costs. Fixed operators are focussed on 
stabilising domestic fixed revenues and developing innovative services, such as voice over 
internet protocol (VoIP) and fixed mobile converged products. Broadband services revenues 
are offsetting the decline in fixed line voice revenues.  
Broadband penetration has increased significantly, spurred by lower prices and intensifying 
access,  but  also  infrastructure based,  competition,  as  new  entrants  start  climbing  the 
                                                 
17  The  regulatory  situation  described  here  is  generally  that  at  1  October  2004.  Market  data,  unless 
otherwise indicated, cover the period up to and including 1 August 2004. 
18  The communications services sector encompasses the following service segments as defined by EITO: 
Fixed voice telephone, Fixed data, Mobile telephone and CaTV. 
19  In nominal terms. Source: EC services based on estimates by EITO and IDATE 
20  Source: Commission. Eurozone GDP growth estimate for the year 2004 
21  Source: EC services based on estimates by EITO. 
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investment ladder
22. Mobile penetration continues to increase and, while voice services still 
dominate,  there  is  evidence  of  growth  in  mobile  data  services.  In  some  Member  States, 
revenues from mobile services were higher than fixed line revenues for the first time ever. 3G 
networks and services have been launched, at least on a limited commercial basis, in most 
Member States.  
There seems to be a new sense of confidence leading to a renewed focus on growth. In the 
past four years, following the start of the downturn, and the impact of real competition, fixed 
operators concentrated on survival by cutting costs and reducing high long term debt levels 
arising from acquisitions, capital investments in infrastructure and 3G licence fees. At the 
same time, they sought to resist the initial effects of competition. During this time, however, 
mobile telephony has continued growing and broadband has taken off. These two elements 
have fuelled the more positive outlook. Even if debt levels are still high in some cases, funds 
are now more readily available. New acquisitions, not only within the EU but also in other 
regions, buyouts of minority shareholders, including ISP subsidiaries, and further investment 
in  mobile  and  fixed  networks  (in  3G  networks, xDSL  and  conversion  of the  copper  line 
networks into IP networks) can be observed.  
EU25 electronic communications market breakdown (€ billion)
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MOBILE COMMUNICATIONS SERVICES 
The mobile sector continues to grow strongly,  achieving estimated 7%
23 growth in 2004. 
Revenues from mobile voice services exceed those of fixed voice services. However growth 
appears increasingly to be driven by value added services such as mobile data including SMS.  
                                                 
22  This term relates to a situation where a new entrant/alternative operator benefits initially from access 
products at different levels of the value chain in order to build customer base, and then progressively 
rolls out its own infrastructure towards the customer. 
23  Source: EITO 2004  
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Penetration 
The average EU25 penetration rate continues to grow and is now at 83%. The penetration rate 
for the EU15 has increased by 6 percentage points to 87%, the same rate of growth as last 
year. There are now more than 379 million mobile subscribers in the EU.  
EU mobile subscribers and average penetration, 1998 -  2004
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As the table below shows, growth has occurred in all Member States; however, the pace 
varies. The majority of EU15 Member States have experienced growth of between 5% and 
8%.  Four  EU15  countries,  namely  Greece,  Luxembourg,  the  Netherlands  and  Finland, 
experienced growth rates of 10% or more. In some of the new Member States growth was 
very high (25% in Lithuania, 19% in Latvia, 17% in Cyprus and 16% in Estonia). Growth was 
lower  in  the  Member  States  where  the  penetration  level  was  already  very  high.  Mobile 
telephony penetration is higher than fixed penetration in many new Member States.  
Mobile penetration and growth 2003-2004
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Drivers of growth 
While  future  growth  in  the  mobile  sector  in  the  EU  will  increasingly  come  from  the 
deployment  of  advanced  value added  services,  voice  services  still  account  for  the  vast 
majority of revenues. As noted, the penetration rate for mobile services continues to grow at a 
healthy rate; however, it is clear that mobile operators will seek to add value through the 
deployment of content rich data and by encouraging customers to move to higher value post 
paid options. Data services appear to be growing, with indications
24 that these services now 
account for 13% to 22% of mobile operators’ revenues. However, the majority of this revenue 
is derived from basic data services such as SMS, although more advanced services such as 
Multimedia Messaging Services (MMS) are having an impact. Enterprise solutions are likely 
to be the main drivers behind the growth of mobile data services but the extent of take up 
remains uncertain. GPRS has been the main bearer technology and e mail is likely to be the 
main application.
25  
Market shares and new entrants 
There are indications that competition in aspects of the mobile sector is intensifying. For 
example, the average market share of leading operators in each Member State has dropped 
from 46.58% last year to 43.2% this year. Although this trend had begun at the end of 2000, 
this year’s reduction is greater than the reduction seen in the previous two years combined. 
There are 80 network operators in total in the EU, with three to four operational in most 
Member States. The number of competing players is significantly increased in some Member 
States by the presence of service providers such as MVNOs.  
 EU15 average mobile operators' market share
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As  the  table  below  demonstrates,  there  is  significant  divergence  between  Member  States 
when it comes to the number of mobile service providers operating in the market. There are 
no service providers in twelve Member States and competition there is consequently confined 
                                                 
24  3G Mobile, August 2004  
25  EITO 2004  
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to network operators. A further six Member States have a low number of service providers. 
However, there are six Member States, Denmark, Latvia, Lithuania, Finland, Sweden and the 
United Kingdom, that have at least ten service providers operating in the market. It is worth 
noting  also  that  (with  the  exception  of  Latvia  and  Lithuania)  these  Member  States  have 
among the highest penetration rates for mobile services in the EU. 
Operators authorised to provide digital mobile services, July 2004 
Total EU25: 80 network operators
                          166 mobile service providers
2
3
2
2
3
2
2
1
1
2
2
2
1
1
4
3
3
3
2
3
2
3
4
2
3
3
3
4
3
3
3
3
21
10
1
1
3
21
16
2 5
8
16
3
0
5
10
15
20
25
30
BE CZ DK DE EE EL ES FR IE IT CY LV LT LU HU MT NL AT PL PT SI SK FI SE UK
Operators with DCS or GSM licence only Operators with GSM and DCS licences Service providers
59
UK not to scale
Value: 59
 
Source: Commission services based on NRA data 
Wholesale pricing 
As the section below on interconnection shows, there has been a welcome reduction in mobile 
termination rates in many EU countries during the year, although further reductions could 
follow from intervention by NRAs. As for international roaming rates, concerns persist as to 
the high level of these charges. The European Commission is continuing its investigation 
under competition rules into wholesale international roaming tariffs charged between mobile 
network operators, and in July of this year issued its preliminary position on infringements of 
Article  82  of  the  Treaty  with  regard  to  a  first  market,  the  United  Kingdom  market  for 
wholesale  international  roaming
26.  Given  its  nature,  this  issue  is  likely  to  require  a 
coordinated response and the European Regulators Group (ERG) has included international 
roaming in its 2004 and 2005 work programmes. The European Commission urges regulators 
to complete analyses of the markets for call termination on individual mobile networks and 
wholesale international roaming as quickly as possible. 
Mobile number portability 
Mobile number portability (MNP) allows subscribers to retain their number when they move 
from  one  operator  to  another.  The  number  of  ported  numbers  has  increased  significantly 
during the year, with dramatic increases occurring in some Member States, namely Belgium, 
Denmark, Germany, Spain, Ireland, Italy, the Netherlands, Finland, Sweden and the United 
                                                 
26  Commission Press Release IP/04/994 
<http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/994&format=HTML&aged=0&lan
guage=EN&guiLanguage=en>   
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Kingdom. Overall, 12.1 million numbers have now been ported in the EU, representing 3.2% 
of mobile numbers. This is a 119% increase on the previous year which suggests that MNP is 
having a greater impact in the market.  
Mobile ported numbers and price of mobile number portability, August 2004
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Launch of 3G services 
The number of 3G launches has accelerated in 2004, with many operators offering trial and 
commercial services. Of the 75 existing 3G licences, 30 operators are offering commercial 
services, and 21 are in the trial or pre commercial phase. It is estimated that there are around 
2.6 million 3G subscribers in the EU and that, on average, there will be population coverage 
of at least 43% throughout the EU by the end of 2004. Take up has been particularly strong in 
Italy and the United Kingdom. 
BROADBAND 
Broadband is the fastest growing market in the electronic communications services sector. 
This year has seen significant progress, with the total number of broadband access lines
27 
growing by more than 72%. Deployment, as at 1 July 2004, was 29.6 million lines, which 
represents 6.5% of the EU population. The figure for the EU15 is 7.6%, which compares with 
4.5% last year. Two years ago, the corresponding figure for the EU15 was 8.8 million lines. 
Overall, broadband and fixed data services revenues have grown by 11.5% for the year. 
                                                 
27  Number includes fixed access lines only  
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This  dynamism  is  not  confined  to  growth  in  absolute  terms,  but  is  also  evident  in  the 
increasing variety of innovative service offerings, and in the increasing capacity and speeds of 
transmission, that are now available. For example, providers of DSL services are beginning to 
offer  VoIP  in  order  to  increase  user  spending.  The  major  drivers  include  improved 
price/performance  ratios,  growing  internet  usage,  growing  availability,  and  increasing 
awareness. Broadband connections are increasingly likely to be used for applications other 
than high speed access to the internet. Operators are gradually moving into offering voice and 
video services over broadband, while global carriers are incorporating DSL access into their 
remote connectivity portfolios
28. 
Despite rapid growth, Europe still lags behind some other regions in terms of penetration 
levels  (see  below).  However,  some  European  countries,  for  example,  Belgium,  Denmark, 
Finland,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden,  compare  very  favourably  with  the best  performing 
regions.  
                                                 
28  EITO 2004  
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Country 
Broadband Penetration rate JULY 
2004 
(Lines/100 pop.) 
Source 
INDIA  0.02%  NRA 
CHINA  1.3%  Compactnews 
New EU MS  1.14%  COCOM 
AUSTRALIA  5.5%  ACCC  
EU25  6.5%  COCOM 
EU15  7.6%  COCOM 
US (January 04)  10%  Compactnews 
JAPAN  13%  Ministry of Telecom, Japan 
S. KOREA  44% of households  KAIST 
The significant rise in broadband deployment appears to be driven largely by intensifying 
competitive  pressure  and  also  by  the  desire  of  fixed  operators  to  offset  eroding  voice 
telephony revenues by seeking new opportunities for growth. However, an examination of the 
situation  across  Member  States  reveals  a  rather  more  diverse  and  complex  picture.  The 
following key observations, which are discussed in more detail in the following sections, can 
be made: 
•  The  broadband  penetration  rate,  measured  as  a  percentage  of  population,  varies 
significantly across Member States, ranging from 0.2% in Greece to 15.6% in Denmark.  
•  The rate of growth in broadband penetration over the year for the EU15 Member States is 
also diverse, ranging from 0.22 percentage points in Greece to 5.21 percentage points in 
Denmark. In general, the Member States with the highest penetration continue to have high 
rates  of  growth,  widening  the  gap  between  them  and  the  Member  States  with  lowest 
penetration levels.  
•  There is diversity among Member States in the deployment of broadband technologies. 
Some  Member  States  are  characterised  by  significant  deployment  of  alternative 
infrastructures  such  as  cable  and  fibre,  while  in  others,  DSL  is  by  far  the  primary 
technology. 
•  The nature and extent of competition varies considerably across Member States. In general, 
new entrants’ share of the broadband market is increasing.  
•  Bitstream access is now the most common form of access for new entrants.  
•  The significant growth in Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) provides evidence that, in some 
Member  States,  new  entrants  are  beginning  to  climb  the  investment  ladder.  Clearly,  
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regulatory intervention in relation to price and non price issues for LLU has been a key 
factor.  
Broadband penetration and growth 
Although most Member States have experienced growth in the rollout of broadband, the gap 
between them is widening. There are now five Member States where the penetration rate 
exceeds  10%  (Belgium,  Denmark,  Finland,  the  Netherlands  and  Sweden),  nine  Member 
States with a penetration rate between 5% and 10%, and eleven Member States, where the 
penetration rate is below 5%. 
Some Member States have performed particularly well. Denmark achieved an increase of 5.21 
percentage points and has the highest penetration rate in the EU. Finland and the Netherlands 
have added more than five percentage points. Among the larger Member States, the progress 
in France is noteworthy where the rate has more than doubled, from 4.05% (below the EU 
average) to 8.24% at 1 July 2004.  Italy has increased its rate significantly, although it is 
understood that many of the LLU lines in Italy are not yet used for broadband. Growth in the 
United Kingdom, Luxembourg, Denmark and Portugal has also been strong. 
For the new Member States, it is worth mentioning the high penetration rate in Estonia, which 
is similar to the EU15 average at 7.58% of the population and clearly above the average 
penetration  rate  of  the  new  Member  States,  which  is  1.14%.  Early  liberalisation  of  the 
Estonian market and national policies to promote the deployment of internet (Tiger  Leap 
programme), have resulted in lower prices for internet access and high internet penetration.  
EU25 Fixed broadband penetration rate, 1 July 2004
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Broadband technologies 
DSL  technologies  continue  to  account  for  an  increasing  share  of  the  overall  broadband 
market, and now stand  at 77.7% of total broadband lines (EU25), up from 73% in 2003 
(EU15), with cable modem access lines making up 19.6%, a drop of 4.6 percentage points on 
last year. Other technologies such as satellite, fibre and wireless local loop account for the 
balance of 2.7%, an increase on last year’s figure. 
EU fixed broadband lines, July 2002 - July 2004
 5 933 322
 12 562 092
 17 305 116
 23 083 834
 9 034 289
 5 821 305
 4 974 983
 4 165 850
 3 258 236
2 934 172   
  755 831
  660 951
  332 887
  622 129
  492 063
 8 837 924
 12 914 654
 17 220 005
 22 941 050
 29 660 970
5 000 000
10 000 000
15 000 000
20 000 000
25 000 000
30 000 000
July 02
EU15
January 03
EU15
July 03
EU15
January 04
EU25
July 04
EU25
DSL lines Cable Other technologies (cable, satellite, wireless local loop, FTTH, PLC)
 
Source Commission services based on COCOM data 
The table below shows the distribution of new entrants’ DSL lines by type of access. In July 
2003,  competition  was  based  on  service  products,  with  resale  lines  and  bitstream  access 
accounting for 73% of new entrants’ DSL lines. A year later bitstream and resale lines still 
represent 67% of the new entrants’ DSL lines but the more rapid growth of fully unbundled 
and shared access lines over the year (197%) compared to growth for bitstream and resale 
(125%) suggests that competition is moving from service based products to network based 
competition.   
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Bitstream 
There was significant growth of 237% in wholesale bitstream access during the year, from 
795 071 lines in July 2003 to 2 681 398 lines in July 2004. Wholesale bitstream products 
consist of the provision of transmission capacity by the incumbent in such a way as to allow 
new entrants to offer their own, value added DSL services, to their clients. Having overtaken 
pure resale, bitstream access is now the primary means of wholesale access used by new 
entrants to provide retail DSL services, and accounts for 34% of DSL services.  
Local loop unbundling 
A  particularly  noteworthy  development  is  the  significant  increase  of  110%  in  wholesale 
unbundled local loops in the EU15, from 1.8 million in July 2003 to more than 3.8 million in 
July 2004. 
29 This increase comprises approximately one million fully unbundled lines and 
one million shared access lines. The number of shared access lines increased 510% from 
191 500 to 1 168 828 lines, the biggest increases being in France and Sweden (shared access) 
and Italy, Germany, Austria and Finland (fully unbundled).  
While shared access lines are used to provide broadband services at retail level, not all of the 
fully unbundled lines are used for broadband. For example, in the two Member States where 
the number of fully unbundled lines is highest, Germany and Italy, only 36% (Germany) and 
42%  (Italy)  of  the  fully  unbundled  lines  are  used  for  the  provision  of  retail  broadband 
services. Nevertheless, the increase in the number of unbundled lines being used to supply 
broadband services at retail level is very significant.  
                                                 
29  There are no data available in the NMS where LLU is offered  
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Prices for unbundled lines have decreased over the year, with the average (EU15) charge for a 
fully unbundled line (monthly rental plus the connection fee amortised over the year) falling 
from €17.20 to €16.70. A more significant drop was seen in relation to shared access, where 
the average EU15 price fell from €10.98 to €9.01, a drop of almost 18%. This comes on the 
back of a reduction of 28% the previous year. Significant reductions in the charge for shared 
access have taken place this year in Denmark, Germany and the United Kingdom.  
The  growth  in  LLU  over  the  last  year  is  encouraging,  as  it  appears  to  indicate  that  new 
entrants are beginning to climb the investment ladder. Where alternative competing platforms 
are not viable, LLU provides the opportunity for infrastructure based competition. However, 
until  last  year,  the  growth  of  LLU,  particularly  for  broadband  purposes,  had  been 
disappointing. A combination of complexity, in terms of product and process development, 
and  dispute  resolution,  as  well  as  unattractive  wholesale  prices, had  halted  progress.  The 
improved performance this year is possibly a result of the more optimistic outlook and the 
fact that appropriate regulatory action has been taken in a number of Member States.  
Competition in the broadband market 
Competition in the broadband market intensified during the year, although at a slower pace 
than the year before. The new entrants’ share of the broadband market at EU15 level has 
continued to rise and stood at 43.7% in July 2004, an increase of 2.4 percentage points on the 
previous year. The new entrants’ share of the DSL market, a technology which, as stated, now 
accounts for 78% of the overall broadband sector, has also increased and is now at 30.6%, up 
8 percentage points in the year.  
The  table  below  examines  incumbent  and  new  entrant  market  shares  according  to 
technologies  in  each  of  the  Member  States.  It  reveals  different  patterns  of  broadband 
competition at national level. For example, viable alternative platforms, such as fibre and 
upgraded  cable  TV  networks  exist  in  some  Member  States.  This  is  the  case  in  Austria, 
Belgium,  Denmark,  the  Netherlands,  Sweden  and  the  United  Kingdom.  Most  of  these 
Member States are in the highest bracket in terms of penetration rates, suggesting that the pre 
existence  of  alternative  infrastructure  competition  has  been  a  key  factor  in  the  rollout  of 
broadband.   
EN  57    EN 
Breakdown of EU15 national broadband markets by technologies and players
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30 
Where  viable  alternative  infrastructure  does  not  exist,  or  is  relatively  scarce,  competition 
largely depends on access to the incumbent’s facilities. While penetration rates are generally 
lower in countries without competing alternative infrastructure platforms, there are strong 
indications in some Member States that access based competition is growing as regulators 
intervene  in  the  market to  ensure  open,  non discriminatory  access  for  new  entrants.  New 
entrants have gained a strong foothold in the United Kingdom, largely based on resale, where 
the incumbent’s market share is the lowest in the EU. Infrastructure competition is also strong 
there; however, LLU has yet to make a major impact although there are signs of increased 
activity in this segment of the market. In Germany, on the other hand, the incumbent’s market 
share remains very high and alternative infrastructure competition is limited. 
A good example is France, where the new entrants hold one of the highest shares of the DSL 
market,  and  consequently  the  overall  broadband  market.  Broadband  penetration  has  risen 
from 4.05% to 8.24% as at 1 July 2004, primarily driven by competition based on shared 
access and bitstream. France now has one of the lowest monthly rental prices in the EU for 
shared access and the French regulator (ART) has intervened strongly in relation to potential 
margin squeeze issues.  
Clearly a variety of options are being used to drive the competitive rollout of broadband 
services,  ranging  from  bitstream  to  LLU  to  alternative  platforms.  To  some  extent  these 
options can complement one another. Where viable alternative infrastructure does not provide 
sufficient competition, regulators will need to apply appropriate remedies which may include 
rights of access through wholesale products, such as bitstream, making sure that potentially 
anti competitive pricing practices, such as margin squeeze, are avoided.  
                                                 
30  In Portugal the incumbent owns 73% of cable modem lines  
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Following  a  competition investigation  on  the  basis  of  Article  82  of the  Treaty,  Deutsche 
Telekom committed itself, vis à vis the European Commission, to terminating a presumed 
margin squeeze as regards broadband access by reducing its tariffs for shared access (line 
sharing)  with  effect  from  1  April  2004.
31  The  Commission  will  actively  monitor  the 
development  of  competition  in  the  sector  and  intervene  where  appropriate  to  ensure  and 
protect competition. 
FIXED VOICE SERVICES 
Fixed voice telephony revenues have continued to decline slowly. Given the corresponding 
increase in mobile revenues and penetration, the decline in fixed revenues could, in part, be 
due to fixed to mobile substitution. However, there are indications that innovation, driven by 
intensifying levels of competition, both within the fixed segment and across mobile and fixed, 
including the arrival of new technologies such as voice over internet protocol and fixed to 
mobile convergence products, will possibly slow down the decline in fixed voice revenues 
over time.  
Market share and new entrants  
Despite this slow decline, there has, for the first time in a number of years, been an increase in 
the  estimated  number  of  players  entering  this  market
32.  This  reflects  the  more  optimistic 
outlook  for  the  fixed line  sector  and  will  have  an  impact  on  the  competitive  landscape. 
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As the graph below shows, the decline in incumbent market share is continuing across all 
fixed segments. It is also clear that the rate of this decline remains steady and that incumbents 
continue to exercise a very strong hold on the  local call segment. There is also a strong 
                                                 
31  Commission Press Release IP/04/281 
http://europa.eu.int/rapid/pressReleasesAction.do?reference=IP/04/281&format=HTML&aged=1&lang
uage=EN&guiLanguage=en 
32  As a result of the implementation of the new regulatory framework, it will become increasingly difficult 
to get precise figures on the number of authorised operators.  
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correlation between the timing of liberalisation of the market and incumbent market share. 
This is particularly evident for the new Member States, where the incumbent’s share, again 
most notably in the local call segment, is over 90% in many cases.  
EU15 average incumbents' market share on the voice telephony market 
(based on revenues)
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Competition in the fixed market is still largely service based, with new entrants providing 
services via indirect access methods such as carrier selection (CS) or carrier pre selection 
(CPS). In fact only 6.47% of consumers are using direct access
33 to an operator other than the 
incumbent. Direct access competition is relatively strong however in Denmark (18%), Spain 
(11%) and the United Kingdom (16.9%).  
The table below suggests that there has been an increase in subscribers opting for carrier pre 
selection or carrier selection. 31% of subscribers now use an alternative operator for long 
distance or international calls. For local calls the figure is almost 20%.  
                                                 
33  Services provided over proprietary infrastructure or over fully unbundled lines   
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% of subscribers using an alternative provider, EU 15
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Pricing
34 
Although  the  major  rate  of  decline  seen  in  the  early  years  of  liberalisation  has  slowed, 
significant reductions have occurred in some segments during the year. In terms of assessing 
price changes, operators’ list prices are becoming less relevant, as they increasingly offer 
more diverse and tailored pricing packages, such as bundled line rental and call charges, 
which are aimed at customer retention.  
Different trends for local, national and international calls are evident. Reductions for national 
calls  have  been  quite  significant  and,  it  appears,  have  even  accelerated  during  this  year. 
Average prices for a 3 minute national call have fallen by almost 12%. The average price for 
a similar 10 minute call has fallen by 13.5%. Prices for an international call for a residential 
user have fallen by 18%.  
                                                 
34  Information on prices refers to the standard prices charged by the fixed incumbent operators of the 
EU25 Member States. However, standard prices charged by the incumbents are not necessarily the 
cheapest ones, as different price schemes are also made available and new entrants may offer cheaper 
prices.   
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EU25 International basket development
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These trends suggest that that there is an intensifying level of competition in the fixed market 
for national and international calls. The reductions are consistent with other developments 
identified in this document such as the overall declining value in fixed telephony revenues, 
the increasing number of subscribers opting for new entrants, declining incumbent market 
share and the increase in ported fixed telephone numbers (see below). However, it is also 
evident,  as  in  previous  years,  that  competition  in  the  local  calls  market  remains  weak. 
However, of the general increase in the number of subscribers using a new entrant player, 
local calls saw the biggest growth. Also, the decline in incumbents’ market shares is greatest 
for  the  local  call  segment.  These  gains  for  entrants  are  clearly  based  on  indirect  access 
service based competition such as CPS and may also reflect regulatory intervention in relation 
to CPS.  
Fixed number portability 
Fixed number portability (FNP) enables subscribers to retain their number when they move 
from  one  operator  to  another.  Although  it  was  slow  to  take  off,  there  has  been  a  major 
increase  in  numbers  ported  during  this  year,  suggesting  a  more  competitive  environment 
where customers are changing operator in greater numbers.   
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Almost 5 million numbers have now been ported in the EU. This is a 61% increase on the 
previous year. Spain, the Netherlands and Italy show the highest values in absolute terms. 
Fixed ported numbers and price of fixed number portability, August 2004
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Leased lines 
The downward trend in leased line prices
35 has continued in 2004 for all categories with the 
exception of 34 Mb/s 2km, for which prices have remained stable since 2000. The table below 
shows that 2Mb/s prices have continued to fall and, for 200 km leased lines, prices are 25% 
cheaper than in 2002.  
                                                 
35  EU24:  all  EU  Member  States  except  Finland.  EU22: all  EU  Member  States  except  Finland, 
Luxembourg  and  Malta.  Information  on  leased  lines  prices  in  the  new  Member  States  (with  the 
exception of Malta) is available since 2000 only. Data for Malta refer to 2003 and 2004 only. All 
pricing information at EU level refers therefore to the EU24 weighted average for the years 2000, 2001 
and 2002 and to the EU25 average since 2003.   
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EU average price variation since 2000, 2 Mb/s
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INTERCONNECTION  
Fixed interconnection  
In the fixed sector the downward trend in interconnection tariffs has continued. The table 
below shows slight reduction at all levels, and especially for double transit termination. 
Among this generalised downward trend, the major changes since last year have occurred in 
the United Kingdom and Belgium for local level termination, Sweden, Germany and Belgium 
for single transit and Greece, Germany and Portugal for double transit call termination.  
As with retail charges, there is a strong correlation between the levels of the charges and the 
timing of liberalisation of the market. Interconnection charges, for most of the new Member 
States, are significantly higher than those for the EU15 (74% higher for local level, 60% for 
single transit and 32% for double transit).   
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Mobile interconnection  
In the mobile sector, on the other hand, concerns have been expressed for some time that, in 
many cases, mobile call termination rates bear little relation to costs. In response to regulatory 
intervention there has been a welcome downward trend in these rates over the last year. Data 
for the EU15 show that the average fixed to mobile call termination rate for operators with 
SMP has fallen by 14% between July 2003 and July 2004.  
The difference in charges between the SMP and non SMP operators has arisen mostly as a 
result of regulatory intervention by NRAs to bring about cost orientated charges for SMP 
operators. It should be noted that, even for non SMP operators, interconnection charges have 
been sometimes set by the NRAs, for example as a result of intervention on the basis of a 
competition enquiry or setting a price ceiling to avoid excessive tariffs.  
EU15 average fixed-to-mobile interconnection charges for SMP and non-SMP operators 
in the national interconnection market 
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As the table below shows, significant reductions took place in many Member States, with the 
biggest being in the United Kingdom, with more than a 50% reduction. There have also been 
significant reductions in Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands. These charges are still eight 
times the equivalent rate (double transit) on the fixed network. Further reductions may follow 
from the market analysis procedures currently under way in Member States.  
 Fixed-to-mobile national average interconnection charges 
EU15  weighted average (all operators, €-cents):   
2004: 14.76 -  2003: 17.58 - 2002: 18.92 
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SUMMARY - CONSUMERS  
The trends emerging from the market for 2004 suggest that the consumer continues to make 
significant gains from an increasingly competitive sector, although concerns remain as to the 
slow rate of progress in some areas, for example, competition in local fixed voice services. In 
general, prices continue to decline in the fixed sector and more players are now entering the 
market.  
Given the later liberalisation of the markets, consumers in new Member States have not yet 
experienced the  gains of the EU15. Competition is relatively under developed in most of 
these countries. For many of the key indicators, such as pricing and broadband rollout, there 
are significant gaps between the old and the new Member States. A notable exception to this 
is for mobile phone penetration, where the rates are high, reflecting, perhaps the relatively 
under developed penetration of fixed networks.  
Prices for international and long distance national calls in the EU25 have fallen by 40%
36 and 
30% respectively since 2000. However, there has been a slight 1% increase in the price of 
short local calls. An increasing number of consumers, more than 31%, are opting to use new 
entrant operators for international and national calls, and the increase in ported fixed numbers 
signals  that  consumers  are  moving  from  one  operator  to  another  in  greater  numbers. 
Competition in the local call segment is relatively weak and prices appear to have stabilised 
here although, the number of consumers using an alternative operator for local calls increased 
                                                 
36  Decrease since 2000 in the average price of an international call in all EU25 Member States except 
Malta, for which data are only available since 2003.  
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by 3.4% in the year. Regulatory intervention in relation to CPS is paying dividends in terms 
of  increasing  consumer  choice.  To  date,  however,  these  gains  have  not  translated  into 
significant price reductions at local level.  
The consumer take up of broadband services is one of the major developments in the year and 
indicates  that  the  consumer  is  making  use  of  the  greater  choice  in  terms  of  services  and 
providers.  
The declining market shares of leading mobile network operators, as well as the growing 
penetration and the increase in ported mobile numbers, suggest that the consumer is enjoying 
the benefits of an increasingly competitive environment. However, international roaming rates 
appear high. Further regulatory action on wholesale mobile call termination rates should lead 
to knock on consumer benefits at the retail level. Over time, the launch of 3G services will 
stimulate further competition in the mobile sector and bring a new range of innovative data 
services to consumers.   
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ARTICLE 7 FRAMEWORK DIRECTIVE PROCEEDINGS 
This section of the report focuses on the main issues that the Commission has dealt with under 
the Article 7 procedures and the main regulatory trends observed, since July 2003.  
INTRODUCTION 
Notifications  by  national  regulatory  authorities  of  draft  measures  under  the  Article  7 
procedures  commenced  in  August  2003.  By  27  October  2004,  103  notifications  from  10 
Member  States  (Austria,  Greece,  Finland,  Hungary,  Ireland,  the  Netherlands,  Portugal, 
Slovakia, Sweden, the United Kingdom) had been received. Of these, 101 have been closed. 
The Commission has issued 57 “comments” or “no comments” letters, 3 “serious doubts” 
letters; considered 2 notifications to be “incomplete” and issued 3 veto decisions
37.  
Ensuing  Commission  decisions  (incompleteness,  comments  or  veto)  were  issued  with  the 
main objective of harmonising the regulatory landscape for e communications throughout the 
EU, i.e. providing guidance to NRAs in their market analyses whilst addressing policy and 
implementation issues in order to ensure a consistent approach based on EU competition law 
principles in  all Member States. Experience to  date shows that when  adopting their final 
measures  NRAs  have,  in  most  cases,  taken  utmost  account  of  the  comments  issued  in 
Commission decisions. 
The  Commission  services  have  held  62  pre notification  meetings  with  NRAs  from  15 
Member States (including two of the new Member States: Hungary and Slovakia) in order to 
provide  guidance  on  intended  notifications.  This  practice  has  laid  the  foundations  for  a 
productive and solid cooperation between the Commission and the NRAs, and the latter have 
for the most part taken into account guidance provided by the Commission’s services. 
The overall picture resulting from these proceedings is that regulation in line with competition 
law principles has become more focussed in addressing identified market failures, and has 
been rolled back in a number of cases. NRAs have generally tended not to deviate from the 
markets defined in the “Recommendation”
38. However, two markets in particular have been 
subject to a different approach: the wholesale broadband access market and the market for 
broadcasting transmission services. 
Another  trend  is  a  tendency  to  impose  the  full  set  of  remedies  provided  for  in  the  new 
regulatory framework on undertakings with significant market power (“SMP”). In some cases, 
the NRAs have adopted an asymmetric approach to remedies, i.e. imposed different remedies 
on SMP undertakings in similar markets within their Member State.  
Notifications received so far related to all but one (i.e. the wholesale national market for 
international roaming on public mobile networks – market 17) of the markets identified as 
susceptible to regulation in the Recommendation.  
                                                 
37  Note that those letters/decisions can concern several notified draft measures. 
38  Commission Recommendation of 11 February 2003 on relevant product and service markets within the 
electronic  communications  sector  susceptible  to  ex  ante  regulation  in  accordance  with  Directive 
2002/21/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on a common regulatory framework for 
electronic communication networks and services, OJ L 114, 8.05.2003, p. 45 (the “Recommendation”).  
EN  70    EN 
ISSUES RELATED TO THE ARTICLE 7 PROCESS 
Parallel national and Community consultations 
Several NRAs have conducted their national and Community consultations in parallel
39. In 
such cases it is difficult for the Commission to consider properly the comments of interested 
parties (e.g. industry, consumer associations and national competition authority) which are 
provided  during  the  national  consultation.  These  comments  may  affect  the  Commission’s 
assessment of the compatibility of the draft measure with Community law and, if applicable, 
the appropriateness and proportionality of the proposed remedies. In addition, in the event that 
the national consultation results in significant changes to the original notification, the NRA 
risks having to re notify the measures pursuant to Article 7 of the Framework Directive.  
For these reasons, the Commission encourages NRAs to conduct sequential consultations at 
national and Community level.  
Two-stage notifications 
Some NRAs have split the market review into two stages – the first pertaining to the market 
definition and SMP assessment, the second to the remedies
40. The Commission invites such 
NRAs to notify the proposed remedies also within a short period.  
The Commission continues to monitor whether all NRAs meet their notification requirements 
with  regard  to  decisions  in  the  context  of  access  and  interconnection  disputes.  The 
Commission therefore  recalls that as a matter  of principle all measures falling within the 
scope of Articles 15 or 16 of the Framework Directive, Articles 5 or 8 of the Access Directive 
or Article 16 of the Universal Service Directive are subject to Article 7of the Framework 
Directive.  
Notification ahead of transposition 
In respect of a review of mobile call termination markets, an NRA defined the relevant market 
appropriate to national circumstances and carried out its market analysis prior to transposition 
of the EU regulatory framework into national law
41.  
The Commission considers that an NRA is entitled to do so on the basis that (i) the validity of 
its assessment is based on the assumption of correct transposition and (ii) the time period 
between the market reviews and the adoption of the final measure is kept as short as possible. 
Accordingly,  where  any  material/substantial  elements  in  the  NRAs’  analysis  change  as  a 
result of incorrect transposition of the framework or delayed adoption of the final measure, 
the  resulting  measure  should  be  re notified  as  a  draft  measure  under  Article  7(3)  of  the 
Framework Directive. 
                                                 
39  Cf.  cases  UK/2003/0019,  32 34,  35 39,  40,  UK/2004/41,  45,  47,  65;  AT/2004/0044,  63,  74,  90; 
IE/2004/0046; SE/2004/0048, 49, 50, 51, 52. 
40  Cf.  cases  IE/2004/0073,  PT/2004/0053 0061,  AT/2003/0018  (NB:  the  latter  only  covered  market 
definition, no market analysis nor remedies) 
41  Cf. case EL/2004/0078  
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Disapplication of national legislation  
In  a notification regarding mobile call termination (market 16), the NRA was faced  with 
national legislation contravening the EU regulatory framework
42. The Commission services 
will monitor closely the situation where the NRA`s functions, powers and duties flowing from 
the EU regulatory framework are unduly and manifestly restricted due to conflicting national 
provisions,  and  may  call  on  the  NRA  concerned  to  disregard  the  conflicting  national 
provisions (on the basis of case law of the Court of Justice on the primacy of EC law). In 
addition, the Commission may envisage using its powers in accordance with Article 226 of 
the EC Treaty with respect to the conflicting provisions of national law (to the extent that 
infringement proceedings have not already been launched). 
ISSUES RELATED TO MARKET DEFINITION 
“Three criteria” test 
The Commission underlines that in cases where the NRA identifies an additional market or 
excludes a market in relation to the “recommended” markets, the NRA concerned is expected 
to  verify  whether  the  three  criteria  are,  or  are  not,  met  and  to  notify  the  Commission 
accordingly. This three criteria test should in general be prospective in nature and not rely on 
purely  historic  data.  NRAs  are  expected  to  analyse  all  markets  listed  in  the 
Recommendation
43.  
It is considered that for the markets listed in the Recommendation, the three criteria test set 
out in recital 9 of that Recommendation   i.e. the presence of high and non transitory barriers 
to entry, whether or not the structure of the market is moving towards effective competition 
(dynamic aspects), and whether the application of competition law alone would adequately 
address the market failure concerned   has already been applied by the Commission.  
Wholesale broadband access (market 12)  
To date, four NRAs have included broadband access via cable within the broadband access 
market
44. Two of them have considered that the indirect pricing constraint exercised by cable 
based services at the retail level justifies their inclusion in the wholesale broadband access 
market
45, despite the absence of offers in the relevant market.  
The  Commission  draws  attention  to  the  definition  of  wholesale  broadband  access  in  the 
Annex to the Recommendation, which covers both (PSTN) bitstream access and “wholesale 
access  provided  over  other  infrastructures,  if  and  when  they  offer  facilities  equivalent  to 
bitstream access”
46.  
Therefore,  regulators  should  examine  carefully  the  technical,  practical  and  economic 
feasibility for cable operators to offer facilities equivalent to bit stream access and where this 
is so, provide evidence of an equivalent wholesale offering on the part of cable operators   if 
                                                 
42  Cf. case FI/2004/0031 
43  Cf. cases UK/2003/0004 and UK/2003/0005 
44  Cf. cases UK/2003/0032 34, FI/2002004/0062, SE/2004/0083, IE/2004/93 
45  Cf. cases UK/2003/0032 0034 and IE/2004/0093 
46  Italics added  
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the market is to include cable based services. References to indirect constraints   for example, 
through substitutability at retail level   are in general to be considered at the level of the SMP 
assessment and not as part of the market definition. 
Broadcasting transmission services (market 18) 
So  far,  three  NRAs  have  notified  the  market  for  television  and  radio  broadcasting 
transmission services and all three split this market by platform
47. All three consider that cable 
transmission does not warrant ex ante regulation, mainly due to must carry obligations and 
the  limited  negotiating  power  of  cable  operators.  As  to  the  transmission  of  broadcasting 
services via satellite, both the Austrian and Finnish NRAs excluded these from their market 
analysis since no such providers are subject to their jurisdiction. The Commission invites the 
NRAs  to  have  regard  to  any  future  Commission  decision  on  trans national  satellite 
broadcasting transmission services under Article 15(4) of the Framework Directive and to 
take this decision into account in their market analysis. 
Voice call termination on individual mobile networks (market 16)  
The seven NRAs which have so far notified these markets have designated all the terminating 
operators  as  having  SMP
48.  Indeed,  according  to  the  Recommendation,  each  individual 
mobile network constitutes a relevant market for voice call termination. This implies that each 
terminating operator is likely to be found to have SMP and thus to be regulated. In terms of 
remedies, some NRAs have applied asymmetric remedies
49. Sweden for example imposed 
lighter cost control obligations on newly established operators.  
The Commission services recall that termination of voice calls on 3G networks is not as such 
to be considered as a novel service or newly emerging market, but rather a product that in 
principle  should  be  part  of  the  market  for  voice  call  termination  on  individual  mobile 
networks. 
ISSUES RELATED TO SMP ASSESSMENT 
The Commission has so far used its veto powers three times: twice against draft measures 
notified by the Finnish regulator, Ficora, and once against a draft measure notified by the 
Austrian regulator, TKK. 
The first veto decision concerned the markets for publicly available international telephone 
services provided at a fixed location for residential and non residential customers in Finland. 
The Commission contested the methodology followed by the NRA in reaching the conclusion 
that there were no SMP operators in either of the markets (residential and non residential). 
The Commission concluded that there was both a lack of evidence to support the finding of 
the absence of SMP and a lack of consideration of existing remedies. The Commission went 
on to recommend that the Ficora conduct a fresh market analysis looking into a number of 
indicators such as the evolution of market prices over time, the nature and intensity of barriers 
                                                 
47  Cf. cases AT/2003/0018, IE/2004/0042 and FI/2004/0076 
48  Cf. cases FI/2003/0031, UK/2003/0040, SE/2004/0052, IE/2004/0073, EL/2004/0078, AT/2004/0099 
and HU/2004/0101 
49  Cf. cases FI/2003/0031, UK/2003/0040, SE/2004/0052, EL/2004/0078  
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to entry and, in particular, whether a finding of lack of SMP in a defined retail market was 
due principally to existing regulatory obligations. 
In the second veto decision, the Commission did not agree with the NRA’s draft decision 
according to which the mobile operator with the highest market share in the relevant market 
had SMP in the market for access and call origination on public mobile telephone networks. 
The  Commission  came  to  the  conclusion  that  the  evidence  provided  by  Ficora  and  the 
developments in the Finnish mobile market did not support the finding of SMP. In the view of 
the Commission, the recent developments at retail level and the ability of service providers to 
conclude wholesale agreements point towards sufficient competition in the Finnish market for 
mobile access. 
In the third veto decision, the Commission challenged the proposal of the Austrian NRA to 
cease  regulating  wholesale  transit  services  in  the  fixed  public  telephone  network.  In 
particular, the Commission did not agree with the NRA’s approach to including operators 
which no longer demand transit services in the market definition. In the Commission’s view 
this would have underestimated the incumbent operator’s market power (and thus potential 
SMP), in particular vis à vis operators which cannot self provide transit as long as they do not 
have a real commercial alternative. Further, insufficient consideration was given by the NRA 
to the possibilities that would be open to operators currently dependent on regulated transit 
services in the event regulation were lifted, and which have insufficient traffic volumes to 
justify further roll out of their networks (lack of green field approach). The Commission’s 
veto decision does, however, provide for the re examination of the market by the NRA. 
ISSUES RELATED TO PROPOSED REMEDIES 
Asymmetric/symmetric remedies  
Four  NRAs  in  several  cases  have  imposed  asymmetric  obligations  under  the  Access 
Directive
50. Indeed, obligations imposed under the Access Directive should be based on the 
nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified.  
In circumstances where it is likely that the market failure identified will be the same in all 
markets (for example 100% market share in termination markets, high barriers to entry and 
the economic non viability of installing a competing local access infrastructure), and where an 
NRA intends to impose different remedies on different undertakings within similarly defined 
markets, such differential treatment should be adequately reasoned. 
Remedies imposed outside the relevant market  
Within its review of market 16, an NRA proposed to impose a non discrimination obligation 
with respect to GSM gateways, which the Commission considered outside the scope of the 
relevant market
51. The Commission is of the view that, in principle, the proposed obligations 
should pertain to a finding of dominance within the scope of the relevant product market.  
                                                 
50  Cf. cases FI/2003/0020, FI/2003/0021, FI/2003/0022, FI/2003/0025, FI/2003/0028, FI/2003/0029, 
FI/2003/0030, FI/2003/0031, SE/2004/0050, SE/2004/0052, EL/2004/0078, PT/2004/0091 and 
PT/2004/0092. 
51  Cf. case EL/2004/0078  
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However,  in  specific  circumstances,  NRAs  may  impose  proportionate  and  justified 
obligations in an area outside, but closely related to, the relevant market under review, if such 
imposition  constitutes  (i)  the  most  appropriate,  proportionate  and  efficient  means  of 
remedying the lack of effective competition found on the relevant market, or alternatively (ii) 
an essential element without which the obligation(s) imposed on the relevant market would be 
ineffective.  
Obligations imposed under Article 5(1) of the Access Directive  
Two NRAs have used Article 5(1) of the Access Directive to impose obligations unconnected 
to a finding of SMP
52: the first was to impose under Article 5(1)(a) a  general horizontal 
obligation to ensure end to end connectivity in the Netherlands; the second was to impose on 
a digital platform operator, under Article 5(1)(b), the provision of access to certain technical 
broadcasting services (beyond API’s) as well as accounting separation, reporting obligations 
and the obligation to publish charges.  
The Commission considers that NRAs must use Article 5(1) of the Access Directive with 
caution,  taking  into  account  the  strict  requirements  for  the  application  of  this  provision, 
namely  that  (i)  access  and  interconnection  and  interoperability  of  services  shall  only  be 
mandated  where  appropriate,  (ii)  NRAs  must  exercise  their  responsibility  in  a  way  that 
promotes efficiency and sustainable competition and gives the maximum benefit to end users 
and  (iii)  conditions  imposed  shall  be  objective,  transparent,  proportionate  and  non 
discriminatory. 
SUMMARY 
15 months after NRAs began to notify draft regulatory measures to the Commission, it is 
apparent that cooperation between NRAs and the Commission services responsible for the 
electronic  communications  consultation  mechanism  is  working  well.  Since  the  market 
analysis under the new  regulatory framework is based on EU competition law principles, 
cooperation between the NRAs and their respective NCAs is also very important. To date, the 
Commission is of the view that such cooperation could further improve, however. 
As regards the markets which are to be analysed and notified by the NRAs pursuant to Article 
7 of the Framework Directive, the Commission would like to reiterate that it operates on the 
assumption that the three criteria test is met for all markets listed in the Recommendation, but 
that  deviations  from  the  market  definition  in  the  Recommendation  are  possible  when 
appropriately  justified  in  the  relevant  notification,  on  the  basis  of  the  prevailing  market 
structures in the country in question. When assessing such a notification, the Commission will 
take into account past notifications by other NRAs regarding similar markets.  
As far as the SMP assessment is concerned, it is fair to say that the market shares identified by 
NRAs remain an important indicator for the finding or non finding of SMP. However, the 
Commission would like to stress again that the existence of a dominant position cannot be 
established on the sole basis of large market shares. 
                                                 
52  Cf. cases NL/2003/0017 and UK/2003/0019  
EN  75    EN 
ANNEX 2 
IMPLEMENTATION IN THE MEMBER STATES  
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BELGIUM  
TRANSPOSITION 
The new EU regulatory framework has not yet been transposed in Belgium. A draft law has 
been finalised and adopted by the Council of Ministers following a consultation procedure. 
This draft has been submitted to the Parliament. The Commission has already made a formal 
application to the Court of Justice asking it to condemn Belgium, at the end of the infringe 
ment proceeding started in October 2003, for failing to communicate the necessary transposi 
tion measures for the Directives. 
This Report discusses therefore the overall progress in the telecommunications markets in 
Belgium with a particular emphasis on the implementation problems of the old regulatory 
framework. It seems, however, that some of these problems continue to exist under the new 
framework as the issue of the universal service fund activation which has created a number of 
concerns in the past. Given that the draft legislation could be modified during the Parliamen 
tary process, this Report will not discuss in detail points of concern relating to the draft legis 
lation which is submitted to the Parliament. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The fixed line incumbent retains its leadership in the local and long distance markets with its 
market share estimated in December 2003 at 81.1% (local calls market) and at 60.8% (market 
for international calls), based on retail revenues. A similar situation exists in the market for all 
local calls (including phone calls and calls to Internet) where the incumbent’s market share is 
around 81.1%. The mobile penetration rate is estimated to be around 84%, an increase on last 
year, while the market share of the subsidiary of the incumbent fixed operator was 51%. The 
broadband penetration rate was estimated in July 2004 to be around 14%, which among the 
highest in the EU 
NATIONAL REGULATORY AUTHORITY 
Following the adoption of the BIPT Act in 2003, BIPT, the Belgian regulator, enjoys greater 
independence, however, concerns still remain and the industry would welcome further guar 
antees as to its independence. These concerns relate to a provision in the Act which gives the 
right to the Council of Ministers to suspend a decision of the BIPT on matters to be deter 
mined by a Royal Decree and when they consider such a decision to be illegal or contrary to 
the public interest. However, to date, no such decree has been adopted  
It appears that, following the adoption of the new legislation, the respective broadcasting 
regulators for the Flemish and the French speaking Communities, will be responsible for su 
pervising the market for broadcasting services. 
The draft electronic communications law which aims at transposing the new EU regulatory 
framework has raised concerns among the alternative operators as to whether the BIPT will be 
vested with sufficient powers to regulate the markets effectively. In particular, the issue as to 
whether BIPT would be granted sufficient powers to control retail prices of the incumbent, to  
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decide on the existence of an unfair burden for the provision of universal service and to define 
cost methodologies have been questioned.  
It is reported that the BIPT does not have all of the powers necessary to enforce its decisions. 
However, under the BIPT Act, the Council may impose an administrative fine for a violation 
of the laws or any regulatory decision implementing the framework which can range between 
0.5% and 5% of the last annual turnover in the relevant market, up to a maximum of € 12.5m. 
According to the alternative operators, it appears that the BIPT is reluctant to impose admin 
istrative fines and penalties on the incumbent operator as the BIPT, in practice, has never im 
posed any fines for non compliance against the incumbent. 
It is reported by market players that the resources of BIPT are limited and that this is causing 
delays in meeting its objectives. The problem is likely to be exacerbated in view of the new 
tasks required of the BIPT such as conducting market analysis under the new EU framework.  
Since 2003 the Competition Council is responsible for settling disputes between operators in 
relation to interconnection, leased lines, special access, full unbundling and shared access. 
The operation of the Council has been criticised by the alternative operators as not being effi 
cient and that appropriate procedures are not yet in place. In addition, there is speculation as 
to whether the Council is adequately resourced in terms of number of personnel and expertise 
in order to deal with these issues effectively.  
The public consultations conducted by BIPT have been well received by the market while the 
Royal Decree with the “Rules of Order” (Règlement d’ordre intérieur) of BIPT still needs to 
be adopted. The Decree, which aims to increase transparency, will refer to procedural issues 
in the contacts between BIPT and third parties such as the timeframe for the communication 
of the BIPT’s Councils’ decisions and advices etc.  
Appeal mechanism 
In 2003, the Act on Legal Remedies and Disputes Settlement introduced the right to appeal 
against BIPT’s decisions before the Court of Appeals in Brussels which can deliver a judge 
ment on the merits of the case. The alternative operators blame the incumbent for appealing 
almost every decision of BIPT challenging the legal certainty until a final judgement is deliv 
ered while the incumbent claims that all appeals made so far refer to issues of similar nature.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Universal service 
The discussions on the establishment and activation of the universal service fund started al 
ready in 2002 at the request of the incumbent. In the same year, BIPT conducted a public con 
sultation regarding the methodology for calculating the net cost of the provision of the univer 
sal service. A year later, BIPT communicated to the Minister of Telecommunications a rec 
ommendation on the total net cost of the universal service obligation (USO). This submission 
indicated that the cost was up to € 101m however, this figure was subsequently reduced, in 
March 2003, to € 91m. The alternative operators considered such cost to be the highest in 
Europe and it appears that the net cost calculated by them is lower than the one calculated by 
the incumbent. For the latter, the level of the cost is the result of the high number of benefici 
aries for social tariffs and payphones in Belgium. The BIPT has re examined the methodology  
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used for the calculation and a public consultation was launched on 19 September 2004. Ac 
cording to the latest estimate of the BIPT, the net cost is approximately € 46m.  
The current legislation does not provide for the concept of an unfair burden. Alternative op 
erators consider this to be an essential requirement for the activation of the universal service 
fund and expect that a relevant provision will be included in the new electronic communica 
tions law which is still in draft form. Further transparency is also requested by them in rela 
tion to the net costs and net benefits of the different components and the indirect and immate 
rial benefits of the provision of the USO by the incumbent. They also consider that the op 
portunity for other operators to be designated as universal service providers should be created 
through the establishment of appropriate procedures. The required transparency appears to be 
ensured, however, by the draft decision on the provisional net cost submitted recently to pub 
lic consultation by the BIPT. The draft decision contains also an overview of the net cost or 
benefits of the components, including the impact of the immaterial benefits.  
Market players have expressed concerns regarding the scope of the USO under the draft leg 
islation. Specifically there is concern that the scope covers every operator for social tariffs, 
that there is no reference to the concept of the unfair burden, about the existence of possible 
discrimination in the calculation of the contribution for the incumbent and the alternative op 
erators, and in relation to the selection procedure, where for two services (directory inquiry 
and directory services) it needs to be determined whether a selection procedure will be fol 
lowed by the King through a Royal Decree. Under the current legislation, the possibility for 
alternative operators to provide universal service exists, but is subject to a condition of na 
tional coverage.  
Local loop unbundling 
Despite progress in relation to the relevant framework and the Reference Offer as a result of 
BIPT’s involvement, the vast majority of DSL lines are still provided by the incumbent that 
maintains its leading position in the market.  
The Commission is paying close attention to the implementation of co location, the content of 
the  Reference  Offer  and  the  Service  Level  Agreement.  In  relation  to  co location,  the 
incumbent offers options, physical co location and co mingling but difficulties are reported in 
their implementation, which is regarded as adding further costs to its provision. The BIPT has 
made several efforts to ensure the provision of an improved Service Level Agreement. How 
ever, the incumbent has appealed the relevant SLA decisions of the BIPT before the courts 
requesting their annulment. At present, there is a standard SLA which is being offered. 
The prices of the provision of raw copper and shared pair were reduced. However, a signifi 
cant price difference is reported between shared pairs with and without voice (where the user 
is provided a voice or other service). Given this pricing differential, it appears that alternative 
operators are not interested in requesting shared pair on a line where the end user does not 
have voice subscription. They consider that this reinforces the dominance of the incumbent in 
the relevant market. It is reported that the difference is such that it is almost impossible for 
alternative operators to provide access to ADSL services independently from the incumbent 
(where the end user has no fixed line subscription with the incumbent). 
There is no cost accounting model specifically for the provision of LLU. At present, a “retail 
minus” formula is being used with historic costs as a basis. The level of detail in this cost 
analysis is limited. As regards the incumbent’s latest offer for basic retail PSTN access, aimed  
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at low end users (including a monthly subscription at almost half the price of raw copper), the 
alternative operators appear to consider this formula as inappropriate.  
The  incumbent  is  currently  preparing  to  provide  services  over  VDSL.  The  alternative 
operators  consider  that  such  provision  will  render  the  provision  of  ADSL+2  technologies 
impossible  as  the  usage  of  spectrum  for  such  deployment  will  be  limited  because  the 
frequencies  envisaged  by  the  incumbent  for  such  use  could  interfere  with  other  xDSL 
technologies.  
The  decisions  to  be  taken  by  the  NRA  in  this  regard  will  be  critical  for  the  level  of 
competition in the relevant markets.  
Interconnection 
An  interconnection  offer  is  normally  finalised  by  the  end  of  January  of  each  year.  The 
alternative operators consider the timing of the provision of the RIO as being too late to be 
informed of the new tariffs for their own budgetary planning purposes. They also consider 
that,  if  a  level  playing  field  is  to  be  ensured,  they  need  to  receive  the  incumbent’s 
interconnection offer before the latter launches new retail services.  
Regarding carrier pre selection, different conditions seem to exist between the activation and 
deactivation obligations imposed on the alternative operators. They consider that the use by 
the incumbent of a more simplified letter of authorisation for activation of preselection than 
the one used by them is inappropriate. They expect that both alternative operators and the 
incumbent should enjoy the same level of complexity/simplicity in these standard letters. This 
issue is currently under examination by the BIPT in the consultation process for the RIO 
2005.  The  Federal  Ombudsman  for  Telecommunications  reports  that  there  have  been 
complaints brought to his attention by citizens who claim that carrier preselection service is 
either activated without permission or suspended without their authorisation. In particular, in 
the past nine months between January to September 2004, 228 complaints were submitted to 
the Ombudsman. It is also reported that the requirements of the authorisation letters are not 
always implemented. 
The  BIPT  has  achieved  further  progress  and  increased  transparency  in  relation  to  cost 
orientation, through the development of a new LRIC bottom up cost model. However, due to 
delays  (the  development  started  in  2001)  the  process  was  finalised  only  in  2004  and  a 
description of the cost model was finally published. However, the results of the reconciliation 
of the top down model with the new bottom up cost models will be taken into account only in 
setting the tariffs for the RIO of 2005. Therefore, the tariffs for 2004 are based on the top 
down model only. 
Cost accounting  
Alternative operators report that there is no information publicly available as to compliance 
by the incumbent with the accounting separation obligations. In 2004, the BIPT adopted a 
decision regarding the publication of separated accounts for the year 2000 to 2001. There is 
no confirmation of compliance from the regulator nor is there any information available as to 
the methodology used as well as the transfer charges.  
For the accounting separation for 2002, the BIPT imposed additional requirements upon the 
incumbent and requested the disclosure of additional information, which the latter refused to  
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provide. Despite the threats of BIPT to initiate a formal dispute procedure, no action has been 
taken so far to enforce its decision.  
Alternative operators have requested more concrete information regarding the cost accounting 
systems in order to verify compliance with cost orientation and cost accounting obligations. 
The request has not been fulfilled so far, on the grounds of the business confidentiality of the 
information.  The  available  information  is  not  always  sufficient  to  enable  the  alternative 
operators to verify the incumbent’s internal transfer charges.  
Leased lines 
In  2004,  BIPT  published  its  decision  on  cost  orientation  of  the  retail  tariffs  for  the 
incumbent’s  leased  lines  for  the  year  2001.  This  followed  the  designation  of  the  fixed 
incumbent as having SMP in the leased lines market in the same year. However, the fixed 
incumbent had already introduced new tariffs based on geographic zones for digital leased 
lines, the cost orientation of which, according to alternative operators, has not been analysed 
in depth. The analysis in particular did not refer to the discount scheme offered in the Global 
Contract and its adherence to the principle of cost orientation. 
In 2003, BIPT adopted a decision determining the tariffs for the migration of leased lines to 
the transport interconnect service. However, it is reported that the penalties under the Global 
Contract remain an open issue. 
Tariffs for partial private circuits for 2004 were not approved on the basis of a cost model but 
on retail minus basis, complemented by a viability test. Alternative operators consider that 
this  approach  does  not  guarantee  that  the  retail  tariffs  are  based  on  the  underlying  cost 
elements. 
Regarding  the  migration  of  retail  leased  lines  to  half  links,  while  BIPT  improves  the 
conditions, discounts which have been granted in commercial agreements and to migration 
conditions (penalties and additional investments) remain stumbling blocks. 
Mobile services 
Network problems resulted in delayed launches of 3G services for all three 3G licensees while 
the first commercial 3G application was launched in May 2004. Prices for 3G services are 
similar to those for 2G services and network coverage was extended in June 2004 to six cities 
including  Brussels.  The  3G  service  includes  provision  of  SMS  via  laptop,  remote  email 
access, remote internet access, monitoring data usage etc. 
Mobile termination rates are reported as a symmetrical. A difference exists in the termination 
rates between the two SMP operators as well as between the first and the third operator. The 
fixed incumbent’s mobile subsidiary claims that this situation has a negative impact on the 
competition  in  the  mobile  retail  market.  On  the  other  hand,  fixed  operators  continue  to 
complain about the squeeze between fixed to mobile termination and the offers of mobile 
operators to large users.  
A  recent  communication  was  issued  by  the  BIPT  allowing  the  use of  GSM Gateways  in 
principle.  Mobile  operators  consider  that  this  communication  leaves  room  for  legal 
uncertainty. BIPT concedes in the communication that the use of GSM Gateways could, in 
certain circumstances, cause damage to the mobile networks.   
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Rights of way 
Contradictory legal provisions on the (private) use of public land are reported as problematic 
for the alternative operators. While the federal legislation provides for the use of public land, 
free of charge, fees imposed by local authorities in the form of taxes on networks developed 
in  their  regions  have  created  concerns  for  operators.  In  addition,  the  Flemish  legislation 
requires the payment of a fee of € 1 for the use of regional routes per running meter of cable, 
both existing and new, with certain exemptions to apply (for example for the 52 000 km of 
cable belonging to one operator). 
In addition, several local authorities are imposing taxes on mobile operators’ antennae and 
pylons which could amount to € 2 450 per pylon, to be paid on a yearly basis.  
ePrivacy - Data retention 
The new Data Protection directive is not yet transposed in Belgium.  
Under  the  Act  on  Computer  Crime  of  2000,  data  must  be  retained  for  law  enforcement 
purposes for a minimum period of 12 months.   
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CZECH REPUBLIC 
TRANSPOSITION  
Legislation in order to transpose the new regulatory framework has not yet been adopted. The 
most recent version of the draft law was approved by the Czech Government on 1 September 
2004. Currently, the draft is under discussion in Parliament, and it is intended to come into 
effect on 1 January 2005. Secondary legislation is being prepared simultaneously with the 
draft of the new primary law. 
Although some issues arise in the draft law as regards transposition of the requirements of the 
new EU regulatory framework, the draft seems in general to demonstrate a high degree of 
legislative precision and it appears that substantial efforts are being invested in the current 
preparatory stage. Nonetheless, the Commission services are examining a number of issues 
which are referred to below. 
Even though the new EU regulatory framework has not yet been transposed, in general the 
starting conditions appear to be in place, although areas for improvement exist which the 
Commission services are scrutinizing. 
MARKET OVERVIEW  
The fixed incumbent was originally formed as a state enterprise. The company became a joint 
stock company in January 1994. 51.1% of the company is owned by the National Property 
Fund  of  the  Czech  Republic.  The  company  is  a  100%  shareholder  of  the biggest  mobile 
operator in the Czech Republic, and has subsidiaries in Germany, Austria and Slovakia.  
The  fixed  incumbent  is  designated  as  the  SMP  operator  in  the  markets  for  public  fixed 
telephone networks and services. It is also designated as having SMP in the provision of 
public telephony networks and services, in the provision of leased line services and in the 
provision of data transfer services.  
Although the fixed line business has declined in recent years, mainly due to increasing mobile 
penetration, it has attempted to compensate by boosting its internet and other data services. 
The Czech Government is planning a sale of the state’s shareholding in the fixed incumbent. 
Several options are currently being considered, including a direct sale to a strategic investor, a 
stock market floatation, or a combination of the two.  
Information on the market share of the fixed incumbent in the voice segment is treated as 
confidential. Fixed line penetration stands at 34.4% of the population. 
Licences in the mobile market have been granted for GSM, DCS and UMTS networks, and 
the mobile operator controlled by the fixed incumbent also operates an NMT network. Three 
operators are competing in the mobile market: by the end of June 2004 the operator controlled 
by the fixed incumbent had a 47% market share, while the market shares of the other two 
were 35% and 18% respectively. All three operators provide GPRS services, while the two 
biggest have also been granted 3G licences. The newest entrant did not participate in the 
auction for 3G licences; the launch of services is planned for the beginning of 2006.   
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Mobile  penetration  was  approximately  99%  as  of  June  2004.  The  two  biggest  mobile 
operators are designated as having SMP in the public mobile telephone networks and services 
market. The mobile operator controlled by the fixed incumbent is also designated as having 
SMP in provision of public telephony networks and services.  
The  fixed  incumbent  introduced  broadband  internet  (ADSL)  in  March  2003.  The  ADSL 
market is mainly in the hands of the fixed incumbent operator. The number of incumbent’s 
ADSL  lines  reached  30 000  in  July  2004.  At  that  time  cable  operators  were  providing 
broadband services to approximately 40 000 customers. In July 2004, without considering all 
new  entrants’  lines  using  WLL  and  other  technologies,  the  market  share  of  the  fixed 
incumbent on the broadband market was 39.5% and broadband penetration was 0.74% of the 
population (i.e. the latter figure includes only DSL and cable modem lines   specific data were 
not available for other technologies such as leased lines). 
THE NRA  
The Czech Telecommunication Office (ČTÚ) was established in 1993 and on 1 July 2000 was 
transformed into an independent regulatory authority. It is financed from the State budget and 
has its own budget chapter.  
Under the draft Law on Electronic Communications, ČTÚ is to be led by five Board members 
as  a  collective  body  presided  over  by  the  President  of  the  Board.  Under  the  draft  law, 
members of the ČTÚ Board, including the President of the Board, may be dismissed by the 
Government on a proposal of the Minister of  Informatics even in cases of “repeated less 
significant breach” of their duties.  
It is open to question whether the current law provides sufficiently precise guidance with 
regard to the division of competences between  ČTÚ and the Office for the Protection of 
Competition (the NCA in the Czech Republic). The new legislation will need to address this 
issue. 
Some regulatory responsibilities belong also to the Ministry of Informatics (the Ministry), 
which is involved in preparation of the legal  framework. During the reporting period the 
separation of regulatory and ownership functions in the electronic communications sector and 
the functional independence of the Ministry from matters relating to the State’s ownership of 
the fixed incumbent operator was an issue, due to the representation of this Ministry on the 
board of one of the governing bodies of the fixed incumbent operator. However, this matter 
now appears to have been resolved.  
The powers of the Ministry under the draft law are to be slightly increased. The Ministry is to 
obtain powers to define criteria for tenders in which radio frequencies are to be assigned and 
to define criteria for tenders in which universal service providers are to be designated.  
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MARKET ANALYSIS 
ČTÚ  has  not  yet  publicly  announced  its  plans  regarding  market  analysis  under  the  new 
framework, as in its view the market analysis process can start fully only after the new law is 
in place. ČTÚ has however started preparatory work based on elaboration of a methodology 
for the market analysis. The draft law requires ČTÚ to complete the market analysis within 
nine months after the new law comes into force and to review the SMP obligations imposed 
under  the  current  law  on  telecommunications  (based  on  the  previous  framework)  within 
twelve months after the new law comes into force.  
DISCRETIONARY AND ENFORCEMENT POWERS OF THE NRA 
The requirement in the Access Directive that SMP obligations be based on the nature of the 
problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the objectives laid down by the 
Framework Directive is apparently not transposed in the draft law. The conditions that have to 
be fulfilled for wholesale price regulation to be imposed under the draft law appear to limit 
the regulator’s discretion unduly. The draft law enables wholesale price regulation, subject to 
the condition that other SMP remedies, including even some retail level SMP remedies, would 
not be sufficient to solve the problem in the wholesale market. The imposition of such a strict 
conditionality on the imposition of wholesale price regulation could limit the flexibility of the 
regulator in cases where this type of remedy is needed. Based on this it might be questioned 
whether the power of the NRA to choose and impose SMP remedies as appropriate, in the 
event of finding an undertaking with SMP, is sufficiently clearly stipulated in the draft law. 
The Commission services will continue to monitor developments in this area closely. 
With respect to the powers of the regulator to impose various types of obligations, including 
SMP obligations and universal service obligations, there are concerns on the part of market 
players  as  to  the  limited  powers  of  the  regulator  in  the  area  of  enforcement  of  these 
obligations due to the fact that the draft law stipulates a maximum aggregate sanction that can 
be imposed on any undertaking in breach of its obligations by regulator.  
STARTING CONDITIONS  
The market was liberalised in January 2001 on the basis of the Law aiming to transpose the 
EU’s 1998/2000 acquis in the telecommunications field. This law is still in force pending 
transposition  of  the  new  regulatory  framework  and,  in  general  appears  to  meet  the  basic 
principles  necessary  for  effective  liberalisation  of  the  market;  however,  a  few  issues  of 
conformity remain. 
The Commission services are examining whether the principle of cost orientation is correctly 
transposed in the current law. It is not automatically imposed on SMP operators and on them 
exclusively in accordance with the Interconnection Directive. Under the existing law there is 
also a requirement for accounting separation to be applicable to all service providers, not just 
those with SMP.  
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Interconnection is regulated by ČTÚ. The cost base applied to fixed operators is forward–
looking, and interconnection charges for call termination in the fixed network are calculated 
using the LRAIC methodology. The cost base applied to mobile operators is historic, and 
interconnection charges are calculated using the FAC methodology for call termination in 
mobile  networks.  ČTÚ made  a  decision  on  reductions  in  interconnection  charges  for  call 
termination in the fixed networks and mobile networks this year.  
The  fixed  incumbent’s  RIO  has  been  published.  The  fixed  incumbent  has  concluded  22 
interconnection agreements with new market entrants. The first RUO of the fixed incumbent 
was published in September 2003 and the first LLU agreement was signed in December 2003. 
Currently there are two operators who have concluded LLU agreements with the incumbent. 
It  appears  that  in  many  cases  new  entrants  prefer  implementation  of  CPS  rather  than 
implementation of LLU. One of the possible reasons could be the price for LLU, which is not 
regulated; however, ČTÚ is currently preparing to introduce price regulation of LLU also. 
Currently the prices for LLU clearly exceed the EU average (€ 15.5 for monthly rental and 
€ 317.4  for  the  connection  as  regards  full  unbundled  loop;  € 8.7  for  monthly  rental  and 
€ 324.1 for the connection as regards shared access). 
Carrier  selection  was  introduced  in  July  2002.  Carrier  pre selection  as  well  as  number 
portability in the fixed network were introduced in January 2003.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Access and interconnection 
Interconnection  charges  and  the  absence  of  fixed–fixed  interconnection  at  local  level  are 
among the main sources of tensions between the incumbent and new entrants.  
Under the draft of the new law the rule under which pricing for access and interconnection 
related to number portability is to be cost oriented is limited only to SMP operators. 
In  September  2004  all  three  mobile  operators  were  fined  by  the  NCA  for  concluding 
interconnection agreements that limited the contracting parties to direct interconnection of 
their networks only, and excluded the possibility of another operator interconnecting between 
these  mobile  operators.  The  total  aggregate  amount  of  all  three  fines  imposed  was 
CZK 44 million (€ 1.4 million). 
The regulator has imposed an obligation on the incumbent to interconnect its network with 
alternative operators for the purpose of providing ADSL services, and has defined maximum 
prices for wholesale ADSL resale services. With respect to interconnection for dial up access 
from the network of the incumbent to internet services provided by other market players, the 
regulator has imposed a minimum level of charges to be paid by the incumbent to the other 
market players for the provision of their element of the service, as the customers using dial up 
access from the incumbent’s network to internet services provided by  other operators are 
billed by the incumbent.   
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Price regulation  
The incumbent offers a large number of tariff plans, of which four are regulated, on the basis 
of a fully allocated historical cost methodology. Regulation is effected in the form of a price 
cap. Fixed tariffs are not yet reported by the regulator to be fully rebalanced. 
The absence of regulation of certain facilities, e.g. the prices charged by the incumbent for 
LLU, is due to the fact that a dispute does not exist. The Commission services are examining 
whether, as it appears, in some cases ČTÚ has limited possibilities to apply regulation on its 
own initiative under the existing law. On the other hand, in cases where a dispute has arisen, 
e.g. related to mobile termination, subsequent price regulation has also been applied to those 
market players without SMP. 
Price regulation, where applied, is based on principles of cost orientation. Price regulation as 
well as SMP designation is not carried out by virtue of individual administrative decisions, 
and appears therefore not capable of being appealed in ordinary administrative proceedings. 
Leased lines 
The  prices  of  leased  lines  are  not  regulated.  Prices  for  national  leased  lines  (64kb/s  and 
2Mb/s) exceed the EU average if compared to these prices in those EU Member States for 
which these data are available (€ 2 577 per year for 64kb/s, 2 km circuits; € 8 149 per year for 
64kb/s, 200 km circuits; € 13 660 per year for 2Mb/s, 2 km circuits and € 52 153 per year for 
2Mb/s, 200 km circuits). 
Universal service 
The  fixed  incumbent  operator  provides  all  basic  services  generally  required  under  the 
universal service obligations. The mechanism for recovery of loss arising from the provision 
of universal service is set by law. Under the law, the loss is to be financed by all operators in 
proportion to the level of their revenues. There are problems reported by market players in 
this area, as not all of the operators are willing to pay the contributions. The fixed incumbent 
sued ČTÚ at the end of 2003, claiming it had failed to collect these contributions. Under the 
existing law there is no process for determining whether the provision of universal service 
constitutes an unfair burden to the universal service provider, and compensation from other 
operators  is  automatic.  The  law  provides  for  reimbursement  of  demonstrable  loss  to  the 
universal service operator without the need for proof that there is an unfair burden. On the 
other hand the loss from provision of universal service is evaluated under current secondary 
legislation only for unprofitable services specified therein, i.e. mostly the losses caused by 
provision of services to disabled users and rental of special equipment for these users. The 
unprofitable services not specified in the secondary legislation are not included in the loss 
calculation and are considered as a fair burden  for the provider of universal service (e.g. 
provision of public payphone services). 
Tensions between the fixed incumbent and new market entrants are evident inter alia with 
respect to bundling of monthly line rentals with free minutes by the incumbent. The NCA has 
launched its first proceedings under the new EU competition rules by opening an investigation 
in  this  area.  Similar  tensions  arise  from  the  incumbent’s  recent  offer  of  free  calls  during 
weekends, as no analogous offer by the incumbent exists at the wholesale level on the basis of 
which similar competitive services could be offered by new entrants.   
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Earlier this year the NCA fined the incumbent CZK 81.7 million (€ 2.6 million) for abuse of 
its dominant position on the market for provision of telephony services to business customers 
through fixed public telecommunications networks. The abuse consisted for example in the 
fact that customers were bound for a minimum volume of calls and they were also bound not 
to terminate the contract with the incumbent before a specified date.  
Mobile number portability is not yet available and under the draft of the new law is intended 
to become available within six months after the new law comes into force. 
Frequency management 
The  mobile  operator  controlled  by  the  fixed  incumbent  has  succeeded  in  gaining  full 
authorisation to operate a high speed mobile data network in the 450 MHz band using the 
CDMA  standard,  effectively  by  means  of  a  change  in  the  permitted  use  of  its  existing 
frequencies in the 450 MHz band. This operator launched these services at the beginning of 
August 2004. In view of the factual background to this case, the issue arises as to whether the 
rights held in this frequency band constitute special or exclusive rights. ČTÚ has stated the 
view that the accompanying issues can be solved by imposition of an obligation on the mobile 
operator controlled by the fixed incumbent to provide wholesale access to its mobile data 
network. The Commission services are examining this issue attentively. However, to date no 
wholesale reference offer has yet been published.  
ePrivacy  
The  law  currently  valid  in  the  Czech  Republic  appears  to  transpose  some  elements  of 
Article 13  of  the  ePrivacy  Directive  on  unsolicited  communications.  However,  no  formal 
notification  has  been  received  so  far  and  the  Commission  services  are  examining  the 
exception to the opt in principle with regard to unsolicited communications to see whether it 
is transposed correctly.  
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DENMARK 
TRANSPOSITION 
Denmark transposed the bulk of the new regulatory framework on time, its law coming into 
force on 25 July 2003.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
For a country of its size and population, Denmark has quite a large number of operators (four 
mobile network operators and about a dozen fixed operators with national coverage). There 
are  six  major  competing  players.  In  total  there  are  more  than  thirty  operators  effectively 
providing services. No notification is required upon entry, rights of way are granted to all 
providers of infrastructure and mast sharing is mandatory for providers of mobile services. 
Fixed  line  penetration  is  at  65.6%.  Fixed  network  traffic  has  decreased  and  has  been 
substituted by broadband connections and mobile network calls.  
Also the market share and the volume of the fixed line incumbent operator have gone down. 
Based on traffic volume the fixed line incumbent operator has a 62% market share of all fixed 
calls  (including  internet).  The  mobile  penetration  rate  is  well  above  average  at  90 95% 
(depending on whether the definition is based on a 3 months or a 6 months activity period for 
pre paid cards). The largest mobile operator has a 43% market share (based on subscriptions, 
including a 100% owned subsidiary), its main competitor 24%.Denmark is among the leading 
EU Member States in terms of broadband penetration (15.6% of the population in July 2004). 
67% of these broadband access lines are DSL lines and 76% of these DSL lines belong to the 
fixed line incumbent operator. 96% of the Danish population is able to get a fast internet 
connection and from 1 October 2005 this will increase to 98%. Since 2000 the fixed line 
incumbent operator has been very pro active marketing its ADSL products and its market 
share has come down within about a year from 82.5% (July 2003) to 76%; new entrants have 
a customer base of over 135 000. 
THE NRA  
The NRA in Denmark, NITA, is a Government Agency under the auspices of the Ministry of 
Science, Technology and Innovation. It is independent from telecommunications operators 
and Danish legislation ensures that the Ministry cannot intervene in the Agency’s handling of 
regulatory functions. The NITA adopts a consensus approach, attempting, whenever this is 
within its competence, to mediate between operators or to engage them in discussion in order 
to  solve  problems  before  they  become  disputes.  Given  the  workload  in  general  and  the 
resources available there is a need to prioritise and this means it is not always possible for the 
NITA to act on their own initiative, even though it is the preference of the market players that 
the  NITA  deals  with  every  issue  brought  to  its  attention  before  it  becomes  a  dispute. 
However,  the  procedures  for  dispute  resolution,  and  even  mediation,  are  defined  in  the 
legislation and would normally result in a decision within a certain time frame, which is not 
by definition the case in those situations in which the NITA acts on its own initiative. The 
NITA  encourages  operators  to  follow  this  “legal”  route  of  dispute  resolution  but  market 
players in Denmark are reluctant to do so, as it may endanger their negotiation position with  
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the other party (in most cases the wholesale department of the fixed line incumbent operator). 
The downside of the ‘mediation’ approach is that the outcomes, based on consensus, may not 
always provide the clarity or precedent that those same market players also want. Greater 
clarity is, provided when the NITA is forced to use its powers under the dispute resolution 
procedure. 
Appeal mechanisms - dispute resolutions 
As indicated above, it is the normal practice for operators in Denmark to keep negotiating 
with the other party and not to jeopardise relationships by bringing disputes before the NITA. 
When  disputes  are  brought  before  the  NITA  and,  in  some  cases,  appealed  before  the 
Telecommunications  Complaints  Board,  there  is  generally  respect  in  the  market  for  the 
decisions,  which  are  then  implemented.  The  Telecommunications  Complaints  Board  only 
convenes a few times a year, which doesn’t appear to suggest a fast response to appeals. For 
instance the appeal of the fixed line incumbent operator on the LRAIC decision took one year 
and three months. However Board meetings are convened on request, so this could differ 
every year. 
Despite comments from operators relating to the NITA not keeping the deadlines in dispute 
resolution procedures, it appears that, for 2003 at least (until September), out of a total of 
thirteen cases, only two were finalised with marginal delays. 
With  effect  from  25 July  2003  a  new  telecommunications  appeal  board,  funded  by  the 
industry, took over the handling of consumer complaints in the telecommunications sector; 
this is more transparent and simple for the consumer as, prior to that point, there were a 
number of different bodies to which they could address their complaints. 
Cooperation NITA - NCA 
Regarding the division of tasks between the NITA and the Danish Competition Authority 
(NCA), it appears that, even though operators claim that the division of tasks is not always 
clear, the division of tasks is clear in the legislation. Moreover, complaints or disputes filed 
with the wrong authority will be sent to the other one and, in cases where both authorities 
share  competence,  there  is  close  cooperation.  Both  authorities  published  reports  on 
competition in the telecommunications market around the same time. The NITA produced a 
telecommunications  competition  report  in  May  2003  at  the  Ministry’s  request.  The  NCA 
drafts an annual general competition report with a focus on different themes every year; in 
this report telecommunications was one of the topics of focus. The NITA report, which was 
drafted  on  the  basis  of  input  from  the  industry,  identified  (legal)  barriers  in  the 
telecommunications market with the aim of removing these. The NCA report, which is non 
binding, took a forward looking approach by looking at how to tackle some of the (regulatory) 
problems. 
Even though the two authorities in general work well together, they don’t agree on all topics 
as is apparent when reading their competition reports. There are different opinions regarding 
the length of the ‘lock in’ period of customers to a mobile network operator. The NCA thinks 
that a twelve month period will encourage competition and technological progress, whereas 
the  sector  specific  telecommunications  legislation,  which,  according  to  NITA,  intends  to 
balance competition and consumer interests, foresees that exclusive binding contracts should 
only last for six months.  
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The same applies to the cost calculation for shared lines. The NCA seems to think that there is 
a problem of double costing, while, according to the NITA, an investigation it has carried out 
shows there is no such problem. These kinds of contradictory opinions create confusion and 
uncertainty in the market. 
The NITA competition report - May 2003 
The report concluded that there were a few, but no serious, legislative gaps and also that the 
telecommunications industry does not take sufficient advantage of the opportunities provided 
to them by the legislation, such as submitting cases to the NITA or requesting mediation. On 
the basis of the public consultation, and also the political discussion following the report, 
steps were taken to eliminate the issues/barriers raised. 
For instance, new legislation was introduced on 1 April 2004 to clarify that ATM networks 
are covered by the national legislation already in force. Also, in order to prevent a first mover 
advantage for the incumbent operator when it introduces new services, a new legal provision 
introducing a higher penalty (based on competition law practices) for infringement of the 
transparency obligation in relation to the publication of information on new interconnection 
products,  has  been  included.  The  alternative  operators  preferred  a  so called  “standstill” 
provision of 6 months to be imposed on the fixed line incumbent operator. This was, however, 
not considered by NITA to be proportionate vis à vis the fixed line incumbent operator. 
Some non legal initiatives also followed from this report, such as the introduction of a flexible 
system for change of customers between ADSL providers and the setting of targets for the 
measurement  of  the  quality  of  telecommunications  products.  Moreover,  the  fixed  line 
incumbent  operator  extended  its  ADSL  coverage  and  ceased  billing  for  ADSL  tests  and 
cancellation charges for non availability of raw copper (since 1 January 2004). 
Fewer barriers were listed in the report than the alternative operators had identified in the 
preparatory process. For example spectrum trading was not tackled immediately by the NITA 
(but will be addressed at a later stage) as well as the possibility of relaxing the terms and 
conditions for payments of frequencies. Internal cabling is another issue that was clarified in 
the summer of 2003, but with seemingly poor effect. The NITA has been working for a while 
on this issue, and four operators have asked the NITA for decisions regarding changes in their 
co location agreements with the fixed line incumbent operator. A draft decision was sent for 
comments  in  September  2004.  The  NITA  is  also  preparing  to  impose  changes  in  the 
incumbent’s co location reference offer. 
The NCA Competition report - 2004 
The report written by the NCA signals that, even though liberalisation has been generally 
successful (more providers, lower tariffs), almost all of the fixed line incumbent operator’s 
competitors are suffering losses and perhaps even major providers may leave the market. The 
report pointed to some weaknesses in the legal construction and reported on how to act in a 
more dynamic way in the future, by suggesting solutions. For instance the report indicates that 
the fixed to mobile termination tariffs are too high; in this way fixed line telephony consumers 
have been subsidizing the falling mobile telephony retail tariffs. The NCA suggests that the 
mobile termination tariffs should be lowered gradually in order to prevent the creation of 
obstructive competition between fixed and mobile telephony. Before the implementation of 
the new regulatory framework it was the task of the NCA to regulate mobile termination 
tariffs, if necessary according to competition law, due to the fact that none of the mobile  
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operators had a significant market power (of 25%) under the old regulatory framework. The 
NCA report was welcomed by the fixed line incumbent operator and the mobile operators in 
particular.  
Market analysis 
The NITA is in charge of the market analysis procedures and has, since 2003, invested much 
of its resources into this process. There is a close co operation with the NCA, which will have 
the opportunity to give advice on draft decisions, and there is an extensive dialogue with, and 
involvement of, the operators. In this way specific competition law knowledge and market 
experience is included in the process. The market analysis procedure is currently ongoing. 
The procedure is that the NITA’s preliminary conclusions on market analysis are subject to a 
seven week national  consultation. The NITA will then draft proposals  for remedies to be 
imposed  and  finally  the  whole  package  of  SMP  analysis  and  remedies  will  be  consulted 
nationally, with the European Commission and with the other EU NRAs. The NITA expects 
the first markets to be notified by the end of 2004. 
With the NITA acting largely in line with the Recommendation, the fixed line incumbent 
operator fears that it will lead to more rather than less regulation as the tendency might be to 
expand telecommunications regulation to new areas and new players. 
All  operators  are  very  pleased  with  the  transparency  of  the  NITA  throughout  the  market 
analysis  procedures  but  the  alternative  operators  in  particular  are  concerned  about  the 
timeframe  of  the  implementation  of  the  market  analysis.  With  two  rounds  of  national 
consultations (on finding of SMP and on remedies) they feel that actual implementation could 
be delayed considerably. Some delay in the timetable already occurred at an earlier stage 
when market players asked the NITA to change its original timetable, as they preferred that 
the NITA would use the data for all of 2003 in their analysis. Market players also wonder 
whether  the  Telecommunications  Complaints  Board  is  equipped  to  deal  with  appeals  on 
market analysis decisions. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES  
Access/Interconnection 
Alternative  operators  believe  that  the  NITA  should  focus  more  attention  on  new 
technologies/services; they claim it is difficult to introduce new products and that they have 
not always been able to roll out the products they want. Sometimes the products are not yet 
covered by existing legislation, and by the time they are covered, the alternative operators 
normally lag behind the fixed line incumbent operator. This issue should now be solved since 
a  penalty  has  been  introduced  in  relation  to  the  transparency  obligation  for  a  new 
interconnection product. 
The  introduction  of  the  LRAIC  model  in  January  2003  resulted  in  an  increase  of  the 
wholesale access price for full local loop unbundling in order to cover the actual level of 
costs. This increase will take place over a period of seven years. To the detriment of the fixed 
line incumbent operator, the reduction in the interconnection tariff (also as a consequence of 
the application of the LRAIC model) however, is not gradual and in fact did enter into force 
with immediate effect. Co location prices are also set on the basis of the LRAIC model. The 
NITA’s LRAIC decision was appealed by the fixed line incumbent operator, claiming that the  
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cost basis is misleading and the prices not correct. The decision was upheld in appeal. At the 
end of 2003, the NITA made a decision on interconnection tariffs for 2004, using the LRAIC 
method;  the  prices  for  switched  interconnection  have  dropped  by  three  to  four  percent. 
Denmark has the lowest interconnection tariffs in the EU (single and double transit). 
Combining wholesale line rental with CPS 
On  the  basis  of  the  new  telecommunications  legislation,  there  is  now  the  possibility  to 
combine wholesale line rental with carrier pre selection (CPS), which has an effect on the 
operator customer relationship 
Broadband 
Full local loop unbundling is available in Denmark nation wide. Despite the fact that the price 
for full unbundling is among the lowest in the EU, the fact that an alternative operator now 
has a choice, namely between unbundling and the resale of the incumbent’s bit stream access 
service, does appear to have reduced the incentive for unbundling in general at the moment. 
LLU has been largely unsuccessful in promoting competition on PSTN subscriptions. 
ADSL  was  introduced  in  1999  in  Denmark  by  an  internet  provider  based  on  local  loop 
unbundling. The fixed line incumbent operator is the prevailing operator providing ADSL, 
but also falls under certain roll out obligations for ADSL. In September 2003 the national 
audit  office  analysed  the  processing  by  the  relevant  authorities  of  all  complaints  on 
competitive  restrictive  conduct  in  the  ADSL  market  and  assessed  that  the 
questions/complaints raised were generally handled promptly and carefully. 
The fixed line incumbent operator’s bit stream access offer is only available in circumstances 
in which the end user has a PSTN subscription with the fixed line incumbent operator. Unless 
consumers keep their PSTN subscription with the fixed line incumbent operator in order to 
have a broadband connection, they will meet another pricing obligation due to the fact that no 
PSTN subscription contributes to the costs of the line. Where the broadband access is being 
provided by an alternative operator or ISP, the alternative operators have negotiated with the 
fixed line incumbent operator, but the tariff offered is almost identical to the one offered by 
the incumbent to its own subscribers. This indirect bundling of the PSTN subscription with 
the  bit stream  access  product  may  lead  to  competitive  problems  when  looking  at  the 
deployment of new services, such as VoIP. This issue will be analysed thoroughly by the 
NITA very soon. 
There has been a large increase in the number of shared lines in Denmark (from over 10 000 
in  July  2003  to  well  over  28 000  a  year  later)  despite  the  fact  that  alternative  operators 
question the correctness of the price for a shared access line, which is currently exactly half 
the price of the fully unbundled line. According to them the tariff is not based on the actual 
incremental costs and this price makes it (unnecessarily) expensive for them to compete on 
raw copper. The situation regarding the bit stream access offer (see above) may have an effect 
on the increase in the number of shared lines. 
There  is  also  an  increase  in  the  number  of  alternative  infrastructures  (for  fast  internet) 
established  by  other  ‘operators’,  such  as  municipalities,  housing  associations  or  utility 
companies, even when there may already be a competitive infrastructure. By mid 2003 the 
estimated number of connections was 102 000 (of a total of nearly 913 000 connections).   
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Mobile termination 
Fixed to mobile termination tariffs, which are just above the overall EU average, are claimed 
to be very high according to fixed operators and also according to consumer associations. 
Possible imposition of obligations following the market analysis procedure may change this. 
Currently regulation doesn’t appear to give any incentive to lower the tariffs. 
The issue of high mobile termination tariffs was the subject of a complaint against two mobile 
operators filed in 2002 and dealt with jointly by the NITA and the NCA. In December 2002 
NITA decided that the approach taken by the two mobile operators to on net and off net 
offerings  was  not  discriminatory.  The  NCA,  after  extensive  investigation  in  April  2004, 
dismissed the parts of the complaint regarding excessive pricing and collusive behaviour but it 
did find that one of the two mobile operators had abused its dominance as there was an illegal 
margin squeeze between the wholesale and retail markets in 2003. The squeeze took place in 
connection with an  end user product, parts of  which were sold at retail prices below the 
wholesale tariffs. The NCA also found that this mobile operator used bonus systems which 
were both discriminatory and creating loyalty. The mobile operator appealed the decision and 
the appeal is still pending. 
Traffic data retention 
A draft order on anti terrorism requires operators and service providers to keep traffic data 
and other data for one year. This involves also data which are not logged today and which are 
not  needed  for  billing  purposes,  such  as  incoming  calls,  cell  information  for  GPRS  and 
incoming mail. Operators question the necessity and proportionality of such an obligation, 
which would also be difficult to implement. In June, operators sent a letter, including these 
and other comments, to the Ministry of Justice. It is expected that the legislation will not be 
finalised until there is clarity as to what will happen with the EU legislative proposal on the 
same topic, in order to be in line with that. 
Universal service  
The fixed line incumbent operator is appointed as the universal service provider until the end 
of 2007. The obligation covers PSTN, ISDN, a minimum set of leased lines, directory enquiry 
services and certain services provided for people with disabilities and there are –in some 
areas  regulated maximum prices for end users. There is currently a price cap regulation for 
call set up charges (per minute charges are not regulated), subscription fee, conversion of 
PSTN to ISDN and vice versa, installation of the line, relocation and for calls to the directory 
enquiry service. The fixed line incumbent operator and (some of the) mobile operators say 
that this price control distorts price competition but the (alternative) fixed operators claim that 
a full lifting of these price controls would have a negative effect on their businesses.  
With the objective of protecting user interests, a number of obligations have been placed on 
all operators. Some of these should be revised according to the alternative operators, as the 
costs of implementing some of these obligations, usually leading to changes in the billing 
and/or customer handling procedures, may not be proportionate to the number of customers 
using  these  services.  Operators  are  calling  for  a  careful  cost/benefit  analysis  before 
obligations are imposed on them when new services are introduced in the future.  
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Masts - health issues 
The building of 3G masts and antennae has resulted in an overheated debate about 18 months 
ago due to the health issues that have been raised in the media. The 3G operators have carried 
out an information campaign and, since 24 June 2004, the NITA has set up a database, which 
can be accessed by anyone, and that consists of all the (current and planned) locations of all 
masts. The present network roll out status of one of the 3G operators does however indicate 
that the health debate has not led to a major setback in its building plans.  
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GERMANY 
TRANSPOSITION 
Germany appears to have transposed most of the new regulatory framework through a new 
Telecommunications Act (Telekommunikationsgesetz   TKG) which came into force only on 
26 June 2004. Its structure resembles to some extent that of the old law, which, on the one 
hand,  may  facilitate  its  application.  On  the  other  hand,  this  could  possibly  create  the 
impression that only minor changes have taken place. One article of the ePrivacy Directive 
has  been  transposed  by  the  new  Law  against  Unfair  Competition  (Gesetz  gegen  den 
unlauteren  Wettbewerb  –  UWG),  which  came  into  force  on  8 July  2004.  Furthermore,  a 
catalogue of secondary legislation is envisaged by the Ministry in order to complete fully the 
transposition.  
Market players expressed uncertainty as to which provisions apply in the transitional period. 
They were of the opinion that it should be clear which provisions of the new law are already 
applicable before the market analyses have been completed. The Framework Directive states 
that  Member  States  shall  maintain  previous  obligations  referred  to  in  the  Access  and 
Universal Service Directives until such time as a national regulatory authority has made a 
determination concerning these obligations.  
In July 2004, RegTP decided
53 that an obligation under the old TKG to have retail tariffs 
approved should remain valid in the transitional period. This appeared to be in line with the 
Framework Directive. In its first preliminary ruling concerning the transitional period
54, the 
Cologne  Administrative  Court  however  was  of  the  opinion  that  the  obligation  in  the 
Framework Directive to maintain certain obligations would, as regards end user tariffs, be 
restricted  to  certain  tariff  principles.  It  would  not  refer  to  the  obligation  to  have  tariffs 
approved. Following this decision it is likely that RegTP will no longer uphold obligations to 
have  tariffs  for  retail  services  approved  which  were  imposed  under  the  old  law.  The 
conformity  of  such  a  regulatory  approach  with  the  Framework  Directive  will  have  to  be 
verified.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The turnover of the telecommunications market in 2003 totalled approximately € 63.4 billion, 
which  is  an  increase  of  3%  compared  with  the  preceding  year.  In  the  same  year, 
telecommunications  companies  invested  more  than  € 5  billion  in  equipment  and  plant  in 
Germany, of which about € 2 billion was in mobile communications. Regionally the new 
entrants were able to expand their market shares measured in terms of share of telephone lines 
to different extents in the past few years. In certain regions of Germany the national average 
of 5.7% relating to telephone lines was substantially exceeded. There are regions in which the 
competitors’ share exceeds 20%
55.  
                                                 
53  Decision of 14 July 2004 (BK 2c 04/12). 
54  Decision of 6 September 2004 (1 L 1832/04). 
55  The above mentioned data are taken from RegTP’s annual report 2003.  
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On the basis of retail revenues and outgoing minutes of communications the leading position 
of the incumbent operator as regards public fixed voice telephony remains almost unchanged 
compared to the previous year. On the basis of retail revenues small decreases can be seen: 
from 95% to 90% for local calls, from 75% to 70% for national calls and from 59% to 57% 
for international calls whereas the share of calls to mobile remains unchanged at 68%. The 
incumbent’s  share  of  the  market  for  local  calls  on  the  basis  of  outgoing  minutes  for 
communications has seen a significant drop from 92% in 2002 to 82% in 2003.  
The  total  number  of  operators  that  are  actually  offering  public  voice  telephony  or  public 
network services has risen considerably in the last year, but has not reached the level achieved 
in 2002. Up to the end of August 2004 there were 94 operators actually offering fixed public 
voice telephony. There are now 8 cable TV operators, instead of just one in 2003, which are 
actually offering voice telephony. As in the previous year, 40% of subscribers use a provider 
other than the incumbent operator for long distance and international calls, but only 11% do 
so for local calls. Only since April 2003 has it been possible for consumers to choose freely a 
provider for local calls via call by call. Since July 2003 pre selection has been possible for 
local calls. In the latter cases the obligation existed under EU law since 1 January 2000. 
There are 12 mobile players in the market, and four of these have their own mobile network. 
At  the  end  of  June  2004  there  were  67.6  million  mobile  subscribers  in  the  market.  This 
corresponds to a penetration rate of about 82%, (omitting non active prepaid accounts). The 
overall market share of the subsidiary of the incumbent fixed network operator was 40% in 
June 2004. The main competitor held a market share of 38%.  
At  the  end  of  July  2004  more  than  5.4  million  broadband  Internet  access  lines  were  in 
operation in Germany, of which 4.7 million were incumbent DSL accesses, about 586 000 
DSL accesses of fixed line competitors and more than 129 000 broadband accesses via other 
means. This means that at this time the competitors had a broadband access share of about 
13% compared with approximately 9% in July 2003. For DSL access lines, the incumbent had 
a 89% market share and competitors had 11%, which is up from 7% in July 2003. 
THE NRA 
The National Regulatory Authority, RegTP, is a higher federal authority under the remit of 
the  Federal  Ministry  of  Economics  and  Labour.  Determinations  are  made  by  its  Ruling 
Chambers.  One  Ruling  Chamber  with  a  specific field  of  responsibility  is  the  Presidential 
Chamber, which is composed of the President of RegTP and its two vice presidents.  
RegTP is a subordinated authority of the Ministry of Economics and Labour. However, the 
decisions of its ruling chambers cannot be over ruled by the Ministry, but only by a court. The 
fact that the members of the Presidential Chamber depend on political appointment and that 
they  have  annullable  public  service  contracts,  whereas  the  members  of  the  other  ruling 
chambers  are  lifetime  officials,  could  give  rise  to  concern,  especially  given  that  the 
Presidential  Chamber  is  responsible  for  important  issues  such  as  market  analyses.  The 
Commission services will continue to scrutinize this issue. 
The general regulatory policy of Germany is developed by the Ministry in close collaboration 
with the regulatory authority. To ensure a clear long term regulatory policy and a strategic 
approach on the part of the NRA, Section 122 (2) of the TKG now requires RegTP to publish 
the fundamental legal and economic issues on which it will give an opinion during the year to  
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come. As far as transparency of RegTP’s work is concerned, it is a cause for concern on the 
part of the market players that RegTP does not publish the comments it receives from the 
Competition Authority (Bundeskartellamt – BKartA) within regulatory procedures. Neither 
RegTP’s Official Journal nor its regulatory decisions have been fully published on the Internet 
up to now. In the latter regard, RegTP has pointed to the necessity to safeguard business 
secrets and to a related decision by the German Constitutional Court which is expected soon. 
Notwithstanding that, RegTP is considering the publication of non confidential versions of 
decisions  and  the  publication  of  the  Official  Journal  on  the  internet  is  apparently  under 
preparation.  Placed  on  the  internet  are  the  documents  on  market  definition  and  market 
analysis,  the  submissions  for  approval  of  tariffs,  and  the  regulatory  decisions  on  access 
regulation.  
Under the old regulatory framework, it was unclear whether the BKartA had the power to 
conduct  proceedings  in  the  electronic  communications  sector.  The  TKG  now  appears  to 
confirm this explicitly.  
As  regards  RegTP’s  powers  to  bring  to  an  end  abuses  of  dominant  positions,  TKG  now 
appears to enable market players to initiate such proceedings. Given that it has often taken 
some time before RegTP opened proceedings under the old regulatory framework, this would 
appear to be an improvement.  
Appeal mechanism and dispute resolution 
Actions  against  RegTP  determinations  may  be  brought  directly  before  the  administrative 
courts. Following a decision of the two Chambers of Parliament it is planned, however, to 
allocate responsibility for actions against RegTP’s determinations after a transitional period of 
five years to the civil courts. This would mean that such determinations would be handled 
within the same jurisdiction as competition law cases. The duration of appeal procedures 
before the German administrative courts has already given rise to concerns on the part of 
market players, as indicated in previous implementation reports.  
The situation regarding appeals may improve given that, in the new law, one of the instances 
for  appeal  was  removed  both  for  preliminary  and  main  proceedings.  Whether  this  will 
significantly shorten the long appeal procedures remains to be seen. 
Delays  can  be  caused  by  the  practice  of  some  operators  systematically  appealing  against 
RegTP’s  decisions  challenging  legal  certainty  until  the  time  that  the  final  judgment  is 
delivered.  Appeals  against  RegTP’s  decision  have  apparently  no  suspensory  effect.  If  the 
addressee  seeks  preliminary  legal  protection,  RegTP  does  not  execute  administrative 
decisions (e.g. interconnection orders) until the court has decided.  
Section 133 (2) of the TKG aims at transposing the dispute settlement procedure pursuant to 
Article 20 of the Framework Directive. According to the reasoning for the law, however, this 
procedure is only applicable if the NRA is not required to take action on its own initiative. 
This could in practice lead to a reduction of the rights of market players which are laid down 
in the Framework Directive. Here, it will strongly depend on RegTP’s practical application as 
to whether the conformity with the framework will be fully achieved, and the Commission 
services will monitor this closely.  
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MARKET ANALYSIS  
According to RegTP there will be no separate decision on market definition. The starting 
point for RegTP’s market analyses has been and will be the 18 markets in the Commission’s 
recommendation, with the possible inclusion of some additional markets.  
The way RegTP envisages applying the consultation procedures provided for in the TKG 
appears to be complex. According to RegTP’s plans, national consultations will be run prior 
to  the  consultation  of  the  Commission.  There  will  be  separate  consultations  for  market 
definition /analysis and for remedies and the NRA justifies this possibly time consuming way 
of  proceeding  by  arguing  that  the  Presidential  Chamber  is  responsible  for  the  decisions 
concerning  market  definition  /  analysis  whereas  the  other  ruling  chambers  decide  on 
remedies. Only in exceptional cases and to save time does RegTP plan to take advantage of 
the possibility given by the TKG to run the respective consultations in parallel. Whether the 
fact that market  analysis and the imposition of remedies are carried out by two different 
chambers of RegTP has any impact on the procedure or its results remains to be demonstrated 
in the future. 
Concerning  the  sequence  of  market  analyses,  RegTP  has  started  to  analyse  market  11 
(wholesale unbundled access) first, followed by interconnection markets. RegTP argues that 
the sequence depends on the need to revise expiring obligations imposed under the old TKG 
as well as on volume of work considerations. In general, market players stated that RegTP’s 
“sequential approach” was very time consuming and could lead to legal uncertainties. 
Depending on the final sequence chosen by RegTP, the analysis of the important wholesale 
broadband access market may be delayed. In this context, it should be noted that, in 2003, the 
market  share  of  the  incumbent  operator  for  retail  broadband  access  in  Germany  was  the 
highest in the EU 15. Irrespective of the fact that, up to 2003, the incumbent fixed telephone 
network operator applied a margin squeeze for access to its fixed telephony network
56 and 
that it presumably also applied a margin squeeze for broadband access until 2004
57, this lack 
of competition also derives from the fact that there has been no bitstream access in Germany.  
RegTP will also have to decide whether the mobile markets will be analysed in a timely 
manner so that potential market distortions, probably impacting on the prices for fixed to 
mobile calls, are removed. It should be mentioned that, following a related regulatory decision 
before RegTP, agreements between the mobile network operators and the incumbent fixed 
network operator to reduce the mobile call termination fees have been announced. RegTP 
strongly welcomed these agreements and they can certainly be regarded as a step in the right 
direction.  
RegTP has, however, already started to do some preparatory work concerning the markets 
mentioned  above  like,  for  example,  the  evaluation  of  questionnaires  sent back  by  market 
players. It confirmed that it is envisaged to open the consultation concerning the analysis of 
the markets for voice call termination on individual mobile networks in the fourth quarter of 
2004. 
                                                 
56  See Commission decision of 21 May 2003 (Deutsche Telekom), OJ L 263 of 14.10.2003, p.9. This 
decision is currently before the ECJ after an appeal by Deutsche Telekom. 
57  See Commission press release of 1 March 2004, IP 04/281.  
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As regards VoIP, RegTP opened a public consultation on 21 April 2004, the aim of which 
was to contribute to creating a framework that will allow the opportunities and potential of 
VoIP to be grasped. Creating these framework conditions could also contribute to addressing 
problems with regard to the leveraging of market power. Earlier implementation reports had 
criticized the fact that RegTP did not prevent the incumbent fixed network operator from 
leveraging  its  quasi monopolistic  power  in  the  provision  of  access  to  switched  telephony 
services to the provision of access to broadband services. This was despite the fact that RegTP 
had found that some of the incumbent’s retail ADSL services were offered below cost and 
that  RegTP  was  aware  that  the  incumbent  did  not  offer  its  competitors  corresponding 
wholesale products such as line sharing or bitstream access.  
Pursuant to the new TKG, the decisions concerning market analysis will apparently be taken 
by RegTP after consultation with the BKartA.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Objectives of framework 
It will have to be verified whether all objectives of Article 8 of the Framework Directive have 
been transposed into the new TKG. The specific protection of the interests of users with 
disabilities, for example, is only briefly mentioned in Section 42 (1) 2
nd Sentence of the TKG, 
but may possibly be described in more detail by future secondary law. Furthermore Germany 
has not notified any legal acts apart from the TKG by which objectives of the Framework 
Directive could have been transposed.  
It is noteworthy that Section 2 (2) no. 6 of the TKG establishes as an objective the promotion 
of telecommunications services in public institutions. 
Duration of procedures 
In the new TKG, there is a general time limit of four months within which RegTP must decide 
in proceedings regarding abuses of a dominant position. This appears to be an improvement 
compared to the old law in which for this kind of proceedings no time limit was applicable. 
Pursuant to the new TKG the standard period for taking a decision on ordering network access 
and  interconnection  is  ten  weeks,  with  the  possibility  of  an  extension  to  four  months. 
However, special reasoning must be given for such extensions, which can have an inhibiting 
effect. Ex ante approval of rates must be decided within a period of ten weeks. With regard to 
ex post approval, the period within which a decision must be taken is between two weeks and 
two months.  
In the past, RegTP has frequently tended to extend time limits, although prolongation should 
have constituted the exception. Hence the value added by the above modifications may need 
to be evidenced in practice.  
Access-Interconnection  
The new framework provides for independence of NRAs, with a broad scope of discretion. In 
contrast to this, the new TKG appears to limit RegTP’s discretion by prescribing certain types 
of remedy for certain situations and by introducing criteria which are outside the framework 
(for example “double dominance”, “historic market power”). By virtue of this, it is possible 
that consumer sensitive markets such as wholesale broadband access or voice call termination  
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on individual mobile networks could be excluded from appropriate regulation. Furthermore, 
unbundled resale of access services may not be imposed before 1 July 2008. As already set 
out in the Ninth Implementation Report, the ability of NRAs to take proper account of other 
NRAs` or the Commission’s comments in the Article 7 process is constrained where primary 
legislation predetermines the nature of the remedies which can be imposed. The Commission 
services will continue to examine this issue. 
Pursuant to the new TKG, RegTP is responsible for access authorisation systems; in carrying 
out this function it must take broadcast interests into account. RegTP therefore claims to be 
responsible  for  regulation  of  Application  Programming  Interface  (API)  and  Conditional 
Access Systems (CAS), notwithstanding the competences of the media institutes of the federal 
states (“Landesmedienanstalten”). API market opening is included in the TKG but not yet in 
the federal states’ media laws (in which MHP seems to be the prescribed standard for APIs). 
However,  representatives  of  RegTP  and  the  Länder  have  already  initiated  first  steps  to 
collaborate in this area.  
Doubts  were  recorded  in  previous  implementation  reports  as  to  whether  RegTP  had 
adequately addressed the effects on competition of the incumbent fixed network operator’s 
optional tariffs. It remains to be seen how this issue will be addressed under the new TKG. 
Now, there is a pattern of the incumbent offering more and more bundled tariffs which aim at 
raising the fees for access by reducing or even abolishing those for the connected minutes. 
This pattern was approved by RegTP at several occasions. Such bundling can make it very 
difficult  for  alternative  providers  to  compete  and  will  need  further  scrutiny  as  to  its 
compliance with competition law. 
Universal service  
The 9
th Implementation report pointed to some of the key issues relating to the scope of 
universal service arising from the national transposition measures. It appears, however, that 
the  TKG  does  not  require  explicitly  that  the  connection  to  the  public  telephone  network 
permit functional Internet access. 
It has already been stated that the new TKG appears to limit RegTP’s regulatory discretion 
and  powers.  This  is  underlined  by  provisions  dealing  with  regulation  on  the  retail  level. 
Whereas Article 17 of the Universal Service Directive prescribes that NRAs shall impose 
“appropriate regulatory  obligations”, the relevant transposing provision (Section 39 of the 
TKG) appears to restrict these obligations to tariff regulation. This is a cause of concern on 
the part of the market players and the Commission services will examine this closely. 
Moreover,  it  seems  questionable  whether  the  principle  of  cost  orientation,  a  potentially 
significant aspect of tariff regulation, has been comprehensively and distinctly transposed in 
relation to retail obligations. The TKG seems, however, to ensure that retail prices do not 
exceed the cost of efficient service provision.  
It  also  has  to  be  verified  whether  the  principle  of  cost orientation  has  been  properly 
transposed as far as the provision of information for directory and directory enquiry services 
is concerned. This is an issue which has already been mentioned in a previous report and 
where apparently no improvement has been reached with the new law. 
Must carry is regulated in all 16 federal states (“Bundesländer”), and in some of these all 
analogue channels are specified for must carry. It appears that in a few Bundesländer the  
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station that takes part in terrestrial digital TV provision (DVB T) receives must carry status 
for  analogue  provision  via  cable  and  that  restrictions  are  regulated  in  laws  and  in  cable 
allocation statutes of the Bundesländer. This legislation, however, has not yet been notified to 
the  Commission.  Some  must  carry  rules  have  been  called  into  question  by  some  market 
players. 
Authorisations  
Section  144  (1)  of  the  TKG  introduces  a  telecommunications  levy 
(“Telekommunikationsbeitrag”).  This  contribution  is  intended  to  finance  RegTP  for  the 
fulfilment of certain identified tasks under the new law. The costs for carrying out these tasks 
are borne by the operators in proportion to their turnover. Similar contributions exist in the 
German financial area where banks contribute to funding the costs of the national banking 
supervisory body. The details of this contribution system are not yet clear; the final approach 
will however have to comply with Article 12 of the Authorisation Directive. 
ePrivacy 
The  ‘anti  spam  task  force’,  which  was  initiated  by  almost  all  leading  internet  service 
providers, has issued in September 2004 a White Paper that includes a “white listing” project 
called  “certified  senders  alliance”  which  is  promoting  a  joint  venture  between  German 
internet service providers and the German direct marketing association. 
Broadband 
The existence of margin squeezes in the German communications markets has already been 
an issue of concern in previous implementation reports. Following a competition investigation 
on the basis of Article 82 of the Treaty, Deutsche Telekom committed itself vis à vis the 
European Commission to bring to an end a presumed margin squeeze as regards broadband 
access by reducing its tariffs for shared access (line sharing) with effect from 1 April 2004.
58 
The TKG now explicitly declares margin squeezes as being abusive. The practical impact of 
this provision however remains to be seen. 
The unbundling of subscribers’ network connections has not yet been completed. In wide 
areas of Germany there appears to be still no consumer choice as regards the provision of 
fixed telephony  access  services.  As stated  above, the TKG nevertheless provides that the 
scope of a possible corresponding resale obligation should be limited until 30 June 2008, to 
cover only a resale of access services which is bundled with conveyance services. 
                                                 
58  See Commission press release of 1 March 2004, IP 04/281.   
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ESTONIA 
TRANSPOSITION 
Estonia  is  one  of  the  Member  States  that  have  not  yet  transposed  the  five  Directives 
comprising the 2002 EU regulatory framework on electronic communications. Although the 
draft  law  on  Electronic  Communications  passed  its  second  parliamentary  reading  on 
27 October  2004,  it  has  yet  to  pass  the  third  reading  before  its  final  adoption.  The  date 
envisaged  for  enforcement  of  the  new  law  is  now  1 January  2005.  As  regards  secondary 
legislation, the adoption of 26 various ministerial or governmental regulations is envisaged on 
the basis of the draft law. The preparation of secondary legislation is said to be already in 
progress, but there is no information about when these measures will effectively enter into 
force.  Until  the  adoption  of  the  new  law,  the  electronic  communications  sector  is  being 
regulated  by  the  existing  Telecommunications  Act  of  2000  and  the  numerous  regulations 
issued under it, as well as the Cable Distribution Act and the Broadcasting Act.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The Estonian electronic communications market is small by EU standards, but yet one of the 
fastest  developing  markets  in  Estonia.  As  of  2003  the  estimated  value  of  the  Estonian 
telecommunications  market  was  about  € 488  million
59.  Mobile  telephony  dominates  the 
market and there has been a rapid increase in the number of mobile subscribers associated 
with a decrease in subscribers to fixed telephony services within the last years. Currently, 
mobile  penetration  is  84%  and  fixed  line  penetration  is  33%.  Digitalisation  of  the  fixed 
network has yet to be completed, reaching 82% as of June 2003
60. The Internet segment is 
very well developed, with a penetration rate of 46% of the population
61 and about 16% of 
households. Broadband penetration is 7.6% of the population.  
In general, there appears to be a satisfactory level of competition on the Estonian electronic 
communications market, with the significant exception of the ADSL market.  
There are three major competing players on the fixed telephony market plus five smaller 
operators. All fixed operators except the fixed incumbent have entered the fixed telephony 
market after the opening of the telecommunications market in 2001. There are also a number 
of operators offering VoIP services.  
On the mobile market there are also three major competing operators each of which has 2G 
and 3G licenses. In addition, six mobile service providers have also been registered, but none 
of them are actually providing services yet, although one of them is in testing phase. The 
interest in becoming a mobile service provider has increased recently in anticipation of the 
benefits created by introducing mobile number portability starting from 1 January 2005. 
                                                 
59  Adjusted information collected by ENCB during the SMP designation process. 
60  IBM/4th report on Monitoring of 
EU Candidate Countries (Telecommunications Services Sector). 
61  Monitoring of TNS EMOR in the beginning of 2004.  
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For  the  year  2004  the  fixed  incumbent  has SMP  status  on the  telephone services  market 
(87.32%), the leased line services market (73.22%) and the interconnection services market 
(43.78%), while the mobile incumbent has SMP on the mobile telephony services market 
(63.22%)
62. In September 2004 the national regulatory authority announced its intention to 
assign SMP status again for the said companies also for 2005. In doing so it is proceeding 
from the existing Telecommunications Act and is not therefore applying the market analysis 
and consultation procedures in accordance with the 2002 regulatory framework, as it has no 
legal  grounds  to  start  proper  market  analysis  before  the  new  Act  on  Electronic 
Communications has been adopted. According to the draft law, no deadline for starting or 
completing of the market analysis seems to be established. However the draft seems to set 
forth that the decisions passed under the existing Telecommunications Act on designating 
SMP operators and the respective SMP obligations deriving from the said act will be valid 
until 31 December 2005. It should be also mentioned that Estonia is one of those Member 
States where the relevant markets are not going to be defined by the NRA. Namely, it is 
proposed that the relevant markets will be defined in the new law transposing the regulatory 
framework. This may raise issues of flexibility and adaptability in relation to any changes to 
the relevant Commission Recommendation. 
THE NRA 
The Estonian National Communications Board (the ENCB) – Sideamet – was established on 
21 April 1998
63 as an independent regulator in order to ensure the existence of the necessary 
regulatory mechanisms by the time of opening the market for competition. According to its 
statutes,  the  ENCB  is  a  governmental  agency  under  the  responsibility  of  the  Ministry  of 
Economic Affairs and Communications (the Ministry). 
The ENCB reports to the Minister, who directs and coordinates its activities and performs 
official supervisory control over the ENCB. The costs of the ENCB are covered from the state 
budget, and the budget of the ENCB is approved by the Parliament and its implementation 
controlled by the Minister. The total number of ENCB employees as of 30 June 2004 was 123 
and there are 22 further posts that are still vacant and waiting to be filled. 
The  ENCB  is  managed  by  the  Director  General  who  is  nominated  and  released  from 
employment by the Minister upon the proposal of the Chancellor. In order to guarantee the 
independence of the ECNB, its statutes provide that the Director General is competent to take 
decisions independently and individually in compliance with the law. In doing so the Director 
General may issue decrees (individual acts). 
                                                 
62  Press release of ENCB of 18 November 2003 (no. 1.3 1/03/36). 
63  The history of the ENCB 
dates back to 1991(it was then called Inspection of Telecommunications). Since 
starting its operations on 1 August 1998 ENCB changed from being mainly technical regulator of radio 
frequencies  and  radio  transmitting  equipment  into  an  independent  economic  regulator  of  the 
telecommunications market. As of 2002 ENCB is also responsible for regulation is postal sector.  
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Although the state still holds a minor shareholding of 27.23% in the holding company that 
owns 100% of shares in both the fixed and mobile incumbents, the ENCB and the Ministry of 
Economic  Affairs  and  Communications  are  sufficiently  independent  in  their  regulatory 
activities, as the state’s shares are administered by the Ministry of Finance. In spring 2004 the 
Government  of  Estonia  and  the  majority  shareholder  of  the  holding  company  started 
negotiations  over  the  possible  buyout  of  the  state’s  shares,  but  the  negotiations  were  not 
successful.  
The ENCB also cooperates with the National Competition Board, the National Consumer 
Protection  Board  and  the  National  Tax  and  Customs  Board  on  the  basis  of  co operation 
agreements. Although market surveillance information can be exchanged on the basis of the 
co operation  agreement  with  the  Competition  Board,  in  many  cases co operation  is  made 
difficult by the fact that there is no legal basis for exchanging confidential information.  
In general the ENCB seems to have a positive image among stakeholders and seems to be 
sufficiently competent and efficient in regulating the market and most of its decisions have 
been also upheld by the courts.  
STARTING CONDITIONS 
The existing Telecommunications Act liberalized the Estonian telecommunications market as 
of January 2001 and its implementation has been largely in line with the old EU regulatory 
framework. Although the acquis on local loop unbundling and affordable universal service 
has  not  been  fully  transposed,  in  practice  both  of  these  elements  are  being  applied.  The 
existing law does not appear to explicitly provide for the right to affordable universal service, 
but there are certain measures in other legal acts that ensure the provision of financial support 
to consumers identified as having low incomes or consumers with disabilities. Terms and 
conditions  for  reference  interconnection  offer,  non discrimination  and  transparency 
obligations,  cost accounting  and  accounting  separation  obligations,  as  well  as  carrier 
selection,  carrier  pre selection  and  fixed  number  portability,  are  all  provided  under  the 
existing law and are also implemented in practice. In general there have not been any major 
problems in implementing the existing Telecommunications Act 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Number portability 
On the fixed telephony market an important milestone was the implementation of number 
portability as of 1 January 2004. In total, 12 530 fixed numbers have been ported so far. After 
the introduction of number portability the fixed incumbent has lost approximately 0.3% of its 
clients.  Mobile  number  portability  has  not  yet  been  implemented.  According  to  the 
amendment of the existing Telecommunications Act adopted by the Estonian Parliament on 
28 June 2004, mobile number portability should be available only as of 1 January 2005. In 
order to ensure this, a common routing database will be created both for fixed and mobile 
numbers, administered by an entity that has been selected through a public tender procedure. 
The  successful  bidder,  announced  on  4  October  2004,  is  a  privately owned  Estonian 
information  technology  company  independent  from  the  electronic  communication  service 
providers.  
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Mobile services 
Although the incumbent mobile operator opened a test 3G network on 17 September 2003, no 
services have yet been launched. While the incumbent operator would be capable of creating 
its own 3G network, the two other operators holding 3G licenses would like to co operate. 
Different  network sharing  scenarios  have  been  discussed  under  the  existing  legislative 
framework with the ENCB and the Ministry, but so far there seems to be no final result. It has 
to  be  mentioned  that,  according  to  the  current  conditions  of  their  licences,  each  operator 
should create a 3G network within seven years of the issue of the licences in 2003. In the 
beginning of 2004, the ENCB announced a public tender for the fourth 3G licence, but the 
tender failed as no applications were received from interested parties.  
Broadband 
In the ADSL market there seems to be virtually no competition, and the market is dominated 
by the fixed incumbent (99.8%), which does not appear to provide bitstream access to any of 
the alternative operators. Besides the fixed incumbent, there are only some cable TV operators 
who are offering Internet over cable modem, limited to their respective areas of coverage. The 
ENCB has started to take steps to promote competition in the ADSL market, but so far no 
constructive progress seems to be achieved. In September 2003 the ENCB issued a request to 
the fixed incumbent demanding the latter to provide bitstream access to alternative operators, 
but  the  said  request  was  appealed  by  the  fixed  incumbent  on  the  grounds  that  it  is  not 
technically possible to fulfil it. The dispute is currently pending; however the request itself 
has become pointless at this stage, as it was issued with regard to the incumbent’s PSTN 
network.  Following  the  opening  of  proceedings,  the  fixed  incumbent  registered  its  DSL 
network as a data communications network, access to which is not covered by the ENCB’s 
regulatory powers under the existing Telecommunications Act.  
Access-Interconnection 
After  evaluating  the  interconnection  charges  of  the  fixed  incumbent  using  a  bottom up 
LRAIC cost methodology, on 22 June 2004 the ENCB issued a request to the fixed incumbent 
regarding the calculation of the interconnection charges. It demanded a 20% decrease in local 
level  and  single  transit  interconnection  (call  termination  and  call  origination)  charges  by 
1 August 2004. The request was partially challenged, but finally a mutual agreement was 
reached. The basis for the agreement was that the ENCB came to the conclusion that the 
network model it used in calculations of interconnection charges was partially out of date
64 
and the fixed incumbent concluded that several telephone network equipment prices that were 
used by it as input data for calculations had substantially decreased during the previous years. 
The new interconnection prices are expected to have a positive influence on retail prices. 
Compared to the interconnection service charges in force up to 1 August 2004, the new local 
and regional level interconnection service charges are approximately 15% lower in peak time 
and the new national level interconnection service charges are approximately 24% lower in 
peak time. The new interconnection service charges are applicable from October 2004.  
                                                 
64  Currently  it  is  being  considered  whether  there  is  a  necessity  to  change  the  existing  governmental 
regulation on network model data.  
EN  106    EN 
The ENCB has also analysed the termination rates of all mobile network operators and found 
that all operators have unreasonably high profits. So far operators have voluntarily decreased 
prices, but in the ENCB’s opinion these reductions have not been enough. On 9 March 2004 
ENCB issued a request to the second largest mobile operator, which had the highest average 
call  termination  fee,  demanding  that  the  calculation  of  mobile  network  call  termination 
charges be brought into compliance with the Telecommunications Act. This states that it is 
not permitted to set the weighted average cost of capital (WACC) above 18%. According to 
the calculations of the ENCB, the said mobile operator’s call termination charge based on a 
reasonable rate of return should be approximately EEK 2.50 per minute compared to the EEK 
3.06 per minute currently applied. The new call termination fee was to have been applied 
from 1 October, 2004, but the ENCB’s decision has been appealed and the dispute is pending. 
The mobile incumbent and the third largest mobile operator have declared their willingness to 
restart negotiations on the reduction of call terminations charges, if the second largest mobile 
operator will lower its call termination fee.  
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GREECE 
TRANSPOSITION 
The transposition of the new regulatory framework has not yet taken place in Greece. Political 
changes have further delayed the process of adoption of the new Telecommunications Act, 
and it is estimated that the transposition measures will be finally in place by the end of 2004. 
While  it  appears  that  the  new  government  intends  to  adopt  a  law  transposing  the  new 
regulatory framework, no draft had been presented to the Commission at the time of drafting 
this Report. The Commission has already made a formal application to the Court of Justice 
asking it to condemn Greece, at the end of the infringement proceeding started in October 
2003, for failure to communicate the necessary measures transposing the Directives.  
The lack of transposition of the new framework has resulted in constraints on the power of the 
EETT, the national regulatory authority. The EETT has nevertheless taken the initiative to 
collect  market  data  and  conduct  an  analysis  of  the  market  for  voice  call  termination  on 
individual mobile networks. No remedies have been applied so far, since the EETT does not 
have  the  necessary  legal  powers  to  enforce  them.  The  analysis  was  notified  to  the 
Commission and a decision was taken in this regard.  
The fixed incumbent operator in Greece maintains its position as the only access network 
provider  in  the  fixed  market.  As  fixed  network  competition  is  now  evolving,  regulatory 
intervention continues to be very important in Greece. Consequently, the role of the EETT in 
monitoring the electronic communications markets will continue to be crucial, as it needs to 
be able to apply whatever remedies are needed to address regulatory bottlenecks. In view of 
the absence of a major cable operator in Greece, the only fixed network which has started 
competing  with  the  incumbent  is  that  of  the  national  power  enterprise.  This  network  is 
currently under development but, despite its promising expansion, will still rely on the local 
loops of the incumbent.  
Further efforts will be required to overcome regulatory constraints and facilitate the further 
development of fixed networks. Such constraints concern, inter alia, rights of way, access to 
the  local  loop,  CPS  conditions  etc.  The  development  of  the  mobile  market  is  more 
satisfactory, as competition is quite well developed. Despite recent positive signs, broadband 
access is one of the major problems in the electronic communications markets in Greece.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
As  of  December  2003,  the  fixed  incumbent  remains  dominant  on  the  fixed  markets.  In 
particular, its market share (based on retail revenues) was estimated at 90.7% in local calls 
(including calls to Internet), 84.2% in long distance calls and 75.8% in international calls. The 
situation is even more pronounced in the market of local calls to Internet only, where the 
incumbent’s share was 99.5% while in the market for calls to mobile it stood at 84.5%. The 
biggest part of the overall value of the Greek telecommunications market comes from the 
mobile telephone services and is estimated at 47% while fixed voice services represent around 
40% and fixed data services around 13%. Only 2% of subscribers are using an alternative 
operator for local voice telephony services while the figure is higher (around 12.8%) for long 
distance and international calls. As of the end of July 2004, only a few mobile numbers were  
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ported to another operator (around 6 379 numbers). The mobile penetration rate has reached 
93% of the population while 9.9 million mobile subscribers were reported in May 2004. The 
market  share  of  the  subsidiary  of  the  fixed  incumbent  is  around  41%,  the  second  largest 
around  31%  and  the  third  largest  27%.  As  of  July  2004,  the  penetration  rate  for  retail 
broadband access, taking account of the incumbent and new entrants’ offerings, is the lowest 
among the 15 EU Member States. In July 2004 Greece’s penetration level was 0.24%. The 
market share of the incumbent’s ISP subsidiary of total DSL broadband lines is close to 46% 
while 96% of the total DSL broadband lines are provided through the incumbent’s “ADSL 
Offer” (bitstream level).  
THE NRA 
The  EETT  exercises  the  main  regulatory  functions  while  the  Ministry  of  Transport  and 
Communications is responsible for the policy making and the drafting of legislation in Greece 
is the National Regulatory Authority in Greece. There is sufficient evidence that the overall 
performance  of  the  EETT  has  been  positive  so  far  and  the  EETT  has  used  its  powers 
effectively.  
The  ability  of  the  EETT  to  intervene  in  monitoring  and  regulating  the  markets  has  been 
restricted  because  of  the  lack  of  transposition.  Therefore,  important  actions  have  been 
delayed, such as market analysis and the application of relevant remedies. Significant issues 
such as broadband access were not addressed for the same reason. 
Alternative  operators  expect  further  actions  to  be  taken  to  ensure  the  availability  of  co 
location, to facilitate CPS procedures and facility sharing and to protect them from win back 
tactics.  There  have  been  calls  from  the  market  for  the  EETT  to  play  a  stronger  role  in 
applying competition law and in particular in applying a price squeeze test in relation to the 
wholesale  ADSL  offer.  In  accordance  with  the  Telecommunications  Law  2867/2000,  the 
EETT has the power to impose remedies based on the competition laws currently in effect. 
The efficiency of publication of EETT’s decisions has been a point of criticism, suggesting 
that the requirements of the relevant national legislation are not fully implemented. On the 
other hand, decisions of the EETT are not always applied fully by the affected parties. 
Contradictory opinions between different operators are reported regarding the exercise by the 
EETT of its right to impose financial penalties. On the one hand, it is reported by operators 
that, in certain cases, the EETT either does not impose financial penalties at all or the level of 
those finally imposed is so low that it does not affect the incumbent’s behaviour, especially in 
those cases where its profits exceed the penalties imposed. On the other hand, the EETT 
claims to have imposed financial penalties totalling around € 1.7m in 11 cases during the year 
2003. These penalties were imposed on a number of operators but mostly on the incumbent, 
for violations of SMP obligations and the telecommunications and competition laws. In 2004, 
penalties  of  lower  amounts  have  been  imposed,  mainly  against  all  mobile  operators  for 
violation of the obligation to provide a universal directory service.  
Appeals and dispute resolution 
Regarding appeals, it appears that there has been an increase in the number of appeals in 2003 
and 2004.  In particular during 2003, out of the 35 decisions of the EETT relating to the 
incumbent, 20 have already been appealed by the latter before the Council of State. Among  
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those decisions which have been appealed before the Administrative Courts of Greece, 10 
relate to EETT decisions imposing financial penalties. 
The dispute resolution procedures have functioned well so far. Nevertheless, it is reported that 
some room for improvement exists regarding the time limits for the delivery of the EETT’s 
decisions and compliance with them by the affected parties. In most cases, operators report 
their problems to the EETT, asking for its intervention without filing a formal complaint. The 
EETT then mediates with a view to finding solutions while, if a violation of the relevant laws 
is identified, a hearing starts at the initiative of the EETT. 
Market analysis 
In July 2004, the Commission registered a notification by the EETT concerning the voice call 
termination on individual mobile networks. The notification was made ahead of transposition 
and therefore it could not be enforced against individuals until appropriate transposition of the 
EU framework has taken place. In case that any substantial elements of the notified market 
analysis are modified until the time of transposition of the framework, the EETT would need 
to re notify the resulting measure. The Commission has commented among others on the 
obligation of non discrimination in respect of GSM gateways, cost orientation and accounting 
separation. In relation to the GSM gateways, the Commission considered that the obligation 
of  non discrimination  is  not  intended  to  remedy  an  SMP  finding  in  the  product  market 
covered by the notification but may pertain to a potential finding of dominance in another 
relevant market. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Interconnection 
Termination charges for calls from fixed to mobile networks appear to be high. Alternative 
fixed operators complain that the mobile operators apply price squeeze tactics when charging 
on net calls at prices much below interconnection charges. The EETT has adopted a decision 
in this regard determining that such practices are illegal and has issued recommendations to 
the mobile operator involved requiring it to desist from similar violations in the future. Such 
decisions  are  considered  by  the  alternative  operators  to  be  insufficient,  as  they  have  no 
practical impact on the behaviour of the affected parties. Another inquiry is in progress by the 
EETT against a mobile operator for similar reasons. 
Carrier pre-selection 
In relation to the provision of carrier pre selection, it is reported that the second fixed network 
operator  has  lost  a  number  of  subscribers  during  the  past  18  months  because  of  the 
anticompetitive win back actions of the incumbent. While a complaint was filed with the 
EETT at the beginning of 2004, it seems that it has been hard to obtain sufficient evidence to 
establish that the incumbent has used customer data in an anti competitive manner. No final 
decision has yet been reached by the EETT although interim measures were taken. Immediate 
regulatory intervention to facilitate customer activation and prevent anti competitive win back 
tactics is expected by alternative operators.  
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Mobile services 
An Ombudsman’s decision on the health aspects of installing antennae in residential areas, in 
particular  at  sites  close  to  hospitals  and  schools,  provoked  intense  debates  on  the 
environmental, social and economic aspects of such installations. As a result, local authorities 
sought to play a greater role in intervening in the process of authorising antennae.  
The issue is even more important in view of the increased number of antennae required for the 
development of 3G networks. In addition, since the installation of antennae can be costly, co 
location has been encouraged by the EETT. Mobile operators also expressed an increased 
interest in co location. Nevertheless, the conclusion of cooperation agreements seems to have 
been delayed by considerations as to what constitutes the most appropriate site for co location 
in relation to the frequency plans of each operator or how to share the advantages of acquiring 
a  superior  antenna  location.  Further  involvement  of  the  EETT  in  ensuring  the  successful 
conclusion of such agreements would be desirable, especially where the difference in the 
negotiating power of the operators does not ensure a level playing field. 
Directory services 
Despite a number of initiatives undertaken by the EETT, the universal directory service was 
not fully implemented in Greece under the old framework. It is reported that certain mobile 
operators refused to provide their subscribers’ data to the incumbent who is designated as the 
universal service provider, while mobile operators claim that the non provision of the service 
was  the  result  of  the  failure  of  the  EETT  to  specify  important  implementing  terms  and 
conditions.  
In early spring 2004, EETT initiated proceedings against all operators concerned, in which it 
concluded  that  the  four  mobile  operators  were  acting  in  violation  of  the  national 
telecommunications legislation and imposed a fine on them. EETT has recently approved the 
format of the first issue of the Universal Directory which covers only a part of Greece and 
contains, in addition to the numbers of the incumbent a few numbers of two other fixed 
operators.  
Number portability 
Mobile number portability was only launched officially on 1 March 2004 and in practice on 
1 April, with the application of the same tariffs and the same format (application of a 5 digit 
code) by the three biggest mobile operators. It is reported that an unusually high percentage of 
rejections of applications has been notified for allegedly incomplete or erroneous filing of the 
application (i.e. name, surname and identification number). In this regard, EETT started a 
hearing procedure against the four mobile operators in order to investigate whether the way 
that  they  provide  the  number  portability  service  violates  the  current  legislation.  The 
proceeding is still in progress and mobile operators have reported that the rate of rejections is 
by now taking a downward trend. 
Local loop unbundling  
Slow uptake of local loop unbundling is still reported, with only 1 092 subscribers in mid 
2004, as compared to 655 subscribers a year ago. Some increase in shared access is reported, 
with 160 subscribers in comparison with 5 subscribers a year ago. It is also reported that 
difficulties in obtaining  access to the local loop of the incumbent are the result of either  
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limited information or delays of a technical nature, such as in implementing the necessary 
technical studies. In addition, it seems that the alternative operators have not developed a 
clear investment strategy.  
The EETT has taken some initiatives in organising a number of meetings with the incumbent 
to  discuss  LLU  problems.  The  incumbent  was  found  in  2003  to  have  violated  both  the 
national LLU legislation and competition law. For this reason the EETT decided to impose 
administrative  fines  against  the  incumbent  of  € 150 000  for  each  of  the  two  violations. 
Recently, in order to promote the development of broadband services in Greece, the EETT 
has organised working groups including the incumbent and alternative operators to facilitate 
the implementation of the provision of LLU. 
The  provision  by  the  incumbent  of  co location  appears  to  be  problematic  for  alternative 
operators.  It  is  reported  that  neither  physical  co location  nor  co mingling  are  currently 
provided by the incumbent but only distant co location. Different types of co location are 
foreseen in the RUO but they are not fully implemented. 
It  is  also  reported  by  alternative  operators  that  the  incumbent  does  not  accept  alternative 
means of switching such as backhaul and certain wireless loops or fibre optics belonging to its 
competitors and that the timetables provided in the RUO are not fully respected. 
Broadband 
There was a high demand for ADSL services during the first year of their provision. Currently 
there are only 26 000 subscribers. Given that the new EU regulatory framework is not yet 
transposed, EETT’s ability to intervene to impose ex ante measures in the market has been 
limited. Certain problems have been identified in the provision of the service, such as the 
quality of service and certain requirements imposed by the incumbent. The EETT took the 
initiative to organise working groups to improve the incumbent’s ADSL offer and look for 
solutions to problems related to the provision of the service. A hearing was held by EETT to 
inquire about a possible violation of competition laws and in particular the bundling of the 
service with certain terminal equipment.  
Pricing of the ADSL wholesale access is still reported to be problematic as current prices do 
not allow alternative operators to maintain a profit margin. A price squeeze test to be applied 
by EETT and a substantial reduction of the price of the wholesale offerings are expected by 
the market.  
Although certain political initiatives were taken, such as relevant research and establishing the 
Greek Broadband Task Force in March 2002 to draft the national strategy for broadband, 
further actions are needed to boost the development of broadband services in Greece. Despite 
the substantial increase (more than double) of the number of subscribers within the past six 
months and the efforts made by the EETT, the figures representing the actual development of 
the broadband market are very disappointing.  
Moreover in the light of the absence of an extensive cable network and until the development 
of a second network provider capable of providing competitive broadband services to the 
whole of the Greek territory, further action needs to be taken to meet the expectations of 
growth and competitiveness of the Greek economy and eliminate the digital divide between 
Greece and the rest of the EU.  
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Rights of way 
A number of difficulties are reported in obtaining rights to install facilities on, over or under 
public property. It seems that the role of the EETT in granting such rights is limited, while 
other authorities, such as the City Planning and local authorities are involved in the process.  
In accordance with the rules currently in force, the local authorities responsible for issuing the 
final approval for access enjoy certain discretion in handling relevant requests. A diversity of 
approaches applied by them in exercising such discretion has been reported. In particular, 
each municipality has the ability to apply its own rules for giving access to the public land 
which is under its responsibility and it seems that in certain cases inappropriate remedies were 
imposed. Appeals before the courts have been ineffective as often relevant decisions were 
modified and new appeals had to be launched. 
The market expects that homogeneous rules and procedures, such as limits on the discretion 
of the local authorities, should apply to decisions on whether or not to grant approval. In 
accordance  with  the  EU  regulatory  framework,  the  principles  of  transparency  and  non 
discrimination need to be followed by competent authorities in attaching conditions to such 
rights.  These  will  contribute  to  regulatory  certainty  and  facilitate  the  development  of 
competition. The Commission services are examining whether further legislative initiatives 
are necessary in this respect. It is reported that relevant provisions will be finally included in 
the new electronic communications legislation.  
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SPAIN 
TRANSPOSITION 
The  institutional  framework  in  Spain  has  undergone  a  series  of  changes  in  the  reporting 
period. As a result of the formation of a new government following the March 2004 elections, 
responsibility for telecommunications has been placed with the Ministry of Industry, Tourism 
and Trade. 
The first policy statements have been generally welcomed by the sector, and in June the new 
government  formalised  an  agreement  with  the  mobile  operators  to  adapt  the  3G  roll out 
conditions  to  the  current  market  situation.  However,  the  implementing  regulations  of  the 
General Telecommunications Law of November 2003, which are necessary to transpose fully 
the new regulatory framework, have still not been adopted. As the necessary procedures are 
close to completion, it is expected that the relevant draft regulations will be adopted by the 
end of the year. 
The  Commission  has  identified  a  series  of  issues  that  merit  consideration  regarding  the 
conformity of the new Spanish law with the common regulatory framework, in particular the 
absence of provisions governing the consultation at national level of interested parties on 
measures having a significant impact on the relevant market, the unavailability to the national 
regulatory  authorities  (NRAs)  of  all  the  wholesale  remedies  provided  for  by  the  Access 
Directive to address the absence of effective competition on the relevant markets and the 
absence of a definition of the remedies that the NRAs may impose on undertakings identified 
as having significant market power (SMP) in relevant retail markets and of the conditions 
governing the imposition, modification and withdrawal of such obligations . These issues are 
dealt with in the above mentioned draft regulations. 
The conformity with the common regulatory framework of the transitory provision of the new 
law, which establishes that no further cable TV licences will be granted before the end of 
2009, also needs to be examined, if it concerns transmission services.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The period 2003 2004 has been characterised by a clear, but as yet timid recovery of the 
sector.  Even  though  the  main  operators  are  making  profits  again,  only  the  mobile  sector 
recorded higher investments in 2003. Together with broadband, the mobile players are driving 
the growth in the sector: mobile services grew by 18% and broadband services by 88% (in 
terms of revenues) in 2003. 
While competition in the mobile market has been dynamic, with the third operator gaining a 
20% market share in 2003, in the fixed telephony market the incumbent has lost less market 
share than in previous years. Its share (by revenue) of the fixed telephony market is now 81%.   
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Mobile penetration has already reached 92%
65. However, the average per minute price of 
mobile calls did not decrease in 2003, with the notable exception of on net calls. .Mobile 
termination represents 62% of all interconnection revenue, which reflects the high mobile 
termination charges levied
66. As of July 2004 (the reference date for comparative market data 
in this Report), the termination charges levied by all three mobile operators designated as 
having SMP were above the EU 15 average for SMP operators.  
On net calls are 50 75% less expensive than off net calls
67. 
According  to  the  Ministry,  on  30  June  2004  there  were  some  2.6  million  broadband 
connections in Spain (this figure has increased by 46% in just one year), 25% of which are 
provided to end users via cable modem (an increase of 35% in terms of customers), and the 
rest via ADSL (up 50%).  
In 2003 the market share of the companies of the incumbent’s group in the retail broadband 
market  (all  technologies)  increased  by  five  percentage  points  over  2002  (in  terms  of 
revenues).  
The market share of the cable operators (the incumbent’s main competitors) was 18% in 2003 
in terms of revenues (this figure is eight percentage points lower than the market share in 
terms of customers due to the fact that the average revenue per client for cable offers is lower 
than is the case for ADSL offers
68). 
Regarding ADSL alone, at that same date the incumbent’s group had a 75% share of the retail 
market. In fact, it has very successfully positioned itself as the leader in this market (contrary 
to the dial up internet access market where an alternative operator has been the major services 
provider). 
THE NRA 
While the new General Telecommunications Law designates a total of five NRAs, including 
the government itself, and is quite clear in assigning functions to each of them (with the CMT 
and  the  Ministry  of  Industry,  Tourism  and  Trade  vested  with  the  key  competences),  the 
combination  of  the  dispersal  of  these  functions  and  references  in  the  law  to  further 
implementing regulations on those authorities’ tasks causes some unrest among operators.  
However, in view of the various critical opinions expressed by market players regarding the 
retail price regulation applied thus far, the transfer of responsibility for retail tariff regulation 
(based on market definitions and analysis) to the CMT, pursuant to the new law, has been 
welcomed by all. While it is the Member States’ prerogative to decide on the allocation of 
responsibilities as between public bodies, there are clear advantages in having wholesale and 
retail regulation under the same organisational umbrella. Retail (and wholesale) regulation 
should  be  proportionate  and  based  on  the  nature  of  the  problem  identified.  The  new 
responsibility of the CMT for retail tariff regulation (alongside that for wholesale regulation) 
should enable it to deal more swiftly and effectively with problems such as price squeezing in 
                                                 
65  Compared with a fixed penetration rate of 42%. 
66  CMT Annual Report 2003. 
67  CMT Annual Report 2003. 
68  The figures and data quoted in this paragraph are from the CMT’s Annual Report 2003.   
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an environment that has been characterised by a proliferation of different types of discount 
and other price schemes, the majority of which have been introduced by the incumbent. 
The CMT’s regulatory activity has remained intense. Nonetheless, for the first time and in 
contrast  with  statements  made  in  previous  reporting  periods,  the  market  has  expressed 
concern at a lack of transparency of the CMT, in particular regarding the market reviews (see 
“Market analysis” below).  
While the CMT has recorded a series of successes and has pioneered regulation in certain 
areas (such as the implementation of capacity based interconnection, and the incorporation of 
migration  processes  and  prices  in  the  reference  unbundling  offer),  the  more  it  has 
progressively broken new and more complex ground (cost accounting, mobile termination, 
price  squeeze  test),  the  more  information  which  new  entrants  consider  essential  to  the 
proceedings has been declared confidential. 
MARKET ANALYSIS 
In  July  2004,  the  CMT  issued  a  pre consultation  document  defining  and  analysing  four 
broadly  defined  retail  markets
69.  While  this  may  have  dispelled  somewhat  the  concerns 
relating to the perceived lack of transparency of the CMT’s regulatory policy, some confusion 
has arisen from the fact that both the market definitions and the market analysis methodology 
differ  –  in  some  respects  quite  significantly     from  the  Directives  and  Commission 
recommendation and guidelines.  
This being said, the document clearly spelled out that neither the market definitions nor the 
analyses included therein corresponded to those referred to in the Framework Directive. The 
declared aim of the pre consultation document was to check whether the CMT’s views on 
competition problems in the above mentioned markets were shared by the market players. 
Formal consultations are expected to be initiated in October 2004.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Access and interconnection - fixed market 
The latest reference interconnection offer dates back to 10 July 2003. After a difficult start 
marked by many disputes and interim measures, capacity based interconnection is booming 
and is expected to supersede metered interconnection in terms of traffic in 2004. 
The CMT is currently revising the principle of reciprocity between the incumbent’s and the 
new  entrant’s  termination  charges.  In  its  latest  annual  report  of  July  2004,  the  CMT 
recognises that the imposition of the costs and efficiency standard of the incumbent on new 
entrants  may  constitute  an  obstacle  to  the  provision  of  alternative  networks,  taking  into 
consideration the different starting conditions faced by the new entrants in terms of coverage, 
number of clients and competitive framework.  
                                                 
69  Access to the public telephone network at a fixed location, access to and traffic on data networks at a 
fixed location, access and traffic at a mobile location, traffic at a fixed location.  
EN  116    EN 
Regarding the charges for metered interconnection, the local level charges are slightly above 
the EU average. Single transit charges have come down close to the EU average, while double 
transit charges are among the most expensive in the EU. 
In recent years, the prices of interconnection leased lines have come down, but remain well 
above the recommended ceiling and the EU average as concerns 2 Mbit/s lines. New entrants 
are satisfied with the service level agreement incorporated into the reference offer, but claim 
that it is not being executed or enforced. 
The number of unbundled local loops, although still low (some 40 000 fully unbundled loops 
and some 2000 loops in shared use on 30 June 2004), has doubled over the last year (with a 
monthly growth rate of 20%) and is expected to increase significantly in the coming months. 
The monthly average total cost for leasing an entire or a shared local loop is among the least 
expensive in the EU. New entrants’ interest in co mingling and the take off of shared access 
to the local loop are particularly noteworthy developments. 
Broadband 
In its annual report, the CMT notes that the discounts and promotions on the incumbent’s 
retail ADSL prices (which were deregulated in November 2003 without any public market 
review process having been carried out) have not been carried over into its ADSL wholesale 
prices and have exerted pressure on new  entrants’ margins. Consequently, the latter have 
requested repeatedly the intervention of the CMT for margin squeeze concerns and some 
offers have been blocked on these grounds.  
These developments and the fact that the incumbent has strengthened its position on the retail 
broadband market pose clear regulatory challenges, in particular from a prospective point of 
view.  
In order to tackle this problem, in July 2004 the CMT devised a methodology (reportedly 
based on Community competition law and case law principles) to assess any price squeezes 
produced by discounts on the incumbent’s retail ADSL products (with a view to preserving 
the  existing  retail  minus).  New  entrants  consider  the  CMT’s  cost  assessments  to  be  very 
conservative and point to a difference of several tens of percentage points between the latter 
and their own estimates. 
In  July  2004,  the  CMT  revised  the  incumbent’s  reference  unbundling  offer  (RUO)  by 
incorporating the financial and technical conditions for migrating large groups of customers 
from shared access to fully bundled access, and from indirect access to fully unbundled access 
and  shared  access.  As  from  March  2004  the  RUO  also  sets  the  conditions  for  migration 
between different indirect access modes (e.g. IP bitstream to ATM bitstream). Alongside the 
detailed regulation applied to the bitstream product (GigADSL), the other wholesale ADSL 
products of the incumbent’s  group  (the re sale products ADSL  IP and Megavía) are  also 
subject to some regulatory conditions, albeit less strict than for GigADSL (publication, non 
discrimination requirements, but no price regulation).  
New entrants note that there is no wholesale SDSL product allowing to cater properly for the 
business market. Moreover, under GigADSL, full national coverage requires a presence at no 
less than 109 access points, while other wholesale products require less extensive network 
deployment.   
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New entrants have expressed concern about the recent proposal of the incumbent to double 
the speed rates of its retail ADSL offer without modifying the prices.  This is however  a 
welcome development in as far as users are concerned, given that the standard speed rates 
offered so far have been rather low in relation to the relatively high prices applicable. On 22 
July  2004  the  CMT  issued  a  decision  amending  the  incumbent’s  wholesale  offer  and 
establishing new prices on the basis of the retail minus methodology. For this measure to be a 
success, effective enforcement and execution of the CMT’s decision will be essential. 
The public authorities’  support for the deployment of broadband  as part of their national 
broadband strategy is another area where possible distortions of competition may occur, and 
there are concerns on the part of market players about public authorities’ investments and 
procurement without open and transparent tenders. The CMT has issued guidelines to the 
public authorities in this respect, and this is clearly an area that will require a close follow up 
in the future as the authorities implement their broadband strategies. 
Mobile services 
As mentioned above, the mobile sector has been driving growth and investment in the sector 
in 2003. The mobile market is very dynamic, as witnessed by high mobile number portability 
(with some 2.1 million ported mobile numbers on 1 July 2004) and the 20% market share 
gained by the third mobile operator, which was also designated as having significant market 
power in 2003.  
The two main mobile operators were designated as having SMP in 2000. On 26 June 2003 the 
CMT issued a decision regarding the verification of the 2000 and 2001 cost accounts of these 
two operators and then initiated the proceedings aimed at determining the cost orientation of 
their termination charges.  
In an interim measure regarding the incumbent’s mobile arm that was adopted in October 
2003,  the  CMT  noted  that  there  was  “a  big  difference  between  the  mobile  operator’s 
termination  charges  and  the  costs  for  those  services  that  have  been  calculated  for  2001”. 
However, the relevant decisions introduced only a 7% reduction in the two main operators’ 
charges, and a 12% reduction in the third operator’s termination charges for traffic originated 
in fixed networks.  
On 18 December 2003, the CMT added to its October’s decision a new system of maximum 
average mobile termination prices; however, the application of this system did not result in 
any further decreases in the termination charges in real terms. At the same time, the CMT 
stated that the reductions effected in October 2003 had brought the termination charges to a 
cost oriented level. Yet in its decision, the CMT also noted that “it is observed that after the 
application of the interim measures of 2 October 2003, there remains a margin between the 
termination charge of the incumbent’s mobile arm and the average price for providing the 
service as derived from the cost data audited by this Commission”. 
The fixed new entrants have expressed several grievances about the decision of 18 December 
2003. They note that the new system of maximum average mobile termination charges is not 
transparent due to the fact that essential information used for calculating the charges has been 
declared confidential. They stress that the termination charges are not cost oriented due to the 
fact  that  for  the  first  minute  is  charged  as  a  whole.  They  also  point  to  the  fact  that  the 
operators’ 2004 charges have been oriented to their 2001 costs.  
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The CMT is aware of the concerns of the sector and is contemplating a glide path allowing the 
sector to anticipate future developments, which is expected to bring more decreases to the 
mobile termination charges. As a consequence, further reductions of 12%, 10.5% and 15.5% 
were adopted in October 2004 that apply respectively to the main, second biggest and third 
mobile operators. Due to the regulatory framework in place, which requires charges to be 
oriented to audited costs, there is a clear need to speed up procedures to allow for the charges 
to be oriented to the costs of the latest auditing year (e.g. the termination charges applied in 
2004 should be oriented to the 2003 audited costs). 
In 2001, new entrants also brought a case of alleged price squeezing and discrimination by the 
mobile operators in the treatment of fixed to mobile and mobile to mobile calls, on the one 
hand, and on net and off net calls, on the other hand. The Competition Court is to provide its 
ruling on the investigation shortly. 
Authorisations and rights of use of frequencies; rights of way 
The new telecommunications law provides for an automatic adaptation of existing licences to 
a general authorisation regime and that any licence conditions contrary to this regime must be 
considered as not applicable. 
In June 2004, the holders of a 3G mobile licence and the government concluded an agreement 
by which the licence conditions were adapted to prevailing market conditions. Two of the four 
licensees started offering 3G services in 2004 and can be considered as being in a “near 
commercial phase”. The third and fourth licensees are expected to launch their services in 
October 2004 and in 2005 respectively. 
The Audiencia Nacional has still not ruled on the legality of the increase of the spectrum 
reservation charges effected in 2001. Generally speaking, as in a number of other Member 
States, the resolution through judicial proceedings of appeals lodged by operators against the 
most important and complex regulatory decisions has been protracted, and this can undermine 
the effectiveness of regulation. 
The new telecommunications law provides for the creation of a new public body with the 
status of NRA within the meaning of the Directives, which is to manage radio frequencies and 
charges for the use of frequencies. The latter has not yet been established. 
The new law also provides for the possibility of secondary trading of frequencies, but an 
implementing regulation is needed to set the conditions thereof. There is an interest on the 
part of the third mobile operator, which has a DCS 1800 and 3G licence, to have access to the 
GSM frequencies being vacated by the closing of the incumbent’s Moviline service. Contrary 
to its main competitors, it does not have any GSM 900 frequencies, which entail a number of 
restrictions not borne by its competitors. 
A corollary to access to frequencies is the issue of obtaining rights of way, which has not 
improved substantively since recent reports despite the efforts by the central authorities to 
address the issue by means of new legislative provisions and cooperation with the regional 
and local authorities. A round table gathering these parties was organised in July 2004 to 
address the issue. Further tangible progress is needed and collective responsibility should be 
assumed in a situation where the operators have had to appeal regional and local authorities’ 
decisions before the courts, which have in most cases ruled in their favour.   
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Universal service, consumer issues, taxation 
The incumbent has been designated as universal service provider until 2005. According to the 
CMT, the incumbent has incurred a net lost of € 110 million in providing universal service in 
2002. As in previous years, the CMT ruled that it was not necessary to set up a universal 
service  fund,  since  the  incumbent  has  not  suffered  a  competitive  disadvantage  from  the 
provision of the relevant services. 
The electronic communications sector as a whole has welcomed statements by representatives 
of the new government that public co financing is being examined as another means to fund 
universal service. This would require an amendment to the new telecommunications law. 
The authorities consider that the cost of universal service may rise in the years 2003 and 2004 
as a result of the phasing out of the analogue rural mobile telephony system (‘TRAC’) and its 
replacement  with  technologies  that  permit  functional  internet  access,  as  required  by  the 
Universal Service Directive. By now approximately 77% of the TRAC phones reportedly 
permit functional internet access, and pursuant to the law, 100% of the phones should allow 
for this facility by the end of 2004. 
Regarding  consumer  issues  operators  complain  about  various  public  service  obligations 
placed on them (emergency calls; traffic data retention, legal interception) and advocate self 
regulation in the provision of .adequate service quality. 
Issues  that  have  particularly  caught  users’  and  their  associations’  attention  have  been  the 
prices of fixed to mobile calls, with the “indivisible first minute”, and of broadband access in 
general.  
Market  players  also  voice  concerns  about  the  financial  burden  that  they  must  bear  as  a 
combination  of  a  series  of  different  central  and  local  taxes.  They  have  to  pay  an 
administrative  tax  (0.15%  of  operators’  revenue)  the  purpose  of  which  is  to  finance  the 
CMT’s work. In this respect, the Authorisation Directive provides that any administrative 
charges  on  operators  should  in  total  only  cover  the  administrative  costs  incurred  by  the 
benefiting authorities in performing their tasks. The Commission services are looking further 
at this issue. 
In 2002, the system of local taxes (1.5% of the revenues earned in each local council district) 
on rights of way was modified with a view to aligning the regime applied to all operators with 
that historically applied to the incumbent. It does not concern mobile operators, however: the 
latter are subject to a new business tax formula (impuesto de actividades económicas) that is 
based on the number of users and of antennae in each municipal district. These changes have 
reportedly significantly increased the tax burden on the sector.   
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FRANCE 
TRANSPOSITION 
The positive developments in regard to competition in France over the past year, especially 
with regard to broadband, have been overshadowed by the fact that France was very late in 
adopting the laws required to transpose the new regulatory framework. While the key piece of 
legislation was finally adopted in July 2004, even now a significant amount of secondary 
measures  is  required  to complete  transposition.  There  does  appear  to be  a  common  view 
among  interested  parties,  however,  that  the  new  laws  are  a  faithful  transposition  of  the 
Directives. 
The Commission has not yet reached a formal conclusion on the conformity of the measures 
adopted.  The  French  authorities  appear  to  be  making  considerable  efforts  to  have  the 
necessary secondary legislation adopted as soon as possible. A public consultation on a set of 
nine  draft  Decrees  was  launched  on  1  September  2004  covering,  amongst  other  things, 
universal service tariffs, directory services, rights of way, frequency management, and the 
rights  and  obligations  of  operators  under  the  authorisation  regime.  Some  of  the  issues 
addressed  must  be  dealt  with  before  the  new  framework  can  begin  to  be  properly 
implemented. The most important are those establishing the necessary legal conditions for the 
national regulatory authority (ART) to proceed formally with the market analysis process and 
to  impose  the  necessary  obligations  on  operators  with  significant  market  power,  as 
appropriate. The public consultation ended on 22 September, and the French authorities hope 
to have the Decrees adopted by the end of the year.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
After remaining stable for over three years, the fixed line penetration rate has reduced by 
nearly 0.51% since last year, to 56.7% of the population or 33.83 million lines. The ART 
estimates that the fixed line incumbent had 80.7% of the local call market, including dial up 
calls to internet, and 69% of the long distance and international calls markets in December 
2003, a slight decrease on the year previously. While the market shares of the three principal 
new entrants on the fixed line market are not available individually, 22.4% of all subscribers 
used  carrier  selection  or  pre selection,  with  a  hard  core  of  13.7%  subscribed  to  another 
operator through carrier pre selection. 
While the mobile market remains the most dynamic sector for growth in France, growth in 
mobile penetration slowed in the year to June 2003, in part because operators were shedding 
low margin customers and focusing on value added customers, and then accelerated again in 
the third quarter of 2004, so that annual growth reached 6.8% in the year to 30 September 
2004
70. Nevertheless, France still has one of the lowest mobile penetration rates in the EU 
(71%), and the third operator has not been able to break through an average market share 
ceiling of 17% and to compete on even terms with its two larger competitors, who control 
                                                 
70  Source : ART – Mobile Observatory, 3rd Quarter 2004   Observatoire des mobiles du 3ème trimestre 
2004 (http://www.art telecom.fr/).  
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close to 83% of the market (48% for the incumbent’s mobile subsidiary, 35% for the second 
GSM operator). 
One of the most important developments in the French market has been the growth in the 
number of DSL connections, and notably the number of those lines that are in the hands of 
new entrants, with a penetration rate for broadband (8.3%) that is now just above the EU 
average. France has had considerable success in developing unbundling, and has the highest 
number of shared access lines in the EU (717 564). There are now 4.95 million broadband 
lines in France (of which 4.52 million are DSL lines), and the incumbent’s market share for 
retail broadband lines has slipped to 48%. As regards DSL specifically, when including the 
number of resale lines that are supplied by the fixed line incumbent operator but sold on the 
retail market by other service providers, the incumbent now only has 50% of the retail DSL 
market (compared to 75.3% of the wholesale DSL market). 
THE NRA 
The Autorité de Régulation des Télécommunications (ART) is the independent regulator for 
the electronic communications sector in France, which already has a proven track record in 
the  regulation  of  the  sector.  Under  the  recently  adopted  laws  transposing  the  new  EU 
regulatory framework, the ART has received responsibility for some of the few matters that 
were not already attributed to it, including in particular the regulation of retail tariffs, where 
appropriate under the new framework. 
Despite the fact that the more recent developments in broadband can be attributed largely to a 
series of regulatory decisions by the ART, most notably in 2002, there continues to be a 
perception of a lack of regulatory independence in France. This is due in part to the fact that 
the Ministry in charge of electronic communications, which was responsible for approving 
retail tariffs under the old framework  (a situation that remains in place until the relevant 
decrees  have  entered  into  force)  and  is  still  responsible  for  issuing  rights  of  use  for 
frequencies where it has been decided to have a restricted number of individual licences, is 
under the authority of the Ministry of Finances which is managing the State’s shareholding in 
the incumbent. And while this situation is now changing, such a relationship was perceived to 
be very sensitive in the period when the State was seeking the best possible price for the sale 
of part of its shareholding, which was completed in early September 2004. Added to the fact 
that there was a challenge to the powers of the ART in regards to price regulation during 
parliamentary discussions on the new regulatory framework, it is hard to reassure market 
players that regulatory decisions are taken in an atmosphere that is conducive to independence 
and objectivity. 
As referred to in previous Reports, there are still some concerns on the part of market players 
with the duration of procedures once a request for intervention has been made to the ART. 
While the maximum possible duration was shortened in mid 2003, the average length of time 
for a decision to issue has been approximately 4 months for 2003 and 2004, which is the 
maximum period permitted under the new framework.  
Building on the relationship developed under the old framework, co operation between the 
ART and the French competition authority (Conseil de la Concurrence) appears to be close 
and effective. As a recent example, the complementarity of the action of the two authorities 
was demonstrated when the Conseil issued a favourable opinion on a draft market analysis of  
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the ART for ex ante regulation of a market while issuing at the same time a decision imposing 
ex post sanctions on two operators for anticompetitive pricing practices in the same market.  
Appeal mechanism 
The duration of appeals against decisions of the ART is perceived by market players as a 
serious problem (as in the case of the appeal against the ART’s decision on third party billing, 
see  below)  where  lengthy  procedures  can  effectively  freeze  any  developments  in  a  given 
product or service. While ART decisions remain in force during any appeal process, unless a 
Court specifically agrees to a request for suspension, long drawn out procedures can mean 
that the market does not develop, often to the benefit of the incumbent operator. With the 
entry into force of the new framework, and greater reliance on ART decisions such as in the 
case of market analyses and designations, the Commission intends to monitor closely whether 
any delays could militate against the effective regulation of the market.  
Delays in decision taking can have a knock on effect on other services, but do not remove the 
obligation on the NRAs to take decisive action. This was the case in regard to third party 
billing, for example, which was a key issue in determining the success of non geographic 
number portability. In September 2004, at the instigation of the Commission, the European 
Court of Justice ruled that France was in breach of certain obligations under the old regulatory 
framework for its failure to ensure the availability of non geographic number portability (and 
particularly for shared revenues services), which makes it clear that the national authorities 
have to take all the action necessary to ensure that a mandated service is effectively available. 
MARKET ANALYSIS 
Despite  the  delays  in  completing  the  transposition  measures  required  to  allow  the  formal 
market analysis procedure to be completed, the ART has carried out a significant amount of 
preparatory work, including a full data gathering exercise and the preparation of draft market 
analyses. As of 30 September 2004 it had completed three grouped consultations covering 12 
of the markets referred to in the Commission’s Recommendation, for the purposes of which it 
has provisionally identified a number of sub markets. 
The ART has also issued a questionnaire on a market for SMS messaging which, without 
prejudice to the market analysis that the ART will carry out subsequently, indicates a priori a 
willingness to examine the possibility that a separate market exists for SMS.  
Some  views  have  been  expressed  that  the  procedures  for  the  collection  of  data  (through 
detailed  questionnaires)  were  quite  burdensome,  but  there  is  an  acceptance  that  the  ART 
needs  to  have  all  the  pertinent  data  at  its  disposal  in  order  to  ensure  a  thorough  market 
analysis can be carried out. While the original deadline was quite short, given that it included 
the summer holiday period, the ART in reality accepted considerably longer delays in the 
provision of responses to the questionnaires by a number of operators, and engaged in a series 
of meetings and reminders in order to ensure that it had a satisfactory body of data available 
for the market analyses. . Another issue raised by operators was the relative lack of detail in 
the preliminary draft market analyses that have been published for consultation. However, as 
evidenced  by  the  first  formal  draft  market  analysis  decision,  published  recently,  a 
considerably more detailed analysis is contained in the final draft market analysis which is 
published again for consultation of all interested parties.  
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MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES  
Development of competition 
The incumbent has been able to maintain and stabilise its dominant position in local voice 
telephony and local access, and other operators have concerns about the lack of regulatory 
intervention  in  relation  to  the  incumbent’s  aggressive  commercial  and  pricing  strategy  – 
particularly as the practice of the bundling of tariffs has developed. The re integration of the 
incumbent’s ISP subsidiary back into the incumbent’s organisation, after a share buy out, will 
require close monitoring by the Commission and the national authorities about transparency 
and competitive practices, given the market power that the incumbent can bring to bear on the 
retail market for voice telephony and Internet services, including broadband.  
One specific issue in this regard is the incumbent’s continuing domination of the local access 
market, despite advances in unbundling. Proposals for the incumbent to introduce wholesale 
rental of the subscriber line, did not come to a successful conclusion. And while there has 
been an agreement between the incumbent and another operator offering preselection so that 
the  pre selected  operator  could  undertake  third party  billing  on  behalf  of  the  incumbent, 
alternative operators feel that they are unable to develop products and services to the end user 
until at least the market analysis is completed, other than by means of total unbundling, which 
does not appear to be competitively priced for alternative operators.. 
However, the most critical situation appears to be the incumbent’s pricing strategy between 
retail (broadband) products and the equivalent bitstream and resale products offered to other 
operators. Following a period where the resale and bitstream tariffs of the incumbent appeared 
to be relatively balanced and to allow for the development of competition in DSL services, 
due to previous regulatory action by the ART, this balance now appears to have gone, and 
new entrants are complaining of a price squeeze. In December 2003, the ART agreed to a 
reduction  in  the  retail  charges  and  the  resale  ISP  tariffs  for  DSL,  but  this  has  put  huge 
pressure  on  the  operators  using  the  incumbent’s  bitstream  product  and  those  who  were 
developing  unbundling.  Given  the  very  positive  effects  of  the  ART’s  previous  efforts  to 
regulate these markets, where sufficient margin was allowed between the resale, bitstream and 
unbundling products, resulting in very significant growth in broadband lines and the market 
share of alternative operators, such a development must be considered as a step backwards. 
Authorisations 
While  many  aspects  of  the  implementation  of  the  new  framework  were  delayed  by  the 
absence  of  transposition  measures,  the  ART  did  move  swiftly  to  apply  an  authorisation 
scheme from the date of application of the new framework in July 2003. However, one area of 
the authorisation system that the Commission is looking into as far as correct application of 
the new framework is concerned is that relating to cable operators, who are still subject to 
“conventions”  or  contracts,  mostly  with  local  authorities  in  whose  catchment  areas  their 
networks  were  developed.  These  contracts  were  drawn  up  in  a  situation  where  the  local 
authorities had extensive powers to determine if the operator could proceed and under what 
conditions. They set down a number of conditions and obligations and therefore constitute   at 
least  in  part     a  set  of  conditions  affecting  the  operators’  right  to  provide  electronic 
communications and services. As such they must be brought into line with the regulatory 
framework.  
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The transposition laws do contain a provision requiring these contracts to be brought into 
conformity. However, there will be a one year delay from publication of the decree giving 
effect to this provision (which has not yet taken place) before which the contracts are to be 
brought into line, to allow for negotiation with the local authorities.  
Administrative charges 
Another issue regarding the system of authorisations in France is the continuing high levels of 
administrative  fee  charged  to  certain  categories  of  operators  who  declare  themselves  in 
accordance with the new system. Although there have been decreases in the level of charges 
in recent years, small operators, including those operating in a very restricted geographical 
area,  find  themselves  having  to  pay  charges  that  compare  with  those  applied  to  national 
operators. It must be considered whether this acts as a disincentive to the development of 
small niche operators and those seeking to provide value added services outside the major 
urban conglomerations. 
Broadband  
The very substantial growth in the broadband market in France, from a starting point two 
years ago where the number of such connections was much lower than the EU average, can be 
directly attributed by firm regulatory intervention by the ART. While new entrant operators 
still rely to a large extent on wholesale supply from the incumbent, there are now nearly 
5 million [4 9454 465] retail broadband lines in France. There has been a major growth in 
unbundled lines [760 769] and in the number of broadband lines supplied by new entrants. 
Two  operators  at  least  appear  to  have  established  a  strong  business  case  to  use  partial 
unbundling to provide high speed (DSL) services, as well as the development of triple play 
products (voice, data/Internet and television). 
The revised reference unbundling offer (RUO), published in December 2003, has not been the 
subject  of  any  decision  by  the  ART.  There  has  been  criticism  that  it  does  not  contain  a 
significant change to the tariffs for full unbundling which, in contrast to shared access, has 
met with little success in France, and where there is little appreciable difference between the 
monthly charge and the monthly retail subscription. Furthermore, it has been very difficult for 
alternative operators to develop their services to the business market, given this high cost of 
full unbundling, the cost of wholesale IP access, and the fact that the incumbent’s virtual 
network service to business users is very competitively priced. Alternative operators have 
refused to sign agreements on the basis of the new RUO, particularly as it appears to restrict 
the services which they can offer to end users on the basis of an unbundled line, which the 
Commission services are looking into. 
In December 2003, the ART did give a generally positive opinion to the reduction of the 
incumbent’s resale offer for DSL services. Furthermore, to take account of the significant 
development of unbundling, the ART has allowed the incumbent to de average its tariffs for 
wholesale broadband access between bundled and unbundled areas. The ART’s objective was 
to allow for greater decreases in retail tariffs to the benefit of users in areas where competition 
was relatively strong, while not wanting to inhibit the development of unbundling. However, 
given  that  unbundling  has  been  concentrated  in  urban  areas  there  are  very  different  cost 
considerations in the areas where unbundling has not developed, largely because of lower 
population density and greater technical problems because of the type of switches and the 
distance to customer premises. It is to be seen whether, as a result of these combined factors,  
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there is a danger that development of competition in DSL services in less densely populated 
areas could be inhibited. 
The new transposition laws also included provisions allowing local authorities to set up their 
own broadband networks. In anticipation of this, in January 2004, the incumbent announced 
an initiative to collaborate with local authorities to accelerate and extend the deployment of 
broadband in the French regions. These initiatives responded to growing pressure from local 
authorities to improve broadband roll out and ensure the development of the use of innovative 
services, particularly for public services, and also to the increasing number of initiatives by 
them to establish their own broadband networks. A number of agreements have been signed, 
but there have been considerable tensions around the strategy employed to convince local 
authorities to avail of the incumbent’s services rather than construct their own networks, or to 
call on alternative providers, and the competition authority, at the request of ART, issued an 
opinion on the agreements stating that it had a number of reserves about the potential effects 
on competition and making recommendations for improvements. 
Mobile services 
The GSM licences of two of the three mobile operators in France expire in March 2006, and 
the French government was obliged under the terms of these licences to state clearly, two 
years in advance, the conditions that would apply for their renewal. Following considerable 
debate about the level of fees to be charged, the final decision was to charge an annual fee of 
€ 25 million plus 1% of turnover. There were also some modifications made to the conditions 
attached to the licences, including coverage and access for handicapped, while in parallel 
considerable political pressure was brought to bear on the mobile operators to commit to 
reductions in the tariffs for SMS messages. 
The issue of SMS charges was already sensitive because of formal complaints by the main 
consumers’ organisation of abuse of a dominant position by the three mobile operators. This 
has led to an investigation by the consumer protection agency in association with a formal 
procedure before the competition authority. The competition authority is also investigating 
alleged concerted practices regarding the voice telephony charges of the mobile operators, in 
which minutes (or shorter periods) were indivisible for billing purposes. More recently, all 
three operators have introduced at least some tariff packages based on billing by the second. 
As in a number of other EU states, the roll out of 3G networks and services has experienced 
significant delays in France. However, two operators have now announced the commercial 
launch of services, albeit on a limited scale as they are restricted in geographical coverage and 
the products are designed exclusively for business customers. 
Universal service 
It has been suggested by operators that the process for designating universal service operators 
may breach the spirit, if not the letter, of the new framework. It does not appear to respect the 
obligation  for  a  non discriminatory  designation  mechanism,  as  it  would  exclude  most 
operators in practice, given that only operators that are in a position to prove the service on a 
national basis are qualified to apply. It could also prolong the problems of universal service 
funding in France under the old framework, as the existing designated operator could have an 
undue influence on the costs to be reimbursed by other operators (by establishing the sum to 
be paid by the universal service fund on the basis of a call for tender in which there could be 
only one eligible bidder).   
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Another  issue  concerning  universal  service  funding,  is  the  risk  that  the  obligation  to 
contribute to funding will be applied retrospectively to authorised operators which did not 
previously  have  a  licence  and  did  not  enjoy  the  full  rights  and  obligations  of  the  new 
framework until it was properly transposed in France (on the basis of turnover), for the year 
prior to the entry into force of the transposition measures. 
The Commission will be looking into these issues. 
Must-carry 
The provisions established in the new law on electronic communications concerning must 
carry are extensive and complex. In fact, while a number of obligations have been placed on 
broadcasting service providers and distributors, it is not clear if the obligations correspond to 
or are covered by the provision on must carry in the new Universal Service Directive. The 
law  creates  an  obligation  on  broadcasters  to  allow  the  transmission  of  the  specified 
programmes or channels and an obligation on distributors to make them available to their 
customers. But it is not clear if these obligations apply to the operators of the networks along 
which these programmes or channels are transmitted. This obligation has been extended to 
include two extra (digital) channels that must be supplied even to customers who only take an 
analogue service.  
These  provisions  create  an  obligation  on  collective  cable  systems  and  on  broadcasters  to 
provide a more extensive list of programmes in areas where a cable network is ensuring the 
supply of channels in a collective cable system. The Commission is examining how this dual 
must provide  and  must carry  obligation  takes  account  of  the  development  of  alternative 
individual means of connection, such as television over DSL and satellite.   
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IRELAND 
TRANSPOSITION 
Ireland  has  notified  on  time  its  measures  to  transpose  all  the  Directives  under  the  new 
regulatory framework, by means of primary legislation, the Communications Regulation Act 
2002, and secondary legislation (a number of Statutory Instruments). 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The Irish electronic communications market has continued to grow, and total revenues for 
fixed, mobile and broadcasting sectors increased by 3% since 2003 (although fixed revenues 
have decreased and mobile revenues have increased).  
Mobile penetration remains high at 88% of the population. However, by October 2004 Ireland 
had  a  broadband  penetration  rate  of  2.3%,  which  is  below  the  EU  average.  The  fixed 
penetration rate (incumbent’s PSTN lines per 100 inhabitants) is 40.1%, which is slightly 
below  the  EU  average.  Digital  TV  continues  to  expand,  and  32%  of  all households  now 
subscribe to a digital service.  
Internet penetration has steadily increased and currently 46% of subscribers with a fixed line 
are now connected to the Internet. The introduction of FRIACO (Flat Rate Internet Access 
Call Origination) has been successful, and the number of FRIACO subscribers has increased 
steadily since its launch in July 2003, and reached in excess of 81 924 by August 2004.  
The launch of Mobile Number Portability in July 2003 has also been successful and most 
ports  are  completed  within  the  targeted  2  hour  timeframe.  No  charges  are  imposed  on 
consumers  with  respect  to  either  mobile  or  fixed  porting.  In  the  case  of  mobile  porting, 
operators have agreed a charge, without regulatory intervention.  
One roaming agreement has been completed and one is in the process of being negotiated. 
Roll out of 3G is ongoing since the launch in 2003 and currently all operators have met their 
licence  commitments.  The  two  3G  operators  which  had  specific  demographic  coverage 
obligations  (33%  demographic  coverage  by  1  May  2003  for  one,  and  33%  demographic 
coverage by 31 March 2004 for the other, have both met these obligations.  
Unlike in many other Member States, the fixed incumbent operator currently has no interests 
in the mobile market. The two biggest mobile operators held in May 2004 market shares of 
54% and 40% respectively (in terms of number of subscribers).  
The incumbent fixed operator held in December 2003 a market share of 95% of all local calls, 
70% of long distance calls, and 70% of international calls (in terms of retail revenue).  
THE NRA 
The  notified  National  Regulatory  Authority  (NRA)  for  Ireland  is  the  Commission  for 
Communications Regulation (ComReg). The Commission consists of at least one and not 
more than three Commissioners (one of which is appointed the Chairperson, when there is  
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more than one Commissioner). There are currently only two Members of the Commission, 
following the expiration of the contract of another Member in June 2004.  
The  Communications  Regulation  Act,  2002,  specifies  that  the  Commissioners  shall  be 
appointed by the Minister in accordance with terms and conditions (including remuneration) 
set by her/him. Commissioners are appointed following a competition and selection procedure 
conducted by the Civil Service and Local Appointments Commission. A third commissioner 
is expected to be appointed following interviews in November 2004. This appointment will be 
on a full time basis for a period of 4 years. A Commissioner can be re appointed for one 
additional term. 
The 2002 Act also provides that, when there is more than one Commissioner, the Minister 
shall appoint one of them to be the Chairperson of the Commission. The Chairperson has a 
casting vote in the Commission in the event of a tied vote. Unlike for Commissioners there is 
no set term for the office of the Chairperson but, since ComReg’s establishment in December 
2002, the Chairmanship has been rotated on an annual basis. The Minister sets the terms and 
conditions, including remuneration, of the Chairperson, with the consent of the Minister of 
Finance. To date, there has been no extra remuneration for the position of Chairperson. As a 
Commissioner,  the  Chairperson  will  have  undergone  a  transparent  selection  procedure. 
However,  there  are  potential  concerns  in  relation  to  the  appointment  of  the  Chairperson, 
insofar as it appears that the criteria and terms of this process of appointment are not very 
transparent and the duration of the appointment is not set in advance.  
Ministerial policy directions 
Under Section 13 of the Communications Regulation Act 2002 the Minister may give such 
policy directions to ComReg as he or she considers appropriate, to be followed by ComReg in 
the exercise of its functions. ComReg shall comply with such Directions. Before giving a 
Direction, the Minister shall publish a draft of the proposed Direction for consultation, which 
thereafter will be given to ComReg with or without amendments. 
In 2003 the Minister issued Directions, including a Direction on the introduction of FRIACO 
(Flat  Rate  Internet  Access  Call  Origination).  At  the  end  of  March  2004,  following  the 
publication  of  draft  directions  for  consultation,  the  Minister  issued  a  new  set  of  Policy 
Directions  on  a  number  of  issues,  including  national  roaming  and  wholesale  line  rental 
(WLR). 
As regards national roaming, the initial draft direction had suggested that ComReg would be 
instructed to introduce national roaming. ComReg commented upon this draft in the course of 
the consultation process and stressed, inter alia, the need to comply with the EC regulatory 
framework and the importance of the process of market reviews (including findings of SMP 
and  determination  of  suitable  remedies).  The  final  Ministerial  Direction  clarified  that,  if 
ComReg with the agreement of the European Commission, designated any mobile operator as 
having SMP, individually or collectively, following the completion by ComReg of the mobile 
market review process required under the EC regulatory framework, ComReg should make 
use  of  its  powers  under  existing  legislation  to  examine  mandating  national  roaming  on 
existing GSM networks of SMP mobile network operators in favour of other mobile network 
and virtual network operators on fair commercial terms. The Direction stated further that the 
goal was that agreement would be reached between relevant parties, and that such agreement 
be implemented, commercially and technically, by the end of 2004. The Ministerial Direction 
was made at a time when ComReg was in the process of carrying out the relevant market  
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analysis,  but  before  ComReg  had  made  any  findings  of  SMP  or  made  any  decisions  on 
suitable remedies. 
The Ministerial directions of 21 February 2003 referred to FRIACO, stating that ComReg 
should make use of its powers under the legislation as appropriate, to bring about agreements 
among market players in order to facilitate early introduction of retail dial up internet access 
services charged at flat rates. ComReg was to report to the Minister on progress in relation to 
this matter within one month of the issue of this direction, and on a monthly basis thereafter 
until such time as retail services were introduced, making any recommendations it considered 
appropriate for further action. In relation to FRIACO, two operators had already formally 
requested the wholesale provision of FRIACO in 2002, and ComReg had convened a forum in 
November  of  that  year  when  it  was  unsatisfied  with  progress  towards  implementation. 
ComReg formally mandated FRIACO in January 2003.  
As regards wholesale line rental, the Ministerial Directions of 26 March 2004 stated that 
ComReg should ensure the introduction of a Wholesale Line Rental product for voice and 
data services by 31 March 2004 and ensure that the product be accessible, affordable and with 
sufficient  margin  for  telecommunications  operators  to  enable  them  to  stimulate  and  drive 
competition in this market. It further stated that ComReg, as of 30 June 2004, would report 
monthly to the Minister on the commercial take up of the WLR product and that a review 
would be undertaken by 24 September 2004 on the overall impact of the introduction of the 
WLR product on competition and line rental. If the progress envisaged was not evident at that 
stage, the Minister would direct ComReg to examine, subject to relevant requirements under 
European and national law; the removal of line rental from the present price cap and examine 
the setting of a specific rental cap no greater than CPI; or to take whatever other appropriate 
steps necessary to ensure its successful introduction. At the time of the Ministerial Policy 
Directions, the incumbent was already in the process of introducing single billing wholesale 
line rental, following a Direction from ComReg in July 2002 (under the previous regulatory 
framework)  and  this  was  introduced  on  31 March  2004.  This  Direction  mandated  single 
billing through WLR as an extension to the carrier pre selection (CPS) obligations, according 
to the old regulatory framework. 
Although Ministerial Policy Directions may be a useful means for Ministers to specify overall 
policy,  in  the  context  of  the  new  regulatory  framework,  regulatory  intervention  must  be 
justified  in  accordance  with  the  process  of  market  review  that  is  the  cornerstone  of  that 
framework. In the national roaming case above, the final policy direction clarified that it was 
subject to EU law and, in the wholesale line rental case, the obligation had already been 
established under the previous regulatory framework. Notwithstanding this, the Commission 
services intend to monitor closely the use of Policy Directions in terms of allowing ComReg 
to carry out its tasks as foreseen by the regulatory framework.  
Appeal mechanisms 
The Regulations transposing the framework in Ireland provide for an appeal mechanism on an 
ad hoc basis, with an Appeals Panel being set up only when an appeal against a ComReg 
decision is received. It is to be seen whether the ad hoc basis for the Appeals Panel could 
raise  certain  concerns,  for  example,  in  terms  of  ensuring  continuity  of  expertise  and 
experience. In August 2004, the first appeal under this appeal system was made by one new 
entrant 3G operator, seeking to challenge ComReg’s designation of it as having SMP in the 
market for wholesale voice call termination on individual mobile networks. Following this, on 
21 September the Minister appointed an Appeals Panel comprising four members, valid for  
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one year, from which three members can be drawn to hear each appeal of decisions made by 
ComReg, and constituted a specific panel to hear the abovementioned appeal. The Appeals 
Panel is independent in the performance of its functions and determines its own procedures. 
Stakeholders  are  waiting  with  interest  to  see  how  the  appeals  mechanism  will  work  in 
practice.  
Market analysis 
As required under the EU framework, ComReg is in the process of carrying out a number of 
market analyses, and has completed four of them. The analyses completed are for the market 
for LLU (market 11), the broadcasting market (market 18), the market for wholesale mobile 
voice call termination (market 16), and the market for wholesale broadband access. National 
consultations  have  been  completed  for  four  other  markets,  and  launched  for  seven  other 
markets. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES  
Broadband 
As part of its Broadband Strategy, the Government, in partnership with the local authorities, is 
in  the  process  of  constructing  regional  broadband  infrastructure  (Metropolitan  Area 
Networks). The current broadband rings, funded by the Government and local authorities, 
consist of duct and fibre laid around 26 large cities and towns. In the summer of 2004 the 
Government announced that a further 41 towns are to be part of the Regional Metropolitan 
Area Network programme and it is expected that the roll out to these towns will be finalised 
within 12 months. The Government has also announced that the expansion to further towns is 
expected  to  be  announced  in  the  near  future.  In  the  summer  of  2004  the  Minister  also 
announced  that,  following  an  open  competitive  process,  the  contract  for  managing, 
maintaining and operating the regional Metropolitan Broadband Networks had been awarded 
to  a  technology  company.  This  company  will  operate  as  wholesaler  of  access  to  the 
metropolitan  area  networks  (making  broadband  infrastructure  available  to  authorised 
electronic communications operators). It will offer a full range of products, including ducting, 
sub ducting,  dark  fibre,  and  co location.  The  15 year  concession  agreement  provides  for 
revenue  sharing  with  the  Government,  and  also  for  extension  to  additional  metropolitan 
networks.  The  company  has  announced  plans  to  be  the  provider  of  low cost  broadband 
infrastructure in the regions so as to enable service providers to offer services at competitive 
prices. 
The  fact  that  the  Government  is  part owner  of  the  regional  metropolitan  networks,  and 
benefits  from  the  revenues  of  these  networks  and,  at  the  same  time,  has  legislative  and 
regulatory functions for the electronic communications industry and even has the possibility 
of  issuing  binding  policy  Directions  to  the  independent  NRA,  raises  certain  questions.  It 
remains to be seen how the separation of regulatory and ownership functions, as required 
under EC law, will be ensured.  
The  local  authorities  are  also  partial  owner  of  these  regional  networks.  If  these  local 
authorities also were to have some regulatory functions, for example granting of rights of 
way, separation of ownership and regulatory functions will need to be ensured. Finally, the 
fixed incumbent and the responsible government department do not agree as to whether at 
least part of the broadband network duplicates the incumbent operator’s current broadband  
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network. While alternative infrastructure competition can be healthy per se, there are potential 
issues  when  such  infrastructure  is  partially  state  subsidised,  for  example  possible  cross 
subsidisation. 
The Commission services will be looking into these issues. 
Authorisations 
Ireland has notified the Wireless Telegraphy Act of 1926 as part of the transposition measures 
for  the  Authorisation  Directive.  This  focuses  on  authorising  “apparatus”  rather  than 
introducing  a  system  of  general  authorisations  and  rights  of  use,  as  provided  for  in  the 
Authorisation  Directive.  Ireland  also  notified  a  Statutory  Instrument  (the  European 
Communities (Electronic Communications Network and Services) Regulation, 2003), which 
complements the 1926 Act. The Irish transposition, which focuses on “apparatus”, seems to 
create  a  heavy  and  inflexible  system  and  affect  the  transposition  of  articles  of  the 
Authorisation Directive. Its compatibility with the Authorisation Directive will need to be 
examined.  The  Irish  authorities  are  planning  amendments  to  the  1926  Act,  but  there  is 
currently no draft legislation and no planned adoption date.  
Local loop unbundling 
The number of unbundled lines in Ireland is low, and is currently at 1195 shared access lines 
and  only  305  fully  unbundled  lines.  Prices  for  local  loop  unbundling  continue  to  be  of 
concern, remaining at a high level since the 9
th Implementation Report. Currently, as regards 
fully unbundled loops, Ireland’s prices for connection and monthly rental are above the EU 
average (connection fees are among the highest in the EU). Also the monthly average total 
cost per fully unbundled loop is well above the EU average, and even among the highest in 
the EU.  
The  situation  is  very  similar  as  regards  shared  access,  where  both  monthly  rental  and 
connection fees are above the EU average, and among the highest in the EU. Again, the 
monthly average total cost per shared access is above the EU average, and among the highest 
in the EU. 
In May 2003 ComReg set a price of € 14.67 per month for LLU, but the relevant Direction 
was challenged by the incumbent by way of judicial review. In September 2003 the case was 
settled before going to court. ComReg proposed in a recent consultation document to lower 
the monthly rental for an unbundled loop from € 16.81 to € 14.65 per month from 1 December 
2004, to be fixed in real terms until December 2007. This followed a detailed analysis of the 
costs of the access network using a bottom up model based on forward looking Long Run 
Incremental Costs and efficient operator principles. Notwithstanding the favourable margins 
available between retail and wholesale prices, many alternative operators are opposed to the 
proposed monthly rental charge, which they consider too high. The new proposed price would 
place the monthly rental for a local loop in Ireland as the second highest in the EU. One 
explanation put forward for this by the regulator is the unusual demographics that apply in 
Ireland where over 40% of the population live in rural areas, one of the highest proportions in 
the  developed  world.  These  rural  dwellers  also  tend  to  be  relatively  widely  dispersed. 
ComReg is also actively working with the industry to advance the take up of full unbundling, 
has recently introduced a 50% reduction in survey costs and is actively looking at the other 
associated process costs. At least one additional operator has placed orders for the opening of  
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over 60 new exchanges, of which at least 30 40 will be opened in the next quarter and others 
are actively considering entering this area.  
ComReg has also undertaken an own initiative investigation regarding the wholesale charges 
for Site Surveys and site Offers associated with LLU. 
The fixed incumbent’s standard SLA (Service Level Agreement) for the provisioning and 
fault management of LLU services has been amended, following a review via an industry 
forum, and the revised SLA provides for, inter alia, improved delivery timeframes. In July 
2004 ComReg designated the fixed incumbent as having SMP in the market for wholesale 
unbundled access (including shared access) to metallic loops and sub loops for the purpose of 
providing broadband and voice services. ComReg imposed a number of obligations on the 
incumbent  (transparency,  non discrimination,  accounting  separation,  access  to  specific 
network facilities, price and cost accounting obligations). 
Universal service 
The Commission services are looking at the manner in which the Irish legislation transposes 
the definition of universal service for its conformity with the EU legislation. Section 12 of the 
Communications Regulation Act, 2002, states, in relation to ComReg’s tasks regarding the 
promotion of interests of users, that ComReg is responsible for: “ensuring that all users have 
access  to  “a  universal  service”.  The  Directive  specifies  that  it  is  “a  universal  service  as 
specified in the Universal Service Directive”. Irish legislation has also added an objective 
which does not exist in Community law: “encouraging access to the Internet at reasonable 
cost to the users”. The Commission services will be looking closely into these issues.  
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ITALY 
TRANSPOSITION  
The  new  regulatory  framework  has  been  transposed  by  the  Codice  delle  Comunicazioni 
Elettroniche  which  entered  into  force  on  16  September  2003.  The  Codice  in  materia  di 
Protezione dei Dati Personali, which transposes the e privacy directive, entered into force on 
1 January 2004. The Italian government has also recently notified to the Commission the new 
law on audiovisual markets (Gasparri Law n. 112/2004 of 3 May 2004) which transposes 
(inter  alia)  the  framework  for  broadcasting  transmission  networks.  The  same  law  also 
mandates  the  Government  to  bring  together  the  existing  regulation  into  a  Radio  and 
Broadcasting  Code  (Test  unico  della  radiotelevisione).  The  analysis  of  conformity  of  the 
aforementioned national provisions with the new regulatory framework is ongoing.  
MARKET OVERVIEW  
Despite modest growth in the Italian economy, the overall telecoms sector has performed well 
and has grown by 5.2% during 2003. One of the most important developments during 2003 
was the fact that the mobile market has overtaken the fixed market in terms of revenues (16.7 
compared  to  € 16 billion).  In  some  cases  this  has  taken  the  form  of  fixed  to  mobile 
substitution in terms of both number of connections and traffic volume.  
In 2003, the incumbent’s overall share of fixed voice telephony (in terms of traffic revenues) 
was 68%; 24.6% of the market was shared among three operators, with the remaining 7.5% 
among eight other operators. The incumbent’s market share has remained more or less stable 
in comparison with 2002, with a slight increase for the long distance, international and calls to 
mobile markets (71.6%, 61.1% and 66.6%) and a decrease of 5.4% to 70%, for local calls (in 
particular  for  the  Internet  dial up  service).  Regarding  the  fixed  access  market,  AGCOM 
reports that it still shows strong monopoly characteristics.  
The  year  2003  has  been  characterised  by  a  strong  take up  in  broadband  connections:  the 
penetration rate (excluding 3G connections) has more than doubled since July 2003 and it is 
now at 6.4%.  
In  July  2004,  there  were  around  3 500 000  broadband  lines,  92%  of  which  use  DSL 
technology, around 5% are fibre and 3.4% are satellite connections. As a consequence of one 
of the lowest monthly rentals in the EU (€ 8.3), and stringent regulation, the unbundling of the 
local loop (LLU) is providing an effective way for alternative operators to compete in the 
provision of broadband connections. The number of active unbundled local loop lines in July 
2004 (697 530) was among the highest in the EU (and doubled since July 2003) and almost 
30% of the new entrants’ broadband retail connections are based on LLU. During the period 
July 2003 July 2004, the incumbent has increased its share in the overall retail broadband 
market (from 63.8% to 70.3%) and in the ADSL market (from 73% to 76.2%).  
In October 2004 there were 1.6 million active 3G lines; if 3G connections are included, the 
incumbent’s market share and the broadband penetration rate are, respectively, 55.9% and 
7.8%.  
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As regards mobile communications, their rapid growth has been confirmed by the penetration 
rate that is currently above 100%. Mobile number portability has been successfully used by 
operators and at July 2004 there were 2.5 million mobile ported numbers (more than the 
double since July 2003). Furthermore, for the first time, the incumbent mobile subsidiary’s 
market share (in terms of revenues) has decreased to less than 50%.  
THE NRA 
After  some  years  of  lack  of  clarity  as  to  the  distribution  of  tasks  between  the  national 
regulatory  authority  (Autorità  per  le  Garanzie  nelle  Comunicazioni  –  AGCOM)  and  the 
Ministry of Communications, a final agreement was notified to the Commission in July 2004 
under  Article  3  of  the  Framework  Directive.  In  January  2004  a  cooperation  agreement 
between  AGCOM  and  the  national  Competition  Authority,  concerning  the  general 
consultation mechanism, in particular with regard to market analysis and spectrum trading, 
was also signed. 
There  is  a  broadly  positive  consensus  among  market  players  concerning  AGCOM’s 
implementation of the regulatory framework so far. Furthermore, AGCOM has taken some 
important pro competitive regulatory measures during the past two years, for example, the ex 
ante replicability test for the incumbent’s retail offer. Some concerns have been expressed by 
operators  and  consumer  associations  regarding  slowness  of  the  AGCOM  decision making 
process in some areas. The delay in the market analyses has created problems for operators, 
not only because of the consequent uncertainty about the new regulatory framework, but also 
because  of  the  delay  in  defining  some  existing  regulatory  obligations  not  yet  fully 
implemented (see following sections for more details). 
AGCOM has been pro active in many important areas as a result of the adoption of more 
stringent  rules  for  non discrimination  on  technical  and  economic  wholesale  offers. 
Nevertheless,  due  to  lack  of  human  and  financial  resources,  the  enforcement  of  national 
regulation in an effective and timely manner has been questioned by alternative operators, 
who are now less confident than in previous years. 
Another  issue  which  has  been  raised  by  a  number  of  interested  parties  is  the  lack  of 
effectiveness of the sanction system. AGCOM has the power, under administrative law and 
under the terms of its Statute, to impose penalties. However the long delays involved and the 
low  level  of  monetary  penalties  (set  by  the  Administrative  legislation)  make  the  whole 
sanction system ineffective in the opinion of many parties. It should be noted that, according 
to ordinary Law n. 689/81, operators are allowed to stop the sanction proceeding at an early 
stage by paying a reduced penalty. Alternative operators have expressed grievances as to lack 
of transparency during the monitoring process, in particular concerning the different stages of 
the process for individual cases.  
As already stated, lack of human and financial resources is still a problem for both AGCOM 
and the Ministry of Communications (as far as its duties in the new regulatory framework are 
concerned). The situation for AGCOM will probably not be substantially improved with the 
arrival of new personnel in 2005, given the new competences assigned to it by two recently 
approved Italian laws on conflict of interest and on the audiovisual market. The situation has 
been  exacerbated  by  the  12%  reduction  in  the  financial  contribution  from  the  State  to 
AGCOM  as  decided  by  the  General  Budget  Law  for  2004.  AGCOM  is  also  currently  
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confronted  with  the  ending  of  the  mandates  of  the  President  and  8  Commissioners,  in 
February 2005. 
Market analysis  
Market analyses are still being carried out. AGCOM has completed the analysis of seven 
markets
71  and  the  remainder  will  be  approved  by  AGCOM’s  Council  by  the  end  of 
November. Public consultation for market definitions, SMP identifications and remedies for 
all markets is expected by the end of the year and the final decisions are expected by spring 
2005 
The incumbent has challenged an AGCOM decision of July 2003 on retail tariffs, claiming 
that it constitutes a new remedy imposed without prior market analysis
72. Article 5 of law 
112/2004 seems to place obligations on all TV network operators aside from any that may be 
imposed as a result of market analysis.  
National Competition Authority sanctions for abuse of a dominant position 
From 2000 onwards, new entrants brought several cases before AGCOM concerning alleged 
anti competitive practices by the incumbent, including price squeeze, arising from a series of 
commercial offers that targeted public institutions and business users.  
On the basis of some of these complaints, AGCOM sanctioned the incumbent for several 
infringements  and,  in  2002,  issued  a  more  stringent  regulation  in  order  to  prevent  the 
incumbent from discriminating in favour of its commercial divisions
73. Nevertheless, in 2003 
the  main  new  entrants  brought  all  the  outstanding  cases  before  the  national  competition 
authority (NCA). The NCA opened an investigation in July 2003 and, on 16 November 2004, 
sanctioned the incumbent for abuse of a dominant position. 
According to the NCA’s Decision
74, the investigation revealed a strategy aimed at excluding 
“its  competitors  from  the  business  end users  market  for  telecommunications  services  and 
thereby to maintain its historically dominant position both on the end users market and the 
market for intermediate services for its competitors”
75. 
The NCA found that this strategy has been implemented by the incumbent from 2001 until the 
present through “the offering of financial and technical conditions to customers which the 
competitors could not replicate
76” and through “the use of contractual terms and conditions, 
                                                 
71  They are: markets 3 and 5 (residential and non residential public fixed telephony services), market 11 
(wholesale unbundled access), market 16 (mobile termination), markets 7 and 13 (retail and wholesale 
leased lines) and market 14 (wholesale trunk segment). 
72  The  measure  prevents  the  incumbent  from  differentiating  retail  tariffs  on  the  basis  of  different 
interconnection charges applied by the operator which terminates the call. 
73  “Delibera” n° 152/02/CONS 
74  “Provvedimento” n° 13752 – Case A351 – “Comportamenti Abusivi di Telecom Italia” 
75  NCA’s press release of 19/11/2004 “The Competition Authority has fined Telecom Italia S.P.A. for 
abuse of a dominant position” (http://www.agcm.it/eng/index.htm). 
76  ibid. According to the Decision, this anticompetitive conduct includes, in particular, the offer made in 
the context of the 2002 call for tender launched by the State information services agency for the supply 
of telecommunications services to the public administration. “The framing of this bid was of particular  
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such as exclusive clauses (…) that (…) were considered abusive because of the effect they 
would have on excluding competitors”
77.  
In its Decision, which the incumbent has announced publicly it will appeal against, the NCA 
has imposed an obligation on the incumbent to stop the anti competitive practices identified, 
within 90 days of the notification of the Decision, and to pay fines totalling € 152 million. 
Dispute resolution 
Between  April  2003  and  April  2004,  AGCOM  has  received  25  new  cases  of  dispute 
resolution between operators. Among the 19 of these cases that it opened, mutual agreement 
between the parties was reached in four cases and, only in very few cases, have operators 
obtained a decision from AGCOM acting in its capacity as dispute settlement body. AGCOM 
has opened discussions with operators aimed at improving the dispute resolution process in 
light of the new regulatory framework. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES  
Access-Interconnection 
In February 2003 AGCOM set up a network caps mechanism for access and interconnection 
prices. This has speeded up the process for publication/approval and, for the first time, the 
2004 reference offer (RO) for interconnection and access was published before the reference 
period (October 2003). In June 2004, the incumbent published an approved version of its 
reference offer (RIO and RUO), while claiming that for some services a price below current 
costs, has been imposed (namely the LLU and the billing services for non geographic value 
added services). The RIO 2005 has already been published by the incumbent and provides for 
a significant reduction in the price of the services included in the network cap system.  
The second operator, which (in 2002) was designated as having SMP in the market for dial up 
Internet call termination, has not  yet published its reference interconnection offer for this 
service. 
With the aim of supporting investment by new operators in the access segment, in 2003, 
AGCOM reiterated the general ONP principle already applied in Italy, according to which 
new entrants are allowed to apply different interconnection charges for terminating calls on 
their networks to those applied by the incumbent. Up to now, not all new entrants have signed 
the  new  interconnection  agreements  with  the  incumbent.  In  response  to  a  request  by  the 
incumbent, filed in July 2004, AGCOM opened a dispute resolution proceeding.  
To reduce the likelihood of abuses and price squeeze practices in ADSL offers, new retail 
offers may be launched by the incumbent only after AGCOM’s approval. A key condition is 
the  existence  of  a  wholesale  offer  that  allows  technical  and  economic  replicability  by 
competitors (following the retail minus principle). While AGCOM has successfully applied 
this mechanism several times during the past two years in the retail market, new entrants have 
                                                                                                                                                         
importance both in terms of the size of the tender, and because the financial terms and conditions 
offered to CONSIP that were below the cost of its competitors on the upstream markets”.  
77  NCA’s press release; see reference above  
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complained to AGCOM on several occasions about prices, provisioning and quality of the 
wholesale offers that would prevent them from competing with the incumbent on an equal 
footing in the business market. 
One  alternative  operator  has  recently  brought  to  the  attention  of  the  Italian  Competition 
Authority, the incumbent’s decision to eliminate the lower ADSL speed rate (256 Kbit/s) 
from  the  wholesale  (and  retail)  offer.  AGCOM  has  allowed  the  incumbent  to  launch  its 
commercial offer after a period of 90 days in order to allow alternative operators to upgrade 
their networks. According to AGCOM the current regulatory framework does not provide for 
any obligation on minimum broadband capacity and the incumbent has complete freedom to 
decide the technical features of its retail broadband services. 
Price for shared access has fallen significantly in 2003 (making it one of the lowest in EU); 
however, by July 2004, the demand for this access by alternative operators was still very low 
(only 158 wholesale lines). 
New  entrants have started only recently to show an interest in this service, however, the 
reference offer seems to include technical conditions that are not in line with the existing 
regulation. In July 2004 AGCOM set up a specific working group of operators and ISP’s with 
the purpose of addressing problems with line sharing service provision and of evaluating 
measures for the introduction of voice over IP services. At the same time, AGCOM has also 
clarified the conditions to be applied in cases where the end user ceases its voice contract with 
the incumbent and maintains the shared access with the new entrants. This clarification from 
AGCOM was necessary in light of the request by the incumbent to charge the cost for a full 
unbundled line instead of the shared access cost.  
Consumer associations have reported problems concerning the provision and quality of ADSL 
services,  in  particular  as  regards  the  connection  speed.  In  August  2003,  AGCOM  issued 
general guidelines aimed at ensuring maximum transparency of contract clauses, technical 
parameters and quality of service (the identification of specific quality indicators for each 
service is still ongoing).  
AGCOM has put a great deal of effort into the formulation of regulatory accounting policies. 
The incumbent’s cost accounting system, for both historical and current cost methodologies, 
is verified by AGCOM. AGCOM also verifies the regulatory accounts for the two mobile 
SMP  operators  (rather  exceptionally  amongst  EU  Member  States).  Nevertheless,  to  date, 
AGCOM have still not published the compliance statement on the incumbent’s costing and 
accounting separation model for 2001 (at historical costs).  
Guidelines on the effective implementation of the current cost (CCA) methodology have been 
published  and  applied  for  the  transport  network.  In  the  context  of  the  analysis  of  the 
wholesale unbundled access market (market 11) AGCOM is in the process of evaluating and 
selecting the methodology to be applied to the access network. As a result of this, the price for 
local  loop  unbundling  continues  to  be  determined  each  year  on  the  basis  of  both  the 
incumbent’s historical costs analysis and benchmarking considerations; the monthly rental has 
been confirmed for the year 2004 at € 8.3, the cheapest in the EU.  
In August 2003, AGCOM established a new set of conditions for the incumbent’s wholesale 
leased  lines  offer.  Reductions  were  based  on  both  the  incumbent’s  cost  analysis  and  EU 
benchmarking,  with  a  view  towards  transition  to  a  price cap  mechanism  (after  market 
analysis) in future. Improvements in the provisioning, timing and penalties have also been  
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introduced. Nevertheless, alternative operators have brought to AGCOM’s attention that they 
are experiencing problems regarding the incumbent’s adherence to the obligations set in the 
Service Level Agreement. In June 2004 (in conformity with AGCOM decision of 2003), a 
new provisioning and assurance system has been put in place by the incumbent, with the aim 
of solving such problems. This is now under evaluation by AGCOM. 
Mobile services 
As a result of the network cap system for mobile termination charges, which was set up in 
February  2003,  AGCOM  is  progressing  from  a  historical  to  a  current  cost  system.  The 
introduction of the network cap has also resulted in reduced tariffs, while a further reduction 
totalling 10% are foreseen for 2004 2005. This has yet to be confirmed by the market analysis 
that is still ongoing. The fixed to mobile termination tariffs for the two SMP operators are 
currently higher than the EU15 average. 
According to AGCOM, current Italian regulation covers both fixed to mobile and mobile to 
mobile termination charges for the two SMP operators. Nevertheless, these operators do not 
follow the same interpretation and mobile to mobile termination charges are de facto defined 
through commercial agreements and, in some cases, at a higher level than fixed to mobile.  
The Ministry of Communications is currently verifying whether the coverage obligation (95% 
of the population resident in the regional capitals by 30 June 2004) has been satisfied by the 
licensed  3G  operators.  According  to  article  32  of  the  new  Codice  delle  Comunicazioni 
Elettroniche,  if  the  coverage  obligation  has  not  been  complied  with,  the  Ministry  of 
Communications will start the procedure for infringements of the conditions applied to rights 
of use for radio frequencies.  
One  3G  licensed  operator  (that  has  never  started  any  significant  coverage  activity)  has 
indicated its intention to withdraw from the market and to transfer the right of use for radio 
frequencies.  
Directories  
AGCOM’s Decision of June 2002, setting up the universal database for fixed and mobile 
customers, has not been implemented. In July 2004 the Italian Authority for Privacy issued a 
Decision on the prior consent model for existing customers. Mobile and fixed operators are 
finalizing  the  establishment  of  a  database,  which  will  connect  each  operator’s  numbering 
database, and the universal directories should be operational at the beginning of next year. 
The decision on the introduction of a new code “12xy”, envisaged for directory assistance 
services, has been only recently adopted and will be operational as of 1 July 2005. The short 
code “12” used by the incumbent, as well as the “internal” code 412 used by telecoms access 
operators (fixed and mobile, including the incumbent) for providing information exclusively 
to their customers
78, will be ceased on the same date. According to some operators, the delay 
in the full implementation of the national numbering plan has created a lack of transparency 
for consumers and a distortion in market competition. 
                                                 
78  According  to  the  national  numbering  plan,  the  code  “4”  is  dedicated  for  giving  info  to  the  own 
subscribers about network facilities, prices, and similar, without any interoperability.  
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Since the entry into force of the Codice the directory enquiry service is no longer part of the 
universal service obligations in charge of the incumbent, due to the existence of different 
offers in the market. Since this provision was introduced, the price charged by the incumbent 
for the directory enquiry service through an operator has doubled. The use of the interactive 
voice  recorded  service  facility  (for  which  the  price  has  remained  stable)  gives  correct 
information only in 30% of the requests.  
Data protection/data retention 
The Italian Data Protection Code which transposes the e privacy directive entered into force 
on 1 January 2004. The process of protecting final customers from unsolicited commercial 
advertising (spam) is still ongoing; it should be noted that this activity was regulated in Italy, 
even before the e privacy directive, under the rule of “previous consensus”. 
After a long debate, on 26 February 2004, the government introduced a law modifying the 
provisions in the personal data protection legislation for data retention for the purpose of 
crime detection. This has led to the introduction of a “minimum” data retention period of 24 
months for telephone traffic, which can be extended for another 24 months in the case of 
crimes against electronic systems and for information related to organised crime or terrorism. 
This period of retention is one of the longest in Europe. Operators have complained about the 
fact that they have to bear heavy costs for data storage. 
Premium rate services 
In June 2004 the Ministry of Communication drafted a decree aimed at preventing fraudulent 
abuse  of  PRS.  The  decree  foresees  the  same  regulation  of  voice  and  data  premium  rate 
services delivered on all kinds of fixed and mobile networks (including cable, TV, satellite, 
etc.). A price limit for each service (€ 12.25) and the possibility for the users to block the 
services if a threshold is reached (€ 50 or € 100) have been introduced. Mobile operators 
claim that the new regulation could create a barrier to the development of new multimedia and 
3G  mobile  services.  A  draft  ministerial  decree  has  been  submitted  to  the  European 
Commission for a preliminary evaluation; the analysis is still ongoing. 
Carrier pre-selection 
In August 2004, carrier pre selection (CPS) represented almost 15% of the total number of 
lines, with an increase of 100% since last year.  
Despite some AGCOM sanctions on the main telecom operators for unsolicited activations of 
carrier pre selection lines, in view of the great number of complaints to AGCOM the practice 
seems to be continuing, even if at a lower rate as in 2003. 
The current level of CPS prices is well above the average for comparable EU countries. Italy 
is among the few EU countries that imposes a surcharge on this service. One operator has 
challenged AGCOM’s approval of the 2002 RIO before the Court on the grounds of incorrect 
application of the cost orientation principle. The RIO 2005, which was published in October 
2004 by the incumbent, provides for a price reduction for the CPS activation fee of 19%. It is 
also understood that AGCOM is considering the elimination of the surcharge.   
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Consumer issues 
Consumers’  associations continue  to  denounce  an  alleged  general  lack  of  transparency  in 
contracts  and  in  commercial  offers  by  operators.  In  a  significant  number  of  cases  these 
contracts have been judged as fraudulent by the Civil Court. Since the beginning of 2003 
there has been an average of 1 000 complaints per month. The vast majority of the complaints 
concern unsolicited activation/deactivation of CPS services and the subscription to new tariffs 
schemes and services (mainly ADSL) without an explicit consent from customers. Under the 
national regulation, an operator guilty of slamming has to rectify the situation within three 
days and meet the relevant expenses. Nevertheless, very often penalties are not applied and 
reimbursement not made because of the difficulty in defining which operator is responsible 
for the problem.  
In December 2003, AGCOM set up a specific Consumers Complaints Unit with the task of 
simplifying the submission of complaints by customers and of encouraging operators to solve 
consumers problems, before activating the formal dispute resolution procedure (at September 
2004 about 2500 complaints had been solved promptly by operators without any dispute).  
Consumer associations also complain about the lack of transparency in mobile tariffs. As for 
the  transparency  of  calls  toward  ported  mobile  numbers,  a  special  free of charge number 
(456)  providing  information  on  the  name  of  the  called  mobile  network  was  recently 
introduced although it seems not to be sufficient to solve the problem. In 2003, consumer 
associations  brought  a  complaint  to  the  national  competition  authority  against  mobile 
operators for price collusion in the SMS market (currently at € 0.15).  
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CYPRUS 
TRANSPOSITION 
Cyprus has adopted two primary laws in 2004 – the Law on Electronic Communications and 
the modification of the 2002 Law on Radiocommunications – to transpose the new regulatory 
framework (NRF) and it has also introduced four pieces of secondary legislation in the field 
of  radiocommunications.  All  of  these  measures  have  been  notified  to  the  Commission. 
Cyprus, however, has not yet introduced the necessary secondary legislation for the Law on 
Electronic Communications. Although a large part of the secondary measures adopted on the 
basis of the 2002 Law on Telecommunications and Postal services remain valid until the entry 
into  force  of  the  new  secondary  legislation,  on  one  hand  these  measures  have  not  been 
notified to the Commission, and on the other they appear not to cover issues related to market 
analysis.  
The Cypriot authorities focussed in the period prior to accession on the starting conditions, 
and there accordingly appears to be little practical experience of the implementation of the 
NRF at this stage. In addition, given the need for the regulators to finalise drafting of the 
remaining transposition measures and to finalise implementation of the starting conditions, 
they have been unable to devote a significant amount of time to the application of the NRF, 
including market analysis. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
Competition appears very limited in the Cypriot electronic communications markets. New 
entrants in the fixed communications markets are mainly providing voice telephony services 
through  carrier  selection,  pre selection  and  via  calling  cards.  They  also  aim  to  provide 
services  for  the  purposes  of  accessing  the  internet  through  the  public  switched 
telecommunications  network,  but  due  to  the  current  pricing  system  which  markedly 
differentiates  both  on  the  wholesale  and  the  retail  level  between  voice  calls  and  calls  to 
ISPs
79, new entrants claim that there are obstacles for them to compete on this segment of the 
market. 
Although interconnection rates – to the extent that the service is available – are mostly lower 
than EU average, the incumbent still has a 96% market share in the fixed local and national 
calls market and 97% as regards international calls
80 This is likely to be a consequence of the 
very low margin available between retail and wholesale prices and the lack of certain types of 
services offered as part of interconnection. 
As far as the state of affairs on the broadband market is concerned, the incumbent possesses a 
100% market share with a 2% of population penetration rate. The underlying technology used 
for broadband is almost exclusively DSL. 
                                                 
79  The RIO of the incumbent defines different prices for voice calls and dial up calls, setting a higher price 
for the latter. The incumbent’s regulated retail prices are also different for voice calls and dial up calls 
but here the latter is set on a lower level. As a result of the system the retail prices for dial up calls are 
lower than the respective wholesale prices. 
80  Data on market shares reflects the situation as of September 2004.  
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The  second  mobile  operator  could  launch  its  operation  only  on  12  July  2004,  as  a 
consequence of the issuing of the second GSM licence at the end of 2003. The delay in 
opening the market for the second operator created a difficult situation for the newcomer as, 
by the time of its launch, the penetration rate in the mobile sector had reached 84% with, 
naturally, a 100% market share of the incumbent. 
In  these  circumstances  there  currently  seem  to  be  few  players  on  the  electronic 
communications  market  capable  of  establishing  a  customer  base  sufficient  to  ensure 
sustainable competition on the market. 
THE NRA 
The tasks of the National Regulatory Authority (NRA) are divided between two regulatory 
bodies  in  Cyprus.  The  Ministry  of  Communications  and  Works  (Ministry  of  C&W)  is 
responsible for granting and monitoring the rights of use of frequencies. This Ministry has a 
separate  department  –  the  Department  of  Electronic  Communications  –  dealing  with  the 
regulatory and policy issues regarding the sector. At the same time the Ministry of C&W 
coordinates the ownership rights in the 100% State owned incumbent within the Council of 
Ministers. Although the regulatory tasks are carried out by the separate department within the 
Ministry of C&W, that the Commission services are examining the extent to which the latter 
has sufficient functional independence from the body responsible for the ownership functions. 
The  Office  of  the  Commissioner  of  Electronic  Communications  and  Postal  Regulation 
(OCECPR)  is  responsible  for  all  other  regulatory  matters  and  is  empowered  to  issue 
regulations – subject to approval by the Council of Ministers – orders and decisions in relation 
to its tasks.  
The status of the incumbent 
The incumbent operator is not a corporate body but it is regarded as a ‘semi governmental 
organisation’. Its budget and possible other business ventures are approved by the Council of 
Ministers and the House of Representatives. At the same time the two regulatory bodies – the 
Ministry of C&W and the OCECPR– are also dependent on those institutions.  
Market analysis 
The market analysis procedure has not yet started. As regards the rules on market analysis, the 
primary law appears not to ensure that the OCECPR would withdraw its draft decision if the 
European Commission has decided to veto a specific national measure. The law lays down 
that detailed rules for the procedure will need to be adopted by the OCECPR. These pieces of 
secondary legislation have not yet been adopted. 
Starting conditions 
The overall liberalisation of the Cypriot electronic communications market was governed by 
the  2002  Telecommunications  and  Postal  Services  Law,  along  with  secondary  legislation 
which was adopted in 2002 2003. This legislative framework opened the Cypriot electronic 
communications markets to competition and also established a separate regulator, which was 
responsible for applying the law in all sectors of the market, with the exception of issues 
relating to frequencies. This framework introduced the main legislative instruments of the  
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1998 2000 EU regulatory framework. The full implementation of those tools is ongoing and 
still forms the major part of the current regulatory work in Cyprus.  
Both fixed and mobile number portability were implemented by the end of August 2004. 
However,  so  far  no  fixed  numbers  have  been  ported,  as  new  entrants  do  not operate  the 
necessary access infrastructure for providing this service. 
There appears to be a serious delay with the implementation of a proper cost accounting 
system – i.e. a system which is implemented in accordance with the Interconnection Directive 
– for the incumbent, despite several attempts at drawing up the system. The current practice of 
the incumbent in this field is still not audited either by the NRA or an external body and 
therefore it still has not been approved by the regulator. According to the current project plan 
the audit should have been completed by the end of November 2004.  
Further  concerns  can  be  identified  as  regards  the  implementation  of  other  important 
provisions of the old framework – such as the adoption of the Reference  Interconnection 
Offer (RIO) and Reference Unbundling Offer (RUO) of the incumbent. The level of prices 
and the structure of the conditions applied at the wholesale and at the retail level for voice and 
dial up traffic, combined with the high market share of the incumbent, suggest that there is 
little or no margin – such as in the case of calls to internet – for retail service providers to 
operate  in  the  market.  The  Competition  Commission  of  Cyprus,  which  is  currently 
investigating a possible price squeeze situation in the market, will have to decide whether it is 
more likely that this has come about as a result of regulatory decisions in relation to both 
wholesale  and  retail  prices  as  opposed  to  anti competitive  behaviour  on  behalf  of  the 
incumbent operator. The interconnection regime outlined in the RIO provides for only two 
points of interconnection where single transit interconnection is available – one for the region 
of  Nicosia  and  one  for  the  Limassol  area.  In  addition,  there  is  no  possibility  yet  to 
interconnect at a local level. The RIO does not ensure that the incumbent provides its pulses 
on top of the basic interconnection, making it difficult for entrants to sell their services e.g. to 
hotels – which are major customers in Cyprus – since their PBXs will not be able to bill their 
clients, as they do when subscribing to the voice telephony service of CYTA. According to 
information given by the OCECPR a review of the regime is under way. The Commission 
services  are  monitoring  these  issues  carefully  in  regard  to  there  conformity  with  the 
framework. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Secondary legislation 
The  Law  on  Electronic  Communications  empowers  the  OCECPR  to  issue  any  relevant 
secondary measure – regulation, order or a decision – which is needed for the proper exercise 
of the tasks assigned to it in law. There are a number of provisions in the law which already 
define the need to issue secondary measures in several fields: granting of individual rights of 
use for numbers; market analysis; universal service, in particular the financing of the service; 
access  and  interconnection;  minimum  elements  of  the  RUO;  consumer  protection  issues; 
dispute resolution; data gathering process; community consultation. The law also provides for 
a transitional provision which lays down that secondary legislation adopted on the basis of the 
previous law – intended to transpose the 1998 2000 regulatory framework – still applies until 
the secondary measures of the current law have been adopted. This fact, however, does not 
necessarily ensure that a number of instruments introduced in the NRF – for instance issues  
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related to market analysis and procedural requirements – are necessarily put in place. In the 
absence of the necessary secondary legislation the transposition of the NRF appears to be 
incomplete, and the Commission services will continue to follow this issue. 
Leased lines 
The country’s geographical situation could potentially give rise to possible market failures in 
the provision of international leased lines. International connectivity can be regarded as a 
bottleneck facility as the capacity is limited on the basis of the established submarine cables. 
(Other connections – such as satellite – cannot provide the same features for voice services as 
submarine cables.) The vast majority of available international connectivity – international 
half  circuits  –  appears  to  be  either  operated  or  rented  under  long  term  contracts  by  the 
incumbent. This could mean that the incumbent controls a large proportion of the available 
submarine cables, which are vital for any new entrant on the market. This situation presents 
serious obstacles to market entry and restricts the capacity for competition from those new 
entrants  that  have  managed  to  enter  the  market. Both  the  OCECPR  and  the  Competition 
Commission of Cyprus  have intervened on this issue, among others by including landing 
stations in the RIO and a provision on backhaul, and by regulating the price of half circuits to 
popular destinations. 
Mobile services 
As stated above, Cyprus issued the second GSM licence in October 2003 with a due date for 
commencement of operation on 1 May 2004. . However, owing to the continuing regulatory 
process, the new company was not able to start its operations until July 2004. This delay 
would seem to have favoured the incumbent. 
Through last October’s licensing process, a decision was made by the Ministry of C&W that 
the new entrant and the incumbent should be given the right to establish and operate 3G 
networks and offer  relevant services within a period of 10  years from  the date the GSM 
licences were issued. The conditions of the tender process have assured the two operators that 
there will not be a further granting of rights of use in this frequency band. According to the 
licences, this clause is to be evaluated in five years time or at the time when the new entrant 
gains 25% market share. This clause will need to be scrutinised by the Commission services 
for compliance with the Authorisation and the Competition Directives. 
The  Cypriot  authorities  are  in  the  process  of  transforming  these,  and  other,  licences  into 
general authorisations or rights of use for frequencies, in order to align them with the new 
framework. 
Building permits 
The lack of harmonisation in the field of acquisition of building permits is reported by new 
entrants  to  act  as  a  disincentive  to  enter  the  market,  particularly  for  mobile  telephony. 
According to the  current legal environment, the establishment of masts and placement of 
antennas requires permission from local authorities pursuant to the relevant town planning 
laws. The practice applied regarding this subject differs between local authorities and in many 
instances new entrants state that any person who wishes to establish any construction on a 
rooftop has to certify that all previous constructions were installed legally, which they regard 
as an entry barrier. Regarding the roll out of fixed infrastructure, operators also need permits 
from local authorities and/or the utility companies. The procedures to obtain permits from  
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local authorities are not harmonized, this issue has been raised by the OCECPR with other 
Government bodies. The Commission services are examining the above issues, including any 
possible questions of discrimination arising from any differences of treatment between the 
incumbent and new entrants.  
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LATVIA  
TRANSPOSITION 
Latvia’s new Electronic Communications Law (ECL) aiming to transpose the 2002 acquis 
was adopted by Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers in April 2004 and came into force on 
1 May of the same year. As of 1 October 2004 this law was still valid and legally binding. In 
that time it still remained to be adopted by the Latvian Parliament. A number of transposition 
issues  arising  from  the  ECL,  which  are  set  out  below,  remain  to  be  verified  by  the 
Commission services. The ECL provides a deadline of the end of October 2004 for adoption 
of secondary legislation. Part of the secondary legislation still remains to be adopted. The 
Commission  has  been  informed  that  the  Latvian  Parliament  adopted  the  Electronic 
Communications Law on 28 October 2004 in a new version if compared to that adopted by 
Regulations of the Cabinet of Ministers in April 2004. This law however has not yet entered 
into force and the text is not referred to for the purposes of this report. 
MARKET OVERVIEW  
Differences in the market situation exist between the capital Riga and rural areas in Latvia. 
Fixed line penetration stands at 25.6% of the population in July 2004. As of December 2003 
the fixed incumbent’s market share in the national fixed telephony market was 98.1% on local 
calls,  99.6%  on  long distance  calls  and  81.4%  on  international  calls  in  terms  of  retail 
revenues. Market share of the fixed incumbent operator in the leased lines market dropped to 
66% in terms of revenues at the beginning of 2004, as there are two other main competitors to 
the incumbent in this market. Fixed tariffs are not yet rebalanced and are regulated by means 
of a price cap. 
The fixed incumbent operator was established in 1994. 51% of the company is State owned, 
with 49% being held by a private consortium. The company provides voice and data services 
and is the designated universal service provider. The incumbent currently owns 23% of one of 
the mobile operators, in which the State also has a shareholding via the Ministry of Transport 
and  Communications  (the  Ministry).  Under  the  previous  law,  the  fixed  incumbent  was 
designated as an SMP operator in the markets for fixed voice telephony services, leased lines 
services and interconnection services.  
A  dispute  between  the  non State  shareholder  of  the  fixed  incumbent  and  the  Latvian 
Government was settled this year. The terms of this settlement remain confidential. In this 
dispute  the  non State  shareholder  of  the  fixed  incumbent  argued  that  a  later  date  for 
liberalisation  of  the  electronic  communications  sector  had  been  promised  by  the  Latvian 
Government at the stage of privatisation. The Latvian Government on the other hand argued 
that an earlier date had been promised by the non State shareholder for modernisation of the 
incumbent’s  network.  The  non State  shareholder  is  currently  considering  increasing  its 
shareholding in the fixed incumbent. 
There are two mobile network operators with 2G and 3G licences and one service provider 
which  provides  pre paid  services  through  leased  capacity  on  the  network  of  the  mobile 
operator  in  which  the  fixed  incumbent  has  its  shareholding.  The  mobile  penetration  rate 
stands at 62.7% as of September 2004. In terms of total number of customers, the mobile  
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network  operator  part owned  by  the  fixed  incumbent  has  a  42%  market share,  with  51% 
belonging to the other mobile network operator and 7% to the service provider referred to 
above.  Both  mobile  network  operators  were  granted  3G  licences  in  January  2003  with  a 
deadline for launching services of 31 December 2004, ensuring 30% of the population will be 
covered by the end of 2005. Roll out obligations require 45% of the population to be covered 
by the end of 2007. Both mobile network operators were designated under the previous law as 
having SMP in the national market for interconnection.  
Internet services are not regulated. Fixed broadband penetration is approximately 1.5% of the 
population as of July 2004. Of these, DSL services account for 79% and from remaining 21% 
of broadband services provided by other means, 30% are provided by cable modem. DSL 
services became available to business users in 2000. In July 2004 the fixed incumbent’s share 
of the broadband market was 80.9%.  
THE NRA 
The Public Utilities Commission (PUC) was established in 2001 as a unified regulatory body 
with oversight of the telecommunications, energy, railway and postal sectors. It is financed 
from regulatory fees paid by undertakings. Market players report problems related to lack of 
resources.  
The  Commission  services  are  examining  the  extent  to  which  the  rules  in  the  Framework 
Directive governing the provision of information from the NRA to the Commission as well as 
provision of information from the NRA to other NRAs in other Member States remains to be 
fully transposed in the law.  
It remains to be seen whether separation of the regulatory and ownership functions of the 
State has been achieved, as the Ministry of Transport and Communications is a direct 5% 
shareholder  in  the  mobile  network  operator  in  which  the  fixed  incumbent  also  has  its 
shareholding. The Ministry is also an indirect 23% shareholder in the same mobile operator, 
through a non profit making company in which the Ministry has a 100% shareholding. This 
non profit making company deals with broadcasting of radio and TV programmes and also 
provides radio communications services. The Ministry is responsible for the preparation of the 
legal  framework  which  includes  drafting  primary  law  and  submitting  draft  secondary 
legislation  to  the  Government  for  approval.  The  Ministry  also  determines  electronic 
communications  industry  development  policy  and  represents  the  Republic  of  Latvia  in 
international organizations.  
Market analysis 
PUC has not yet made publicly available its plans regarding market analysis under the new 
framework. It has stated that it sees some risks in a rapid transition to the new framework 
shortly  after  liberalisation.  The  current  law  appears  neither  to  indicate  a  timeframe  for 
carrying out market definition and analysis nor explicitly to transpose the requirement in the 
Framework Directive under which market analysis is to be carried out as soon as possible. 
The Commission services are examining whether the ECL transposes the rules governing 
national consultation and consultation with the Commission and other NRAs as contained in 
the Framework Directive.  
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STARTING CONDITIONS 
The market has been liberalised since January 2003 on the basis of the law transposing the 
1998/2000 acquis, which was in force until the end of April 2004. 
The  fixed  incumbent  has  published  a  reference  interconnection  offer.  Currently  11 
interconnection  agreements  have  been  concluded  between  the  fixed  incumbent  and  new 
entrants. SMP operators have an obligation to provide cost oriented interconnection charges 
using a fully distributed cost methodology adopted by PUC. LLU has been mandatory since 
1 May 2004 on the basis of a decision by PUC and a reference unbundling offer is available. 
One LLU agreement is currently being negotiated with a new market entrant. Regulation in 
the area of leased lines is conducted by way of approval of conditions and prices offered by 
the incumbent. 
Latvia has chosen a phased approach to the introduction of carrier selection and pre selection 
and terms for their provision are included in the licence of the fixed incumbent. The deadline 
for  full  implementation of  carrier  selection  is  1 January  2006,  while  the  deadline  for  full 
implementation of carrier pre selection is 1 July 2006.  
Number portability for both fixed and mobile numbers is planned to become available by 
1 December 2005. 
The ECL does not explicitly state that previous SMP obligations will remain in force until 
market analysis and review of obligations under the new law are completed. The ECL confers 
an obligation on PUC to prepare all regulations, guidelines, procedures and methodologies 
provided for in the law by the end of October 2004. Until that date the regulations, guidelines, 
procedures  and  methodologies  based  on  the  previous  law  apply,  as  long  as  these  do  not 
contravene the new law. PUC claims, however, that obligations issued by it, with respect to 
fixed telephony, leased lines and interconnection, will remain in force. Similarly PUC claims 
that specific requirements under the previous law, including the obligation of cost orientation 
and obligations related to provision of LLU, will remain in force until completion of market 
analysis and imposition of new remedies based on the ECL. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Policy objectives and regulatory principles  
The correct transposition of some policy objectives and regulatory principles in Article 8 of 
the Framework Directive is being looked into by the Commission. One of the examples in this 
respect  appears  to  be  the  principle  of  addressing  the  needs  of  specific  social  groups,  in 
particular disabled users. 
Access and interconnection 
Interconnection charges for call termination on the incumbent’s fixed network clearly exceed 
EU average if compared to these charges in those EU Member States for which these data are 
available (€ cents 2.53 per minute on single transit and € cents 5.93 per minute on double 
transit). The cost orientation of the fixed incumbent’s interconnection charges remains to be 
examined  by  the  NRA.  Interconnection  charges  are  among  the  main  sources  of  tensions 
between the incumbent and new entrants.  
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The  correct  transposition  of  the  rule  in  Article  3  of  the  Access  Directive  under  which 
undertakings requesting access or interconnection do not need to be authorised in Latvia when 
requesting  such  access  or  interconnection  (if  they  are  not  providing  services  and  are  not 
operating a network in Latvia), needs to be verified. The same applies for the powers of the 
NRA to impose obligations on non SMP operators, as referred to in Article 5 of the Access 
Directive,  and  whether  the  law  provides  the  possibility  to  the  NRA  in  exceptional 
circumstances to impose other access or interconnection obligations than those listed in the 
Access  Directive  on  operators  with  significant  market  power,  with  the  approval  of  the 
Commission. 
With regard to the imposition of SMP obligations, the principle that these obligations need to 
be based on the nature of the problem identified, proportionate and justified in the light of the 
regulatory  objectives  requires  clarification.  Whether  the  ECL  makes  sufficiently  clear  the 
discretion of the NRA to choose and impose SMP remedies as it considers appropriate, in the 
event of its finding that an undertaking has SMP, requires verification. 
It  remains  unclear  whether  the  obligation  of  transparency  under  Article  9  of  the  Access 
Directive, as one of the SMP remedies available to the NRA to be imposed at the wholesale 
level, has been fully transposed. 
Frequency management 
An issue of debate has arisen regarding the scope of the service licences issued in 2003 for the 
provision of public mobile services in the 450 MHz frequency band. These licences became 
available in Latvia after the mobile operator which is part owned by the fixed incumbent 
ceased to offer analogue mobile services (NMT 450) in that band. Two new market entrants 
therefore applied for and were granted authorisation to provide public mobile services in the 
band. The authorisations were formulated in a technologically neutral manner. However, due 
to an amendment to the frequency table by the Ministry in the first half of 2004, the use of the 
450 MHz frequency band became limited to either NMT 450 or narrowband TETRA. Thus 
the use of other technologies in this band appears to be excluded. The Ministry has expressed 
the view that no valid frequency table has existed in Latvia since 1 May 2004, on the basis 
that the previous frequency table (which restricted the use of the 450 MHz band) was repealed 
by  the  new  Electronic  Communications  Law  and  no  new  frequency  table  has  yet  been 
adopted. In the meantime the Ministry is currently applying the “ITU First Region Frequency 
Plan” which does not contain any limitation on the use of the 450 MHz band. 
Numbering 
During the first year of liberalisation approximately 10% of numbering resources were re 
distributed and allocated to new market entrants. A potential shortage of numbering resources, 
particularly for the future development of mobile voice telephony services, has been identified 
by the Latvian regulator as a risk.  
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Universal service  
The scope of universal service is defined by the regulator. Currently there appears to be no 
universal service funding scheme effectively in place. The correct transposition of several 
provisions  of  the  Universal  Service  Directive  requires  verification  by  the  Commission 
services. These include: the rules relating to the costing and financing of universal service 
obligations under Articles 12 and 13 of the Universal Service Directive. The principle that no 
undertaking  should  be  a  priori  excluded  from  being  designated  as  a  universal  service 
provider; the scope of the universal service, in particular with regard to provision of access at 
a fixed location, directory enquiry services and directories and public pay telephones, as well 
as  special  measures  for  disabled  users;  provisions  applicable  to  carrier  selection  and  pre 
selection facilities; the conditions governing the imposition of SMP obligations at the retail 
level   that is the absence of effective competition and the insufficiency of wholesale remedies 
or  carrier  selection  and  pre selection  (Article  17  of  the  Universal  Service  Directive);  the 
requirements relating to the implementation of appropriate cost accounting systems and the 
verification of compliance therewith, in the event of retail tariff regulation; rules applicable to 
transparency  and  publication  of  information,  quality  of  service,  integrity  of  the  network, 
operator  assistance  and  directory  enquiry  services  and  access  by  end users  from  other 
Member States to non geographic numbers; and Article 30 of the Universal Service Directive 
dealing with number portability. 
Carrier pre selection is not yet available and carrier selection is only available, to at least 
some end users, for international calls. Neither fixed nor mobile number portability have yet 
been implemented.  
Authorisations 
Under the ECL, PUC has until the end of January 2005 to adjust the rights and obligations 
deriving from licences which existed before the new law came into effect and which are not 
compliant with the new law.  
The  correct  transposition  of  several  provisions  of  the  Authorisations  Directive  is  being 
examined  by  the  Commission.  These  include:  the  rule  under  which  the  use  of  radio 
frequencies does not necessarily have to be subject to the grant of individual rights of use; 
rules on the time limits for making decisions on rights of use of numbers and frequencies, as 
well as on the conditions which may be attached to these rights of use in accordance with the 
Annex to the Authorisation Directive; and the rules applicable to the amendment of rights of 
use. 
Under the ECL, conditions which may be attached to general authorisations include special 
requirements  for  undertakings  with  SMP,  which  raise  questions  of  conformity  with  the 
Authorisation Directive. 
ePrivacy  
Further  clarification  is  needed  with  respect  to  the  rules  applicable  to  confidentiality  of 
communications  and  unsolicited  communications  under  the  ePrivacy  Directive.  The  full 
transposition  of  the  rules  applicable  to  traffic  data  in  the  ePrivacy  Directive  needs  to  be 
verified.  
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LITHUANIA 
TRANSPOSITION 
The Law on Electronic Communications transposing the 2002 EU regulatory framework on 
electronic  communications  came  into  force  on  1  May  2004.  In  addition  to  the  Law  on 
Electronic  Communications,  certain  provisions  are  transposed  by  the  Law  on  Common 
Emergency Centre (transposes Art. 26 of the Universal Service Directive and Art. 10 (b) of 
the E privacy directive) that came into force on 1 September 2004.  
There  are  more  than  50  pieces  of  secondary  legislation  related  to  the  Law  on  Electronic 
Communications. Most of these are secondary acts that were already adopted on the basis of 
the  previous  Law  on  Telecommunications  and  that  need  only  minor  amendments.  The 
majority of the secondary acts are adopted by the Communications Regulatory Authority of 
the Republic of Lithuania (the RRT). By the end of July 2004, the RRT had published several 
draft rules that were open for public comments. These  concerned market analysis, public 
consultations, 3G licensing rules, terms of tender for setting up of a central data base for 
number portability and for introduction of LRAIC in fixed networks, procedures related to the 
imposition of economic sanctions on undertakings failing to comply with the requirements of 
the  Law on Electronic  Communications and secondary legislation. Regulations on market 
analysis procedures and public consultations, as well as procedures for imposing economic 
sanctions were approved by the director of RRT in September 2004.  
As regards the newly adopted Law on Electronic Communications, this is currently under 
examination by the Commission services. Generally, market players seem to be positive about 
the final outcome but appear to be concerned about two issues, the very broad powers of RRT 
and the fact that, in some cases, the remedies that may be imposed by the RRT are not clearly 
defined, although they understand that such flexibility may stem from the new EU framework. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The Lithuanian telecommunications market has been expanding quite rapidly in recent years. 
In 2003 the electronic communications sector, in terms of revenues, was worth approximately 
€ 580 million and is growing strongly. The sector is dominated by mobile telephony. At the 
end of June 2004 the fixed penetration rate was 24% and the mobile penetration rate was 
79%.  
As  the  fixed  market  is  liberalised  only  as  of  1 January  2003,  the  incumbent  (the  state’s 
shareholding  is  only  5.93%;  with  SMP  status  in  the  public  fixed  telephony  market,  the 
national interconnection market and the leased lines) still holds approximately 97% of the 
market. By 1 July 2004 RRT had received 38 notifications from new entities about their 
intentions to start business in fixed market, but 21 actually have started their activities. It is 
interesting to note that the biggest mobile operator has also entered the fixed market in 2003 
and acquired by the end of 2003 1.09% of the market in terms of originated minutes, while the 
rest of the new providers have 1.91%. By the end of June 2004 all new service providers held 
3.3% of the fixed market in terms of originated minutes. The arrival of new entrants on the 
fixed market has already triggered positive changes. The fixed incumbent has lowered some  
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prices  substantially  (e.g.  local  calls  off peak  time,  national  calls  off peak  time,  fixed to 
mobile calls peak time and off peak time, international calls). 
There are three major mobile operators in Lithuania, who all hold 2G licenses However, by 
July 2004 RRT had received 27 notifications of intentions to start activities in the mobile 
sector.  Currently  four  mobile  virtual  network  operators  (MVNO)  actually  operate  in  the 
mobile market using infrastructure of the second largest mobile operator. In terms of revenues 
they had a share of 1.13% of the market by the end of 2003. In the beginning of 2003, RRT 
designated the largest mobile operator as having SMP in public mobile telephony and national 
interconnection  markets  and  the  second  largest  mobile  operator  in  the  public  mobile 
telephony market. Both of the mobile operators lodged appeals against such decisions to the 
administrative court. In August 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court repealed the RRT’s 
decision with regard to the largest mobile operator and rejected the appeal of the second 
largest operator. This gave rise to the unusual situation where the largest mobile operator did 
not have SMP status, but the second largest one did. Based on the application submitted by 
the second largest operator, the Supreme Administrative Court decided to reopen proceedings 
in  the  above  mentioned  case  and  on  20 February  2004  issued  a  decision  abolishing  the 
decisions of RRT on the SMP obligations imposed on the second largest mobile operator 
under the Law on Telecommunications.  
No 3G licences have been issued in Lithuania so far (except a non commercial permit for the 
largest mobile operator to use UMTS frequencies for trial). In 2004, RRT published for public 
consultation a draft strategy on issuing 3G licences. This suggests issuing three licences, with 
some spectrum being set aside for the future. Operators have stated their opinion that the roll 
out requirements are too stringent. They have also pointed out that there are suggestions that 
RRT would like to use retail prices as one of the criteria when awarding licences.  
There are 70 Internet service providers in Lithuania. In 2003 the fixed incumbent had a share 
of 53% of the internet market in terms of revenues (50.1% as of 30 June 2004), the largest 
mobile operator – 10%, the second largest mobile operator   8% and all other ISPs 29%. The 
largest  share  on  the  ADSL  market  is  held  by  the  fixed  incumbent  (93.4%  of  all  DSL 
subscriptions). It should be noted that residential charges are still rather high which has led to 
a  low  residential  internet  access  penetration  rate  (about  8  Internet  subscribers  per 
100 inhabitants; 30% of the Lithuanian population made use of Internet access during the last 
half  year),  although  recently  the  incumbent  has  offered  rather  substantial  discounts  (e.g. 
installation free of charge and discount on monthly charges) for those wishing to get ADSL 
access. At the same time it should be noted that cable TV companies have become more 
active in the broadband sector. The general number of broadband communications subscribers 
has  increased  by  135%  within  one  year  since  July  2003.  By  July  2004  the  broadband 
penetration rate was 2.6%. 
It  also  appears  that,  in  May  2004,  the  Ministry  of  Internal  Affairs  adopted  a  decision 
nominating a 100% state owned company as the sole operator of the secure data transmission 
network  used  by  state  institutions,  whereas  such  exclusive  rights  would  cover  data 
transmission services as well as telephony services, public key infrastructure, etc. No public 
tender procedures appear to be carried out before selecting this company.  
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In 2004, five new entrant companies, who mainly provide fixed and value added services or 
who  are  virtual  mobile  operators,  formed  an  Association  of  Telecommunication  Service 
Providers. This is a second association of telecommunication service providers besides the 
existing INFOBALT association. The representatives of the new association have pointed out 
that their biggest concerns are high mobile termination prices, reluctance of mobile network 
operators to negotiate interconnection agreements, and that there is no obligation to provide 
carrier selection for mobile services.  
THE NRA 
The RRT is an independent state institution that was established in May 2001. At the end of 
2003, RRT had 135 employees (there are plans to increase this to 150 by the end of 2004 and 
to 160 by the end of 2005) and five regional offices. The current administrative capacity of 
RRT  is  regarded  as  relatively  satisfactory,  however  some  strengthening  will  facilitate  the 
carrying out of the new tasks relating to market analysis procedures The RRT seems to have 
an appropriate level of independence, both from market players (the shareholding of state 
enterprises  is  administered  by  the  State  Property  Fund)  and  political  influence.  RRT  is 
financed from the state budget and revenues from administrative charges paid by operators. In 
general, RRT is vested with appropriate powers to regulate electronic communication markets 
effectively. However, it should be noted that, in theory, legal acts adopted by RRT may be 
abolished by decision of the Government on the ground that they contradict the Lithuanian 
Constitution,  laws,  Governmental  decrees  and  ordinances  of  the  Prime  Minister.  This 
provision, established in the Law on the Government, is applicable, not only to the RRT’s 
legal acts, but to those of all governmental institutions. On the other hand, to date there is no 
mechanism  for  implementation  of  such  discretion  by  the  Government  which  has  never 
attempted to use it. Review of the legality of adopted legal acts is performed by administrative 
courts.  
Concerning co operation between the RRT and the National Competition Council, there seem 
to  be  some  inconsistencies  between  the  Law  on  Competition  and  the  Law  on  Electronic 
Communications as regards exchange of confidential information between the RRT and the 
National Competition Council. The Law on Electronic Communications seems to authorise 
such exchange of information and the Law on Competition may be interpreted to prevent it 
with the exception of sharing such information with the EU Commission.  
The attitude of market players towards RRT in general seems to be positive. RRT usually 
appears to consult widely with market players and seems to try to take into account submitted 
comments when adopting decisions. On the other hand, RRT is said to lack experience and 
administrative resources. In some cases, RRT is also said to set time limits that are too short 
for submission of comments and to be slow in resolving issues.  
Appeal mechanism 
The legal acts adopted by RRT or the non adoption thereof may be appealed against in court, 
whereas,  according  to  the  law,  filing  of  such  an  appeal  generally  does  not  suspend  the 
implementation of the appealed legal act, except in cases where the court is entitled under the 
law to decide otherwise. However, in practice there have been problems that administrative 
courts quite often suspend implementation of RRT’s decisions concerning various issues (e.g. 
designation of SMP and imposition of ex ante obligations) until the ruling on substance is 
given. When deciding to suspend RRT’s decisions the court does not explore any possible  
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consequences of such suspension to the competitive environment and consumers, and there 
have been cases in which the court has even refused to take into account relevant practice of 
other EU Member States, or relevant provisions of the EU law. This approach, if continued, 
may cause problems in the future, although in its recent practice, the Supreme Administrative 
Court has started to refer to EU law and to substantiate its decisions.  
Market analysis 
RRT adopted rules on market analysis on 17 September 2004 after review of suggestions 
from market players and started market analysis on 30 September 2004. Priority markets for 
market analysis are fixed and mobile termination, transit, leased lines, access to local loops, 
access and call origination. First notifications to the EU Commission are expected in the first 
quarter of 2005.  
STARTING CONDITIONS 
The telecommunications market in Lithuania was fully liberalised as of 1 January 2003, when 
major  amendments  to  the  Law  on  Telecommunications  of  1998,  fully  implementing  the 
1998/2000 EU regulatory framework, came into force. Prior to that date the incumbent had 
exclusive rights with regard to provision of public fixed telephone services and networks. All 
the tools necessary to ensure competition (i.e. sufficient powers of the national regulatory 
authority,  number  portability,  carrier  selection  and  pre selection,  local loop  unbundling, 
access  and  interconnection,  possibility  to  impose  SMP  obligations  on  operators)  were 
formally in place, however, provisions on number portability and carrier pre selection came 
into force only as of 1 January 2004. At the same time, provisions on a reference offer for 
local loop unbundling came into force at the beginning of 2003, but did not appear to be fully 
implemented in practice. In some fields, the Law on Telecommunications went further than 
was required under the 1998/2000 framework and abolished the requirement to obtain an 
individual  licence  in  order  to  engage  in  certain  telecommunications  activities.  The 
introduction of such a system already proved to be very useful for eliminating the barriers to 
new players to enter the market, especially in the field of fixed and mobile telephony.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Access-Interconnection 
The  fixed  incumbent  published  both  a  RIO  and  RUO  in  January  and  February  2003 
respectively. RRT evaluated the RIO and indicated that interconnection prices were not cost 
oriented and competitive, and requested provision of additional information. After the fixed 
incumbent  failed  to  prove  that  interconnection  prices  were  cost  based,  RRT  established 
ceilings for the incumbent’s interconnection prices on 20 November 2003. The incumbent did 
not appeal the said decision. Some operators have, however, indicated that the prices set by 
RRT do not seem to be competitive in the local market. RRT finished the review of the RUO 
in March 2003 and also ordered some amendments. The prices in the RUO are under the EU 
average, but are still regarded to be uncompetitive by the alternative operators and so far no 
local loops seem to be unbundled; however the fixed incumbent provides bit stream access 
(2249 lines, 17 operators as of 1 July 2004).  
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Carrier selection and pre-selection, number portability  
Carrier  selection  is  available  as  of  1 January  2003  and  carrier  pre selection  and  number 
portability as of 1 January 2004. So far, 23 operators have received their access codes and 12 
of  these  use  access  codes  for  provision  of  voice  telephony  services.  Some  alternative 
operators also have their own geographical numbers.  
At  the  moment,  mobile  number  portability  is  provided  on  a  call  forwarding  basis  and 
operators have pointed out that the regulations of RRT do not seem to be clear enough on how 
to  implement  the  number  portability  in  practice  and  that  this  has  caused  some  disputes 
between the operators. As a consequence, some of the operators are not providing the full 
variety of services (e.g. SMS forwarding). In general, however, mobile number portability 
seems  to  work  quite  smoothly  (as  of  1  August  2004  there  were  13 000  ported  mobile 
numbers), although the smaller new entrant companies pointed out that number portability 
procedures sometimes take almost up to one month. As of 1 January 2005, mobile number 
portability should be provided on the basis of a central database established and managed by 
an entity independent from the operators. RRT has already started preparations for setting up 
the said database and has launched an open tender in order to select the administrator of the 
database.  
Price caps  
In December 2003 RRT awarded to a radio and TV company, a permit granting the right to 
use radio frequencies for the provision of fixed wireless access networks and services and 
establishing, amongst other things, an obligation for the company to observe retail price caps 
on a whole range of services (internet services, digital leased lines, public fixed telephony 
services, etc.). In August 2004 the Commission sent a letter to RRT pointing out that such 
retail  pricing  obligations  could  be  regarded  as  contradictory  to  various  principles  of  the 
regulatory framework (e.g. requirement to impose ex ante regulatory obligations on the basis 
of  a  market  analysis  and  a  finding  of  SMP;  conditions  that  can  be  attached  to  a  general 
authorisation) and inviting RRT’s comments on the issue raised. In its letter of September 
2004, RRT responded that the permit was granted on the basis of a public tender and the 
business plan, including the list of variety of services to be provided and the list of the retail 
prices of these services, was one of the significant criteria for rating the bids. The response 
further stated that, in RRT’s opinion, such criteria are justified and reasonable, as the aim of 
the tender was to select a service provider who would use the limited resources for the highest 
overall benefit for society as a whole, incl. at the lowest possible consumer prices. No initial 
retail  prices  were  included  in  the  tender  conditions  and  the  prices  proposed  by  service 
providers were evaluated during the tender process. The prices included in the permit can 
therefore be regarded as prices which the successful bidder committed to apply in the course 
of  the  tender  proceedings  and  are  applicable  only  to  the  services  provided  by  using  the 
frequencies  granted  by  the  permit.  RRT  is  of  the  opinion  that  the  permit  issued  is  in 
compliance with the EU regulatory framework and that, if they were to amend the conditions 
of the permit, the other market players who participated or would have participated in the 
tender would be discriminated against. The Commission services are still looking into this 
issue.  
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LUXEMBOURG 
TRANSPOSITION 
Luxembourg has failed to transpose the new framework on electronic communications. The 
Commission  has  already  made  a  formal  application  to  the  Court  of  Justice  asking  it  to 
condemn Luxembourg, at the end of the infringement proceeding started in October 2003, for 
failing  to  communicate  the  necessary  transposition  measures  for  the  Directives.  The 
Luxembourg government did in fact propose draft legislation to the Luxembourg Parliament 
in July 2003, but as the formal consultations of various chambers and the Conseil d’Etat were 
only initiated at that time, the consultative process has meant that no discussion has taken 
place in parliament. The package of draft legislation consists of a main draft law on electronic 
communications,  a  draft  law  reorganising  the  NRA,  the  Institut  Luxembourgeois  de 
Régulation (ILR), and other measures on data protection and on spectrum management.  
In  May  2004,  the  Conseil  d’Etat  issued  its  opinion  on  the  draft  laws  on  electronic 
communications and on the ILR. This resulted in the government issuing amendments to its 
proposals  on  30 June  and  22 July,  which  in  turn  required  further  opinions  of the  Conseil 
d’Etat  that  were  issued  on  12  and  26 October  respectively.  The  Luxembourg  Parliament 
started its work on 19 October 2004; fifteen months after the government had submitted its 
drafts, by nominating “rapporteurs” for the proposals. The examination of the proposals in 
parliamentary committee is scheduled for early December 2004. 
The draft law appears to follow closely the text of the Directives, and it must be noted that 
significant elements of the existing legislation, for example in relation to frequencies and 
numbers, will not require modification. However, the key elements of the new framework, 
particularly regarding the market analysis procedure and the powers of the NRA to impose the 
appropriate remedies, must await adoption of the draft transposition law and a certain number 
of secondary measures afterwards. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
With mobile penetration growing by a further 6% in Luxembourg in 2003 2004, to reach 98% 
according to estimations by consultants, the mobile market is the biggest and most dynamic 
part of the electronic communications sector in Luxembourg. The mobile sector represents 
61% of the total telecommunications market in terms of value, the second highest proportion 
in the EU25. There are just two GSM/DCS network operators, each of which also controls a 
service provider, the subsidiary of the incumbent controlling 49% of the retail market, the 
second operator controlling 36% while a third service provider has 15% of the market. On the 
fixed market, the incumbent operator, which is wholly owned by the State, has 85% of the 
voice telephony market (local and national calls) by minutes, and 76% of international calls. 
Despite  the  importance  of  high  speed  services  to  the  business  sector  in  Luxembourg, 
broadband penetration is still relatively low, and residential broadband  has not developed 
significantly, in part due to the very high prices for high speed Internet access, and the lack of 
competitive bitstream or unbundling offers to other operators. The incumbent has 82% of the 
broadband market, including 73.5% of the DSL market, but this share has decreased from  
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83.7% year previously, and many of the retail lines operated by other operators are in fact 
resale lines based on the incumbent’s network offering. 
THE NRA 
The “Institut Luxembourgeois de Regulation” is the NRA in Luxembourg possessing most of 
the  responsibilities  associated  with  regulation  of  the  market,  and  this  situation  should  be 
confirmed by the new draft laws transposing the new regulatory framework, once adopted. 
The question of the staffing resources of the ILR has continued to be raised by operators. 
While once off financial resources have been allocated for carrying out the first round of 
market analyses, the staff of the ILR itself is not increasing. This would require the allocation 
of  civil  service  posts,  but  this in  itself  represents  another  problem  as,  in  the  specific  job 
market  of  Luxembourg,  the  legal,  economic  or  technical  expertise  may  not  be  available 
nationally. A potentially serious problem is therefore created by the fact that, as the ILR is 
responsible for frequency management, employment in the ILR is considered to be of national 
interest and therefore only open to Luxembourg citizens. 
A law has recently been adopted creating a new competition authority in Luxemburg. While 
this authority has yet to become operational, it is hoped that this will mark a more active and 
effective  monitoring  of  competition  law  issues  which  have  been  lacking  in  the 
telecommunications and electronic communications sector. This is particularly important as 
the ILR has tended, under the old framework, to restrict its intervention to a very narrow role 
in regard to the regulation of tariffs on an individual basis. Operators are hoping that there 
will be close co operation between the two authorities, and that the new competition authority 
will tackle issues of alleged price squeeze, and the practise of bundling of regulated and 
unregulated services in retail packages. 
Because of the particularities of the Luxembourg market, as could be expected, the expertise 
contracted by the ILR to assist with the market analysis procedure, or for the cost accounting 
and cost separation issues (see below) often comes from external consultants from other EU 
countries. The incumbent has expressed the sentiment that the unique position of Luxembourg 
is not always taken into consideration, both in terms of its size as well as the presence of some 
international operators who may be able to exert market power on the basis of their position 
on other markets and their customer base. However, the fact that this expertise will be used in 
the context of a national market analysis carried out by the NRA should, in the view of the 
ILR, ensure that the specific market situation in Luxembourg will be taken fully into account. 
Dispute resolution 
In the period before the entry into force of the new transposition law, the ILR has appeared 
reluctant  to  intervene  on  regulatory  issues,  including  in  cases  where  its  intervention  is 
requested by an operator over an interconnection dispute. New entrants have raised a large 
number  of  issues  with  regard  to  the  competitive  behaviour  of  the  incumbent  in  relation 
particularly to interconnection and unbundling, but very few of these issues have actually 
been  addressed  by  the  ILR.  This  situation  is  created  by  the  apparent  reluctance  of  new 
entrants to bring disputes formally before the ILR, either because they are unaware of the 
formal procedures required or because the ILR’s attention has been focused on ensuring that 
regulated tariffs reflect cost, but not on the many issues of technical conditions and service 
level agreements which are needed to allow operators to offer services competitively on the  
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basis of those wholesale products. At the same time there is considerable doubt as to whether 
the ILR has the power, under the old law in force until transposition of the new framework, to 
intervene  on  its  own  initiative.  Following  one  decision  taken  in  2002,  only  one  dispute 
resolution decision was taken in 2003, where the ILR rejected the complaint of an operator 
concerning an interconnection agreement with the incumbent operator, on the basis that it 
concerned a commercial agreement on a non regulated market (bitstream access) and that 
there was no breakdown in negotiations. 
Market Analysis 
In  light  of  its  own  resources,  the  ILR  has  conducted  a  public  call  for  tender  for  expert 
assistance in the conduct of the market analysis. The consultants will assist the ILR in the 
preparatory phase and collection of data, the analysis itself, and the preparation of the national 
and EU consultations. The consultants will also be on standby for technical assistance in cases 
where the ILR’s decisions may be subject to appeal. 
The contract also provides for the training and technology transfer to allow the ILR to develop 
the legal and economic expertise in house so that it will be able to carry out the full market 
analysis procedure in house over time. 
The market analysis procedure cannot start formally until the transposition laws have been 
adopted  and  will  take  between  six  and  nine  months  to  complete.  This  situation  is  not 
satisfactory to any of the interested parties, given that the incumbent believes that it is put at a 
disadvantage by the fact that its SMP obligations carried over from the old framework cannot 
yet  be  reviewed,  while  other  operators  would  appear  to  view  the  market  analysis  as  an 
opportunity  to  impose  some  of  the  remedies  required  to  tackle  the  incumbent’s  market 
position, particularly in regard to bitstream access and unbundling. Given the very restrictive 
approach adopted by the ILR in regard to obligations under the old regulatory framework, 
where it focused on tariff controls in relation to SMP obligations, there is certainly scope for a 
comprehensive review of what remedies may be necessary in each of the markets set out in 
the Recommendation. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Mobile services 
While the mobile (2G) market has been a dynamic growth sector, the deployment of 3G has 
been  seriously  affected  in  Luxembourg  by  the  growing  legal  obstacles  to  the  erection  of 
mobile  antennae,  and  legal threats  to  existing  ones.  Growing  opposition  from  individuals 
opposed to the deployment of such antennae has led to a series of court rulings which created 
jurisprudence  regarding  the  construction  of  masts  in  the  context  of  existing  Luxembourg 
planning law. These rulings have led to a situation where GSM or 3G antennae cannot be 
constructed unless they were expressly identified in the development plan of the commune in 
which it is to be sited, and there is now huge pressure on local authorities not to insert them in 
these plans. Furthermore, the law must now be interpreted to restrict the erection of antennae 
to certain zones. Not only does this affect the development of 3G but existing GSM antennae 
are  also  under  threat;  the  government  has  sought  to  clarify  the  situation  by  encouraging 
communes to include antennae in their plans, but so far to little avail.  
EN  159    EN 
In October 2004, one 3G licence holder (which was not present in the 2G market) formally 
returned its licence and stated that it was leaving the Luxembourg market. On the other hand, 
one 3G operator has launched its service commercially, covering 70% of the territory and 
80%  of  the  population.  Unlike  other  MS  where  tests  or  commercial  services  have  been 
launched, this service is for residential customers rather than business users. 
The mobile penetration rate, at approximately 98%, is one of the highest in the EU. Some 
questions have been raised about the accuracy of such figures, as the total penetration rate is 
considerably  higher  than  the  Luxembourg  population,  but  can  be  partly  explained  by  the 
significant  number  of  transfrontier  workers  that  commute  to  Luxembourg  from  bordering 
Member  States  (over  100  000).  Some  of  these  transfrontier  workers  have  taken  mobile 
subscriptions in Luxembourg and the penetration rate reported above attempts to take account 
of this phenomenon. Nevertheless, it would appear that there is a need to establish a standard 
definition for counting active clients, as the two GSM operators apply no benchmark or rule 
in counting active subscriptions. 
Mobile  operators  are  on  the  point  of  introducing  effective  mobile  number  portability  in 
November. The system for swapping numbers was designed by consultants on the basis of a 
call for tender form the ILR, which is being paid for by the operators themselves. 
Access and Interconnection 
There have been continuing problems with the conformity of Luxembourg’s approach to cost 
accounting and accounting separation in the incumbent. There are two cases taken by the 
Commission against Luxembourg that are currently before the Court of Justice concerning 
cost accounting. The incumbent did not implement the guidelines of the ILR regarding cost 
accounting. Despite the issuing of administrative sanctions, it has continued to fail to meet its 
responsibilities, and the Commission’s infringement proceedings against Luxembourg relate 
to the fact that the authorities have not carried out the requisite verification of the incumbent’s 
cost accounting system. 
The process for approval of the reference offer of the incumbent has not improved over the 
last two years. There is little transparency in the manner in which the RIO is drawn up or 
approved, and the ILR does not give explanations on the structure of the offer. It has informed 
some operators that it is not competent to examine issues such as a potential price squeeze 
between services in the RIO and retail tariffs of the incumbent. Furthermore, in a situation 
where the 2002 catalogue was only approved in September 2003, the draft 2003 RIO was only 
made available in April 2003 and only approved in December 2003, there is little value to 
new entrants in relation to business planning, and they cannot make appeals to the ILR about 
interconnection or access conditions while the RIO is still in draft form. The RIO 2004 had 
not been approved by the ILR as of 30 September 2004. These lacunae in what has been the 
basic tool for market opening in other Member States will hopefully  be addressed in the 
market analysis. 
Given  the  problems  with  obliging  the  incumbent  to  introduce  accounting  separation,  the 
tariffs in the 2002 and 2003 RIOs have been checked against financial models developed by 
consultants on the ILR’s behalf. This has at least allowed the ILR to identify if proposed 
tariffs fit within a certain margin. In the course of 2004 there have been signs of progress 
from the incumbent’s auditors that the separate accounting system and cost model are close to 
finalisation, and the ILR hopes to be able to have a 2005 reference offer based on this new 
model. The first element of the work – the “separation des metiers – was presented to the ILR  
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in  late  September.  The  work  on  separating  the  business  divisions  within  the 
telecommunications will not be ready before 2005. 
As well as a new Reference Unbundling Offer (see below), the incumbent has developed, at 
the  ILR’s  behest,  a  separate  reference  offer  for  co location,  which  covers  the  practical 
delivery of interconnection as well as unbundling services. A formal consultation on this offer 
ended in September 2003, but the offer will probably not be finalised until end 2004.  
Broadband  
There is no effective bitstream product available in Luxembourg. The incumbent has stated 
that it is technically complicated and the ILR has confirmed that there is not a coherent ATM 
network that would allow a full bitstream product to be provided. The IP DSL product on 
offer to ISPs and other operators does not allow a differentiation from the retail offer of the 
incumbent and its subsidiaries, and is effectively a resale product. Nevertheless, there has 
been a 146% growth in retail broadband lines, albeit from a very low base, between July 2003 
and July 2004, and new entrants retail market share has increased by over 10%. 
In these circumstances there has been considerable pressure for unbundling to be effectively 
implemented, but the conditions established in the incumbent’s reference unbundling offer 
(RUO) did not allow this to happen. A new draft offer was made available in the summer of 
2004, but the price levels have stayed very close to those established four years ago, and the 
average monthly total cost for unbundling (full or shared access) is the second highest in the 
21 Member States for which data is available. Given that in the same period the incumbent’s 
retail DSL product has dropped by 60%, it is very difficult for other operators to establish a 
margin, and the tariffs are very high compared to the EU average. Nevertheless, two operators 
are  trying  to  develop  (full)  unbundling  in  order  to  compete  with  the  incumbent  on  the 
broadband internet access market, and to develop triple play products. The new reference 
offer has not been approved by the ILR. 
The ILR is taking steps to allow the development of VoIP services. A consultation meeting 
was  held  with  operators  in  mid September  2004,  and  the  ILR  is  freeing  up  [geographic] 
numbering blocks for use in IP telephony. 
Data Protection 
The  Commission  still  has  two  infringement  cases  against  Luxembourg  under  the  old 
regulatory framework. While it is hoped that the new draft law will soon be adopted, and 
should overcome some of the problems encountered, the fact is that there has not been a 
proper  system  in  place  in  Luxembourg  for  the  specific  protection  of  personal  data  in 
telecommunications  [and  no  agency  is  specifically  responsible  for  data  protection  in 
electronic communications].  
Rights of way  
As well as the developments referred to above concerning the erection of mobile antennae, 
there are continuing problems with the conditions for the granting of rights of use of the 
public  domain  in  railways  and  motorways.  More  than  one  year  after the  European  Court 
judgement of 12 June 2003, it appears that the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg is still failing to 
fulfil its obligations under the old Services Directive, by not clearly defining the authority in 
charge of granting rights of ways and not ensuring the absence of possible discrimination. The  
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complainant  at  the  origin  of  the  Commission’s  case  against  Luxembourg  argued  that  the 
absence of such measures considerably delayed the development of its network.   
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HUNGARY 
TRANSPOSITION 
Hungary finalised the transposition of the 2002 regulatory framework by first adopting its 
Law on Electronic Communications in November 2003, and by adopting gradually the whole 
package of secondary legislation between then and the date of the country’s accession to the 
European Union in May 2004. The law took effect on 1 January 2004 and all of the relevant 
secondary  measures  were  introduced  at  the  date  of  accession.  Apart  from  the  general 
objective of transposing the 2002 regulatory framework the legislator’s aim was to achieve 
three goals through the adoption of these measures: i) to complete and implement fully the 
starting conditions before the date of accession and to maintain these conditions until the 
market reviews are finalised ii) to ensure that the process of market analysis starts as soon as 
possible; and iii) to re structure the National Regulatory Authority, in order to prepare it for 
the workload placed upon it by those legislative measures.  
MARKET OVERVIEW  
Historically  in  Hungary  there  have  been  several  operators  with  exclusive  rights  in  the 
provision of public fixed telephony: one operator can therefore be regarded as the nationwide 
incumbent, alongside four other local telecommunications operators (LTOs) covering 20% of 
the  country.  All  operators  are  privately  owned;  the  State  holds  a  ‘golden  share’  in  the 
nationwide incumbent. The five fixed incumbents had lost their exclusive rights by the end of 
2002,  but  have  held  on to  market  power  in  their  respective  territories.  The  speed  of  full 
liberalisation from a legal perspective was not matched by such rapid effects in reality in the 
electronic  communications  market.  On  the  basis  of  revenues  the  incumbent  companies 
collectively have in 2004 99.9% market share as far as the local market is concerned, with 
98.7% and 93.1% shares respectively on the national and international calls markets. Fixed 
line penetration is at 35.5% in 2004. 
Despite several provisions already included in the 2001 Communications Law, initially there 
were  no  signs  of  a  significant  increase  in  internet  penetration,  in  particular  as  regards 
broadband  development.  The  trend  seemed  to  have  changed  and  broadband  penetration 
reached 2.2% in 2004, but work remains to be done to reach the average EU level. 
Towards the end of the 1990s mobile operators were playing an increasing role in shaping 
market trends, especially after the entry of the third digital mobile network operator at the end 
of 1999. The full liberalisation of the fixed telephony market took place half a year after 
mobile penetration had passed that of fixed telephony. In 2004 mobile penetration exceeded 
80% and the third operator reached a market share (18%) which establishes it as a serious 
competitor of the second operator, which in turn has 34% market share. The leading operator, 
which is the affiliate of the incumbent, has 48% market share. 
2004  has  clearly  brought  more  optimism  to  the  whole  market,  which  is  characterised  by 
market entry by a Europe wide competitive service provider, consolidation on the ISP market, 
the introduction of the publicly available DVB T service, and the Government’s decision to 
issue a tender for 3G rights of use.  
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THE NRA 
The  Hungarian  legislative  framework  places  the  National  Communications  Authority  of 
Hungary (NCAH) as the central body of the regulatory system, allocating responsibility for 
market analysis and imposition of the necessary remedies on the undertakings having SMP. 
The  Law  on  Electronic  Communications  provided  for  a  serious  re structuring  within  the 
NRA, and the appointment of the Board – as a first step in this re structuring – took place in a 
timely manner. The NCAH is not responsible for certain issues, for instance some of the 
regulatory tasks in relation to universal service. Despite the fact that the NCAH has been 
assigned responsibility to carry out the task of market analysis and impose remedies, the law 
grants power to two ministers – the Minister of IT and Communications and the Minister for 
Finance  –  to  issue  decrees  regulating  prices  of  the  provision  of  wholesale  terrestrial 
broadcasting  transmission  and  regulating  the  relationship  between  the  operators  of  fixed 
telephony networks and ISPs. According to the law, none of these pricing decrees would be 
preceded  by  a  market  analysis  and  their  adoption  would  not  require  the  finding  that  the 
addressed undertakings have SMP. The approach taken in the law is governed by the general 
system of price regulation applied in Hungary, which might need to be revisited in light of the 
requirements  set  out  in  the  Access  and  Universal  Service  Directives  concerning  the 
imposition of remedies. Furthermore, it appears that none of these decrees could be appealed 
in accordance with Article 4 of the Framework Directive, as both can only be challenged in 
the Constitutional Court on the ground that they are unconstitutional. Until 30 September only 
the decree on prices for wholesale terrestrial broadcasting transmission  services had been 
adopted and the two ministries had not issued any decree on revenue sharing between the 
operators of fixed telephony networks and ISPs. 
The Commission services are examining the issues raised in the above paragraph. 
Appeal mechanism 
In  the  course  of  appeal  procedures  the  predecessor  of  the  NCAH,  the  Communications 
Authority,  took  the  view  that  its  decisions  concerning  RIOs  and  RUOs  under  the  old 
framework could only be appealed by the parties to the basic procedure – meaning, in these 
particular cases, the undertakings with SMP. This approach was accepted and taken over by 
the national courts. The possible continuation of this practice will need to be scrutinised for 
compliance with the Framework Directive. 
Market analysis 
Apart from the other strategic goals, the new Law on Electronic Communications also aims to 
establish an NRA which is competent to carry out an appropriate market review process as 
soon as possible. This aim was reflected in the law by i) giving the NRA effective data 
gathering powers with sanctions for failure to provide the data; ii) creating an incentive for 
close  co operation  with  the  NCA,  in  particular  a  requirement  to  conclude  a  co operation 
agreement with it; iii) empowering the NRA to impose remedies with the necessary latitude, 
except in certain markets, in relation to price control; iv) imposing a deadline of 1 September 
2004 for the first market analysis, covering all relevant markets, to be carried out. The time 
pressure caused by this deadline did not necessarily allow the NRA to benefit fully from the 
consultation with the NCA and market players.  
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On 2 September 2004 the NRA notified to the Commission the findings of its review of the 
market for mobile access and call origination (market 15) and subsequently on 23 September 
2004 the market for wholesale voice call termination on mobile networks (market 16). The 
Commission  has  assessed  both  notifications  and  already  expressed  its  comments  on  the 
notified draft measures. 
STARTING CONDITIONS 
The liberalisation of the Hungarian electronic communications market commenced in 1992 
with the adoption of the Law on Telecommunications and continued as a gradual process over 
the following ten years. The Government adopted the Law on Communications in 2001, and 
this provided the cornerstone of the 1998 2000 regulatory framework. Exclusive rights in the 
field of fixed telephony were abolished in 2001 2002. 
The Hungarian authorities implemented both fixed and mobile number portability in 2004. 
The introduction of the system in the fixed sector was delayed by one year despite the fact 
that, since 1 January 2003, there has been an obligation in the primary law on operators to 
provide the service. Incumbent operators had opposed the introduction, given that the details 
for the functioning of the system had not been determined in a relevant secondary decree. 
There appears to have been also delay with implementing carrier selection and pre selection 
in  accordance  with  the  Interconnection  Directive.  The  primary  law  only  extended  the 
obligation  for  carrier  selection and  pre selection  to  local  calls  with  effect  from  1 January 
2004, but subscribers could still not benefit from the service because neither the adoption of 
the related secondary measure – it took effect on 24 April 2004 – nor the inclusion of the 
service in the RIOs had taken place. The service became available finally on 15 September 
2004.  The  full  functioning  of  carrier  selection  and  pre selection  was  also  blocked  by  a 
practice  introduced  by  the  nationwide  incumbent  immediately  after  the  date  for  full 
liberalisation. It provided the opportunity to use this service in one of its subscriber packages 
only and restricted access to it in the rest. It also reinforced the restrictive effect by making it 
extremely  difficult  to  change  between  the  different  packages.  Although  this  practice  was 
heavily criticised by competitive operators, the NRA refused to intervene against it, arguing 
that it was legal according to the Hungarian law. The legislator realised the need to address 
this  problem  and  consequently  included  a  provision  in  the  Law  on  Electronic 
Communications which clarified this as unlawful. However, this provision took effect only 
after an eight month delay on 1 September 2004. The Hungarian Competition Office (NCA) 
had initiated a procedure against this practice but the final decision of this authority came only 
after the abovementioned provision of the law had already taken effect. 
By the end of August 2004, the NRA had adopted new, but transitional
81, RIOs and RUOs of 
the SMP operators in the field of voice telephony. The NRA intended to reduce significantly 
the fees included in those reference offers. It also aimed to introduce a flat rate internet access 
call origination obligation (FRIACO) in the RIOs and a DSLAM level bitstream access offer 
in the RUOs. Both FRIACO and bitstream access were introduced in the Hungarian legal 
system by the Law on Electronic Communications and were part of the set of obligations that 
had to be maintained until the findings of the first market analysis take effect. In this context, 
it should be added that the nationwide incumbent has already been required by the NRA to 
                                                 
81  i.e. they are linked to the starting conditions and not to the market analysis.  
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offer a service which is similar to wholesale bitstream access. However, in its current form 
this offer does not necessarily comply with all demands of interested alternative operators, 
particularly owing to the fact that under its terms, the provision of voice services by the 
alternative operator is not allowed, and the possibility of changing the quality parameters is 
also restricted.  
Following the adoption of the transitional RIOs and the RUOs it now seems that the NRA is 
much better positioned to achieve its aim as far as the reduction of prices is concerned, except 
in the case of one off fees and the fees for leased line interconnection links in the RIO, since 
some of these charges have actually increased.  
It remains to be seen whether the nationwide incumbent’s leased lines RIO, as approved by 
the  NRA,  provides  for  a  genuine  regulated  wholesale  offering,  covering  the  terminating 
segment  half circuit  leased  lines,  and  this  issue  will  be  scrutinised  by  the  Commission 
services.  The  significance  of  this  service  was  highlighted  in  the  Commission’s 
Recommendation  on  Leased  Lines  interconnection  pricing  in  a  liberalised 
telecommunications market. 
In  each  case  the  NRA  based  its  decision  on  benchmarking,  as  it did  not  accept  the  cost 
calculation prepared by the SMP operators. However, the particular effects of these decisions 
in the market remain to be seen. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Information flow as regards access and interconnection 
The issue of prohibited information flow between the wholesale and retail operations of the 
nationwide incumbent is reported by new entrants, for instance in relation to leased lines 
disputes between competitive operators and the incumbent. The NRA, however, seems to 
have  no  information  and  hence  has  not  taken  any  action  to  determine  whether  this 
requirement has been fulfilled by the relevant undertaking or not. 
Mobile services 
Under the old regulatory framework it was the responsibility of the NRA to determine the 
level of the mobile termination charges of those mobile operators having SMP in the national 
market for interconnection. In 2002 the NRA designated the first and second digital mobile 
operators as having SMP in this market. The second operator challenged this decision before 
the court and the appeal procedure is still pending. As the Metropolitan Court decided to 
suspend the enforcement of the decision – which was upheld also by the Supreme Court – the 
NRA had no possibility to impose the obligation of cost oriented termination charges on the 
second operator on the basis of the 2002 decision on SMP. The NRA then decided to carry 
out a new analysis in 2003 after which both the first and the second operators were deemed to 
have SMP and so had to adhere to a cost oriented termination charge. The NRA did not accept 
the  cost  calculations  provided  by  the  operators  and  instead  based  its  decision  on  prices 
contained in an international benchmarking analysis. The NRA applied reductions to both 
operators’  charges,  but  this  had  an  asymmetric  effect,  given  that  the  charges  of  the  first 
operator had already been subject to regulation on a cost orientation basis.  
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Finally, after having carried out the market review procedure in September 2004 the NRA 
concluded, in its draft measure, that all three mobile network operators will be subject to the 
same regulatory remedies, including the obligation of cost orientation.  
3G rights of use 
The decision to issue rights of use for 3G mobile networks was taken by the Government this 
year and the tender for the provision of 3G services was issued on 1 September 2004. The 
Government aims to issue the rights of use before the end of the year. There are four blocks of 
3G frequencies to be allocated, with the fourth of these being dedicated to a new entrant. 
All four blocks are similar as far as technical conditions (including available spectrum etc.) 
are concerned. The three current 2G network operator companies are competing for the first 
three blocks, which have different characteristics as far as the payment, coverage and roll out 
conditions are concerned. The fourth has even lighter conditions in these fields. 
The NRA included a number of provisions aimed at encouraging the entry of a new operator. 
First, there are no coverage and roll out conditions attached to the fourth block as opposed to 
the first three. Second, there is an option for the newcomer to acquire rights of use in the 900 
and 1800 MHz spectrum, which would enable it to compete with the three incumbents also on 
the basis of 2G spectrum. Third, the tender for the first three blocks requires the incumbents 
to offer commitments in relation to the encouragement of market entry and promotion of 
competition. Although it is still not clear what will be the exact content of the offers, it can be 
expected that they would relate either to co location or to national roaming. 
Universal service 
Hungary has taken a step forward with creating a new system for the operation of universal 
service  in  the  Law  on  electronic  communications,  adopted  in  2003.  It  appears  that  the 
legislative environment establishes a reasonable starting point for the Hungarian Government 
to overcome the most serious shortcomings of its previous system, but there will still be a 
need to take account of the risks identified below. 
The  new  legislative  environment  introduced  a  system  whereby  undertakings  providing 
universal service are designated by the Minister for IT and Communications, on the basis of 
applications. As no new candidate applied for the provision of universal services the Minister 
designated those undertakings which provided the service in the past. The conditions of the 
service  are  determined  in  the  law,  the  set  of  Government  and  ministerial  decrees  and, 
ultimately, in the universal service contracts which have to be concluded between the operator 
concerned and the Minister. The rules of financing of any net cost of the universal service 
obligation of designated undertaking – including the maximum level of financing and the 
obligation of the designated operators to administer and prove their need for compensation – 
are set out by law and the relevant decrees. Further conditions for such compensation are 
settled in these contracts. 
Although the universal service contracts have to be published in the Official Journal of the 
Ministry, it might be questionable whether this system meets the requirement of transparency, 
non discrimination and least market distortion, as a number of important conditions – such as 
the  need  for  a  contribution  –  are  to  be  settled  in  this  contract,  which  is  negotiated  only 
between the ministry and the universal service operator concerned. (Up to 30 September 2004 
no contracts had been published.) The possible lack of transparency may be further reinforced  
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by the fact that the list of factors for determining whether there is an unfair burden arising 
from the universal service obligation – which are listed in the decree – can be extended in the 
universal service contract, although it is stated in a decree that these additional factors cannot 
increase  the  amount  of  the  required  compensation.  The  practice  adopted  by  the  Ministry 
concerning the conclusion of the contracts so far may be appropriate to overcome the lack of 
clarity provided for in the legislative environment. Further, the risk of lack of transparency 
may be reduced by the fact that any compensation payment from the Universal Electronic 
Communications  Fund  has  to  be  proposed  by  the  director  of  the  Fund  and  requires  the 
approval of the Supervisory Board of the Fund. The majority of the Supervisory Board is 
composed  of  the  biggest  contributors  to  the  Fund.  The  Fund  publishes  a  yearly  financial 
report and is supervised by the Hungarian State Audit Office. The Commission services are 
examining further the matters raised in this paragraph. 
The  Law  on  Electronic Communications  defines the  set  of  universal  services  as  the  four 
components taken together and not separately. This means that the law limits the ability of the 
Minister to designate different undertakings to provide different elements of universal service. 
The impact of this limitation is being examined in the light of the Universal Service Directive, 
along with the definition used in the law for the provision of access at a fixed location to the 
public telephone network.  
The new system also changed the method for assessing the need for compensation. The basis 
for the new system is the calculation of net costs and the definition of any unfair burden. The 
compensation is based on a sharing mechanism between the undertakings concerned. The 
previous system based the calculation of the net revenue loss arising  from the difference 
between  the  price  of  the  reduced  universal  service  subscriber  package  and  the  normal 
subscriber  package  multiplied  by  the  number  of  subscribers  subscribing  for  the  reduced 
package.  
According to the decree on the management of the sharing mechanism, only those universal 
service operators which applied to the body managing the sharing mechanism are entitled to 
any compensation. On the other hand, another decree on the calculation of the contributions to 
the  sharing  mechanism,  and  the  assessment  of  the  need  for  compensation,  allows  for  the 
contribution obligation of the universal service operators to each other to be reduced if they 
do  not  themselves  apply  for  compensation  with  regard  to  their  own  access  and  public 
payphone obligation. This possibility for off setting may well create a system which is not 
transparent.  The  Commission  will  follow  closely  the  practical  implementation  of  these 
provisions of the law and the relevant secondary legislation.  
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MALTA 
TRANSPOSITION 
The new legislation (including subsidiary regulations), which aims to fully transpose the New 
Regulatory  Framework  of  2002,  came  into  force  on  14  September  2004.  The  primary 
legislation  –  the  Electronic  Communications  (Regulation)  Act  –  includes  a  transitional 
provision according to which “any directives,  decisions or designations (…) made by the 
Authority under this Act as in force” on the date of coming into force of this Article “shall 
continue to be in force until revoked or amended by the Authority”. The Commission services 
are examining its compliance with Article 27 of the Framework Directive, which, in principle, 
refers only to those SMP obligations that were imposed in accordance with the old regulatory 
framework  and  does  not  mention  other  obligations  that  may  have  been  imposed.  In  this 
respect, it is to be noted that some of the decisions of MCA, taken prior to accession to the EU 
might indeed be regarded as overregulation from the 1998 acquis perspective. The new law is 
currently being examined by the European Commission. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The  electronic  communications  market  in  Malta  is  characterised  by  a  limited  number  of 
operators. Despite the formal liberalisation of the fixed telephony market (completed by the 
end  of  2002)  the  incumbent  remains  the  sole  provider  of  fixed  services.  As  regards 
international telephony a number of ISPs providing VoIP services are competing with the 
incumbent and have gained a considerable market share
82. There is a duopoly on the mobile 
telephony market with a subsidiary of an international company having 55% of the subscriber 
base of approximately 300 000, and a subsidiary of the incumbent serving the remaining 45%. 
Legally, the duopoly ceased to exist only when the new legislation transposing the NRF came 
into  force  (14  September  2004).  There  is  only  one  cable  operator  (50%  owned  by  a  big 
international company) that provides nation wide TV distribution services and Internet access 
(through its subsidiary). 
The  only  really  competitive  market  in  Malta  seems  to  be  the  provision  of  retail  Internet 
services, with more than a dozen ISPs active on the market. They are providing the service on 
a purely resale basis, buying the wholesale product from the fixed incumbent’s subsidiary, as 
there seem to be no viable alternatives – for example the cable operator is not providing a 
wholesale product for Internet access. 
Regarding  international  leased  lines  (particularly  important  in  Malta,  due  its  geographic 
situation), the market is also enjoying some benefits from infrastructure competition, with a 
second underwater data connection having been deployed. This has resulted in a significant 
drop in international IP bandwidth tariffs. 
                                                 
82  According to the report published by the MCA in April 2004 – “Telecommunications market review. 
October 2003 – March 2004” – “when minutes from March 2003 to March 2004 are aggregated, VOIP 
had a 35.7% of the international whilst {the fixed incumbent operator} had 36.6% of all international 
outgoing minutes”.  
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The  penetration  of  fixed  line  telephony  in  Malta  stands  currently  at  51.9  lines  per 
100 inhabitants and has remained constant. The mobile sector on the other hand has reported a 
notable growth in penetration and up to March 2004 the number of mobile subscribers grew 
by 6.1% on a year on year basis. Total revenues from mobile operations in 2003 grew by 
21.4%  in  comparison  to  2002
83,  and  a  significant  growth  in  mobile  revenues  has  been 
observed  since  2001,  when  the  second  mobile operator  (the  subsidiary  of  the  incumbent) 
entered the market. The Internet market also experienced positive growth both in terms of 
Internet  subscriptions  and  broadband  connections.  In  fact  more  than  80 000  Internet 
subscriptions were reported at the end of March 2004
84. Mainly due to the competition at the 
retail  level  between  service  providers,  broadband  is  taking  up  in  Malta,  with  13 738 
broadband lines (as of 1 July 2004; out of which 2 312 are by means of cable modem) that 
amounts to 3.5% broadband penetration (in terms of population). It appears that recently a 
significant increase in the number of broadband lines has occurred as a result of the decision 
(in October 2004) of broadband providers to double the speeds of all ADSL and cable modem 
connections, free of charge. 
THE NRA 
The  national  regulatory  authority  –  the  Malta  Communications  Authority  (MCA)  –  is  a 
relatively young body, established in January 2001. With the coming into force of the new 
law, it has assumed all the responsibilities of the NRA under the new regulatory framework. 
While  one  of  its  responsibilities  is  also  “to  ensure  fair  competition  in”  the  electronic 
communications  sector,  it  is  not  clear  what  exactly  the  division  of  tasks  is  between  the 
regulator  and  the  competition  authority  and  the  Maltese  authorities  are  about  to  issue  an 
explanatory document in this regard.  
MCA  employs  41  people  (12  of  which  have  been  recently  transferred  from  the  Wireless 
Telegraphy  Department  of  the  Ministry  at  the  same  time  as  the  frequency  management 
function was transferred to the MCA) and it is considered sufficient by market players in 
terms of manpower and quality. In general, there is confidence in the way MCA performs its 
tasks. However, some questions have been raised by market players as to its institutional 
independence  from  the  Government,  which  owns  a  60%  share  of  the  fixed  incumbent 
operator. It seems that according to the provisions of the Malta Communications Authority 
Act, the Minster may in some cases give the MCA directions of a general character on the 
policy to be followed. The Authority would have to give effect as soon as possible to all such 
directions and in a case where it fails to comply with them its functions could be transferred to 
the Minister. In addition, it seems that the Minister may, after consultation with the Authority, 
make regulations in respect of any of the functions of the Authority. There is uncertainty as to 
the  scope  of  the  potential  intervention  by  the  Minister  (which  to  date  has  not  occurred), 
particularly when this is done by regulation. The possibility of regulatory functions being 
transferred to the Ministry in case the MCA failed to comply with policy directions needs to 
be monitored with regard to any implications for the MCA’s ability to operate independently 
and to exercise full discretionary powers.  
                                                 
83  Idem. 
84  Idem.  
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Appeal mechanism 
The  Telecommunications  Appeal  Board  consisted  of  three  members,  appointed  by  the 
Minister. Stakeholders are of the opinion that the appeal body lacks sufficient expertise and 
knowledge  of  the  sector  and  there  is  room  for  improvement.  Under  the  new  law,  the 
Communications Appeal Board will be created with a chairperson appointed by the Prime 
Minister  and  consisting  of  two  other  members  selected  by  the  chairman  from  a  panel  of 
persons with relevant experience established by the Prime Minster. Although the new body 
will  remain  an  ad  hoc  one  (convening  only  when  an  appeal  has  been  filed),  the  new 
provisions are intended to ensure a better quality of appeal procedure in Malta. 
Market analysis 
The new law provides that the market analysis  procedure shall be carried out as soon as 
possible after the relevant markets have been defined by the MCA. The regulator did not yet 
take any formal decision in this regard, nor has it published the sequence of the markets to be 
analysed. In October 2004 the MCA published a consultation document on the market review 
methodology. According to this document, the MCA plans to commence the market review 
process  in  November  2004  starting  with  fourteen  of  the  markets  identified  by  the 
Commission’s  Recommendation.  Notification  of  the  draft  decisions  to  the  European 
Commission are envisaged for June 2005 with regard to wholesale unbundled access and 
wholesale broadband access (markets 11 and 12), July 2005 with regard to mobile access and 
call origination, mobile voice call termination and wholesale national market for international 
roaming (markets 15, 16, and 17) and October 2005 with regard to retail level (markets 1 6) 
and  fixed  call  origination,  fixed  call  termination  and  transit  services  in  the  fixed  public 
telephone network (markets 8 10) respectively. The revision of the remaining markets would 
follow in mid 2005 with the notifications expected by end 2005.  
STARTING CONDITIONS 
All operators (fixed, mobile and cable) have been found to have a dominant position on their 
respective  markets  (including  markets  that  were  not  defined  or  addressed  under  the  old 
framework)  and  remedies,  prescribed  by  the  law  (mainly  in  accordance  with  the  1998 
regulatory  framework)  have  been  imposed.  A  reference  interconnection  offer  (RIO)  was 
published by the fixed incumbent in January 2003, and a new offer is expected to be available 
in October 2004. The fixed incumbent is also obliged to publish a reference unbundling offer 
(RUO). It seems, however, that its publication has not taken place so far and a proposal was 
submitted to the NRA only recently (September 2004)
85.  
In August 2003 the cable operator has been designated as having SMP (“Dominant Market 
Position”  under  the  then  applicable  Maltese  law)  on  a  broadly  defined  “market”  for 
telecommunications transport provision. As a result it has been obliged to provide open access 
to  its  cable  network  to  third  parties  as  from  June  2004.  The  decision  has  not  yet  been 
effectively implemented.  
                                                 
85  On 5 October 2004 the MCA has published it for public consultation that will run until 11 December 
2004.  
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The fixed incumbent operator is legally required under the provisions of the Maltese law to 
provide for carrier selection and carrier pre section; however, the Commission services are 
examining  whether  these  requirements  have  been  effectively  implemented  so  far.  In  May 
2004 the MCA issued a decision detailing obligations imposed by the law on the incumbent 
(including the obligation to incorporate call origination charges in its RIO by June 2004). 
However, the latter has not so far complied with those obligations and has appealed the MCA 
decision claiming that CS and CPS should also be imposed on both mobile operators in Malta. 
Under current circumstances, as there is only one fixed operator, only mobile operators would 
be in a position to provide CS and CPS services and obtain carrier (pre )selection prefixes, as 
ISPs  (providing  VoIP)  are  not  considered  to  be  providers  of  publicly  available  telephone 
services (PATS).  
The Commission services are also examining the availability of number portability (NP) for 
subscribers  in  Malta.  With  regard  to  the  telephony  provided  at  a  fixed  location,  this 
requirement cannot be practically implemented as long as the incumbent remains the sole 
provider of this service (as mentioned above, ISPs are not considered to be PATS providers, 
and in any case they have so far not been eligible to apply for numbers). Concerning number 
portability for subscribers of mobile services – required under the new law – there seems to be 
strong opposition from both mobile operators to its introduction. It is considered to be too 
costly to implement, and mobile operators in Malta do not see any practical benefits for end 
users.  All  parties  agree,  however,  that  this  would  facilitate  an  entry  for  a  potential  third 
operator. 
Alternative operators appear not to have sufficient incentives to enter the Maltese market. It 
may be partly due to the size of the market, with a population of slightly less than 400 000; 
however,  they  are  clearly  regulatory  issues  that  need  to  be  dealt  with  in  order  to  ensure 
competition  on  the  electronic  communications  market  in  Malta,  including  correct 
implementation of the starting  conditions. One  of the remaining issues seems to be tariff 
rebalancing by the fixed incumbent operator. The possibility for operators to compete with the 
incumbent at local and/or national level has to be examined (due to the size of Malta there is 
no differentiation between local and long distance calls; moreover, the tariffs for local, single 
transit and national interconnection are the same in the current RIO of the incumbent). Call 
termination rates
86 seem to be extremely high and are in fact above the level of the retail tariff 
of the incumbent (€ 0.056 and € 0.025 per minute respectively). There is also the issue of the 
implementation of local loop unbundling (as mentioned above, it seems that no reference 
offer has been published so far). Here again, the issue of tariff rebalancing arises. It seems that 
bitstream access is not available. All these issues merit further examination. 
                                                 
86  According to the current reference interconnection offer (and therefore believed to be cost oriented, 
however it is noteworthy that interconnection charges in Malta are very high above the EU average).  
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MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Administrative charges and fees 
The level of administrative charges and fees for individual rights of use (including frequencies 
and numbers and rights of way) is under examination. Under the outgoing regime operators 
had  to  pay  substantial  amounts  of  money  on  a  yearly  basis  –  both  fixed  charges  and  a 
percentage (up to 4% in the case of the cable operator) of their gross revenue. According to 
the new law, public network operators and/or public service providers seem to be obliged to 
pay € 47 000 per annum, and in addition they seem to be obliged to pay up to 1.5% of their 
gross revenue. Mobile operators will also be obliged to pay fees for the use of frequencies in 
the amount of € 3 525 plus 2.5% of the total gross revenue. Every service provider will need 
to  pay  € 0.35  for  each  allocated  number.  In  addition,  in  an  innovation  under  the  new 
regulations, undertakings authorised to provide nationwide fixed electronic communications 
networks will have to pay for the rights of way a fee of 0.4% of gross revenue and not less 
than € 282 600.  
The  law  provides  for  a  yearly  overview  of  MCA’s  administrative  costs  and  the  charges 
collected, which has to be published and appropriate adjustments should be made, if a surplus 
of revenues over costs is identified. Moreover, the impact of the system of administrative 
charges and fees on small niche operators and service providers needs to be verified as part of 
the general monitoring of the compliance of the provisions in question with the requirements 
of the Authorisation Directive. 
Frequency management  
Under  the  new  law,  MCA  has  assumed  the  responsibilities  for  frequency  management 
(frequency  assignment  in  accordance  with  National  Frequency  Table  established  by  the 
Minister). The manner in which those responsibilities will be executed remains to be seen and 
may prove to be crucial for the future development of electronic communications in Malta. 
The Commission has recently received a complaint, according to which there have been some 
deficiencies  in  transparency  in  the  recent  process  of  granting  individual  rights  of  use  for 
frequencies (and rights of way) for the provision of digital terrestrial TV (DTTV) in Malta. 
The Commission services are currently examining this complaint. 
The  recently  published  (by  the  Ministry)  consultation  paper  on  the  strategy  for  the 
implementation of 3G in Malta seems to suggest that the current mobile operators would be 
given priority in tendering for the respective frequencies (to be offered for a fixed amount of 
Lm 2.5 million to current mobile operators, whereas the same amount would be a minimum 
bid for the third licence). Another consultation paper concerning the strategy for introduction 
of fixed wireless access (in the 3.5 MHz band) states that “though technically it is possible to 
grant more than one licence, the idea is to grant only two spectrum bands for this technology, 
at  least  initially,  especially  given  the  limited  size  of  the  country  and  market.”  Without 
prejudice to the outcome of the public consultation in the above mentioned cases, it may be 
questioned whether such an administrative limitation of the number of individual rights of use 
for frequencies to be granted is in line with the provisions of the regulatory framework. The 
Commission services will be looking into this issue.  
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Directory service 
The Commission services are examining the extent to which the existing directory service 
available to end users in Malta corresponds to the requirements of the EU framework (i.e. to 
cover both fixed and mobile subscribers). 
e-Privacy 
The  Directive  on  privacy  and  electronic  communications  provides,  among  others,  for  a 
harmonised  set  of  rules  concerning  unsolicited  communications.  Among  other  things,  it 
requires Member States to ensure that the legitimate interests of legal persons are sufficiently 
protected.  It  is  not  clear  from  the  Maltese  law  notified  to  the  Commission  that  this 
requirement has been correctly transposed. The Commission services are looking into this 
issue.  
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THE NETHERLANDS 
TRANSPOSITION 
The national legislation transposing the new regulatory framework entered into force in the 
Netherlands on 19 May 2004, after a ten month delay. In February 2004, through another 
legislative  amendment,  the  national  regulatory  authority  (Onafhankelijke  Post  en 
Telecommunicatie Autoriteit, “OPTA”) had already been given full powers to start the market 
analysis procedures.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
Fixed penetration is at 48.2%. Based on retail revenues, the fixed line incumbent operator has 
a 76% share in the local call market, 61% in the long distance call market and 46% in the 
international call market. The total volume on the fixed network of the fixed line incumbent 
operator is declining due to high penetration of mobile telephony and to growth of broadband 
internet. Currently the mobile penetration rate is just above EU average, at 84%. The leading 
mobile operator has a 36% market share (down 4% from last year), the second operator 24% 
(down from 26.7% last year) and the three other mobile operators share the remaining 40% of 
the  mobile  market.  On  1  July  2004  the  Netherlands  was  amongst  the  countries  with  the 
highest broadband penetration rate in the EU of 14.7 lines per 100 persons. It has over 2.5 
million broadband lines. Fifty eight percent of these lines use DSL technology and seventy 
seven percent of these DSL lines are on offer via the fixed line incumbent operator. There is 
also  a  high  number  of  ported  fixed  and  mobile  numbers.  There  are  more  than  150 
undertakings registered with OPTA as a public network operator and/or a provider of public 
voice  telephony.  In  general  all  of  this  implies  that  there  is  a  relatively  high  level  of 
competition which, in addition, is still developing. 
THE NRA 
In  the  light  of  the  new  regulatory  framework  OPTA’s  powers  had  to  be  amended  and 
strengthened to enable OPTA to perform its tasks under the new framework. The Ministry for 
Economic  Affairs  considers  that  the  current  strengthening  of  OPTA’s  powers  and 
responsibilities in the Telecommunications Act, needs to be better embedded in general policy 
goals and is in the process of drafting policy rules (“beleidsregels”), the intention of which is 
to give OPTA guidance on a number of issues. The Government says that the policy rules are 
aimed at increasing OPTA’s predictability and providing the necessary level of clarity in the 
market, which is important to enable market players take investment decisions. It is within the 
remit of the Ministry of Economic Affairs, which is also notified as a regulator, to issue such 
policy rules. There will be a national consultation on the draft policy rules. Another reason for 
the Ministry’s initiative to draft policy rules, relates to more  general political discussions 
concerning  the  position  of  statutory  independent  authorities  (“ZBOs”  –  “zelfstandige 
bestuursorganen”) such as OPTA. It appears that the Parliament and the Government wish to 
exercise greater influence over such independent bodies. In the Netherlands such independent 
authorities cannot be held directly accountable in Parliament, as may be the case in some 
other Member States; the Minister is ultimately held (politically) accountable.  
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Enforcement of decisions 
Certain operators are of the view that, in the past, the fixed line incumbent operator has not 
always complied with decisions or kept the promises it made to OPTA, and this in turn has 
raised questions as to the use by OPTA of its powers and/or the adequate enforcement of its 
decisions in these situations. Operators fear that there will be inadequate enforcement of the 
wholesale tariff decision of 30 June 2004 (addressed below). OPTA says that it has a limited 
set of instruments to enforce financial obligations and it is of the opinion that Dutch civil law 
provides better and ample possibilities of enforcement of decisions with financial aspects. 
But, in order to achieve the enforcement of a financial obligation, a case has to be filed before 
the civil court and it is uncertain whether market players, who claim that OPTA has more 
powers to exercise enforcement than it currently uses, will want to do this. 
Partly  due  to  some  of  the  cases  described  below,  it  is  clear  that  alternative  operators’ 
confidence in OPTA has been shaken, although their criticism is not echoed by the consumer 
association (“Consumentenbond”). The same is true of the relations between the alternative 
operators and the Ministry of Economic Affairs, because even though alternative operators are 
positive about some aspects of the new law, such as the speeding up of legal procedures and 
the more effective enforcement tools for OPTA (i.e. fines up to 10% of turnover), they are 
critical on several issues. There also seems to have been some tension in the relationship 
between the Ministry and OPTA, but generally the relationship has improved considerably. 
Dispute resolution and appeals 
It is hoped that, with the new Telecommunications Act, and OPTA’s increased and clarified 
powers, there will be less ground for appeal on the basis of lack of legal basis or on the basis 
of  OPTA  acting  outside  its  remit  on  certain  issues.  Currently,  the  fixed  line  incumbent 
operator, in particular, appeals almost all decisions of OPTA. The new Telecommunications 
Act also includes shorter deadlines for dispute resolution, in line with the Directives. Parties 
are now able to go directly to court instead of appealing a decision of OPTA directly with 
OPTA in the first instance. Some important disputes have remained unresolved for too long, 
some even for a few years. 
Market analysis 
The start of the market analysis process was delayed substantively due to late implementation 
of the legislation giving OPTA the necessary data gathering powers. Furthermore, the Dutch 
Parliament voted for an amendment to the Telecommunications Act, which obliges OPTA to 
provide  detailed  reasoning  for  its  regulatory  decisions  following  the  market  analysis 
procedures. In practice this has led to extensive questionnaires in the data gathering process. 
Although it is in the interest of market players that OPTA provides a solid reasoning for its 
decisions, the questionnaires have been a considerable administrative burden for them and 
have led to more delays in the process. The latest timetable indicates that draft decisions for 
the mobile telephony markets will be taken in February 2005, the broadcasting market in 
March 2005 and the leased lines, broadband and fixed telephony markets in May/June 2005. 
The draft decisions will then be notified under Article 7 of the Framework Directive. It is 
expected that final decision will be taken in the second half of 2005, a year later than the 
original timetable.   
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MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Access-Interconnection 
On  30  June  2004  OPTA  adopted  a  decision  on  the  wholesale  tariffs  of  the  fixed  line 
incumbent operator (for interconnection and special access services and products, including 
LLU and interconnecting leased lines) for the  period July 2004   July 2005 (or until the 
market  analyses  have  been  performed,  but  until  1 January  2006  at  the  latest)  and  also 
retrospectively  for  the  period  2003 2004.  This  decision  is  actually  the  result  of  bilateral 
negotiations between OPTA and the fixed line incumbent operator, which took place after 
OPTA  invited  the  fixed  line  incumbent  operator  to  propose  cost  oriented  tariffs  for  the 
transitional period, for which it was to base itself on the cost models that OPTA approved for 
the period 2003 2004, the EDC VI model, Embedded Direct Costs, for originating calls, and 
BULRIC III,  Bottom Up  Long  Run  Incremental  Costs,  for  terminating  calls).  The 
negotiations led to several adaptations of the proposed tariffs and the fixed line incumbent 
operator agreed to withdraw some disputes and appeals, including the one it filed against the 
EDC VI/BULRIC III wholesale tariff decision of 2003. This appeal was initially filed against 
the fact that OPTA in July 2003 did not approve the cost models proposed by the fixed line 
incumbent operator and instead published the cost oriented tariffs that resulted from the EDC 
VI and BULRIC III cost models. Because of the uncertainty created by this appeal, market 
players were forced to make financial provisions, which was not in the interest of the market 
and the investment climate. The wholesale tariffs for the periods 2003 2004 and 2004 2005 
have now been decided on the basis of these cost models. The tariffs for termination on the 
incumbent’s network are the same for both periods and there is no decrease foreseen until the 
application of the new regulatory framework. The tariffs are above average for local calls 
(0.71, EU23 average is 0.61), just below average for single transit calls (0.90, EU25 average 
is 0.95) and well below average for double transit calls (1.15, EU25 average is 1.54). The 
2004 2005 tariffs for interconnecting leased lines decreased on average with 10% and the 
LLU tariffs with 3 15%. 
A  number  of  alternative  operators  have  greeted  with  great  disappointment  this  bilateral 
approach  to  setting  tariffs.  The  alternative  operators  were  apparently  not  involved  in  the 
negotiations between OPTA and the fixed line incumbent operator; they were invited to an 
information  meeting  about  the  pending  approval  by  OPTA  of  the  tariffs  only  after  the 
negotiations took place.  
OPTA has discretion to determine cost orientation. Its aim was to create legal certainty for the 
market,  as  the  appeal  by  the  fixed line  incumbent  operator  against  last  year’s  decision  is 
withdrawn. The wholesale tariff decision applies in the transitional period (2004 2005) until 
the market analysis process is finalised. OPTA states in its decision that in this period, while 
migrating to the new regulatory framework, OPTA will apply their own 2001 guidelines (on 
costing models) in a different way than they did in previous years. During this period the 
obligations regarding the principle of cost orientation for operators with significant market 
power under the old regulatory framework remain applicable. There is no justification for 
deviating from these provisions.  
Article  4(1)  of  the  Access  Directive  speaks  of  an  obligation  on  operators  of  public 
communications networks to negotiate interconnection. The transposition of this provision by 
the Netherlands may raise concerns of possible overregulation. These concerns are not shared 
by the Ministry of Economic Affairs. The Commission services will be looking into this issue.  
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Bitstream access 
In the past years, based on its powers under the old Telecommunications Act, OPTA has 
attempted  to  impose  a  bit stream  access  obligation  on  the  fixed line  incumbent  operator. 
These attempts have been annulled in court as the obligation could not be derived from the 
relevant  applicable  legislation.  Consequently  there  is  no  nationwide  bit stream  access 
available  for  alternative  operators  who  wish  to  provide  broadband  internet  access  to 
consumers. A number of operators have shown interest in such a product and take the view 
that the absence of a bit stream offer in the Netherlands restricts competition in the residential 
broadband  access  market.  In  addition,  the  absence  of  a  consumer  bit stream  offer  could 
impede  the  further  take  off  of  local  loop  unbundling  in  the  Netherlands  as  alternative 
operators cannot use bit stream as a basis for developing a customer base and generating a 
turn over that can sustain (further) investments in the roll out of alternative DSL networks on 
the  basis  of  local  loop  unbundling.  It  is  not  yet  clear  whether  bit stream  access  will  be 
regulated  under  the  new framework;  this  is  currently  being  investigated  by  OPTA  in  the 
applicable market analysis procedure of the new regulatory framework. 
Fixed to mobile tariffs 
In the Netherlands, mobile termination tariffs have been under investigation for a number of 
years.  OPTA  has  attempted  to  lower  mobile  termination  tariffs  using  dispute  settlement 
procedures and based its decisions on the concept of ‘reasonable tariffs’ as was set out in its 
own policy guidelines. These attempts have been stranded in the courts. Furthermore, in 2002 
and 2003 the NMA investigated the compliance of the mobile termination tariffs with Dutch 
competition law. In December 2003 the mobile operators came to an agreement on a mutual 
gradual  decrease  of  mobile  termination  tariffs.  As  a  consequence  of  this  voluntary  price 
decrease,  the  NMA  stayed  its  investigation.  Although  the  procedure  has  not  been  very 
transparent, the result of the agreement is that the uncertainty in the market has been removed 
and that the tariffs are going down by forty five percent in the period between end of 2003 
and end of 2005. OPTA will, in the meantime, analyse the mobile termination markets under 
the new regulatory framework, which could lead to further price regulation.  
In view of the underlying costs, OPTA has also investigated the reasonableness of the fixed 
line incumbent mobile arm’s direct interconnection offer (enabling alternative operators to 
terminate  traffic  directly  on  its  network  without  having  to  use  the  transit  services  of  the 
incumbent). In a dispute settlement decision on 30 December 2003, OPTA held this direct 
interconnection offer to be unreasonable on a number of points and obliged the operator to put 
a  modified  offer  in  the  market.  This  could  also result  in  a  decrease  of  the  total  costs  of 
alternative operators for terminating traffic on that network.  
Access to cable networks 
Shortly after the entry into force of the amended telecommunications law (transposing the EU 
Directives),  and  on  the  basis  of  the  new  regulatory  framework,  the  fixed  line  incumbent 
operator has requested cost oriented and non discriminatory access to the (local) network of 
the ten largest cable operators in the Netherlands, and requested co location facilities, in order 
to offer broadcasting services to consumers and businesses. This is a very interesting initiative 
from a fixed incumbent operator in the current converging communications environment.  
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Fixed telephony discounts 
The  fixed  line  incumbent  operator  in  the  Netherlands  wants  to  be  able  to  offer  more 
‘packages’ than it is currently allowed by OPTA. OPTA is investigating whether, through the 
price setting of such packages, the incumbent fixed line operator engages in a price squeeze. 
Alternative operators argue that they are repeatedly faced with such price squeezes due to 
discounts, promotions and price plans of the fixed line incumbent operator. 
Rights of way 
In the old Telecommunications Act the obligation to allow the installation of cables in public 
or private land was restricted to cables that are actually used. This provision is still applicable 
under the new legal regime. In a recent proposal to amend the Telecommunications Act this 
obligation is extended to unused cables for a period of 4 years. Even though the industry is 
still concerned, the legislative proposal is made in conformity with the agreement reached on 
this matter between the relevant parties.  
Broadband infrastructure roll-out 
The Commission services will monitor the role played by local authorities in the area of the 
roll out of (broadband) networks, in particular the financial participation by local authorities 
in  the  roll  out  of  fibre  networks  and  its  implications  for  the  climate  for  infrastructure 
investment.  Operators  are  concerned  that  the  return  on  private  investments  could  be 
undermined by the creation of competing public networks that may not pursue a market rate 
of return. The prospect of public intervention might also delay private initiatives for fear of 
investors missing out on subsidies. In such circumstances, the compatibility of the projects 
with State aid rules would have to be carefully assessed. The Dutch Government is in contact 
with  the  European  Commission  concerning  planned  broadband  initiatives.  Even  though 
market players have a right to lay down their own infrastructure, the four largest cities in the 
Netherlands, the so called “G4”, say in the Dutch Government’s “Broadband Paper” that the 
creation of several (access) connection networks is undesirable, as it would lead to loss of 
capital and unnecessary inconvenience for the public as a result of excavation works. They 
also want to investigate how continued investments in existing infrastructure can be avoided. 
On the other hand, public intervention might have pro competitive effects when providing 
open access infrastructure in areas that offer no prospect of competition in access networks 
and where the incumbent’s telephony network represents a bottleneck facility.  
Free internet to schools 
In March 2004 an appeal court ruled that the fixed line incumbent operator’s offer of free 
internet to schools does not lead to market distortion, overruling a lower court decision. The 
initial decision –not to allow the offer  was in conflict with a consultation performed by both 
the  NMA  and  OPTA.  OPTA  indicated  that  any  offer  should  be  in  conformity  with  the 
Telecommunications Act and the NMA was of the opinion that the initiative was not contrary 
to general competition rules and that cable based access to internet and DSL are part of the 
same market, in which the fixed line incumbent operator is not dominant. Alternative fixed 
network  operators  indicate  that  the  fixed  line  incumbent  operator’s  offer  was  based  on 
regulated products (such as leased lines), which was the case in those areas where there had 
not  been  a  roll out  of  ADSL.  These  regulated  products  however  are  wholesale  products 
whereas the fixed line incumbent operator’s offer is a retail offer, which is not regulated by 
OPTA.   
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Government’s shareholding 
The Government still has a 20% share and a golden share in the fixed line incumbent operator 
even though an ongoing Commission infringement proceeding is aimed at the removal of that 
golden share. 
The Government has two different roles (shareholder and regulator) in regard to a company 
that has a licence to provide digital terrestrial television and radio (DVB T) until January 
2017. One of the company’s shareholders is the fixed line incumbent operator (in which the 
Government has a 19.3% share) and this operator has expressed the wish to increase its share 
in the DVB T company from the current 30% to 40% for which a decree will need to be 
amended. The NMA was consulted on the interest by the fixed line incumbent operator to 
increase its share and it concluded that, at least for the period until the end of 2007, there are 
no  objections  on  competition  grounds  to  increase  the  share  of  the  fixed  line  incumbent 
operator.  Alternative  operators  were  not  consulted  and  they  subsequently  objected  to  the 
NMA advice. Their fear is that the fixed line incumbent operator will strengthen its current 
position as a national provider of a broadband network. In its response to the critical remarks 
by alternative operators, the NMA confirmed its earlier position.  
Migration of lines from one operator to another (“Telco-telco migration”) 
Regarding  the  so called  “telco telco  migration”  the  fixed  line  incumbent  operator  has 
complied  with  after  an  OPTA  dispute  resolution  decision  on  6  May  2004,  This  decision 
concerns  the  migration  of  unbundled  lines  (not  the  migration  for  other  types  of  access 
services) and the decision focuses on a per line migration. The service level agreements are 
similar to those of a standard delivery. The tariff that the fixed line incumbent operator can 
charge is more or less similar to the connection/activation costs for an unbundled access line. 
The period in which a client was previously without a DSL connection has now been reduced 
from  a  few  weeks  to  one  day.  The  fixed  line  incumbent  operator  has  not  appealed  this 
decision.  
Must carry 
In  the  Netherlands  a  “must  carry”  obligation,  concerning  fifteen  television  channels,  is 
imposed on the cable operators. Seven of these are public broadcasting channels, which are 
clearly identified in the Media Act. The decision as to the commercial channels benefiting 
from must carry lies with the local programme councils, and the Commission services are 
examining  whether  the  decision  making  procedures  lack  transparency.  Article  31  of  the 
Universal Service Directive states that the must carry obligations can only be imposed when 
they are necessary to meet clearly defined general interest objectives and that they must be 
proportionate  and  transparent.  It  is  not  clear  whether  the  discretionary  powers  of  the 
authorities  to  grant  must  carry  status  are  circumscribed  in  a  manner  that  ensures  that  no 
arbitrary decisions are taken. According to the Dutch Government the must carry obligations 
are transparent as the advice of the local programme councils is published. The Commission 
services will be looking into this issue.  
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ePrivacy -Traffic data 
With regard to the fight against terrorism, there are legislative proposals relating to tapping 
and  the  retention  of  traffic  data,  other  than  the  storage  of  traffic  data  for  billing  and 
interconnection payment purposes. Operators are mostly worried about the costs involved, 
especially as the number of requests for retrieval of (traffic) data has increased.   
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AUSTRIA 
TRANSPOSITION 
Austria  appears  to  have  transposed  most  of  the  new  regulatory  framework  on  electronic 
communications through the new Telecommunications Act (TKG) which came into force on 
20 August 2003. This law encompasses all five relevant directives. Special provisions for the 
broadcasting sector have apparently been transposed by new legislation, which, however, has 
not yet been notified to the Commission. 
The  transition  from  the old  to  the  new  framework  appears  to  have  gone smoothly.  SMP 
determinations and remedies imposed under the old framework are being maintained until 
completion of the market analysis.  
In  particular,  the  old  interconnection  regime  is  being  maintained  in  practice  to  avoid  an 
absence of regulation in this area during the transitional period. If market players cannot agree 
on  interconnection,  the  Telekom Control Kommission  (TKK)  issues  binding  decisions 
substituting a civil law agreement between the parties and containing the relevant details for 
interconnection. For fixed to fixed, the general rule is that the principle of reciprocity applies 
to the relevant tariffs, except that alternative operators only have got a single tandem tariff for 
termination.  In  principle,  both  the  alternative  operators  and  the  incumbent  appear  to  be 
satisfied with this procedure.  
As  far  as  compensation  for  the  costs  of  the  provision  of  universal  service  in  the  past  is 
concerned,  a  civil  law  agreement  between  the  incumbent  fixed  network  operator  and  its 
competitors was concluded in spring 2004 and will be in force within 31 December 2004. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
In the past year the Austrian telecommunications market has been characterised by increasing 
volumes, growing sales in mobile and data communications and falling tariffs in the fixed and 
mobile network sectors. Net revenue increased by more than 5% from € 4.13 billion to € 4.34 
billion with mobile communications accounting  for 53.4% of the total. Due to increasing 
broadband penetration, broadband revenue rose from € 186 million in 2002 to € 279 million 
in 2003, an increase of just over 50%
87.  
The  incumbent  fixed  network  operator  continues  to  retain  its  leadership  position  in  the 
market, with the rate of decline in its market share now slowing down. Though there is a 
decrease from 50% to 47% market share for local phone calls on the basis of retail revenues, 
its market share for all fixed phone calls, i.e. long distance, international, local calls and calls 
to  mobile  together,  remains  unchanged  at  54%.  On  the  basis  of  outgoing  minutes  the 
incumbent has retained a market share of 48%.  
There are five major competing alternative operators in the fixed telephony market. The two 
biggest alternative operators hold 13% and 11% market share respectively on the basis of 
                                                 
87  Data in this paragraph is taken from RTR’s “Kommunikationsbericht 2003”.  
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retail revenues. The others hold 5% to 3% each. 75% of the shares of the largest of these five 
alternative operators are held by public institutions. There are five mobile operators in the 
Austrian market. The market share of the mobile operator which is owned by the incumbent 
fixed network operator has decreased slightly in the past year and is now at about 42%. The 
market share of the second biggest operator has fallen from 29% to about 27%, whereas the 
third operator and the fourth gained a little by rising to 20% (19%) and 10% (8%) market 
share respectively. A fifth operator entered the Austrian mobile market in December 2003 and 
this  had  a  market  share  of  just  over  1%  in  August  2004.  End user  prices  in  mobile 
communications have fallen dramatically over the last few years and connections for less than 
1 cent per minute have become common.  
All mobile operators have so far met the coverage requirements for the roll out of UMTS 
services.  Coverage  of  25%  was  achieved  by  all  five  operators  by  the  end  of  2003.  50% 
coverage is required by the end of 2005. 
Approximately 19% of the Austrian households have broadband internet access. Operators 
providing broadband internet access via cable have a market share of 55%. The incumbent 
fixed telephone network operator has a market share of 42%. 
At least six operators reported to the NRA the launch of voice over IP. 
THE NRA 
The  Austrian  Regulatory  Authority  for  Broadcasting  and  Telecommunications  (RTR)  was 
established by new legislation on 1 April 2001. It acts as the operational arm of the Austrian 
Communications  Authority  (KommAustria)  and  the  TKK.  The  RTR  is  divided  into  two 
specialized sections (Broadcasting and Telecommunications) and is responsible for market 
definitions, operational tasks assigned to it under the Austrian Telecommunications Act, and 
operations for KommAustria.  
The duties of the TKK are specified in the Telecommunications Act 2003. Among these there 
are determinations of significant market power in the relevant markets and the imposition of 
specific remedies, as well as the approval of general terms and conditions and tariffs. RTR 
provides  expertise  and  handles  all  administrative  matters  on  behalf  of  the  TKK.  TKK’s 
members  act  independently.  The  presiding  member  is  a  judge.  No  regular  legal  recourse 
against its decision is possible. There is, however, the possibility to file a complaint with the 
Administrative and the Constitutional Courts. 
KommAustria  regulates  the  broadcasting  sector.  Its  responsibilities  are  laid  down  in  the 
Austrian Federal Act on the establishment of the Austrian Communications Authority and 
have been extended by the new Telecommunications Act in 2003. Its competences include 
inter alia the administration of the broadcasting frequency spectrum and the regulation of 
communications infrastructure for broadcasting and additional broadcasting services. 
It is noteworthy that KommAustria is under the direct authority of the Federal Chancellery 
with  just  one  official  being  responsible  for  its  decisions.  The  public  broadcasting 
infrastructure is owned by a foundation. Any concerns as to the division of interests of the 
regulator and the owner will therefore depend on the concrete organisational structure of this 
foundation  and  on  how  its  representatives  are  nominated.  The  Commission  services  will 
continue to examine this issue.  
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The national consultation according to the new framework usually runs in parallel with the 
Community consultation under Article 7 of the Framework Directive. First experiences have 
shown that this approach might make it difficult for the Austrian NRA as well as other NRAs 
and the Commission to take properly into account the contributions of market players. The 
extent to which the national consultation is however taken into account in the NRA’s final 
decision  cannot  be  stated  in  general.  RTR  is  aware  of  its  duty  to  consider  a  second 
consultation  after  it  has  made  significant  modifications  to  its  drafts  following  the  first 
consultation.  
The Austrian Administrative Court partly relaxed the privileges of business and professional 
secrecy in proceedings before the NRA in a judgement of 25 February 2004
88. The court ruled 
that where reports are adduced as evidence in proceedings before the NRA, no deletion of 
business  data  is  permitted,  since  otherwise  such  reports  would  be  tantamount  to  “secret” 
evidence. As a result of this decision market players may, in future, be reluctant to initiate 
proceedings before the NRA or may provide less data because of the risk of publication of 
relevant data. This may hamper the NRA in its tasks. 
As regards the co operation between the NRA and the National Competition Authority (NCA) 
under  the  old  TKG,  the  NRA  could  approve  tariffs  without  assessing  their  anti 
competitiveness. The latter assessment fell under the competences of the NCA. Following a 
complaint  by  the  NCA, the  Cartel  Court  in  Vienna  obliged  the  incumbent  fixed  network 
operator  by  way  of  a  judgement  of  18 March  2004  to  terminate  an  abuse  of  a  dominant 
position committed by the application of certain of its bundled tariffs. These tariffs had been 
approved by the NRA on 21 July 2003, hence under the old TKG. 
General regulatory policy for Austria is developed by the Ministry of Transport, Innovation 
and  Technology  in  close  collaboration  with  the  regulatory  authority.  A  clear  long term 
regulatory policy and far sightedness is certainly positive, as it provides a perspective to the 
market players.  
When ordinances have to be issued by the Ministry preparatory input is frequently provided 
by the regulatory authority. 
APPEAL MECHANISM 
Appeals  against  KommAustria’s  decisions  have  to  be  addressed  to  the  Federal 
Communications Senate, an administrative body with court like competences, and appear to 
have a suspensory effect in general as here, unlike in the telecommunications area, general 
administrative law (Allgemeines Verwaltungsverfahrensgesetz – AVG) applies (according to 
which appeals do have such effect). 
MARKET ANALYSIS 
Market definition is done by ordinance. KommAustria is responsible for the market definition 
and analysis and imposition of remedies in the broadcasting area, whereas RTR is in charge of 
                                                 
88  Decision  of  the  Verwaltungsgerichtshof  of  the  Republic  of  Austria  of  25  February  2004, 
Zl.2002/03/0273 7.  
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market definition in the telecommunications area. Finally, TKK is responsible for market 
analysis and the imposition of remedies for telecommunication markets.  
Whereas Member States must ensure under the EU framework that market analysis is carried 
out, where appropriate, in collaboration with the national competition authorities, the Austrian 
TKG appears not to contain a specific legislative basis for such collaboration. The NRA has 
confirmed, however, that it does involve the competition authority at an early stage in relevant 
procedures. 
Pursuant to the new TKG only those undertakings have the right to act as a party in the 
procedure of market analysis which are directly affected by this procedure.  
Seventeen markets have been defined under the new framework, of which sixteen markets 
were defined at a first stage by way of an ordinance of RTR. Concerning the broadcasting 
market, which is defined by separate ordinance of KommAustria, Austria’s definition deviates 
from that recommended by the Commission and has been notified on 19 January 2004. The 
wholesale broadband access market has neither been defined nor notified yet. 
By 15 October 2004 seven consultations on market analysis had been concluded. Moreover, 
TKK has notified to the Commission under Article 7 of the Framework Directive eight draft 
measures  concerning  determination  as  to  significant  market  power  and  the  imposition  or 
withdrawal of resulting obligations. The analyses completed concern the following relevant 
markets: 1) the retail market for the minimum set of leased lines (market 7, Commission’s 
response:  no  comments);  2)  the  market  for  transit  services  in  the  fixed  public  telephone 
network  (market  10,  Commission’s  response:  veto);  3)  the  wholesale  unbundled  access 
market  (market  11,  Commission’s  response:  no  comments);  4)  markets  for  wholesale 
terminating and trunk segments of leased lines (markets 13 and 14, Commission’s responses: 
comments); 5) the market for mobile access and call origination (market 15, Commission’s 
response: comments); 6) the market for wholesale mobile voice call termination (market 16, 
Commission’s  response:  comments);  and  7)  the  broadcasting  market  (market  18, 
Commission’s response: comments). 
The fact that market definition and market analysis are carried out by two different bodies in 
the telecommunications sector, RTR on the one hand and TKK on the other, gives rise to 
concern on the part of the market players as to whether the flexibility of the NRA envisaged 
in the Framework Directive is fully ensured and the Commission services are examining this 
issue. If TKK comes to the conclusion that the market it analyses should have been defined in 
a different way than actually done by ordinance of the RTR, it appears not to be able to 
simply modify the market definition accordingly under national law.  
The  TKG  appears  to  ensure  that  the  NRA  has  the  full  range  of  remedies  under  the  new 
regulatory framework at its disposal. It is apparently a matter for the NRA to decide in every 
case, which to impose. In order to ensure full transposition of the minimum list to be included 
in a RUO, Section 49 (2) of the TKG provides for the possibility to lay down the relevant 
details in an ordinance. Such an ordinance has not been issued yet. Pursuant to Austrian law 
the old interconnection ordinance would apparently still be applicable. Austria has, however, 
not notified this old ordinance as a measure to transpose the new framework, the significance 
of which is being considered by the Commission services.  
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MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Objectives of framework 
Full transposition of all objectives of Article 8 of the Framework Directive has to be verified. 
For example, the law does not seem to contain any provisions relating to the special emphasis 
in the framework on the interests of handicapped people. Austria also has included additional 
objectives, which are not in the framework (e. g. in Section 1 (2) no. 1 of the TKG there is the 
objective included to promulgate Austrian industrial policy, “Standortqualität”).  
Rights of way 
Difficulties  are  reported  by  market  players  and  may  arise  as  far  as  rights  of  way  are 
concerned.  In  general,  the  applicant  may  use  his  right  of  way  after  the  highest 
telecommunications authority (Oberste Fernmeldebehörde, the Ministry) has decided that he 
has such a right at his disposal. In such a case the general administrative procedural law 
(AVG) would apply, which means that the appeal to the ministry has suspensory effect. It has 
to be seen whether this raises concerns with regard to the Framework Directive. 
As already illustrated in the Eighth Implementation Report, there is serious concern on the 
part of operators about the constraints imposed by regional and local authorities on the roll 
out of networks, since the procedures for obtaining rights of way seem to be complex, time 
consuming and expensive. This could in particular have an impact on the roll out of the 3G 
network. Some local authorities are reported to ask market players to sign civil law contracts 
for the rights of way allegedly to by pass existing limitations concerning administrative fees. 
Universal service 
The Austrian government has notified the Commission of the imposition of universal service 
obligations on the incumbent. This decision will be valid until the end of 2004. With a view to 
keeping the costs of the service as low as possible the Ministry for Transport, Innovation and 
Technology  plans  to  consider  transferring  parts  of  the  universal  service  obligations  to 
alternative operators. A public consultation on this matter will probably be initiated. 
New  rules  on  must carry  have  been  passed  by  the  Parliament  and  have  apparently  been 
broadly accepted by the relevant market players. According to these new provisions only the 
two  nationwide  public  service  broadcasters  enjoy  free  of  charge  must carry  status.  Upon 
request  and  for  consideration  the  only  nationwide  private  TV  programme  must  also  be 
carried. Furthermore local terrestrial programmes have to be carried upon request and for 
remuneration if further conditions (such as the broadcasting of “Austrian content”) are met. 
These new laws, have not yet, however, been notified to the Commission. 
Mobile  number  portability,  which  is  a  key  facilitator  of  consumer  choice  and  effective 
competition in a competitive telecommunications environment, was still not offered in Austria 
on 1 October 2004. However it is laid down in Section 23 of the TKG that operators of public 
telecommunications services must ensure that they offer their subscribers the possibility to 
change provider of telecommunications services and to keep at the same time their telephone 
number without any change in the specific use assigned to the relevant number range. As far 
as mobile number portability is concerned the Minister is empowered to determine the details 
of  this  obligation  by  ordinance.  He  has  adopted  such  secondary  legislation 
(“Nummerübertragungsverordnung”) in November 2003. Furthermore, RTR made a decision  
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seeking  to  resolve  open  questions  between  operators  concerning  the  provision  of  mobile 
number portability in July 2004. According to this regulation fines will be applicable as of 
16 October 2004, if mobile number portability is not offered by this date.
89  
Itemised billing, the failure to introduce a sufficient level of detail of which led to a ruling of 
the  European  Court  of  Justice  against  Austria  in  September  2004
90,  has  apparently  been 
offered by the incumbent since May 2004. It appears that itemised billing is provided upon 
request and free of charge, either in paper or in electronic form according to an ordinance 
issued by RTR which came into force on 1 May 2004. 
ePrivacy 
The  new  Telecommunications  Act  also  covers  the  ePrivacy  Directive.  However,  the 
transposition of Article 13 of the Directive, which deals inter alia with unsolicited e mails 
(spam),  limits  the  beneficiaries  of  this  prohibition  to  “consumers”  (“Verbraucher”).  The 
Ministry has indicated that an amendment of the respective rule is already under discussion. 
Mobile services 
In the mobile market there has been extremely strong price competition particularly for end 
user  tariffs.  For  signing  a  one year contract  for  mobile  telephony,  an  end user  regularly 
receives a handset and by one new entrant operator also a cash payment. On some mobile 
networks the price of a call can be less than € cent 1 per minute. Here the NRA will have to 
decide whether it remains appropriate to continue to accept high mobile call termination fees 
in particular charged by new entrants or whether these fees might not have to be regarded as a 
subsidy which enables the market behaviour described above. 
Local Loop Unbundling 
After a lack of success in previous years, it appears that unbundling has now successfully 
taken off (reportedly 50 000 to 60 000 unbundled lines) and no further complaints have been 
reported as regards co location issues.  
                                                 
89  As from 16 October 2004 mobile number portability has been offered by all mobile operators. 
90  Judgement of the European Court of Justice Case C 411/02 of 14 September.  
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POLAND 
TRANSPOSITION 
The new Telecommunications Law aiming to transpose the new regulatory framework for 
electronic communications was published in August and came into force on 3 September 
2004. A significant amount of secondary measures that are needed to ensure full transposition 
and  effective  application  of  the  directives  remains  to  be  adopted,  and  the  Ministry  of 
Infrastructure  (hereinafter  the  Ministry)  is  currently  working  on  the  drafts.  Until  the  new 
executive ordinances are adopted, those issued under the Telecommunications Law of 2000 
remain in force.  
The Commission services are presently examining the conformity of the measures adopted, in 
particular  in  relation  to  provisions  concerning  the  appeals  mechanism,  mobile  number 
portability, the use of radio frequencies where the risk of harmful interference is negligible, 
facility sharing and co location rules. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The incumbent fixed network operator   a publicly owned company
91– remains the dominant 
player with regard to fixed telephony and has between 82% and 90% of all call markets.
92 
Although there are about 80 licensed (under the old regime) fixed operators, they are mostly 
active on local markets. By the end of 2003, twenty seven service providers had a prefix 
assigned (for the purpose of carrier selection   CS   and carrier pre selection   CPS); however, 
only a few of them are active on the long distance, international and fixed to mobile calls 
market (CS and CPS is not available in Poland for local calls – see below). The penetration 
rate of the fixed telephony network remains low and according to the NRA’s report for 2003
93 
it was 34% in terms of population by mid 2003. The number of fixed lines in Poland is still 
growing (albeit slowly) and the lines built and owned by new entrants represent about 10% of 
all PSTN lines
94. 
There are three mobile network operators with similar market shares. The mobile penetration 
rate has recently reached 51%, but despite some reported growth in 2004 (slower than in 
previous years, however), it remains the lowest among EU 25. Next to the relatively low GDP 
per capita in Poland, this is partly due to the high retail prices for mobile services. None of 
more than a dozen licensed MVNOs managed to start their operations, as no mobile network 
operator was willing to sign appropriate agreements.  
As regards cable infrastructure, Poland, with 4.5 million cable TV subscribers, is the third 
biggest market in the EU (after Germany and the Netherlands). There are more than 600 cable 
                                                 
91  The Polish state is still in a possession of 3.94% of the incumbent’s shares. A big European operator is a 
strategic investor and has 47.5% stake in the incumbent’s share holding. 
92  On  the  basis  of  minutes  of  traffic,  the  incumbent  has  89%  of  the  market  for  local  calls,  85%  of 
international calls, 82% of long distance calls and 90% of the market for calls to mobile networks 
(competition on the market for calls to the mobile network has been only possible since October 2003). 
93  Raport roczny Prezesa URTiP, 2003 r. 
94  idem.  
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network  operators  and  a  penetration  rate  is  approximately  54%  (households  passed).  All 
major cable operators, besides the transmission of radio and TV signals, are also engaged in 
the provision of other electronic communications services (mainly Internet).
95  
Broadband penetration in Poland is just 0.5% with only 192 307 DSL lines reported in July 
2004
96. Approximately 6% of all DLS lines have been constructed and are owned by new 
entrants. 
THE NRA 
Under  the  new  law  three  bodies  have  regulatory  competences  in  the  field  of  electronic 
communications in Poland, including the Ministry of Infrastructure, which is responsible for 
defining the relevant markets.  
The  Office  of  Telecommunications  and  Post  Regulation  (URTiP)  is  a  relatively  new 
institution,  having  been  established  on  1  April  2002  to  replace  the  Office  of 
Telecommunications Regulation (itself created in January 2001). The Office employs around 
600 people, but a significant number of these deal with frequency management and less than 
10%  deal  with  regulatory  matters.  According  to  certain  market  players,  URTiP  is  facing 
certain budgetary and staffing problems that make it harder for the regulator to carry out its 
tasks.  
There is also a common perception among operators that UTRiP’s performance, quality and 
effectiveness  in  the  execution  of  its  regulatory  powers  are  in  need  of  considerable 
improvement, and they have an obvious lack of confidence in the manner in which URTiP 
addresses its tasks, particularly in regard to the existing limitations on the market.  
Concerning the networks used for radio and television broadcasting, as well as transmission 
services  using  those  networks,  regulatory  competences  and  responsibilities  are  divided 
between  two  bodies.  It  is  being  examined  whether  there  is  a  clear  distribution  of  tasks 
between  URTiP  (the  regulator  for  telecommunications)  and  the  National  Broadcasting 
Council (KRRiT – the regulator for TV and radio content matters as well as for some digital 
TV  issues).  KRRiT  is  responsible  for  the  assignment  of  frequencies  for  the  purpose  of 
providing digital TV and for matters concerning conditional access systems, APIs and EPGs 
as well as “the multiplexing of digital signals”. It is not clear whether “the multiplexing of 
digital signals” would also include digital broadcasting transmission services.  
Appeals and dispute resolution 
The new law does not seem to fully transpose a provision of Article 4 of the Framework 
Directive, according to which, pending the outcome of an appeal, the decision of the NRA 
shall stand, unless the appeal body decides otherwise. In Poland an appeal would normally 
have a suspensive effect, unless the NRA decides otherwise on a case by case basis. The 
Commission services are looking into this issue. 
                                                 
95  According to the report published by the National Broadcasting Council – Krajowa Rada Radiofonii i 
Telewizji  –  “Radio  i  Telewizja  w  Polsce:  Raport  o  stanie  rynku  w  chwili  przystąpienia  do  Unii 
Europejskiej”, September 2004. 
96  Cable operators are also providing broadband services; however URTiP did not provide any data in this 
respect.  
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It is reported that, prior to accession, many disputes and proceedings took years before a 
decision was reached, exceeding by far the deadlines provided for by the law. In addition, a 
high  percentage  of  decisions  has  been  reversed  by  the  courts  on  appeal  (such  court 
proceedings  are  also  extremely  lengthy  in  Poland)  due  to  administrative  and  substantive 
deficiencies in the decisions. As well as the need to respect the procedural deadlines, the 
Commission services will monitor whether these cases represent ongoing issues and, if so, 
their implications for effective application of the new framework 
Market analysis 
It seems that the process of market definition and market analysis has been separated between 
two bodies. In effect, it appears that the Ministry (acting as a regulator in this respect) will 
define relevant markets (concerning product and geographical scope) in an ordinance, and 
only thereafter URTiP will analyse the pre defined markets.  It is to be seen whether this 
approach raises concerns as to how the NRA can properly exercise its discretionary powers in 
such  circumstances  and  whether  any  serious  difficulties  in  defining  relevant  markets 
appropriate to national circumstances in the context of constantly changing markets arise. 
Moreover,  it  seems  that  no  effective  appeal  mechanism  (as  required  by  the  Framework 
Directive) will be applicable to a ministerial ordinance defining relevant markets, which has 
to be seen as a regulatory decision. Although there would be a possibility for each individual 
concerned to refer the case to the Constitutional Court, the latter could only decide on the 
conformity of the ordinance with the Polish Constitution, depriving the market players of a 
right of appeal based on the substantive aspects. This procedure could only be launched after 
the regulator has issued a decision on the basis of that ordinance and the decision would have 
to be final (no other appeal possibilities under national law). The Commission services are 
looking into these issues. 
The market analyses process has not yet started and the NRA is waiting for the Ministry to 
adopt and publish an ordinance defining relevant markets. The draft ordinance was recently 
published for a public consultation. While defining the relevant product markets, the Ministry 
is not planning to deviate from the Commission’s Recommendation on relevant markets. With 
regard to the geographical scope of the markets, the Ministry is planning to define all markets 
(except  for  the  call  termination)  as  national.  The  authorities  have  widely  consulted  on 
questionnaires that are to be sent to operators, and a public tender has been published for a 
consultancy that will provide the NRA with expertise on the criteria to be used for analysing 
the competitiveness of the relevant markets. No formal decision regarding the sequence of the 
markets to be analysed has been taken. 
STARTING CONDITIONS 
The  Polish  market  for  electronic  communications  was  formally  liberalised  with  the 
introduction of competition into international calls in the beginning of 2003 (the market for 
local and long distance calls had been legally opened for competition a year earlier, although 
competition does not seem to have developed because of the failure to effectively implement 
CS  and  CPS  for  local  calls).  URTiP  has  issued  several  decisions  designating  SMP 
undertakings  on  all  previously  regulated  markets  (fixed  telephony,  leased  lines  services, 
mobile  telephony  and  national  market  for  interconnection  in  the  public  mobile  telephone 
network). As regards the latter market, however, the appeal proceedings, launched by all three 
mobile operators (designated SMP) are on going, and as a result of the fact that the decisions  
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in question do not contain an immediate effect clause, the appeals have had a suspensive 
effect (in accordance with administrative law). As a result, no obligations for transparency, 
cost orientation or cost accounting separation can be legally imposed on the mobile operators. 
The cost orientation of the incumbent’s charges for interconnection needs to be verified; the 
Commission services are examining whether the incumbent’s cost accounting model has been 
verified and approved by the regulator so far.  
The fixed network incumbent operator is legally required under the provisions of the Polish 
Law to provide for carrier selection (CS) and carrier pre section (CPS); however, there are 
several problems with their effective implementation. For technical reasons, CS and CPS are 
not available for a significant number of end users connected to analogue exchanges and full 
digitisation of the incumbent’s network seems to be due only by the end of 2005 (the plan for 
modernisation of the network and its timing have been approved by URTiP). It seems that 
with regard to local calls, CS and CPS are not available  at all. Both,  the incumbent and 
URTiP claim that this is a result of an “open” numbering plan currently in place in Poland that 
will be changed to a “closed” one only by the end of 2005. It has been acknowledged that 
even  with  the  open  numbering  plan,  the  introduction  of  CS  and  CPS  for  local  calls  is 
technically possible. 
It is being examined whether number portability (NP) is available for subscribers in Poland. 
As  regards  fixed  number  portability,  this  was  already  required  under  the  old 
Telecommunications Law. However, at the request of main fixed operators (including the 
incumbent), it would appear that URTiP has issued decisions suspending end users’ right to 
port their numbers until the end of 2004 (and until the end of 2005 for the incumbent’s end 
users connected to analogue exchanges).  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Authorisations / rights of use 
Transposition of the requirement that, where possible, in particular where the risk of harmful 
interference is negligible, the use of radio frequencies should not be subject to the grant of 
individual rights of use but the conditions for usage of such frequencies should be included in 
the general authorisation will be looked into by the Commission services. This needs to be 
examined in regard to the general objective of the new framework to ensure the efficient and 
effective  management  of  radio  frequencies,  as  well  the  objective  justification  and 
proportionality of such an approach. 
Mobile number portability 
Correct transposition of mobile number portability, i.e. the right of each subscriber for mobile 
services to retain their number(s) independently of the undertaking providing the service, will 
be looked into by the Commission services. Although it has been formally introduced into the 
Polish system with the adoption of the new law, the relevant provision of the Law seems to 
exclude pre paid customers
97 of mobile services from its scope.  
                                                 
97  Pre paid customers constitute more than 50% of all mobile end users.  
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Access-interconnection 
The  fixed  network  incumbent  operator  has  recently  published  a  reference  interconnection 
offer (RIO) for the first time. This marks the third attempt by the incumbent to have the RIO 
approved by the NRA, and on 5 March 2004 URTiP issued a favourable decision in this 
respect. It seems, however, that the decision was not based on the appropriate cost accounting 
calculation  (as  no  cost  accounting  model  has  yet  been  approved)  but  on  benchmarking 
(average  cost levels of  other European operators). The decision has been appealed to the 
courts by the alternative operators, and this procedure is on going. 
It  is  being  verified  whether  reference  offers  for  leased  lines,  bitstream  and  local  loop 
unbundling remain to be published. 
In the new law, a general obligation to negotiate access agreements seems to be imposed on 
all undertakings. The Commission services are examining the conformity of this measure with 
the relevant article of the new regulatory framework, which provides for an obligation for all 
undertakings to negotiate interconnection.  It appears that, in case access negotiations fail, 
URTiP can (at the request of a party or at its own initiative) issue a binding decision resolving 
the dispute or establishing criteria for co operation. The Polish law states that before issuing 
such  a  decision  a  consultation  on  a  national  level,  as  well  as  with  other  NRAs  and  the 
Commission, would need to be completed. 
Facility sharing, co-location 
The new law seems to impose an obligation on all public network operators with regard to 
facility sharing and co location, if undertakings do not have access to viable alternatives or 
there is a lack of technical or economic reasonableness to duplicate the existing infrastructure. 
The Commission services are examining this obligation for conformity with the provisions of 
the Framework Directive, which allow the Member States to impose the sharing of facilities 
or property where undertakings are deprived of access to viable alternatives because of the 
need to protect the environment, public health, public security or to meet town and country 
planning objectives. The provisions in Poland are particularly important for cable operators in 
respect to sharing of ducts of the incumbent operator, but they also seem to apply to other 
infrastructure.  
Single European emergency number 
The Commission services are examining whether access to the single European emergency 
number  (“112”)  free  of  charge  is  ensured  in  Poland  for  fixed  network  subscribers,  and 
whether access is only possible for mobile end users. 
Directory and directory enquiry services 
The  Commission  services  are  examining  whether  a  comprehensive  directory  or  directory 
enquiry service (i.e. comprising both fixed and mobile subscribers) is available to end users in 
Poland. The existing directory appears to include only fixed networks’ subscribers.  
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ePrivacy 
The Commission services are examining whether the provision of the Directive on privacy 
and electronic communications, whereby a company that obtained electronic contact details 
for sending e mail or SMS messages from a customer in the context of a sale may use them 
for the marketing of similar products or services as those it has already sold to the customer, 
without an explicit consent of the latter, has been transposed. In Poland, all communications 
for the purpose of direct marketing require prior consent of the subscribers (both legal and 
natural persons). 
Broadband 
Broadband penetration in Poland is one of the lowest in EU 25. One of the reasons for that is 
limited  competition  in  the  broadband  (access)  market.  It  seems  that  the  fixed  incumbent 
operator does not provide a bitstream offer (although required under the Polish law) and local 
loop unbundling is not available in Poland. 
On the other hand, as a result of a relatively low penetration of telephone lines in Poland, new 
entrants are investing in the development of telecommunications infrastructure, including the 
local loop.  
With respect to broadband development in Poland, there also seems to be major potential in 
cable infrastructure. Some cable operators already provide broadband services. 
Frequency management  
The  requirement  for  the  efficient  management  of  radio  frequencies  based  on  objective, 
transparent,  non discriminatory  and  proportionate  procedures  is  formally  transposed  into 
Polish law. However, its effective application remains to be seen. There are concerns on the 
part of market players that, before Poland joined the EU, the prescribed procedures for radio 
frequency allocation and assignment were not fully observed. At least in one case, with regard 
to frequency assignment in 800 MHz band, operators have expressed doubts as to whether the 
procedure  applied  by  URTiP  was  fully  objective,  transparent,  non discriminatory  and 
proportionate.  
URTiP has recently published plans, according to which up to two new operators may be 
granted frequency slots in the 1800 MHz band (for the provision of 2G services) and a fourth 
frequency assignment is foreseen for the provision of 3G services. With regard to the latter 
tender, no conditions relating to the roll out obligations would be imposed. Both tendering 
procedures are to be finalised by May 2005. According to the plans, URTiP will decide on the 
frequency assignment taking account of the need to ensure a competitive environment for the 
electronic communications market in Poland (possibly favouring the operators not yet active 
on the Polish mobile market) as well as the proposed payment for the frequency reservation. 
The  outcome  of  the  tenders  may  prove  vital  for  the  development  of  the  mobile 
communications market in Poland.  
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PORTUGAL 
TRANSPOSITION 
Portugal has transposed most of the European Union (EU) regulatory package on electronic 
communications  through  a  Law  (“Electronic  Communications  Law”)  published  on 
10 February  2004.  This  law  encompasses  the  Framework  Directive,  the  Authorisations 
Directive,  the  Access  Directive,  the  Universal  Service  Directive  as  well  as  the  Radio 
Spectrum Decision. Concerning the e Privacy Directive 2002/58/EC, Article 13 had already 
been transposed in national law through a Decree Law of January 2004; the remainder of the 
Directive  was  transposed  through  Law  n°  41/2004,  published  in  the  official  gazette  on 
18 August 2004. 
Following  the  appointment  of  the  new  government  on  17  July  2004,  electronic 
communications now fall under the responsibility of the Ministry of Public Works, Transport 
and Communications which supervises functional and budget issues, while the definition of 
guidance lines and the priority of actions are articulated together with the Ministry for the 
Presidency. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
Since the full liberalisation of electronic communications in Portugal in 2000, competition has 
had a relatively limited impact on the market. The incumbent operator is still dominant in 
most markets: fixed telephony, mobile telephony, leased lines, narrowband and broadband 
Internet.  It  is  worth  noting  that  there  is  hardly  any  competition  to  the  incumbent  in  the 
broadcasting transmission market (even if one alternative broadcasting network exists), and 
that  the  same  group  owns  significant  interests  in  content  industries  like  broadcasting  and 
published media. 
The number of fixed telephone lines is about 4.3 million in Portugal (40% penetration) and 
has slightly decreased since 2001. The incumbent remains strongly dominant in this market, 
after three years of full liberalisation. Its share is still about 94% of all fixed lines, as well as 
87%  of  fixed  calls  in  terms  of  revenue.  9  operators  are  currently  competing  with  the 
incumbent and their share is only around 21% for national calls and 23% for international 
calls (in volume). A specificity of the Portuguese market was that the incumbent did not own 
the  national  fixed  telecommunications  network  but  only  the  main  cable  TV  network. 
However, in November 2002, the Portuguese Government sold the network to the incumbent 
for  €365  million,  without  public  consultation  or  public  tender.  As  a  consequence,  the 
incumbent  now  controls  both  the  fixed  telecommunications  network  and  the  main  cable 
network, which makes infrastructure competition very unlikely in the medium term. 
The Portuguese market has also failed to attract the interest of large competitors (except one), 
who would have been able to make the high upfront investment necessary to compete with the 
incumbent.  The  high  level  of  interconnection  rates  has  probably  deterred  operators  from 
entering the market. 
Mobile penetration is very high in Portugal, standing at 90% of the population. The total 
turnover  is  €3.2  billion,  higher  than  for  fixed  telephony,  and  is  growing  steadily.  Three  
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operators are competing in the market. They have all launched UMTS services on a limited 
commercial basis. 
In 2003 and 2004, the three mobile operators announced price rises for calls. Such a move 
may  indicate  that  competition  in  the  Portuguese  mobile  market  is  no  longer  as  strong. 
Operators do not seem to be aggressively seeking to build market share and, as a  result, 
market growth has slowed down in 2004. 
Portugal has 667 550 broadband lines. The majority (55%) of these are provided through 
cable, and the remaining 45% mainly through ADSL. The incumbent’s market share is about 
89% of ADSL and 73%, via its cable subsidiary, of broadband cable lines. 
THE NRA 
The independence of the NRA, ANACOM, which had been subject to criticism from new 
entrants, is now clearly enshrined in the law. The law does not restrict the range of remedies 
that can be applied by the regulator. The amount of financial penalties that ANACOM may 
impose on operators has been increased. The law establishes an appeals mechanism through 
the courts for commercial law (in the case of breach proceedings) or the administrative courts. 
Appeals do not have the effect of suspending the NRA’s decisions, except appeals against 
decisions taken by the NRA that, in breach proceedings, determine the application of fines or 
additional sanctions. The appeals procedure takes more than one year to be completed. The 
incumbent has repeatedly appealed a significant number of ANACOM’s decisions in court, 
but still has to win a case, and has not yet been granted a suspension of challenged measures. 
Cooperation with the National Competition Authority (NCA) and the Commission is also 
addressed in the law; however, it seems that the cooperation with the NCA is still at an early 
stage. 
It  is  also  clearly  stated  in  the  law  that  the  NRA  has  to  take  the  Commission’s 
Recommendations into account as far as implementation is concerned, and should inform the 
Commission if it does not follow the Recommendation. The NRA is responsible for spectrum 
management and explicit reference is made to the Spectrum Decision. Portugal modified its 
spectrum charging scheme as of 1 July 2004. This modification follows the new scheme, 
which was implemented in 2001, and is based both on the size of the frequency allocation and 
its use. It reduces by 7.5% the fees concerning the public land mobile service, and by 50% the 
fees applicable to the land digital sound broadcasting service in the VHF and UHF bands. 
Some adjustments are also included concerning fixed service using microwave links, both for 
private and public radio communications. 
New  entrants  are  concerned,  however,  about  practical  implementation:  they  perceive 
ANACOM’s decision making as being slow and not sufficiently resolute, because it seeks to 
strike  a  consensus  or  middle  line  between  the  incumbent  and  the  new  entrants.  The 
incumbent’s view on ANACOM is that its decision making is complaints driven and poorly 
substantiated  both  in  economic  and  technical  terms.  It  noted  that  judicial  reviews  of 
ANACOM’s decisions are not merit based. ANACOM considers that the incumbent’s replies 
to public consultations on draft decisions are not always well substantiated and lack good 
technical and economical foundations. The incumbent’s main grievance with regard to the 
new law is that it allegedly pre defines the obligations to be imposed on operators designated 
as having significant market power (SMP) in the leased lines markets.  
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MARKET ANALYSIS 
In  March  2004,  ANACOM  approved  the  draft  measures  concerning  the  relevant  market 
definitions  and  SMP  assessments  for  publicly  available  switched  narrowband  services 
provided at fixed locations (retail and wholesale services, excluding transit), i.e. markets 1 to 
6 (retail fixed telephony) and 8 and 9 (call origination and termination on fixed networks)of 
the Commission Recommendation on relevant markets. They were then subject to a 30 day 
public consultation. In May 2004, these measures were submitted to the Commission and 
other NRAs of the EU, in line with Article 7(3) of the Framework Directive. The Commission 
had no comments on these draft measures, and, subsequently, ANACOM’s board of directors 
adopted the measures on 8 July 2004. 
On 22 July 2004, ANACOM notified the Commission of the draft remedies related to the 
retail markets for fixed telephony and to the wholesale markets for fixed call termination and 
origination. In this notification, ANACOM proposes in particular to impose on the incumbent 
the obligation to have a wholesale capacity based interconnection offer and the publication of 
a reference offer for wholesale line rental to its competitors on the narrowband fixed market, 
as well as accounting separation, cost orientation or carrier selection/pre selection.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES  
Access and interconnection 
The Reference Interconnection Offer (RIO) was revised in 2004. This revision led to a slight 
decrease in prices. It followed the introduction of co mingling in the 2003 RIO, for the lack of 
which the incumbent had been fined. It includes now interconnect leased lines with capacity 
improved up to 155 Mbit/s, and connection at either the switch or at the end users’ premises. 
Prices are oriented towards prospective costs and are determined using a benchmark based on 
the EU average, rather than the cheapest EU Member States. New entrants would like to see 
wholesale line rental and capacity based voice interconnection introduced quickly, but claim 
that the lengthy SMP designation process at ANACOM has led to unnecessary delays on this 
issue.  They  also  complain  regarding  the  lack  of  information  on  the  incumbent’s  cost 
structures,  albeit  a  description  of  the  incumbent’s  accounting  system  is  made  publicly 
available by ANACOM. According to them, ANACOM’s statements concerning compliance 
with the incumbent’s cost accounting system do not contribute in any way to transparency. 
Concerning carrier pre selection (CPS), ANACOM imposed a 6 month standstill period on 
the incumbent, preventing it from trying to win back its customers who choose to pre select 
their calls via another operator. ANACOM is currently re evaluating the situation. Whereas 
new entrants welcome this measure, which they see as necessary to make any impact on the 
market, the incumbent finds it disproportionate and lodged a complaint in court. Nevertheless 
ANACOM has won the court case in which PTC had asked for a suspension of the decision. 
New entrants regret the price increase on CPS as approved by the NRA in the RIO, whereas 
ANACOM claims that the CPS price defined in the RIO did not change since its introduction. 
New entrants also feel that the costs related to number portability are still too high, whereas, 
according to the incumbent, they do not cover its actual costs.  
The incumbent is strongly dominant on its home retail broadband market, due to the fact that 
it has a very high share both on ADSL and cable. In the summer of 2002 the incumbent made  
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a wholesale ADSL offer available to ISPs. However, this wholesale offer admitted only two 
POI, impending new entrants with their own infrastructure to use it in an efficient manner. In 
addition, the tariffs applied led to a negative gross margin for competing ISPs. Following a 
complaint  by  the  ISPs  in  December  2002,  ANACOM  prohibited,  in  June  2003,  some 
discounts  that  the  incumbent  applied  in  the  wholesale  offer,  which  benefited  its  own 
subsidiaries and caused a price squeeze. At the same time, ANACOM introduced a “retail 
minus” pricing mechanism (with a 40% nominal margin). Nevertheless, this retail minus does 
not apply to monthly fees charged on aggregated access (but only to the local access part). 
New entrants therefore claim that a price squeeze still remains. As a consequence, two of the 
most representative ISPs stopped recruiting new residential ADSL customers in January 2004 
and one of them sold its client basis to the incumbent, who now holds a share of 86% for 
retail broadband DSL. ANACOM ordered in April 2004 an ATM interconnection offer with 
more  access  points  (from  2  to  28)  be  made  available  to  competing  operators.  However, 
ANACOM has not yet ensured that the incumbent makes a bitstream offer which would allow 
competitors a viable alternative to the wholesale product. In particular, the incumbent has not 
yet been mandated to allow competitors who invest in their own infrastructure to interconnect 
at local level.  
ANACOM admitted that these interventions have not had a major impact on the market in 
terms of an increase of new entrants’ market share, but argued that this share might well have 
decreased, had those measures not been taken. It is also worth noting that the incumbent 
launched its broadband cable offer before a viable wholesale ADSL offer became available, 
effectively pre empting part of the high speed Internet market. 
Concerning local loop unbundling (LLU), the number of unbundled lines is still very low in 
Portugal. Despite several regulatory interventions, head on prices (set up fees for eligibility of 
lines, testing, transfer of loops etc) remain rather high and set up periods remain long, which 
does  not  encourage  investment  from  new  entrants.  According  to  the  incumbent,  41%  of 
unbundled lines requested by the new entrants are not actually being used to provide services 
to the end users. 
Mobile termination rates are very high in Portugal. Following regulatory pressure, two mobile 
operators have agreed to reduce their prices. Under the old regulatory framework ANACOM 
did not designate any mobile operator as having SMP on the mobile interconnection market 
and therefore could not require those operators to have cost oriented tariffs. However, with 
the SMP assessment currently under way in ANACOM under the new regulatory framework, 
termination prices will probably be reduced, as all mobile operators will have SMP on their 
mobile networks. As far as mobile gateways are concerned, ANACOM prohibited their use 
for commercial purposes in March 2004. 
Leased lines were one of the main areas of concern of ANACOM in 2003. Following an 
intervention from the regulator in 2004, the incumbent had to change its discount scheme, and 
in particular the thresholds, which favoured its own subsidiaries. A new tariff structure was 
introduced, leading to an overall reduction in prices and to a non discriminatory tariff scheme. 
Overall,  interconnection  circuit  prices  decreased  whereas  local end  prices  increased.  New 
entrants welcome this regulatory intervention, but they also feel that they are discriminated 
against by the incumbent as far as leased lines delivery times are concerned. ANACOM had 
analysed data on delivery times and concluded that there was no evidence of discrimination. 
New entrants also think that the introduction of new performance indicators related to quality 
of service in Portugal should give a more accurate picture of the situation.  
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New entrants have, as was the case in previous implementation reports, complained about 
conditions of access to submarine cables. It seems that, in order to gain access to a submarine 
station, an operator needs to have capacity leased from a submarine cable which belongs to 
the incumbent, giving the incumbent a significant competitive advantage over its rivals in this 
market segment. 
Authorisations  
The Portuguese legislation establishes a general authorisation regime. Would be operators are 
requested to send a summary of their intended activities to the NRA. The only exception 
arises when the use of numbers and frequencies, as scarce resources, is subject to allocation of 
individual rights of use by the NRA. 
In the past, rights of way had been a cause of serious concern in Portugal. New entrants are 
satisfied with the wording of the national legislation, which they see as being in line with the 
Authorisations  Directive.  They  are  also  concerned  about  the  actual  implementation,  in 
particular at local level, as each local authority will levy its own charge. The question of the 
continuation of the public domain use tax remains unanswered. 
ANACOM has put forward a Decision containing a reference offer on duct sharing, which 
would be imposed on the incumbent as holder of the “concession” under which the incumbent 
operates.  New  entrants  welcome  this  Decision.  The  incumbent  has  already  expressed 
dissatisfaction concerning this reference offer and questions whether such an obligation may 
be placed on an SMP operator without market analysis and without regard to proportionality 
as well as other tests enshrined in the Directives. ANACOM points out that this obligation 
was imposed, according with the new law, on the incumbent, as holder of the concession and 
not as having SMP in a particular market. 
Universal Service 
The incumbent is currently the universal service provider and has been granted a concession 
for 30 years until 2025. No consultation was organised prior to the granting of the concession. 
The  bidding  mechanism  provided  for  in  the  law  will  only  apply  after  the  end  of  the 
concession period of the incumbent, which will remain, until that date, the only provider of 
universal service. Competing operators do not contest this as such as long as, and on condition 
that, no universal service financing mechanism requiring a contribution from them is put in 
place. 
In 2003, ANACOM ruled that the incumbent was not entitled to claim compensation for the 
costs resulting from the universal service provision before liberalisation took place in 2001. 
For the future, there is still a question as to whether or not the universal service fund provided 
for  in  the  law,  with  possible  contributions  from market  players, might  be  activated.  This 
would undoubtedly raise objections by new entrants. In the meantime, the incumbent has sent 
its calculations of the universal service net costs until 2003 to ANACOM. The incumbent 
claims that an access deficit still exists, but that it cannot raise its monthly fee, as subscribers 
would then turn to the mobile operators instead. 
In line with the Portuguese legislation, the universal service includes  a standard contract, 
including applicable prices, for the basic telephone service. Any amendment to these prices 
must be notified to the NRA 15 days in advance and 30 days in advance to subscribers, which 
the incumbent thinks is excessive.  
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There have been several NRA rulings over the last two years, in accordance with the previous 
regulatory framework, concerning the absence of a comprehensive directory including both 
fixed and mobile numbers. The Commission services are examining the availability of the 
comprehensive directory under the new regulatory framework. Two mobile operators have 
refused to provide subscriber data to the central database, alleging previous cases of use by 
the incumbent of this data for commercial purposes. The latter has denied any such behavior. 
There is only one competing provider of directory services. 
Only public service broadcasters enjoy, free of charge, must carry status. This only represents 
two channels.  
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SLOVENIA 
TRANSPOSITION 
The  new  Electronic  Communications  Act  (the  ECA)  transposing  the  five  directives 
comprising  the  2002  regulatory  framework  came  into  force  on  1  May  2004.  As  regards 
secondary  legislation,  the  ECA  envisaged  the  adoption  of  various  ministerial  rules  and 
regulations  as  well  as  regulatory  acts  by  the  national  regulatory  authority,  no  later  than 
6 months after the entry into force of the ECA. Thus, all relevant secondary acts should have 
been adopted by November 2004. According to the ECA, secondary legislation issued on the 
basis of the former Telecommunications Act remains valid until new secondary legislation 
has been issued and to the extent that it is not in contradiction with the provisions of the new 
law. By September 2004 almost half of the envisaged secondary acts were already adopted, 
some were in preparatory stages, but there were also several whose preparation had not yet 
started.  According  to  the  Ministry  of  Information  Society,  the  absence  of  some  of  the 
envisaged  secondary  acts  does  not  affect  the  implementation  of  the  principles  of  the  EU 
regulatory framework.  
The Slovenian authorities have indicated that the ECA constitutes a full transposition of the 
new EU regulatory framework on electronic communications. Currently the text of the ECA 
is under the examination of the Commission services. So far there have been identified some 
issues requiring verification with regard to conformity with some of the principles of the 
regulatory framework. For example, the new law does not seem to refer to the existence of an 
unfair burden for the universal service provider as the basic consideration for the national 
regulatory authority upon deciding whether payment of compensation is needed. The relevant 
provisions of the new law also appear to leave some room for uncertainty as to whether 
existing SMP obligations will remain in force only up to their purported date of expiry or until 
the completion of the market reviews, if later. 
In general, both the previous Telecommunications Act and ECA were regarded by market 
players  as  quite  satisfactory,  but  the  main  concern  in  the  opinion  of  the  market  players 
appeared to be the proper implementation of the law by the national regulatory authority.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The small size of the market seems to have implications on competition and regulation in the 
telecommunications sector in Slovenia but, nevertheless, since 2001 the sector has grown by 
about  8%
98.  This  has  mainly  been  driven  by  the  growth  in  the  mobile  segment,  where 
penetration has increased from 84% as of September 2003 up to 95% as of May 2004. The 
fixed line penetration is 41.8% of inhabitants as of 30 June 2003. Internet penetration is 45%. 
Broadband penetration is 3.8% as of July 2004. 
There seems to be virtually no competition as regards domestic fixed telephony services and 
very  little  competition  in  international  fixed  voice  telephony  services.  More  competition 
seems to exist in the market of international calls through VoIP telephony and there are 12 
                                                 
98  IBM/4th Report on Monitoring of EU Candidate Countries (Telecommunication Services Sector).  
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alternative  VoIP  operators,  including  the  fixed  new  entrants.  The  fixed  incumbent  is  the 
largest, and for a long time was the only fixed operator in Slovenia (with SMP status in fixed 
public telephony services, the interconnection market and the leased lines market). The first 
interconnection agreement with an alternative provider of fixed telephony was reached only in 
June 2004, i.e. three years after the liberalisation of the market. There are also several other 
alternative fixed operators who have plans to start offering their services, but are said to be 
waiting for more favourable market conditions.  
As regards mobile communications, the fixed incumbent’s mobile arm still has 76% of mobile 
subscribers, and holds DCS, GSM, and 3G licences. Mobile telephony networks and services 
are also provided by two other operators, one of which has 21% of the subscribers and holds 
DCS and GSM licenses and the other 3% of the subscribers and holds only a DCS license. 
There is also one MVNO operating on the basis of the network of the fixed incumbent’s 
mobile  arm.  Despite  the  exceptionally  large  retail  market  share  of  the  fixed  incumbent’s 
mobile  arm,  the  Slovenian  national  regulatory  authority,  the  Post  and  Electronic 
Communications Agency (the APEK) has also designated the second largest mobile operator 
as having SMP status for the years of 2003 and 2004 basing its respective decisions on criteria 
other  than  the  size  of  the  market  share,  e.g.  global  connectivity,  high  market  share  of 
international  roaming,  good  technological  base  and  experience  in  provision  of  goods  and 
services. This operator has challenged both of the decisions of the APEK in administrative 
court, arguing that by assigning them SMP status the APEK has violated its obligation to 
promote competition. The disputes are still pending.  
No competition seems to exist yet in the 3G sector. In 2001 Slovenia initiated a process of 
granting up to three 3G licences but only one licence was granted, to the fixed incumbent’s 
mobile arm, the only bidder, in part due to the high licence fee of about € 100 million. The 
deadline for launching 3G services was the end of 2003 and by March 2004 80 base stations 
had been set up, making 3G services accessible to 31% of the population. By March 2004 
there were over 9000 subscribers to 3G services. APEK has launched a public consultation in 
order to take soundings on the issuance of two more 3G licenses. 
The  narrowband  access  market  (dial up  PSTN ISDN)  appears  to  be  well  developed  and 
competitive. There are 10 operators on the market. Alternative operators have a market share 
of 56% and the incumbent’s subsidiary has 44%. In general broadband access (ADSL plus 
other technologies) also seems to be competitive. The incumbent’s ISP subsidiary controls 
67% of the broadband lines and the rest belongs to alternative ISPs, who are mainly cable 
operators of which there are 28 (approx. 30% of all broadband connections are via cable, 
approx. 8000 cable TV subscribers have broadband internet access). But there seems to be 
virtually no competition in ADSL. 99% of xDSL lines are controlled by the incumbent’s ISP, 
which appears to have the advantage of using its mother company’s leased access network. In 
some cases the number of users is up to five times higher than the number of lines. 
As regards the leased line market, almost 100% of the leased lines infrastructure belongs to 
companies in which the state has a bigger or smaller shareholding. In addition to the fixed 
incumbent who has 75% of the leased lines market, leased lines are provided by three utilities 
companies in which the state has an interest in. There are also some cable TV companies 
which offer leased lines, but their market share is minimal.  
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THE NRA 
The APEK was established in July 2001.
99 According to the ECA, the APEK must operate 
independently  of  natural  persons  and  legal  entities  providing  electronic  communications 
networks and/or services, and must be impartial towards them. Starting from 1 January 2005 
APEK, which currently employs 80 staff, shall be financed directly through revenues from the 
administrative fees stipulated by the ECA and other acts governing its area of operation. The 
director of the APEK is competent to issue both general and individual acts (incl. decisions) 
and to decide on individual matters within the competence of the APEK in accordance with 
the law governing general administrative procedures. Individual acts issued by the director 
shall be final unless otherwise stipulated under the ECA. The APEK itself has the right to 
conduct administrative enforcement of its decisions and may impose appropriate penalties and 
use other enforcement measures set forth by the law. Individual acts and decisions can be 
appealed to the administrative court. Only decisions of APEK inspectors are subject to appeal 
to  the  Ministry  of  Information  Society,  which  is  the  Ministry  with  administrative 
responsibility for APEK. In some cases, APEK requires approval from the Government, for 
example for its plan of action, financial plan and annual activity and financial report, as well 
as  the  tariffs  on  the  basis  of  which  the  operators  are  obliged  to  pay  APEK  the  annual 
administrative fees and fees for the use of radio frequencies and numbers.  
In September 2004 Slovenia's main alternative mobile, fixed and internet service providers 
stated that the main reason for adverse market conditions seems to be the lack of effective 
regulation, and moreover a lack of the necessary commitment to regulate the market. The 
state  shareholding  in  the  fixed  incumbent  appears  to  be  seen  as  the  main  obstacle  to 
liberalisation  of  the  market,  casting  a  shadow  over  the  independence  of  the  APEK  in 
regulating the market. The government’s shareholding (62.5%) in the incumbent operator is 
not administered by the Ministry of Information Society, which exercises supervisory control 
over the activities of APEK and is responsible for legislation. But the Government of Slovenia 
appears  to  have  appointed  two  officials  from  that  Ministry  to  represent  the  state  at  the 
shareholders’ general meeting. 
The  activities  and  independence  of  APEK  seem  to  be  constantly  under  strong  criticism. 
Although  the  ECA  appears  to  bestow  on  APEK  all  the  powers  required  to  exercise 
appropriate market regulation, it is not perceived by operators to be using these efficiently and 
appears reluctant to resolve disputes or intervene ex officio in crucial issues with the result of 
a very few decisions taken or imposing market opening measures. According to APEK, a 
number of requests submitted by alternative operators, however, have been refused due to 
simple  procedural  errors  or  the  reason  that  the  respective  issues  were  the  subject  of 
commercial negotiations. 
The  Commission  services  are  examining  whether  the  apparent  failure  to  ensure  the 
implementation of a workable and fairly priced interconnection offer, when viewed in the 
context of the lack of competition and the bundling of the incumbent’s services with those of 
its subsidiaries, suggests that there are problems in relation to the lack of effective regulatory 
intervention.  
                                                 
99  At that time it was called as Telecommunications and Broadcasting Agency. In June 2002 postal area 
was given into its responsibility and it became known as Telecommunications, Broadcasting and Post 
Agency.  The  current  name  was  given  this  year  after  the  adoption  of  the  new  Electronic 
Communications Act.  
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MARKET ANALYSIS 
Based on the general Act concerning the definition of relevant markets that came into force on 
17 July 2004, the APEK officially started the  market analysis procedures by sending out 
questionnaires  to  market  players  relating  to  all  18  markets  identified  in  the  Commission 
Recommendation. The deadline for returning the completed questionnaires was 24 September 
2004. In the beginning, priority will be given to the three mobile wholesale markets and the 
procedures relating to these markets are expected to be completed by the end of January 2005. 
The procedures relating to the rest of the markets are expected to be completed a couple of 
months later.  
STARTING CONDITIONS 
The Slovenian telecommunications sector was liberalised as of January 2001 on the basis of 
the  Telecommunications  Act  of  1997.  The  implementation  of  the  old  EU  regulatory 
framework started on the basis of the Telecommunications Act of 2001. Slovenia achieved a 
fair transposition of the 1998/2000 acquis. Although the most important principles of the 
regulatory  framework  were  substantially  transposed,  there  appeared  to  be  certain  missing 
elements  that  were  to  be  regulated  under  the  new  law  transposing  the  2002  regulatory 
framework on electronic communications. Although the Telecommunications Act contained 
provisions on terms and conditions of a reference interconnection offer, non discrimination 
and transparency obligations, cost accounting and accounting separation obligations, as well 
as carrier selection, carrier pre selection and fixed number portability, it remains to be seen 
whether they are effectively implemented in practice.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Access and interconnection 
The  incumbent  published  its  first  reference  interconnection  offer  (RIO)  in  2002,  but  was 
thereafter repeatedly requested by APEK to change and improve it. The current version of the 
RIO came finally into force in May 2004. Since then only two operators have signed an 
interconnection agreement with carrier selection and carrier pre selection functionality and 
ISP operators have interconnection still on the basis of APEK’s previous individual decisions 
setting forth the terms and conditions of interconnection. The incumbent’s mobile arm did not 
have an obligation to publish a RIO at all under the previous Telecommunications Act and the 
existing mobile interconnection agreements are  based on the previous Telecommunication 
Act.  Prior  to  the  enforcement  of  ECA,  APEK,  however,  requested  the  fixed  incumbent’s 
mobile arm to issue a RIO and has already provided detailed comments on it. Local loop 
unbundling is possible since 1 January 2002 and a reference unbundling offer (RUO) was 
published by the incumbent in 2003. So far only its ISP subsidiary appears to have signed an 
agreement for shared access, but no lines seem to be unbundled by an alternative operator. 
Most alternative operators seem to be reluctant to sign any agreements based on the RIO or 
the RUO, which seems to suggest that the terms and conditions could be unfavourable and not 
adapted to the market needs. Co location in some of the fixed incumbent’s facilities also 
appears to be highly problematic. There are signs, on the other hand that, after a change of 
management early in 2004, the incumbent has tried to become more open and co operative in 
questions regarding interconnection.  
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On-net/off-net differential 
A problem that has been highlighted by operators is that the very low on net tariffs of the 
incumbent’s mobile subsidiary, together with an off net price for the most commonly used 
tariff packages that is over 2.5 times greater, appear to be dissuading its subscribers from 
switching to other operators. When a subscriber moves to one of the other operators, most 
calls to other mobile subscribers are likely to be charged at higher termination rates, due to the 
sheer size of the customer base of the incumbent’s mobile arm. However, the dissuasive effect 
of moving to another operator has appeared to be even more critical, despite their competitive 
tariffs, when the dominant operator’s retail tariffs seem to penalize all of its subscribers who 
make a call to the smaller network. Despite complaints to the APEK and to the national 
competition  authority,  no  regulatory  decisions  seem  to  have  been  taken  on  the  potential 
impact of the large on net/off net differential on competitive conditions in mobile markets, 
both in regard to cost orientation but also in regard to the incumbent’s position on the market. 
Carrier selection and carrier pre-selection; number portability 
Carrier selection (CS) and carrier pre selection (CPS) for long distance and international calls 
have been available since July 2002, and for local and national calls from May 2003. Number 
portability for fixed numbers also became available as of July 2002. In reality these services 
did not appear to be availed of by other operators, because of the tariffs and conditions, and 
there seemed to be virtually no competition on the fixed market. Mobile number portability is 
theoretically applicable on the basis of the ECA as of 1 May 2004, but the APEK is not 
planning  to  issue  measures  for  its  implementation  before  the  end  of  2004.  It  would  also 
appear that mobile number portability cannot be implemented as long as the question of the 
very high on net/off net price differential on the incumbent’s mobile network has not been 
solved. In addition, the incumbent’s mobile arm appears to apply lengthy customer lock in 
linked to subsidised handsets, and subscribers who would like to change operators seem to 
have to pay a prohibitive charge for terminating their contract. The customer lock in issue is 
currently being analysed by the National Competition Protection Authority. 
Prices 
The APEK has been working on a LRAIC cost model to calculate costs of the provision of 
different  services,  but  still  mainly  seems  to  rely  on  benchmarking  for  conducting  price 
analysis. The fixed incumbent reduced its interconnection prices to the average EU price level 
after APEK requested them in July 2003 to offer cost based prices for interconnection and 
reduce prices for all three connection levels (local, single and double transit). In February 
2003 the APEK requested the incumbent to introduce two subscriber packages (simple and 
standard) and to increase retail prices, but this request appears not to have been implemented 
at the request of the government. As a result only the monthly subscription fee was raised. An 
additional  price  model  was  introduced  in  2003  relating  to  the  access  network  and  ATM 
backbone network of the incumbent used for provision of xDSL services. The new model 
concerns leasing of access network and bitstream access, and is designed to reduce market 
entry barriers for new operators. The price model does not require a smaller new entrant 
operator  to  have  very  high  minimum  capacities for  initial  capacity  leasing.  Despite  these 
efforts  by  the  APEK,  alternative  market  players  still  seem  to  be  of  the  opinion  that  the 
existing wholesale and retail prices of the incumbent and its subsidiaries are not cost oriented. 
Wholesale prices are said to be too high (e.g. leased line prices) and retail prices are said to be 
too  low,  even  below  the  cost  of  providing  the  services  and  thus  making  it  impossible, 
according to certain alternative operators, to establish a business case and to enter the market.   
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SLOVAKIA 
TRANSPOSITION  
The new Law on Electronic Communications, which aims to transpose the new EU regulatory 
framework, including the ePrivacy Directive, into national law, came into force on 1 January 
2004,  i.e.  before  the  date  of  Slovakia’s  accession  to  the  EU.  This  new  law  replaced  the 
previously  valid  Law  on  Telecommunications,  which  aimed  to  transpose  the  previous 
regulatory framework that was based on the 1998/2000 acquis. 
The Commission services are proceeding with their examination of the notified text, including 
conformity of the provisions relating to the powers of the regulator with respect to SMP 
regulation at retail level, number portability and consultations. These are referred to in more 
detail below.  
MARKET OVERVIEW  
There has been very little entry into the fixed line market, due in particular to the lack of 
effective  measures  to  implement  the  law.  Although  the  regulator  has  taken  a  number  of 
positive  initiatives  this  year,  substantial  space  for  improvement  appears  with  regard  to 
ensuring necessary conditions for effective liberalisation of the fixed market.  
According to the regulator’s market analysis, the fixed incumbent has 100% market share on 
the markets for fixed call origination and fixed call termination. Fixed line penetration stands 
at 22.3% of the population. 
The  fixed  incumbent  operator  was  originally  formed  as  a  state  enterprise.  In  1999  the 
company  was  transformed  into  a  joint  stock  company.  The  company  is  the  designated 
universal  service  provider  and  operates  a  fixed  telecommunications  network  covering  the 
territory  of  the  Slovak  Republic.  Leased  lines  form  an  important  part  of  the  company’s 
portfolio of services.  
July 2000 was an important milestone in the development of the company, which was 100% 
state owned until that date, as a strategic investor acquired a share of the company at that 
time. This strategic investor now has a 51% share of the company, while the Ministry of 
Transport, Post and Telecommunications (the Ministry) and the National Property Fund own 
34% and 15% respectively. The company is currently a 51% shareholder in one of the two 
operators providing mobile services in Slovakia. The incumbent is to acquire the remaining 
49% of this mobile operator shortly.  
On the basis of the previous law which was in force until the end of 2003, the fixed incumbent 
has been designated with SMP on the market of public telephony services by means of public 
telecommunications networks and on the market for public telecommunications service using 
leased lines.  
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Mobile licences have been issued for 2G and 3G networks. The mobile operator controlled by 
the fixed incumbent also operates an NMT network. The two mobile operators have 56% and 
44% market shares respectively as of June 2004. Both operators offer GPRS services, while 
the mobile operator controlled by the fixed incumbent also provides EDGE services. Both 
operators were also granted 3G licences and are obliged to launch 3G services by 1 April 
2006. A third applicant participated in the beauty contest for 2G and 3G licences in 2002 and 
was awarded licences as a result. However, as this applicant failed to pay the licence fee, the 
regulator subsequently withdrew these licences.  
Mobile penetration is approximately 74% as of June 2004. On the basis of the previous law in 
force until the end of 2003, both the established mobile operators were designated with SMP 
on  the  market  for  public  telephony  services  provided  by  means  of  public  mobile 
telecommunications networks.  
Sales  of  broadband  connections  began  in  mid  2003.  The  number  of  ADSL  lines  was 
approximately 17 100 as of July 2004. A large number of internet users, especially residential 
households, still use dial up access to internet. Due to the fact that alternative operators may 
provide  competitive  ADSL  services  to  their  customers  only  in  those  cases  where  these 
customers  have  a  voice  telephony  or  ISDN  subscription  from  the  fixed  incumbent,  the 
regulator made a decision in June 2004, to take effect four months later, prohibiting the fixed 
incumbent from bundling its ADSL services with its voice telephony and ISDN services. In 
August 2004 the Supreme Court decided on further postponement of the effectiveness of the 
regulator’s decision, based on incumbent’s proposal. As of July 2004 approximately 3 800 
customers were using broadband services via cable. Only one of the Slovak cable operators 
provides broadband services. At that time the market share of fixed incumbent on broadband 
market was 46% and broadband penetration was 0.4% of the population.  
THE NRA  
The Telecommunications Office of the Slovak Republic (TÚSR) was established in 1993. It is 
financed  from  the  State  budget.  Market  players  report  that  TÚSR  does  not  have  its  own 
budget chapter, as it is included in that of the Ministry. TÚSR faces problems related to lack 
of human resources.  
It is being examined whether the current law provides sufficiently clear guidance with regard 
to the division of competences between the TÚSR and the Antimonopoly Office of the Slovak 
Republic (the NCA in Slovakia). Cooperation between TÚSR and the Ministry appears to 
work well.  
The  Commission  services  are  examining  whether  the  full  separation  of  regulatory  and 
operational functions has been fully achieved, in the light of the fact that the Ministry controls 
part of the State’s shareholding in the fixed incumbent operator and universal service provider 
in Slovakia as it controls 34% shareholding in the incumbent, while at the same time being 
empowered to adopt secondary legislation dealing with universal service and to propose a 
national policy for electronic communications to the government for approval. The Ministry 
has  competence  in  the  area  of  preparation  of  the  legal  framework.  The  Ministry  is  also 
competent  to  prepare  the  draft  national  frequency  spectrum  table  and  to  submit  it  to  the 
Government for approval.  
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Appeal mechanism 
Under the current law decisions taken by TÚSR in the first instance are reviewed by the 
President of TÚSR in the second instance. Filing of an appeal against a decision taken by 
TÚSR in the first instance generally has suspensory effect. However, TÚSR’s decisions can 
be subject to review by a court. Such a review does not in itself introduce suspensory effect of 
the  decision  being  reviewed.  Market  players  report  that  in  practice  this  decision  making 
process tends to be lengthy. 
Market analysis 
The regulator defined 18 relevant markets on the basis of the Commission’s Recommendation 
in January 2004. The regulator was required under Slovak law to carry out an analysis of the 
defined markets by the end of June 2004. However it has made the results of its analysis 
publicly available only with respect to four relevant markets, which are wholesale markets 8 
(call  origination  on  the  fixed  telephone  network),  9  (call  termination  on  individual  fixed 
telephone  networks),  11 (wholesale  unbundled  access  to  metallic  loops  and  sub loops  for 
provision  of  broadband  and  voice  services)  and  16  (voice  call  termination  on  individual 
mobile networks) in the Commission’s Recommendation. Of those markets, the incumbent 
fixed operator was found to have SMP (with 100% market share) on markets 8, 9 and 11, 
while in the case of market number 16 both mobile operators were found to have SMP. One 
pre notification meeting relating to Article 7 of the Framework Directive has taken place 
between the regulator and the Commission. The regulator intends to impose SMP remedies 
after the necessary consultation processes are complete. TÚSR has to date notified to the 
Commission under Article 7 of the Framework Directive three draft measures concerning 
determination as to significant market power and the imposition of resulting obligations in 
respect of the wholesale markets for call origination on the fixed telephone network, for call 
termination  on  individual  fixed  telephone  networks  and  the  market  wholesale  unbundled 
access (including shared access) to metallic loops and subloops for the purpose of providing 
broadband and voice services. The draft measures are under Commission’s review.  
The full transposition of the procedures under Article 7 of the Framework Directive needs to 
be verified. In particular it needs to be seen whether the specific provision of the law giving 
TÚSR the obligation to make the draft measure accessible to the Commission and to NRAs in 
other Member States obliges TÚSR to make accessible draft measures which fall within the 
scope of the Universal Service Directive. 
The compatibility of the definition of the notion “consultation” in the law, which narrows the 
consultation  mechanism  only  to  undertakings,  NRAs  and  the  Commission,  needs  to  be 
assessed  for  conformity  with  the  Framework  Directive,  which  refers  in  this  context  to 
“interested parties”, which may cover also consumers, their associations, etc. Moreover, a 
subsequent  provision  of  the  law  imposes  an  obligation  on  the  NRA  to  consult  only  with 
undertakings.  
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STARTING CONDITIONS  
The Slovak fixed voice market was formally liberalised in January 2003 by a previous law 
transposing  the  old,  1998/2000  regulatory  framework  for  telecommunications,  which 
remained in force until the end of 2003.  
However, while that law provided for the licensing of competitive fixed network operators, it 
did not ensure all necessary conditions for effective liberalisation of the market. For example, 
it granted only what appear to be weak powers to the regulator to ensure interconnection 
between  the  incumbent  and  new  entrants;  there  was  no  obligation  to  publish  a  reference 
interconnection offer (RIO); obligations related to local loop unbundling (LLU) including 
publication of a reference unbundling offer (RUO) were missing; and number portability was 
only required to be made available from 2005. Obligations for call by call carrier selection 
and  pre selection  were  applied  as  general  obligations  on  all  operators  rather  than  as  a 
condition of SMP status. Carrier selection and pre selection were not implemented in practice 
under the previous law.  
Attempts to improve that law by means of amendment failed. Because a substantial part of the 
‘starting conditions’ for application of the new framework did not exist under the previous 
law, it has not been possible to maintain these conditions in place, as required by the new 
regulatory  framework,  pending  completion  of  the  market  review  process  under  the  new 
framework. 
The  Commission  services  are  examining  whether  the  current  law  states  explicitly  that 
previous SMP obligations will be maintained until market analyses are completed. It remains 
to be seen whether the law makes it clear that a particular existing SMP obligation should 
only be removed when analysis of the equivalent market under the new framework has been 
completed. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES  
Access and interconnection 
Only  one  fixed  to  fixed  interconnection  agreement  has  so  far  been  concluded  by  the 
incumbent, and in that case the undertaking concerned does not compete on the domestic 
fixed retail market. The fixed incumbent’s reference interconnection offer was submitted to 
TÚSR in January 2003; however it has not yet been made publicly available as a complete 
document. The failure of negotiations on interconnection to date is generally attributed by 
new entrants to excessively onerous conditions demanded by the incumbent, e.g. unacceptable 
contractual penalties, high bank guarantees, unreasonable conditions for traffic forecasting, 
etc. Because of restrictions on access to the fixed incumbent’s interconnection offer imposed 
on grounds of confidentiality, the document cannot be analysed objectively by third parties. 
In  June  2004  TÚSR  made  a  decision  on  the  technical  and  operational  conditions  for 
interconnection and the pricing methodology to be included in the incumbent’s draft reference 
interconnection offer. This decision deals with interconnection between the network of the 
fixed  incumbent  and  new  market  entrants.  This  decision  did  not  come  into  force  on  its 
adoption  because  it  was  appealed.  A  second  decision  by  TÚSR  was  made  at  the  end  of 
September 2004 as a result of the appeal. By virtue of this decision the fixed incumbent was 
required  to  make  changes  to  its  interconnection  offer  within  30  days.  However,  the  
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interconnection charges imposed by TÚSR are not based on a cost accounting methodology, 
but on a benchmarking exercise by reference to nine EU15 Member States, by excluding from 
consideration the three countries with the highest interconnection charges and the three with 
the  lowest.  Calculation  of  interconnection  charges  based  on  this  decision  also  takes  into 
account  the  ratio  between  fixed  line  penetration  in  these  nine  countries  and  fixed  line 
penetration in Slovakia. As a basis for this benchmarking exercise, the decision refers to the 
Ninth and Sixth Implementation Reports of the Commission. Interconnection charges for call 
termination on incumbent’s fixed network clearly exceed the EU average if compared to these 
charges  in  those  EU  Member  States  for  which  these  data  are  available  (2.87 € cents  per 
minute at local level; 3.72 € cents per minute on single transit and 5.74 € cents per minute on 
double transit). 
TÚSR  has  also  taken  three  decisions  between  July  and  September  2004  imposing  an 
obligation  to  conclude  interconnection  agreements  on  the  fixed  incumbent  and  three  new 
entrant operators. Of these three decisions, one was later rescinded by TÚSR and the other 
two have as of 1 October 2004 not yet become legally binding, as one has been appealed and 
the other was still open to appeal. 
Due  to  the  virtual  absence  of  wholesale  level  fixed  to  fixed  interconnection  with  the 
incumbent’s network, one of the only ways in which alternative operators can compete in the 
fixed retail market is by offering voice services using the incumbent’s network for dial up 
access to the internet. However, even this solution faces problems in practice and creates 
tensions  between  the  fixed  incumbent  and  new  entrants.  The  incumbent  announced  its 
intention to implement certain changes in its pricing for access to the internet in this respect, 
which the new entrants consider unjustified. In July 2004 TÚSR made a preliminary decision 
prohibiting the incumbent from implementing these changes and a final decision on this case 
is still awaited. In the same month TÚSR fined three alternative operators for providing voice 
services via an access code reserved under the current numbering plan for dial up access to 
internet services. An appeal against this decision is still pending. 
Negotiations  on  interconnection  between  new  market  entrants  and  mobile  operators  are 
proceeding without major problems, as both mobile operators have now concluded a number 
of interconnection agreements with new entrants. 
It needs to be examined whether the powers of the NRA as stipulated by Article 5 of the 
Access Directive are transposed correctly, and whether the law provides the possibility for the 
NRA in exceptional circumstances to impose other access or interconnection obligations than 
those  listed  in  the  Access  Directive  on  operators  with  significant  market  power.  The 
Commission  services  are  also  examining  the  conformity  of  the  law  to  the  extent  that  it 
imposes directly on all undertakings providing public networks, obligations of transparency 
and non discrimination in relation to interconnection.  
LLU 
It is being assessed whether local loop unbundling is in place and whether a RUO has been 
published.  
EN  209    EN 
WLL 
In April 2004 TÚSR launched a tender for the assignment of frequencies in the 3.5 GHz 
frequency band for the establishment and operation of a wireless local access network. On 
1 October 2004 TÚSR cancelled this tender, referring to a conflict between two applicable 
provisions in the  Law on Electronic Communications dealing  with fees for rights of use. 
There are two operators providing services in the 26 GHz frequency band. 
Leased lines 
The  prices  of  leased  lines  are  not  regulated.  Prices  for  national  leased  lines  (64kb/s  and 
2Mb/s) clearly exceed the EU average if compared to these prices in those EU Member States 
for which these data are available (€ 5 084 per year for 64kb/s, 2 km circuits; € 13 160 per 
year for 64kb/s, 200 km circuits; € 22 371 per year for 2Mb/s, 2 km circuits and € 67 592 per 
year for 2Mb/s, 200 km circuits). 
Universal service  
The fixed incumbent operator is designated as a universal service provider and it provides all 
basic services covered by the universal service obligations. No universal service financing 
mechanism has been implemented in practice. Based on secondary legislation dealing with the 
universal  service  financing  mechanism  that  came  into  force  in  mid  September  2004,  the 
universal service provider may apply for recovery of the net costs of provision of universal 
service. 
Fixed tariffs have not yet been rebalanced, which means that monthly line rentals are offered 
below their actual cost. Regulation of retail tariffs is achieved by means of a price cap. The 
powers of TÚSR with respect to SMP regulation at retail level are significantly limited by the 
law. The scope of SMP regulation at retail level is narrowed in the law only to undertakings 
identified as having SMP on “public telephony service markets”. 
The Commission services are examining whether carrier selection, carrier pre selection, fixed 
number portability and mobile number portability have been implemented. Under the law the 
facility of number portability is made conditional on technical feasibility, the implications of 
which are also being examined. 
The correct transposition of the right of subscribers to withdraw from their contracts upon at 
least  one  month’s  notice  of  proposed  modifications  to  contractual  conditions  needs  to  be 
verified. Under the law a subscriber has the right to withdraw from his contract on condition 
that the undertaking provides him one month’s prior notice on proposed modifications in the 
contractual conditions. The law does not however grant the subscriber the right to be given 
such prior notice.  
Policy objectives and regulatory principles 
The correct transposition of the policy objectives and regulatory principles set out in Article 8 
of the Framework Directive needs to be verified.   
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ePrivacy  
The correct transposition of the exception from the opt in principle applicable to unsolicited 
communications and of the rules governing the use of networks to store information or to gain 
access to information stored in the terminal equipment of the user (cookies) also remains to be 
verified.  
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FINLAND 
TRANSPOSITION 
Finland transposed most of the new EC regulatory framework on time, by means of primary 
legislation  (the  Communications  Market  Act),  and  some  secondary  legislation,  except  as 
regards  the  e Privacy  Directive,  which  was  transposed  in  the  summer  of  2004.  The  law 
transposing the e Privacy Directive was adopted on 1 June 2004 and entered into force on 
1 September 2004. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
Finland’s mobile penetration rate has been high for a number of years and is currently at 95% 
which is among the highest rates in the EU. The launch of mobile number portability in July 
2003 was very successful and, as of August 2004, almost one million mobile numbers had 
been ported (993 578). A relatively large number (17) of service providers, including over 10 
independent  service  providers,  are  now  present  in  the  market,  and  some  MVNO  (Mobile 
Virtual Network Operator) agreements have been concluded. It appears that two of these new 
entrants in particular have increased rapidly their market share as a result of the introduction 
of mobile number portability. It appears also that many service providers have introduced 
very  low  prices  to  attract  customers  (giving  rise  to  allegations  of  price  squeezes). 
Consequently, Finnish mobile end user prices fell sharply in 2004. There have been some 
problems with billing, customer care etc, and the National Regulatory Authority (FICORA) 
and the Consumer Authority have intervened in order to ensure improvements. 
Roll out of 3G continues. One operator launched its 3G services commercially in October 
2004  and  another  operator  is  expected  to  launch  in  November  2004.  Finland  has  a  high 
broadband penetration rate (11% of the population), which is among the highest in the EU, 
and well above the EU average. However, compared to the EU average, a high percentage of 
the total number of broadband retail lines is in the hands of incumbents (72%). 
The Finnish fixed market remains segmented, with some fifty SMP operators, most of which 
are medium to small local telephone companies. The trend towards market consolidation, 
observed in the previous years, has further strengthened, with the organisation of the market 
around three main players (one of which consists, inter alia, of a number of local telephone 
companies). These three major actors have relatively equal shares of the total fixed market 
(25.9%, 31.4% and 36.1% of all fixed calls respectively, by retail revenue). 
New entrants are encountering difficulties that are specifically related to the above mentioned 
segmentation of the market (which obliges them, inter alia, to negotiate interconnection with 
numerous SMP operators) and to the fact that the local telecommunications markets remain 
firmly in the hands of local telephone companies. Not only do the latter control the local 
access infrastructure, but they also benefit from considerable “intangibles”, such as, in many 
cases, a foothold of several decades in their activity area (in which they have played the role 
of a local utility), and the fact that, in the past, they were owned by their customers. Some ten 
local operators still offer price reductions to their shareholder customers, even though the 
competition authorities have prohibited these reductions and fines have been imposed for non  
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observance of the prohibition. These factors contribute to the intrinsically closed nature of the 
Finnish telecommunications market. 
While the take up of mobile number portability has been successful, there has been very little 
take up of fixed number portability, with only 15 000 ported numbers, although it has been in 
place for much longer. This may be related to the fact that the technical solution chosen for 
fixed number portability is indirect routing, rather than, for example, a common database. 
This system will, however change in 2005, and the operators are obliged to use a common 
database by end of March 2005. 
THE NRA 
The notified National Regulatory Authority in Finland is FICORA (Finnish Communications 
Regulatory Authority). FICORA has been very active in carrying out market analyses, as 
required under the new regulatory framework, and was one of the first NRAs to notify their 
completed market analyses to the Commission. It is also one of the few Member States that 
has completed the vast majority of the market analyses required under the EC regulatory 
framework. A particular challenge has been the fact that there are so many SMP operators in 
Finland. 
However, the new Communications Market Act restricts FICORA’s power to impose certain 
regulatory obligations on operators that have been found by FICORA to have SMP on certain 
markets. One example of this concerns the mobile call termination market, which was notified 
to the Commission in November 2003. The Commission sent a “comments” letter on 18 
December  2003,  responding  to  the  fact  that  FICORA  considered  itself  unable  to  impose 
regulatory obligations on the market as a whole, even if SMP was found to cover the whole of 
the notified market. This was due to Section 43 of the Communications Market Act, which 
did  not  allow  FICORA  to  impose  regulatory  obligations  concerning  cost oriented 
interconnection charges on termination for calls from fixed to mobile networks. This arises 
because the charges for fixed to mobile interconnection in Finland are so called “end user 
charges” (even in cases where there is physical and logical interconnection). In spring 2004 
the  Finnish  authorities  proposed  amendments  to  the  Communications  Market  Act  which 
partially addressed the issue of cost oriented, fixed to mobile interconnection pricing. The 
proposed amendments also addressed Local Loop Unbundling (LLU) pricing and provided for 
the possibility for FICORA to set a maximum price for interconnection. The amendments are 
scheduled to be adopted before the end of 2004. Their compatibility with EC law will be 
examined after adoption. 
FICORA also appears to lack the power to impose some other regulatory obligations provided 
for  in  the  EC  framework,  such  as  the  publication  of  a  reference  interconnection  offer 
(including  changes  to  the  reference  interconnection  offer)  and  to  require  operators  to  be 
transparent regarding internal transfer prices. Section 18 of the Communications Market Act 
sets out an exhaustive list of regulatory obligations that FICORA can impose. However, this 
list  does  not  explicitly  contain  all  of  the  regulatory  obligations  provided  for  in  the  EC 
regulatory framework (Articles 9 to 13 of the Access Directive). 
Appeal mechanisms 
Currently, a FICORA decision does not automatically stand when appealed, and an explicit 
court order is required for a FICORA decision to stand if appealed to a court. It appears that  
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the  current  Finnish  system,  whereby  a  court  order  is  required  for  a  decision  to  stand,  is 
enshrined  in  the  Constitution.  The  Commission  services  are  currently  examining  this  in 
relation to its conformity with Article 4 of the Framework Directive. 
An example of this process concerns FICORA’s SMP designation in Market 16, which three 
mobile network operators appealed to the court. In this case the court decided that obligations 
imposed by FICORA on the two biggest players would stand pending the appeal as these 
operators  already  had  obligations  imposed  under  the  old  legislation.  In  contrast,  the 
obligations imposed on the third complainant are not enforceable as no obligations had been 
applied before to this undertaking. It is worth noting that, despite the completion by FICORA 
of the great majority of initial market reviews, very few appeals have been made against the 
resulting decisions or choice of remedies. This has allowed the process of transition into the 
new regulatory environment to proceed quickly and has increased legal certainty. 
Market analysis 
Finland  has  been  very  active  in  carrying  out  the  market  analyses  required  under  the 
framework, and was among the first countries to send in notifications. They are also among 
the  most  advanced  Member  States  in  that  they  have  completed  the  vast  majority  of  the 
required  market  analyses.  So  far  19  market  analyses  have  been  notified,  covering  all  the 
markets in the Commission's Recommendation with the exception of the national market for 
international  roaming.  Of  these  notifications,  the  Commission  did  not  comment  on  three. 
Comments were issued in 13 cases and in 3 cases the Commission requested FICORA to 
withdraw its draft measure. 
On  20 February  2004,  the  Commission  adopted  a  veto decision  requiring  FICORA  to 
withdraw  its  draft  measures  concerning  markets  for  international  telephone  services, 
concluding that the draft measures lacked the evidence and the level of analysis needed for 
FICORA to arrive at its proposed conclusions, that is, that no operator had significant market 
power in the international calls markets. In addition, FICORA’s assessment of the degree of 
market power of the undertakings in the markets did not take appropriately into account the 
existence of regulatory remedies and their impact on the perceived level of competition in the 
market. FICORA withdrew the draft measures on 26 February 2004. 
On 5 October 2004, the Commission adopted another veto decision requiring FICORA to 
withdraw its draft measure concerning the market for mobile access and call origination. The 
Commission considered that the recent developments in the Finnish retail mobile market and 
the fact that service providers have been able to conclude wholesale agreements, including 
MVNO  agreements,  on  a  commercial  basis  with  all  three  nation wide  mobile  network 
operators in the relevant market do not support FICORA’s finding that the market was not 
effectively competitive. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Local loop unbundling 
Current local loop prices in Finland, for both connection fees for a fully unbundled local loop 
and the monthly average total cost for a fully unbundled local loop, are above the EU average 
and,  are,  in  fact,  among the  highest  in  the  EU.  As  regards  shared  access  the  situation is 
similar,  with  Finland’s  prices  for  monthly  rental  and  connection  for  shared  access  being  
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higher than the EU average, and, as regards the connection fees, among the highest in the EU. 
Also the monthly average total cost for shared access is above the EU average and among the 
highest  in  the  EU.  However,  FICORA  adopted  decisions  on  LLU  connection  prices  in 
September 2004, obliging five local operators to lower their connection prices. 
There have also been some non price related problems, such as long delivery times, for some 
operators.  The  proposed  amendments  to  the  Communications  Market  Act  also  contain 
provisions regarding local loop unbundling prices, and it remains to be seen what effect the 
amended Act, once it has entered into force, will have on current local loop prices. 
Despite the high prices and non price related problems, Finland has a relatively high total 
number of fully unbundled lines (96 600), and also has a relatively high number of shared 
access lines (31 600). Both the number of shared access and fully unbundled lines has risen 
since 2003, and in the case of shared access, it has risen significantly. 
Universal service 
It  remains  to  be  seen  whether  a  significant  number  of  Articles  of  the  Universal  Service 
Directive have a corresponding transposition measure in Finnish law. This seems to be partly 
due to the fact that the Finnish authorities considered that the EC requirements were complied 
with  in  practice  and  partly  because  Finland  has  no  existing  financing  mechanism  for 
Universal Service. According to the Finnish Communications Market Act, once an operator is 
found to have SMP, it is automatically also designated as a Universal Service Provider. The 
Universal Service Directive, however, sets out specific rules for the designation of a Universal 
Service  Provider,  and  also  provides  that  no  operator  should  a  priori  be  excluded  (which 
means also that non SMP operators could theoretically be designated to provide part of the 
Universal Service). Since there is no true designation of Universal Service Providers, and 
Universal  Service  obligations  flow  directly  from  SMP  status,  many  provisions  of  the 
Directive do not seem to be transposed at all. The Commission services are looking into these 
issues. 
Must carry 
Finnish legislation (Section 134 of the Communications Market Act) has certain provisions 
which appear to warrant further examination in relation to the Universal Service Directive. 
Further examination is required with regard to the requirement for technology neutrality, as 
well as to the requirement for the scope of must carry obligations to be clearly defined and 
justified in terms of clearly identified public interest objectives. 
Cable television network companies operating in Finland do not transmit programmes which 
fall  under  must carry  obligations  without  compensation,  and  collect  a  fee  from  all  their 
customers to this effect. 
ePrivacy - Data retention 
The law intended to transpose the e privacy Directive, which was adopted on 1 June 2004 
(entering into force on 1 September 2004), sets strict and detailed requirements with regard to 
data  protection.  There  is  an  obligation  for  operators  to  store,  for  two  years,  information 
relating to the processing of traffic data, including on the time and duration of the processing 
and the person who processed the data. Operators have complained about the fact that they 
have to bear additional costs for such data storage.  
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SWEDEN 
TRANSPOSITION 
Sweden transposed the vast majority of the EC regulatory framework on time, by means of 
new primary legislation and new secondary legislation, with only one provision of the e  
Privacy Directive (Article 13 on “spam”) still outstanding at the time of the formal deadline in 
July 2003. Article 13 was transposed in the spring of 2004, when new primary legislation 
entered into force.  
MARKET OVERVIEW 
The fixed incumbent operator held a market share in terms of retail revenue of 54% of all 
fixed  calls  (including  Internet  dial up  traffic)  in  December  2003,  as  compared  to  57%  in 
December 2002. It held a market share (in terms of retail revenue) of 40% of the market for 
international calls in December 2003, i.e. a decrease of 4% compared to the previous year. 
The  largest  competitor  has  a  strategy  of  consistently  keeping  its  prices  lower  than  the 
incumbent and its markets share amounted to the 14.5% of all fixed calls, including Internet 
dial up traffic. 
Fixed number portability was introduced on 1 July 1999 and mobile number portability on 
1 September 2001. Despite the earlier introduction of fixed number portability its uptake has 
been much more limited than that for mobile number portability. Carrier pre selection (CPS) 
was  introduced  in  September  1999  and  despite  lack  of  decisive  intervention  by  PTS,  the 
NRA, in the initial stages of the reform, the uptake has subsequently been good. Judging from 
the formal consumer complaints of 2003, there are still some outstanding consumer problems 
related to CPS, inter alia customers having been signed up for another operator without their 
knowledge. Most of the consumers’ complaints regard the Distance Contracts Act and the 
Marketing Act, which falls under the supervision of the Consumer Agency. PTS cooperates 
with this Agency and the CPS operators in an effort to diminish these problems. 
Sweden has one of the highest mobile penetration rates in the EU (102% mobile subscriptions 
per 100 inhabitants in August 2004), and also has one of the highest broadband penetration 
rates  in  the  EU  (12.4%).  The  fixed  penetration  rate  (incumbent’s  PSTN  lines  per  100 
inhabitants) is the highest in the EU (61.5%).  
PTS has, together with several authorities, been able to conclude that the Swedish mobile 
market is characterised by a structure that resembles an oligopoly, where mutual dependence 
prevails  between  the  network owning  operators.  In  December  2003  the  largest  mobile 
operator held a relatively strong position in the mobile market with a 44% share of the mobile 
subscriptions, which represents a decrease in market share of 1% since the previous year. 
There are 21 MVNOs present in the mobile market but their combined market share is only 
3.3% of the total number of mobile subscriptions.  
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THE NRA  
The National Regulatory Authority (NRA) of Sweden, Post- och Telestyrelsen (PTS), is a 
government  agency  under  the  Ministry  of  Industry,  Employment  and  Communications 
(“Ministry  of  Industry”).  The  Ministry  is  also  responsible  for  the  State  holding  in  the 
incumbent operator. The State holding in the incumbent has been reduced to approximately 
46% of the capital, following inter alia a partial sale of shares in June 2000. The Ministry of 
Industry  is  not  directly  involved  in  the  management  of  the  incumbent.  The  Government 
appoints the Director General of PTS, for renewable six year terms. The Swedish Constitution 
safeguards the autonomy and independence of all state authorities — including PTS — and 
prohibits any interference by Ministries in the day to day activities of the authorities. The 
Constitution stipulates that all government agencies must act impartially and objectively.  
There are concerns on the part of operators as to whether PTS has been granted sufficient 
resources to deal with the market analysis process and at the same time carry out its other 
duties, such as market monitoring and dispute resolution, which is compounded by certain 
staffing problems.  
Appeal mechanism and dispute resolution 
Criticism has been raised by operators regarding the length of time it takes for PTS to solve 
disputes between market operators. Most interconnection disputes seem not to be resolved 
within the 4 month time frame required under EC law.  
The procedures laid down by The Administrative Procedures Act (SFS 1986:223) apply to the 
handling of matters by the administrative authorities. According to the Act the authority has 
an obligation to investigate the matter thoroughly. Furthermore, an applicant, appellant or 
other party is entitled to have access to the material that has been brought into the matter, 
provided that the matter concerns the exercise of public power in relation to someone. It 
seems that no matter may be determined without the applicant, the appellant or any other 
party having been informed about any information that has been brought into the matter by 
someone other than himself and having been given an opportunity to respond to it, provided 
that the matter concerns the exercise of public power in relation to someone. This duty to 
investigate and communicate often causes delays in handling the matters. 
Furthermore, PTS  considers that the 4 month time limit starts to run when the request is 
complete and not when the request for dispute resolution is registered. This interpretation is 
based on the wording of the explanatory comments to the Act.  
Although a decision of the NRA automatically stands until a court decides otherwise, the 
appeals process in Sweden is considered by many operators to be lengthy and complex. For 
example,  decisions  can  be  appealed  to  three  levels/legal  instances  often  involving  a 
considerable amount of time at each instance. The fact that it may take a very long time 
before decisions of the NRA finally become effective increases legal uncertainty. Most of the 
decisions  taken  by  PTS  under  the  old  regulatory  framework  have  been  appealed  and  the 
appellate courts have repeatedly taken a long time to decide on these cases. It has been alleged 
that  courts  do  not  always  have  the  necessary  expertise  to  deal  with  cases  related  to  the 
application of EC law.   
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It appears that there are some doubts as to the right of third parties to appeal against a decision 
by the NRA not specifically addressed to them. This is decided by the national courts, but 
needs to be considered in the light of the right in Article 4 of the Framework Directive for 
parties “affected” by a decision to appeal against it. 
There have already been a number of appeals of decisions which PTS has taken under the new 
EC  regulatory  framework.  As  regards  the  SMP  decisions  on  call  termination  in  mobile 
networks by PTS, five SMP operators have appealed and three of those have also requested 
that the court suspends the PTS decisions until final court decisions have been adopted. All of 
these suspension requests have been refused by the Administrative Court, which means that 
all regulatory obligations imposed by PTS apply, until such time as the court has made a final 
decision.  One  of  the  operators  has  also  appealed  against  the  refused  suspension  by  the 
Administrative Court. The case will now be handled by the Administrative Court of Appeal. 
Three  operators  appealed  against  the  PTS  decision  regarding  the  fixed  call  termination 
market, and requested a suspension from the court, but the suspension request was refused by 
the court.  
MARKET ANALYSIS 
PTS is in the process of carrying out market analyses required under the new EC regulatory 
framework.  PTS  has  completed  market  analyses  and  has  taken  final  decisions  regarding 
markets 7  10 and market 16. All PTS decisions have been appealed by at least one of the 
interested parties. The market analyses for markets 11 and 12 have also been notified to the 
Commission, and PTS aims at taking the final decisions in autumn 2004.  
However, a matter of major concern is the fact that Swedish law states that, if decisions on 
obligations under the new regulatory framework, following a market analysis, have not been 
made by 25 July 2004, the legal obligations imposed under the old regulatory framework 
cease to apply. This may mean that, for those markets where PTS has not completed market 
analyses and imposed new regulatory obligations, no obligations currently apply. The issue is 
currently under assessment by the Administrative Court and will also be looked into by the 
Commission services. 
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES 
Local Loop Unbundling  
The connection prices in Sweden for fully unbundled loops are among the highest in the EU, 
whereas the monthly rental price is around the EU average. The average total cost per month 
for fully unbundled local loops is among the highest in the EU. As regards shared access, the 
situation is similar, with the connection prices for shared access being among the highest in 
the EU and the monthly  rental price for shared access being above the EU average. The 
average total cost per month per shared access is also among the highest in the EU. 
In addition, there have been a number of non price related problems, where PTS has taken 
action, e.g. concerning the access network. In May 2004, PTS formally ordered the incumbent 
not to discriminate against operators requesting access to the incumbent’s access network. 
These  operators  must  be  allowed  to  purchase  equivalent  products  on  conditions  that  are 
equivalent  to  those  the  incumbent  offers  to  its  own  subsidiaries/retail  arm.  PTS  has  also  
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ordered the incumbent to provide interconnection to its access network, on request, at cost 
oriented prices. Furthermore, in June 2004, PTS ordered the incumbent to provide to other 
operators  complete  information  as  to  how  many  access  lines  are  connected  to  a  specific 
exchange  and  the  length  of  these  access  lines,  to  resume  delivery  of  LLU  lines  to  other 
operators  (after  it  had  decided  to  cease  such  delivery  temporarily)  and  to  ensure  that 
wholesale network access is provided in a non discriminatory manner 
Interconnection  
PTS has decided to designate five mobile telephony operators as having SMP in the market 
for call termination for calls to mobile networks and imposed regulatory obligations on these 
operators. Obligations to apply cost oriented interconnection charges were imposed on the 
three largest mobile operators. PTS has developed a cost accounting model to calculate cost 
oriented interconnection charges. On the basis of this model, PTS has set a recommended 
price  level  of  maximum SEK  0.80  for  2004  for  call  termination in the mobile telephony 
networks of the three larger operators. A gradual transition to a cost oriented price will take 
place over a period of four years. The Administrative Court has decided to reject requests for 
suspensions from the operators. However, two operators have appealed the decision of the 
Administrative  Court  to  the  Administrative  Court  of  Appeal.  PTS  imposed  “fair  and 
reasonable prices” on the two remaining operators designated as having SMP. A fair and 
reasonable price should, according to PTS, be a price comparable with the cost oriented price 
according to the LRIC based price, i.e. no significant divergence from a cost oriented price.  
Universal service 
There is currently no formally designated Universal Service Provider (USP) in Sweden, since 
the legal provisions according to which the incumbent was designated as USP have expired 
and no new provisions seem to have replaced them as yet. Sweden has chosen procurement as 
a possibility to finance Universal Service. Sweden does not seem to have transposed any other 
of the provisions regarding the creation of a Universal Service financing mechanism which 
means that there is currently no other financing mechanism than procurement in the case 
where the universal service obligation (USO) is considered to be an unfair burden to the USP. 
PTS has assessed that the USO has not constituted an unfair burden. The current situation 
may  in  some  cases  lack  financial  certainty  and  is  being  looked  into  by  the  Commission 
services.  
Questions are raised in relation to article 18 of the Universal Service Directive which states 
that national regulatory authorities shall impose obligations regarding the provision of the 
minimum set of leased lines, and the conditions for such provision set out in Annex VII (non 
discrimination, cost orientation, transparency, supply conditions) on operators found to have 
SMP  in  the  market  for  the  provision  of  part  or  all  of  the  minimum  set  of  leased  lines. 
However,  it  needs  to  be  verified  whether  the  Swedish  legislation  sets  out  an  express 
obligation to provide a minimum set of leased lines. PTS has proposed amendments to the 
Swedish  legislation  in  order  for  the  obligations  in  Article  18  of  the  Universal  Service 
Directive to be evident from the law itself and not only from the preparatory work to the law.  
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Must carry 
Article  31  of  the  Universal  Service  Directive  stipulates  that  Member  States  may  impose 
reasonable  must  carry  obligations  for  the  transmission  of  specified  radio  and  television 
broadcast channels and services. This possibility applies to undertakings, under the Member 
State’s  jurisdiction,  which  provide  electronic  communications  networks  used  for  the 
distribution of radio or television broadcasts to the public where a significant number of end 
users  of  such  networks  use  them  as  their  principal  means  to  receive  radio  and  television 
broadcasts. Such obligations shall only be imposed where they are necessary to meet clearly 
defined general interest objectives and shall be proportionate and transparent. 
In Sweden, the must carry regime (as set out in the Swedish Broadcasting Act) applies to two 
public  service  broadcasters  and  one  private  broadcaster  and  requires  that  certain  general 
conditions are met. Must carry channels must be retransmitted without charge. The objective 
of the must carry obligations seems to be that residents in houses connected to cable, who as a 
rule have no opportunity to install individual antennae, should not be deprived of access to the 
terrestrial TV programmes available free of charge for everyone else. Both the public service 
broadcasters  and  the  private  broadcaster  that  are  granted  must carry  rights  are  subject  to 
licence terms requiring them inter alia to observe impartiality and factuality and to broadcast 
a varied supply of programmes, containing news and current affairs programmes. However, 
the  Commission  services  are  examining  that  the  requirement  that  must carry  obligations 
should only be imposed where necessary to meet clearly defined general interest objectives is 
fulfilled.  
Must  carry  obligations  are  under  the  supervision  of  the  Swedish  Radio   and  Television 
Authority. 
Broadcasting markets 
The Swedish Parliament has decided that analogue terrestrial television should be phased out 
and finally closed down by January 2008. In Sweden there is only one provider of analogue 
terrestrial  transmission  services.  This  provider  is  state owned.  The  current  broadcasting 
licences, issued to three broadcasters (one private and two public), are valid until the end of 
2005. According to the Swedish Government, it may be expected that these licences will be 
prolonged  until  January  2008.  These  licences  require  the  broadcasters  to  purchase 
broadcasting transmission services for its analogue terrestrial broadcasts only from the single 
operator.  The  Electronic  Communications  Act  does  not  require  any  amendments  to  these 
licences. In the summer of 2004 PTS tabled its preliminary proposals for decisions concerning 
market  definition,  designation  of  SMP  operators  and  imposition  of  regulatory  obligations 
concerning broadcasting transmission services. According to the preliminary PTS proposal, 
the single operator would be designated as an operator with SMP in the Swedish market for 
analogue terrestrial television broadcasting, and PTS would impose ex ante regulation on this 
operator. However, due to the fact that the single operator still benefits from special and 
exclusive rights, PTS is considering refraining from imposing certain regulatory obligations 
that they otherwise would have wished to impose (notably access obligations). The fact that 
the  licence  conditions  imposed  on  the  broadcasters  oblige  them  to  buy  broadcasting 
transmission  services  from  the  single  operator  pre empts  the  effect  of  imposing  certain 
ex ante regulation. When it comes to digital terrestrial television broadcast the situation is the 
same.   
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Mobile services 
Following  a  “beauty  contest”,  in  December  2000,  PTS  granted  four  licences  to  provide 
network capacity for 3G mobile telecommunications services. The largest 2G operator was 
not granted a licence, and appealed the PTS decision to the Regional Court which upheld the 
decision of PTS. However, this operator subsequently entered the 3G market by forming a 
network sharing consortium with one of the 3G licence holders, aiming at building a nation 
wide 3G network. These two companies also share the ownership of the joint 3G license 
holding company, although the 3G licence remains with the licence holder. There is also a 
second network sharing consortium which originally consisted of one 2G operator and two 
3G new entrant operators. Both network sharing consortia have been found to be compatible 
with the Swedish competition rules by the Swedish Competition Authority.  
In the autumn of 2002, one of the new entrant 3G operators in the second network sharing 
consortium decided that it would not avail itself of its 3G licence and has formally requested 
PTS to recall the licence. At the end of 2003 this operator, and the two operators in the first 
network sharing consortium, requested the permission of PTS to transfer its 3G licence to the 
first  network sharing  consortium.  In  the  spring  of  2004,  PTS  refused  the  request  due  to 
competition  concerns.  Since  the  two  operators  in  the  first  network sharing  consortium 
together  accounted  for  nearly  80%  of  the  total  turnover  for  mobile  telecommunications 
services, PTS considered that the transfer of the licence of the 3G new entrant operator would 
reinforce further the dominant position of the first network  sharing consortium. 
Under the 3G licence terms, licensees were obliged to offer network capacity, in a limited 
geographical area, by 1 January 2002 at the latest. By 31 December 2003, licence holders had 
to provide a minimum network coverage comprising 8 860 000 inhabitants, which by the time 
was equivalent to 99.98% of the population. These conditions were the result of offers made 
by the successful licensees during the bidding process. The coverage requirements were later 
incorporated into the licence conditions by PTS. Licensees may conclude agreements on, inter 
alia, national roaming and network infrastructure sharing in order to achieve the required 
coverage.  However,  licensees  must  ensure  that  at  least  30%  of  the  required  population 
coverage is provided by own radio infrastructure, as opposed to masts, sites etc, which can be 
shared to 100%.  
Since then, all four licensees have formally requested PTS to allow a longer roll out period. 
The  licensees  claimed  that  roll out  had  proven  more  difficult  than  originally  envisaged, 
partially  due  to  problems  in  obtaining  planning  permissions  for  masts  etc.  from 
municipalities.  All  prolongation  requests  were  refused  by  PTS  and  the  original  roll out 
requirements therefore apply. All licensees, except the operator that has stated that it would 
not avail itself of its 3G licence, have launched their 3G services commercially. 
After  having  monitored  the  roll out,  PTS  considered,  in  January  2002,  that  all  licensees 
fulfilled the roll out requirements at that point in time. However, in March 2004 (when PTS 
monitored the roll out again) PTS concluded that none of the licensees fulfilled the roll out 
requirement of 99.98% of the population by 31 December 2003. At the time, the networks of 
the licensees covered 65 75% of the population. PTS subsequently informed the licensees 
formally that they have to comply with the licence conditions by 31 December 2004. If they 
do not fulfil the roll out requirements by then, PTS has the right to, inter alia, impose a 
default fine. By the end of June 2004 the coverage was between 73.1% and 75.9%. Current 
coverage is between 75% and 80%.  
EN  221    EN 
PTS  is  planning  to  assign  one  new  national  mobile  licence  in  the  450  MHz band  in  the 
beginning of the year 2005, by means of an auction. The aim with this project is to establish a 
new, digital mobile telephony service in areas where such services currently are not available. 
Today, large parts of more sparsely populated areas in Sweden are only covered with the 
analogue NMT 450 system. There are, however, strong indications that NMT will be closed 
down  in  the  near  future.  A  proposal  for  regulations  on  the  allocation  is  currently  being 
circulated for consultation.  
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UNITED KINGDOM 
TRANSPOSITION 
The last year has been a very important one for regulation of the United Kingdom electronic 
communications markets, with the assumption by the new, converged regulator Ofcom of its 
statutory responsibilities for the telecommunications and media sectors and the completion of 
the  great  majority  of  the  market  reviews  required  for  implementation  of  the  new  EU 
regulatory framework.  
Transposition of the framework was substantially completed with the entry into force of the 
Privacy and Electronic Communications (EC Directive) Regulations 2003 (transposing the e 
Privacy  Directive)  on  11  December  2003.  Since formally  assuming  its  responsibilities  on 
29 December 2003, Ofcom has taken forward the work begun by its predecessor Oftel in 
carrying out the market analysis required by the new framework, and has now completed all 
but three of the market reviews corresponding to those in the Commission’s Recommendation 
on relevant markets. Whether seen from a European or a domestic perspective, the overall 
perception by market players of regulatory developments over the reference period has been 
very  positive.  The  United  Kingdom  completed  transposition  of  the  new  framework  into 
national  law  at  a  relatively  early  stage  and  it  is  well  advanced  in  terms  of  the  practical 
implementation of the framework following the market review exercise.  
While  some  alternative  operators  have  questioned  Ofcom’s  decision  to  lift  regulatory 
obligations in areas which fall outside defined  relevant markets, and the incumbent fixed 
network operator for its part has questioned the time taken to remove such obligations, in 
general  the  transition  between  the  old  and  the  new  frameworks,  effected  by  means  of 
Continuation Notices adopted under the Communications Act 2003, appears to have worked 
without major legal uncertainty. Where certain obligations falling outside the scope of Article 
27 Framework Directive (Transitional measures) needed to be maintained until completion of 
the  relevant  market  reviews,  the  national  measures  concerned  were  notified  to  the 
Commission  under  Article  7(6)  of  the  Framework  Directive.  Ofcom  announced  on 
9 September  2004  its  proposals  to  lift  all  remaining  continuing  obligations,  with  a  small 
number  of  exceptions  related  either  to  ongoing  market  analyses  or  to  new  obligations 
scheduled to come into force on a specified date. 
MARKET OVERVIEW 
These developments have taken place against a background of steady growth in the telecoms 
sector, in which the overall turnover of the telecoms industry grew by 6% to over € 75 billion 
in  2003
100.  Despite  the  high  levels  of  mobile  penetration  already  achieved  in  the  United 
Kingdom, much of this growth can be attributed to mobile telephony services, which have for 
the  first  time  exceeded  fixed  voice  services  in  terms  of  average  household  expenditure. 
Mobile penetration stood at 91% in June 2004. Although 3G mobile services have  yet to 
develop  into  a  mass  market,  with  existing  service  offerings  by  four  of  the  five  network 
operators aimed primarily at business customers, high quality consumer handsets are likely to 
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become more widely available from the end of this year, and the new entrant 3G operator has 
already launched a wider range of services including pre paid cards. 
Fixed broadband services are also showing healthy  growth, with Ofcom reporting  around 
50 000 new connections every week and overall retail revenues from broadband services more 
than  doubling  in  the  year  to  March  2004.  Broadband  penetration  stood  at  7.4  per  100 
inhabitants  on  1  July  2004  (just  below  the  EU15  average).  Latest  figures  from  Ofcom
101 
indicate that there were over 5 million broadband lines operational at 30 September 2004. 
However, the number of both fully unbundled and shared lines is still very low, at 7 466 and 
5 949 respectively on 1 July 2004, and further development of the unbundling process is 
needed  to  make  it  an  efficient  industrialized  process.  Nevertheless,  a  number  of  recent 
regulatory and commercial developments give reason for optimism that this sector will see 
further growth in the coming months. 
Penetration of the fixed incumbent’s PSTN lines stood at 49.9 per 100 inhabitants at 1 July 
2004, up 1% since the previous July. The incumbent held a 63.7% share of the fixed voice 
telephony market (all fixed calls including internet, in terms of revenue) at 31 March 2004, 
down 0.8% on the previous year. There has been significant growth in carrier pre selection 
(“CPS”), with the total number of lines with this facility standing at 3.5 million at the end of 
June and growth now in the residential as well as the business market. Wholesale line rental 
(“WLR”) has been less successful to date, with Ofcom reporting approximately half a million 
lines  in  operation  (mainly  for  businesses)  as  at  June  2004.  Issues  remain  relating  to  the 
effectiveness of the processes needed to ensure the activation and transfer of lines to WLR in 
large numbers.  
THE NRA  
The legislation transposing the new regulatory framework in the United Kingdom, primarily 
the Communications Act 2003, has conferred on Ofcom the regulatory functions previously 
exercised by five different bodies and has in general terms given Ofcom full powers to ensure 
the implementation of the EU framework in the United Kingdom. No concerns have been 
expressed by the market as to any limitation on the powers of Ofcom to fulfil the duties of an 
NRA as required by the EU framework. The Commission services are examining whether the 
discretion accorded to Ofcom could be said to extend to areas in which the EU framework 
imposes mandatory requirements, and whether it is sufficient for it to be left to Ofcom’s 
general duties to take account of Community law to ensure compliance. 
The  overall  impression  of  Ofcom’s  performance  in  its  first  six  months  conveyed  by 
stakeholders in the market was a positive one. This is not merely due to the fact that Ofcom 
could be said to have conducted prompt initial market reviews. There is also a perception that 
Ofcom has been concerned to look at issues afresh and to consider all options to achieve 
effective regulatory outcomes. Ofcom has shown imagination and creativity in its approach to 
persistent  regulatory  problems,  for  example  by  establishing  the  post  of  “Telecoms 
Adjudicator”  to  help  resolve  intractable  problems  relating  to  the  processes  for  local  loop 
unbundling. While there have been a number of top level decisions designed to address the 
perceived regulatory bottlenecks in the United Kingdom market, much of the controversy 
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remains rooted in the issue of the detailed processes which apply to regulated products and 
facilities.  In  a  number  of  areas,  such  as  local  loop  unbundling  and  migration  between 
wholesale products, the processes needed to ensure that rights conferred by SMP remedies 
can be exercised in a speedy, simple and “industrialised” manner remain to be fully developed 
by the market under the tutelage of Ofcom. In this area the market is looking for a continuing 
active involvement on the part of the regulator to ensure that the objective is achieved. 
The DTI, as Ministry with oversight of the electronic communications sector, has effectively 
withdrawn from day to day involvement in regulation, with the possible exception of matters 
relating to data protection and e privacy, for which it still has more active responsibility.  
In  the  area  of  e privacy,  the  day  to  day  supervision  of  the  market  is  carried  out  by  the 
Information Commissioner. In this regard there is a perceived lack of powers on the part of 
the Information Commissioner (which he himself has identified) to enable him to enforce 
statutory  obligations  effectively  and  to  act  against  offenders,  particularly  in  the  field  of 
unsolicited communications and spam.  
Market analysis 
Ofcom  has  to  date  consulted  on  and  notified  to  the  Commission  under  Article  7  of  the 
Framework  Directive  some  37  draft  measures  concerning  determinations  as  to  significant 
market power (“SMP”)  in relevant markets  and/or the imposition or removal of resulting 
obligations.  The  initial  market  analyses  still  to  be  completed  and/or  notified  to  the 
Commission  are  those  related  to  markets  17  (wholesale  national  market  for  international 
roaming)  and  18  (broadcasting  transmission  services).  Ofcom  has  in  a  number  of  cases 
notified its finding as to SMP and the generic remedies and then further developed the details 
of the remedies by means of subsequent notifications. 
National  consultations  on  draft  measures  have  on  occasion  run  in  parallel  with  the 
Community consultation under Article 7 of the Framework Directive. The Commission has 
commented  in  this  regard  that  any  material  modification  to  the  draft  measure  as  a 
consequence  of  comments  made  by  interested  parties  in  the  framework  of  the  national 
consultation  would  require  the  draft  measure  to  be  re notified  under  Article  7(3)  of  the 
Framework Directive. 
In general the consultation process carried out by Ofcom, in which there was a high degree of 
transparency, has been well received by the market. However, the consultations inherent in 
the initial market review process have inevitably placed a heavy burden on the regulatory staff 
of  the  smaller  operators,  not  least  due  to  the  voluminous  nature  of  the  documentation 
produced by Ofcom. There were also a large number of individual relevant markets defined 
by the regulator, due in particular to its decision to define the markets for fixed international 
telephone services on a route by route basis. Inevitably there has been criticism of the scope 
of  the  market  review  procedures  from  a  variety  of  interested  parties.  For  example  some 
alternative operators have argued that additional relevant markets should have been defined 
and analysed (particularly as regards certain retail services) or that insufficient consideration 
was  given  to  the  leverage  of  dominance  into  related  markets,  while  the  fixed  network 
incumbent has lamented the absence of more tightly defined geographical markets to reflect 
regional differences in supply and network infrastructure.  
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Appeal mechanism and dispute resolution 
Appeals against Ofcom decisions are made to the Competition Appeal Tribunal, a specialist 
judicial  body  with  jurisdiction  over  competition  and  regulatory  cases,  which  assumed  its 
responsibilities  in  April  2003.  It  is  a  matter  of  note  that  by  1  October  2004,  despite 
completion by Ofcom of most of its initial market reviews, only one appeal had been made 
against the resulting decisions or choice of remedies. While a variety of factors may have 
persuaded  operators  not  to  appeal,  including  the  need  to  maintain  a  positive  working 
relationship  with  the  regulator,  this  has  allowed  the  process  of  transition  into  the  new 
regulatory environment to proceed without undue delay or uncertainty.  
As regards its powers of investigation and dispute resolution, it is worth noting that Ofcom 
has  parallel  powers  under  both  competition  law  (Competition  Act)  and  the  regulatory 
framework (Communications Act). Although Ofcom’s publicly stated policy is to use the 
Competition Act ‘where appropriate’, it is making significant efforts to ensure that the four 
month  statutory  deadline  for  dispute  resolution  under  the  Communications  Act  is  met.  It 
should be noted that the four month time period starts to run from the date of acceptance of 
the dispute by Ofcom rather than the date of the submission itself. However, Ofcom states that 
if a dispute is submitted containing all the information it requires, it will accept the dispute 
immediately. In practice, Ofcom has to date never declined to resolve a dispute under the 
Communications Act in preference for acting under the Competition Act.  
Past experience has shown that Competition Act investigations can take significantly longer 
to reach a conclusion, particularly if the resulting decision is the subject of an appeal. One 
example, in which Ofcom has already exercised its powers under the Competition Act, is the 
investigation  of  an  alleged  price  squeeze  in  the  pricing  of  the  incumbent’s  residential 
broadband  services,  concerning  which  Ofcom  issued  a  statement  of  objections  in  August 
2004, following a complaint which originally dated back to 2002. However, it should be noted 
that Ofcom has acted with dispatch in dealing with the case since it assumed its powers at the 
end of 2003. The willingness of Ofcom to act under its competition law powers has been 
hailed by some market players as offering enhanced prospects for redress and an increased 
deterrent.  
MAIN REGULATORY ISSUES  
Broadband  
Although the level of local loop unbundling still remains very low, and prices for LLU and 
shared  access  were  well  above  the  EU  average  at  31  July  2004,  a  number  of  positive 
regulatory  developments  in  recent  months  promise  improvements  in  the  environment  for 
broadband  services.  These  include  in  particular  the  appointment  by  Ofcom  of  the 
“Telecommunications Adjudicator” to resolve disputes relating to implementation of LLU, 
reductions  in  provisioning  timescales  and  a  series  of  further  announced/proposed  price 
reductions covering wholesale prices for LLU (to well below the EU average), the price of 
shared  access  and  the  price  charged  by  the  incumbent  for  migration  between  wholesale 
broadband  products  (IPstream  and  DataStream), as  well  as  an  increase  in  the  margin  for 
DataStream. These announcements have come in the context of the relevant market review 
exercises conducted by Ofcom.   
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Mobile services 
The regulator found that the wholesale market for mobile access and call origination in the 
United Kingdom was effectively competitive, as no mobile operator had SMP in that market. 
The four established 2G operators hold roughly equal market shares in the retail market, and a 
significant number of service providers are also present on the market, despite some recent 
consolidation.  At  the  wholesale  level,  Ofcom  built  on  previous  regulatory  decisions  by 
confirming controls on the charges for termination of calls on 2G mobile networks in June 
2004,  including  requiring  the  operators  of  all  four  2G  networks  not  to  exceed  specified 
average termination charges over the applicable period (1 Sept 2004 – 31 March 2006). The 
fixed incumbent (which provides around 82%  of fixed lines in the United Kingdom) has 
published revised retail prices to reflect these reductions from the beginning of September 
2004. However, there is no clear indication that the reductions in mobile termination charges 
have been passed through to the customers of other mobile operators. 
Developments at retail level 
The incumbent fixed operator has taken a number of initiatives over the reference period to 
respond to the challenges of technological convergence and the increased competition in its 
core markets (for example from CPS and WLR). These include key changes in its retail tariff 
structure, involving the migration from 1 July 2004 of customers on its standard tariff to a 
tariff package which allows flat rate calls at off peak times for an increased line rental fee. 
This gave rise to price squeeze allegations from its competitors, which were investigated by 
Ofcom under the Competition Act. Ofcom determined in July 2004 that the new retail price 
move did not give rise to a breach of the Act, in view of the incumbent’s acceptance of an 
obligation to offer CPS at local level on terms allowing other operators to provide local call 
services on equivalent conditions and recent changes to its overhead charges. 
The  incumbent  fixed  operator  also  announced  in  May  2004  that  it  had  concluded  an 
agreement with a mobile network operator to offer combined fixed and mobile services using 
a single, dual purpose handset. It claims that this type of service will offer customers the 
simplicity  of  a  single  bill  and  telephone  number;  this  is  likely  to  be  a  key  area  for 
development in the future.  
Access-Interconnection 
While improved processes for carrier pre selection and WLR offer the prospect of significant 
further  growth,  they  are  also,  perhaps  as  a  consequence,  subject  to  intense  controversy 
regarding “save activity” and allegations of mis selling.  
A contentious area for market players has been the methodologies and assumptions to be used 
for determining the existence of a price squeeze in particular markets, due to the complexities 
of the process and the difficulty in achieving consistency of approach across markets. The 
stability of margins between retail and wholesale services is seen as a key pre requisite for 
greater competition and investment in the sector. 
The United Kingdom has used the term ‘undue discrimination’ when transposing the non 
discrimination  requirement  under  the  new  framework.  The  Commission  services  are 
examining whether the application of this concept by the United Kingdom authorities imposes 
a higher standard of proof than required by EU law, since it arguably involves the need to  
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show a material adverse effect on competition. Ofcom intends to publish guidelines on this 
issue for consultation. 
Number translation services (“NTS”), which refers to a range of specially tariffed services 
involving calls to non geographic numbers for purposes such as narrowband internet access 
and premium rate services, continue to be a bone of contention, with changes in the call 
termination fees paid by the incumbent fixed operator to other network operators giving rise 
to  a  number  of  complaints,  for  example those on  which  Ofcom  made  a determination  in 
August 2004. This is a complex area which nevertheless represents a significant proportion of 
operators’ revenues in the United Kingdom and has been (and continues to be) addressed by 
Ofcom in a series of recent public consultations.  
The  indirect  routing  solution  used  in  the  United  Kingdom  for  number  portability  poses 
difficulties in the event of the insolvency of the original operator and for certain 3G mobile 
services,  such  as  video  calls,  when  routed  via  2G  networks.  Ofcom  has  engaged  in  a 
consultation process regarding its assessment of alternative solutions for United Kingdom 
number portability.  
Convergence - VoIP 
The incumbent fixed operator’s recent announcement of its plans for major investment in a 
new IP based “21
st Century Network (21CN)”, which will replace the PSTN, has given rise to 
conflicting  concerns  regarding  on going  regulation.  New  entrants  fear  that  hard won 
regulatory obligations applicable to the historical fixed network may be rendered obsolete by 
the new technology. At the same time the new IP network is seen as offering an opportunity 
to incorporate genuinely non discriminatory wholesale mechanisms into the system from the 
outset. The fixed incumbent, on the other hand, argues that existing regulation should not be 
transferred to the new network environment without proper justification and sees itself rather 
as entering the new IP environment on an equal footing with its competitors. This is likely to 
be a key area of focus for Ofcom in the coming months, as it deliberates on the conclusions of 
its strategic review of the sector (see below). 
Ofcom has also been active in developing its approach to the new IP based voice services 
which are likely to have an increasing impact on the market. It launched a consultation in 
September 2004 on the future regulatory treatment of new voice services, including “Voice 
over  Broadband”  services,  including  the  requirements  for  network  integrity,  location 
information for emergency calls and consumer information. It also announced its plans for 
making numbering resources available to facilitate the introduction of voice over IP services.  
Strategic review of the telecoms sector 
In parallel with its work implementing the new EU regulatory framework, Ofcom has been 
conducting a wide ranging strategic review of the telecoms sector, designed to answer a series 
of fundamental questions about how best to ensure sustainable competition and consumer 
benefits while encouraging investment in new technologies. The review is examining where 
in  the  telecommunications  value  chain  competition  is  sustainable,  given  the  fundamental 
underlying  economics,  and  what  regulatory  options  should  be  pursued  to  promote  such 
sustainable  competition.  These  options  could  include  significant  deregulation,  or  a  re 
examination of the structure of the industry. A third option is the pursuit of 'full functional 
equivalence' or as Ofcom terms it, 'real equality of access': i.e. the achievement of true non 
discriminatory access to the essential inputs required by competitors, which would in turn  
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allow  for  significant  deregulation  elsewhere  in  the  market.  The  majority  in  the  industry 
currently favour the latter approach as preferable to re examining the structure of the industry 
itself, though some consider that this should not be ruled out if equality of access is not 
achievable. The strategic review is due to be completed by Ofcom early in 2005. 
Universal service  
There is currently no universal service fund in operation, on the basis that the regulator did 
not consider that the universal service provider’s obligations imposed an unfair burden on it. 
However, Ofcom is due to conduct a review of the universal service in the latter part of 2004. 
This review will cover issues such as how best to meet reasonable requests for connection at 
speeds that provide functional internet access and special tariff schemes for customers with 
low incomes or special social needs. The results of the review will need to be considered in 
the light of the requirements of the Universal Service Directive. 
Spectrum management  
In transposing the provisions of the new regulatory framework relating to rights of use of 
radio spectrum the United Kingdom has adapted, rather than replaced, the existing Wireless 
Telegraphy Act, which is based on the authorisation of radio apparatus rather than rights of 
use per se. This makes it more complicated to establish whether all the relevant requirements 
of the framework have been met. Ofcom has however been taking forward its thinking on 
spectrum management issues, conducting a number of consultations over the last year on the 
prospects for liberalisation of spectrum usage and spectrum trading.  
It remains to be seen how the enabling provisions in the Communications Act dealing with 
Recognised Spectrum Access (“RSA”) will be applied in practice. RSA is intended to offer 
safeguards for the use of spectrum for the reception of signals transmitted from outside United 
Kingdom territory. 